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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents an alternative tradition of classical Marxism capable of 
understanding what appears to be a shift in power from states to markets over the last two 
decades. It provides a theory of international political economy which explains both state 
ownership and control of the economy and its relinquishment, as aspects of ‘actually 
existing capitalism’ on a global scale. It is argued that this approach is superior to both 
Weberian-influenced International Political Economy (IPE), and the current tradition of 
classical Marxism in International Relations (IR), in that it has the potential to provide a 
deeper understanding of the apparent ‘retreat of the state’ as an aspect of so-called 
‘globalization’.
The core contribution of the thesis is a critique of the current classical Marxist approach 
in International Relations and the proposal of an alternative which differs in its analysis 
of the space, time and motion of capitalism. It is argued, through a rereading of Capital 
volumes 1 to 3, that this alternative is truer to Marx’s intentions. It is further argued that 
this more nuanced understanding of capitalism is well-represented through the writings of 
Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin, and is identifiable, though underdeveloped, in the work 
of contemporary Marxists influenced by these theorists. This alternative tradition of 
classical Marxism provides an understanding of capitalism in phases of both 
‘nationalization’ and ‘privatization’, deepening our understanding of capitalism as it 
‘actually exists’.
The thesis has two main tasks. The first is to show that both Weberian-influenced IPE 
and classical Marxism in IR have an inadequate model of capitalism, a theoretical 
limitation that has become evident in the globalization debate over ‘the retreat of the 
state’. The second is to suggest an alternative theory of capitalism based on a rereading of 
Capital volumes 1-3. This theory of ‘actually existing capitalism’ is better able to capture 
the complexity of changing state market-relations including what is superficially 
described as the ‘retreat of the state’.
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Introduction
The Privatisation Revolution as the ‘Retreat of the State’
The state seems to be accepting its own demise. I don’t know what the 
reason for that is.. .Why are governments prepared to give up so much and 
get absolutely nothing in return? -  Seattle 1999
Speaking at a trade union teach-in during mass protests against the Third WTO
Ministerial Conference, Susan George, a leading activist in the anti-capitalist
movement, asked the question above.1 This thesis attempts to answer it.
There is a general perception, expressed by George and others, that elected
governments are seeking to get out of the business of governing. They are
choosing to leave much of their role as owner and regulator of the economy to
private actors. They are shedding responsibility, delegating authority, and
generally reconstructing themselves in deference to market forces. Where they are
re-regulating, they are doing so in the direction of empowering forces which are
capable of forcing their own hands, the hands of the state, on core domestic policy
issues. One of the key elements of this general process has been privatisation.
George, above, was referring to the trend over the last two decades for the
state to ‘give up’ ownership and control of public services and industries through
the privatisation of transport, electricity, water, natural gas, mining, banking, postal
services, education and health. This transfer of ownership and control has been
described as nothing short of a ‘privatisation revolution’ on a global scale.
Between 1992 and 1999, more than US$790 billion in state-owned enterprises
1 Whether the term ‘anti-globalisation’ is more appropriate than ‘anti-capitalism’ for describing the 
movement, is the subject of some debate. There are problems associated with both terms. 
Throughout this thesis I have used the term ‘anti-capitalist’. Susan George, George Monbiot and 
Naomi Klein have all written under this banner and it seems to be a description of the movement 
that is increasingly accepted in Britain and North America. See Bircham and Charlton 2001, 
Callinicos 2003, and Saad Fihlo 2003, in Bircham and Hsaio et al. 2003, in the US.
2 This phrase has been used as the title of a course in the government department at the University 
of Manchester 2002/2003.
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were sold to investors around the globe. The privatisation of the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe has been one of the most significant political 
transformations of the twentieth century and has been accompanied by an 
intensified pace to privatisation elsewhere.4 Commentators have claimed that ‘[t]he 
privatisation of the last 20 years is the most significant trend in the world in which 
most of us do business and live.’5 In the words of another analyst, we have 
witnessed ‘truly an unprecedented shift of power from government to other parts of 
society’.6
George is not alone in finding it difficult to understand why states have 
enabled this enormous transfer of ownership and control from the public to the 
private sphere.7 One of the best selling non-fiction books in Britain in 2000 and 
2001 was George Monbiot’s Captive State: the Corporate Takeover o f  Britain, a 
book that could be rewritten to fit the situation of any developed, and many 
developing, countries today. In the book, Monbiot looks at the privatisations and 
part-privatisations of hospitals, schools and universities and the influence of 
business in policy making at all levels. He exposes the puzzle of the British 
government’s role in promoting its own impotency through the shedding of powers 
and responsibilities to private corporations.
3 Privatisation International 2000, p. 1. Given that state enterprises have been consistently been sold 
at below-market prices, this figure represents an even larger transfer of assets. These figures also do 
not include voucher privatisation in Russia and Eastern Europe, nor do they include privatisation 
partnerships’, US$83 billion of which occurred between 1984-1994 with US$514 billion worth of 
such projects in the planning stages in 68 countries. PSI 1997a, 1997b, 1997c.
4 ‘Privatisation is today being carried out by governments of all ideological stripes. Communist 
Cuba has sold a portion of its telephone system, while Communist China is one of the leading 
practitioners of infrastructure concessions, in both electric power and toll roads.’ Poole 2001, p. 2 
Even the ‘previously sluggish’ Middle East has been catching up. Middle East Economic Digest 
reports on an ambitious privatisation programme in Lebanon ‘Hariri Wields the Axe’ May 25, 
2001.
5 Shafer et al. 2000, p. 8.
6 Poole 1996, p. 1.
7 Naomi Klein also expresses this sense of bewilderment. She takes her cue from John Ralston Saul, 
who refers to the current situation as ‘a coup d’etat in slow motion’. Klein 1999. Saul 1997.
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For Monbiot, it is not hard to see why corporations might wish to infiltrate
governments, ‘in order to bypass democracy’ in their pursuit of profit. ‘A
compliant state, willing to assist in its own redundancy is an indispensable asset.’8
What is more confusing is why a government would allow corporations to usurp it.
One might have imagined that the governments of rich countries would 
have resisted these attempts to transfer power away from national 
parliaments and concentrate it instead in the hands of remote and 
unaccountable committees of lawyers. Curiously, however, they have 
found ever more enterprising means of speeding the passage of such 
agreements, in the face of sustained resistance from their own 
populations.9
We are witnessing,
the curious spectacle of government seeking a mandate from the 
corporations. The flow of power prescribed by the democratic model has 
been reversed. Big business has become the leviathan of the third 
millennium, the monster before which our representatives feel obliged to 
prostrate themselves. The people we have appointed as the guardians of 
our liberties have delivered us into its maw.10
Curiouser and curiouser. George and Monbiot articulate what is a widespread 
sense of confusion as to why there has been such an enormous transfer of 
ownership and control from the state, by the state.
Students of International Relations could reasonably be expected to shed 
some light on this situation. The question of the apparent ‘retreat of the state’ in the 
face of ‘globalisation’ is one which IR, as a discipline, first confronted in the 
1970s. In fact, the term ‘globalisation’ while popularised in the 1990s, appeared in 
IR almost two decades earlier, along with ‘interdependency’, in order to describe 
state vulnerability to economic actors and events.11 The sub-discipline of 
International Political Economy emerged, at this time, precisely in order to focus 
on the relationship between nation-states and the world market.
8 Monbiot 2000, p. 9
9 Monbiot 2000, p. 305.
10 Monbiot 2000, p. 353.
11 The oil crisis of the 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the rise of transnational 
corporations were key features of this period in which Modelski 1972 and Keohane and Nye 1972, 
1977, pioneered the study of ‘complex interdependence’.
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It is a contention of this thesis that had theorists of IPE at this time been 
more successful at theorising state-market relations, we might by now have moved 
beyond the largely descriptive notion of ‘globalisation’. Instead, globalisation, as a 
concept, has overwhelmed the social sciences while letting significantly limited 
understandings of states and markets go unchallenged.12 This has been particularly 
apparent in literature on the ‘retreat of the state’, one of the central pillars of the 
globalisation orthodoxy.13 Theorists of the ‘retreat of the state’ have not lacked 
critics, but both sides of the debate hold hidden assumptions about state-market 
relations suited to argument at cross-purpose far into the next decade. The result is 
academic debate ill-equipped to shedding light on the very real transformation in 
state-market relations which the ‘privatisation revolution’ represents.
This is not a thesis about privatisation, the documentation and ideological 
consideration of which, has been substantially undertaken elsewhere.14 Rather, the 
popular confusion surrounding the ‘privatisation revolution’ merely provides the 
impetus to investigate the way in which state-market relations have been theorised 
in the disciplines of IR and IPE.
Privatisation is the concrete point of departure because it is in the process 
either of large scale privatisation or nationalisation that the state’s relationship to 
the market is denaturalised and therefore problematised. Why does the state take 
ownership and control of production at one point in history and not in another? The
12 This ‘overwhelming’ is evident in IR where the title of a key introductory text book shows that 
the subject as a whole has been recast in the shadow of this particular concept, The Globalisation o f 
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Baylis and Smith 1997.
13 That the ‘retreat of the state’ is a key feature of the globalization orthodoxy is supported by 
Baylis and Smith 2001, for instance, who consider the claim that ‘states can no longer control their 
own economies’ as one of the main platforms of globalisation as a theoretical concept.
14 The literature on privatization is vast and almost as varied as the literature on globalization. For a 
relatively recent and very thorough overview of the key issues see Yarrow and Jasinski 1996 (4 
volumes). Tittenbrun 1996 provides a useful survey of primary research on the success of 
privatization in various contexts. Pro-privatisation arguments can be found in the annual 
Privatisation Yearbooks. Critical approaches to privatization have been well researched and 
developed by the think-tank Public Sector International. See Martin 1993 and P S I1997a-c.
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state’s relinquishment of control in the current period is both a very concrete 
problem for those who wish to keep more of the productive sphere within 
democratic control, and it is a theoretical problem in terms of how we might 
understand the state’s relationship to market forces.
This thesis grapples with the second of these problems. It is concerned with 
the theory of capitalism that lies behind the approach to states and markets 
employed by IR and IPE theorists such that privatisation is superficially explained 
as the ‘retreat of the state’15 It is argued that both Weberian-influenced IPE and 
classical Marxism in IR have an inadequate model of capitalism, incapable of 
explaining the changing state-market relations at the heart of the globalization 
debate.
It is suggested that the globalisation debate has starkly exposed serious 
limitations in our understandings of the state and market as social forms. Neither 
side of the debate over the ‘retreat of the state’ is capable of escaping the central 
paradox of the disempowerment of the state, by the state. IPE, the strand of the 
discipline charged with investigating state-market relations, is found to be limited 
in its ability to move beyond this globalisation paradox. This is due to a Weberian 
methodology in which states and markets are viewed as autonomous social 
spheres, the complex interactions of which can only be described, not explained. 
The most compelling critique of this Weberian approach has been provided by 
recent classical Marxist contributions to IR, which explain the apparent separation 
of states and markets as the distinguishing feature of uniquely capitalist social 
relations. But here, in a sense, the problems begin.
15 The ‘retreat of the state’ has been taken to mean a great deal more than simply ‘privatisation’ but 
privatisation is consistently cited as the key feature of the neo-liberal strategy of globalisation. See, 
for instance Stiglitz 2002 and Saad-Fihlo 2003, p. 7.
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While the classical Marxist critique of Weberian methodology is shown to 
be largely correct, we are left with a definition of capitalism incapable of 
accounting for the enormous variation in state-market relations, of which the 
‘privatisation revolution’ is a recent example. Classical Marxism, as introduced to 
IR has failed to provide an alternative means of addressing the kinds of questions 
of interest to IPE, relating to how and why state-market relations change over time. 
Defining capitalism in terms of the apparent separation of states and markets, has 
left unexplained a great deal of capitalism as it ‘actually exists’. Phases of large 
scale state ownership and control of production such as occurred during both world 
wars and on a global scale in the post-war period, fall outside our understanding of 
capitalism, given that even an ‘apparent’ separation of spheres has ceased to exist. 
Also, the transition to a more privatised world is seen by these theorists to be 
unremarkable in capitalist terms, simply ‘business as usual’. This helps to explain 
the distinct lack of interest in the globalisation debate displayed by many Marxist 
scholars.16
It is not the position of this thesis, despite taking a distinctly Marxist 
approach, that there is nothing new under the sun of global capitalism. Rather it is 
suggested that there is something new, but globalisation theory is ill-equipped to 
explain it, IPE can only describe it, and much classical Marxism has failed to 
acknowledge it. In an effort to remedy this situation, the thesis introduces a 
tradition of classical Marxism which has hitherto been neglected by the discipline 
of IR. This body of thought derives from an alternative reading of Marx developed 
primarily in the writings of Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin. This analysis,
16 Baylis and Smith remark that ‘[f]or Marxist theorists, globalization is a bit of a sham. It is 
nothing particularly new, and is really only the latest stage in the development of international 
capitalism’. Baylis and Smith 2001, p. 6.
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introduced under the heading of ‘actually existing capitalism’,17 is equally capable 
of explaining periods of nationalisation and privatisation, in other words both the 
advance and retreat of the state.18 As such, this is an understanding of capitalism 
which should allow for a more nuanced intervention in the globalisation debate.
Structure of the argument
In chapter one, I examine three texts which established the original globalisation 
paradox of the ‘retreat of the state’.19 Particular attention is paid to their 
descriptions of the state, the market, and the relationship between the two. The 
paradox is that the state appears to have ‘engendered its conqueror’, it has been 
active in the creation of a world market to which it has now fallen victim. This 
image of globalisation is shown to rely on an ahistorical understanding of the state 
and an eclectic, descriptive model of the market. I then consider the critics of this 
perspective, those who have modified the thesis, preferring the term 
‘internationalisation’ and identifying power retained by the state,20 and those who 
have attempted to transcend it, through variations on the model of the ‘adaptive 
state’.21 It is argued that while these latter theorists have a more historically 
informed understanding of the state, they are unable to provide any real analysis of 
the market and thus explanations of state-market relations remain beyond their 
reach. In the case of the ‘adaptive state’ we have no sense of to what the state is 
adapting. Paradox is postponed.
17 This expression is by analogy to the use of ‘actually existing socialism’ to distinguish Soviet-type 
societies from the ideal of socialism. See Bahrol978.
18 The ‘retreat of the state’ has been taken to mean a great deal more than simply ‘privatisation’ but 
privatisation is consistently cited as the key feature of the neo-liberal strategy of globalisation. See, 
for instance Stiglietz 2002 and Saad-Fihlo 2003, p. 7.
19 Ohmae 1990, Reich 1992 and Horsman and Marshall 1994.
20 Included here are The Economist 1995 and Hirst and Thompson 1996 [1999].
21 The leading proponent of this view is Weiss. Her 1998 work is examined in some detail.
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In chapters two and three we consider the tools available in the discipline 
of IR to address the paradox described above. In chapter two, we look at those 
theorists whose work is influenced by a method of Weberian pluralism, overtly or 
otherwise, in the sub-discipline of IPE. We consider how the discipline of IPE has 
developed in relation to the question of state-market relations. We look at the 
underlying assumptions of an ‘IPE method’ which limit the discipline to describing 
rather than explaining the changing environment of the global political economy. 
We consider the ‘classical Marxist’ critique of the IPE approach. We will see that 
the IPE, far from being capable of resolving the apparent paradox of ‘the retreat of 
the state’, is limited by the same methodological assumptions upon which the 
paradox depends.
In chapter three, we consider an alternative to Weberian pluralism, a 
tradition of classical Marxism introduced to IR through the work of Justin 
Rosenberg, Ellen Wood and others.22 These Marxists argue that theorists of IPE 
have ‘read into the past that which is unique to the present’, that they take as their 
starting point a separation of state and market, which is, in fact, unique to capitalist 
social relations. The differentiation of the social world into separate state and 
market spheres, this ‘apparent separation’, is for classical Marxist critics of IPE the 
distinguishing feature of capitalism.
One of the most fully-developed applications of this critique, and its 
alternative, to the discipline of IR is found in Rosenberg’s Empire o f  Civil Society, 
influenced by Ellen Wood and Robert Brenner. Rosenberg’s work is particularly 
fascinating because it shows what happens when the ‘separations of spheres’ 
theory of capitalism is taken to its logical conclusions, relatively unhindered by
22 Rosenberg 1994, Wood 1981, Sayer 1991.
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historical detail.23 In the third chapter of this thesis, the argument of this text is 
outlined and analysed both as a theory of capitalism and as a theory of 
international relations. As a theory of capitalism it is shown to leave out periods of 
state ownership and control of production, when the separation of spheres is no 
longer apparent. As a theory of International Relations it has an application 
severely limited to a critique of arch-Realism. Rosenberg’s alternative operates at a 
level of abstraction too far removed to explain capitalism as it ‘actually exists’, the 
changing state-market relations which IPE theorists, admittedly, only describe. An 
impasse is reached. An alternative is required.
The next three chapters form the core of the thesis. They introduce an 
alternative tradition of classical Marxism that is more capable than the ‘separation 
of spheres’ variety of capturing the complexity of capitalism as it actually exists. A 
theory of ‘actually existing capitalism’ seeks to explain those phases within the 
history of capitalism when states have expanded their ownership and control over 
the means of production, as in war and post war reconstruction, as well as 
moments of minimal state intervention in the market. The point being that an 
explanation of both is required. A theory of capitalism, capable of making sense of 
changing state-market relations, is necessary for the sake of analytical rigour -  
without it, the explanatory potential of ‘capitalism’ becomes partial and 
fragmented. Moreover, if we are to move beyond the deadlock between IPE on the 
one hand and classical Marxism in IR on the other, such a theory must be found.
23 As will be indicated later on, theorists like Wood and Burnham engage in an equally passionate 
defense of the ‘separation of spheres’ approach to understanding capitalism, but they also engage in 
more detailed historical and journalistic work. In the latter, they cannot be criticized for inattention 
to the complexity of state-market relations, but nor can these writings be said to be sufficiently 
theoretically informed by their theory of capitalism. In Rosenberg’s work he attempts to marry the 
two by reading as much history as possible in terms of the ‘separation of spheres’ but is then 
limited in terms of the history he can include. See, for instance, his understanding of the Cold War 
balance of power discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis.
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In chapter four, it is argued that in Marx’s own writings we find evidence 
supporting a theory of capitalism which differs in a number of important ways 
from the ‘apparent separation of spheres’ model. Through a consideration of 
Marx’s dialectical method over the course of Capital volumes one to three, it is 
concluded that the theory of capitalism proposed by Rosenberg and others may be 
of a distorted ‘volume one’ variety. That is to say there are abstractions in volume 
one which lend themselves to a particular understanding of the geographic scope, 
historical trajectory, and core dynamic of capitalist social relations such that the 
apparent ‘separation of spheres’ model seems sufficient. As Marx develops his 
analysis of capitalism on an increasingly concrete level, through volumes two and 
three of Capital, the assumptions held by ‘volume one’ Marxists become more 
problematic. Insights from the latter two volumes of Capital provide for the 
theoretical possibility of state ownership and control of production as a capitalist 
social form. Much more of ‘actually existing capitalism’ comes into view.
In chapter five, we examine the writings of Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin 
as attempts to understand the actual historical development of such actually- 
existing capitalist formations during periods of imperialism and war. Hilferding 
picks up where Marx and Engels left off, as he traces the tendency toward the 
centralization of capital through corporations and trusts. Bukharin extends 
Hilferding’s analysis, to the level of state-capitalist trusts understood to be a 
reaction to capitalist competition, imperialism, on a global scale. Lenin provides an 
understanding of the way in which national alternatives to state-capitalism have 
been limited by the global dynamic of competition between state capitalist trusts. 
Taken together, these three theorists provide an explanation for the capitalist social 
relations of their time, in terms of the international relations between states.
10
In chapter six, we look at more recent manifestations of this theoretical 
tradition, developed during the post-war period to make sense of the high levels of 
state ownership and control of production on both sides of the Cold War, which 
have formed the backdrop to the ‘retreat of the state’. We consider the argument 
that Russia was a ‘state capitalist’ society in the context of its international 
relations. This view, developed by Tony Cliff and others, is shown to reflect some 
of the understanding of ‘actually existing’ capitalism developed over the previous 
two chapters, particularly Bukharin’s analysis. However, it is suggested that Cliff 
and others should have moved beyond their understanding of state-capitalism to an 
analysis of ‘bloc capitalism’ in order to understand the post-war world. This was a 
step in the analysis foreshadowed by Bukharin. The early significance of lend lease 
and the Marshall Plan, the ongoing significance of dollar hegemony, the IMF and 
the World Bank are such that the identification of a stage beyond specifically 
‘state’ capitalism is warranted. Kees van der PijTs analysis of circuits of trans­
atlantic capital24 and Peter Gowan’s model of dollar hegemony25 are usefully 
employed to establish that even high levels of nationalization may be viewed as an 
aspect of bloc capitalist power.
The final section of the thesis is more speculative. It involves ‘rethinking 
globalization and the retreat of the state’ on the basis of the alternative 
understanding of capitalism that we have developed. Here we return to the subject 
matter covered in chapter one, the period since 1989-1991 when the world was 
seen to have entered a new phase of globalization. Now however, instead of seeing 
the state ‘in retreat’, we see capitalist relations restructuring beyond the level of 
competing state-capitalist blocs. The shift in ownership and control of sectors of 
the economy from state to market, allows units of capital to operate on a truly
24 Pijl 1984.
25 Gowan 1999.
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global scale. This is a continuation of the tendencies identified by Marx and 
developed through the three core chapters of the thesis. While it is difficult to 
effectively draw out all the implications of our new understanding of capitalism, 
we are able to sketch some of its explanatory potential. What does become clear, in 
terms of the focus of this thesis, is that periods of nationalization and privatization, 
both the advance and retreat of the state, mark phases in the historical development 
of capitalism on a global scale. The classical Marxist analysis of ‘actually existing 
capitalism’ allows us to better understand these sorts of changes in state-market 
relations within an analysis of capitalism so that we do not have to ignore so much 
of what IPE describes.
In the conclusion we return to the question of the privatization revolution. 
Theorists such as Ernest Mandel have argued that privatization represents capitalist
0 f \restoration. For this reason they uncritically support a return to state ownership 
and control. This thesis problematises that stance, having shown that state 
ownership and control of production is not inimical to capitalism but is an 
important stage of capitalist development on a global scale. The thesis therefore 
ends, with a return to the questions raised at the start of this chapter about the 
meaning of the ‘retreat of the state’ and the appropriate political response.
26 Mandel 1992, p. 44.
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Chapter One 
The Globalisation Paradox
1.1 Introduction
Arguably ‘the concept of the 1990s’,1 the growth in the use of ‘the g-word,’2 has been 
extraordinary and shows no sign of retreat.3 The sheer weight of literature on the 
subject suggests it may in fact be an ‘over-fashionable concept’.4 Yet the great 
‘globalization debate’ continues.5 As an ‘inter-disciplinary’ or even ‘anti- 
disciplinary’6 concept, globalisation has been used to describe and explain social 
changes taking place on a domestic and international level as seen by geographers, 
sociologists, economists, political scientists, international relations theorists and 
others.7 If its defiance of disciplinary boundaries is impressive, so is its ability to 
resist definition.8 Understood to be a ‘contested concept’,9 a ‘shifting concept’,10 and 
a ‘cluster concept’,11 globalisation appears to mean a great many things to a great 
number of people.
1 Waters 1995, p. 1.
2 Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995, pp. 130.
3 Busch 2000, pp. 22-23 charts the meteoric rise in number of texts published with the word 
‘globalisation’ in the title from 1-3 per year in the early 1980s to more than 200 in 1996 alone. In 2003 
a search of amazon.com for books with ‘globalisation’ or ‘globalization’ in the title published in 2002 
produces 270 texts. Reinicke reports that in 1971 a search of the ABI inform database produced no hits 
for ‘global’ or ‘globalization’ in a title, but that by 1995 the number was almost 1200. Reinicke 1998, 
p. 235 fh 2. In 2003, this search of ABI inform produces 10,000 hits for ‘globalization’ with an 
additional 440 for ‘globalisation’.
4 Hirst and Thompson 1996, p. 186.
5 Held and McGrew 2000, pp. 1-39 usefully characterise the literature as a whole as a ‘debate’.
6 Germain 2000, referring to the approach taken by McLean 2000, pp. 3-66.
7 Useful surveys of the topic are provided by Germain 2000, Hay and Marsh 1999, and Held and 
McGrew 2000 which provides a collection of essays on globalization from a variety of disciplinary
of ‘the definitional problem’ can be found in Amoore et al 1997, p. 181. Scholte 2001, pp. 
14-20, distinguishes five uses corresponding to: internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation, 
westernisation and deterritorialisation.
9 Higgott 1999, p. 23. Cerny 1997, p. 273.
10 Lachappelle and Trent 2001, p.l
11 Amoore et al 1997, p. 181.
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In the introduction, we noted that the ‘privatisation revolution’ of the last two 
decades can be seen as evidence of the fact that something significant has changed in 
the global political economy. There has been a noticeable shift in ownership and 
control from the state to private actors and this has taken place on a global scale. This 
is a key element of what is understood as ‘globalization’ and it is at the heart of what 
needs to be explained in terms of the apparent ‘retreat of the state’. The question for 
this chapter is to what extent the globalization literature can explain that change.
What is valuable about the globalisation debate is that simply by entering into 
it, regardless of the point of view taken, theorists are put in a position of revealing 
their hidden assumptions about the nature of states and markets. To judge the stability 
or change in a relationship between two forces, it is necessary to have some 
preconception of those forces. Globalisation theorists are therefore, often 
inadvertently, led into the really big questions of social science: the nature of the state, 
the nature of the market, and the relationship between the two.
These highly contested issues are seldom specifically addressed elsewhere. 
Theorists within various disciplines tend to focus on their particular area of interest, 
carrying with them a set of assumptions about the state and the market which simply 
form the backdrop to whatever it is they are trying to understand. Even in IR, where 
the state remains the central unit of analysis, the concept gets thrown around far more 
than it gets theorised.12 IPE has been equally reluctant to probe the fundamental 
nature of either of these social form s.13
12 Fred Halliday discusses the many and varied uses of the term state and remarks that ‘it is indeed 
paradoxical that a concept so central to the discipline as this one should have so escaped explication.’ 
Halliday 1994, p. 78. He suggests that one of the central tasks for IR may be to redefine the concept 
altogether if the discipline is to make progress. Halliday 1994, p. 93.
13 Susan Strange, one of the founding mothers of IPE, referred in a 1995 article to the need ‘to go back 
and start again’ from first (or at least earlier) principles, if there was to be any progress in our 
understanding of state-market relations. Strange 1995, p. 171.
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In this chapter we shall focus on the way in which state-market relations have 
been characterised by participants in the globalization debate. We start by considering 
the original ‘retreat of the state’ thesis, we then assess the arguments of its critics, and 
we conclude by examining its attempted transcendence. For the first group of theorists 
the state is increasingly helpless in the face of market forces.14 In the second, we have 
a backlash, globalization is nothing but hype and the state retains many of its 
powers.15 In the third, the state is seen to be the agent of its own transformation.16
It has become increasingly popular to see the globalization debate in three 
stages and this chapter accepts that convention. However, it is generally structured in 
terms of the original thesis, the skeptics response, and then a third, more nuanced, 
position in which the authors locate themselves.17 Here, it will be argued that all three 
waves are trapped in a paradox established by the terms of the first. The debate seems 
to have stalled in this ‘third gear’ leaving us no closer to an understanding of the 
forces at work. It is this point of impasse that provokes investigation, in the next two 
chapters of this thesis, into the models of state and market at work in the discipline 
which have left this ‘globalisation paradox’ untouched.
1.2 The Globalisation Thesis
Three major texts stand out as having established the original globalisation thesis: 
Kenichi Ohmae’s The Borderless World, Robert Reich’s The Work o f Nations and
14 As well as Ohmae, Reich and Horsman and Marshall, we find these arguments about the crisis of the 
state more recently in Dunn 1995, Khan 1996, and Bauman 2000.
15 Hirst and Thompson 1996 exemplify this view which is also held by Boyer and Drache 1996. 
Thomson and Krasner 1989 and Krasner 1999 also argue that sovereignty is not being diminished. For 
Krasner, legal sovereignty is more important than ever given the large number of international 
contracts recently entered. Krasner 1999, p. 40.
16 Weiss 1998, Sassen 1999, p. 159 takes a similar view arguing the state remains strong through its 
participation ‘in setting up new frameworks through which globalization is furthered.’
7 See for instance Palan et al. 1996, pp. 1-3, Hay and Marsh 2000, p. 3 and Higgot 1999, pp. 23-24.
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Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall’s After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism 
and the New World Disorder.1* Sometimes known as the ‘globalists’19 these writers 
share the view that the nation-state is becoming increasingly powerless in the face of 
global market forces. They represent the ‘first wave’ of literature asserting a ‘strong’ 
globalization thesis.20 They are representative of a considerable initial body of thought
91ranging from the ‘business globalization thesis’ of which Ohmae may be considered 
pioneer, to Horsman and Marshall’s more academic treatment of the subject.22 They 
also represent a spectrum of view on the relative merits of globalisation, with, we 
might say, Ohmae a free-market enthusiast, Reich a hand-wringing pragmatist, and 
Horsman and Marshall raising the alarm. As such they are a reasonably representative 
sample.
What is of interest in looking at these three authors is the assumptions they 
have made about both state and market in order to come to the conclusion that one is 
diminishing in the face of the other. It is worth noting at the outset that each of the 
texts proceed by way of counterposing the state, government or nation-state with the 
market, economy, or capitalism in varying combinations. While it would be 
inaccurate to suggest that these terms are used entirely interchangeably, no analytical 
effort is made to distinguish them except in the case of ‘state’ and ‘nation-state’ which 
both Reich, and Horsman and Marshall discuss in terms of the one evolving into the 
other during the nineteenth century with the rise of nationalism.
18 Ohmae 1990, Reich 1992, Horsman and Marshall 1994. The characterisation of these texts as the 
backbone of the globalisation orthodoxy is not original to this thesis, it has been used by Hirst and 
Thompson 1996, pp. 175-176, Weiss 1996 and others.
19 Hirst and Thompson 1996, p. 177.
20 Hirst and Thompson 1996, p. 47 characterise this depiction of globalization as a ‘strong’ version.
21 Hay and Marsh 2000, p. 5 use the term ‘business globalisation thesis’. See Phillips 1992, Barnet and 
Cavanagh 1994 and Sachs and Warner 1995 for a similar approach.
22 Other ‘academic’ statements of the position included Strange 1995 and Cable 1995. Reich arguable 
falls between the business and academic audience, pitching to politicians and the general public.
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It is also worth noting that what we are concerned with here is the common 
way in which all these theorists have characterized state-market relations. This is the 
basis of our critique of the debate. However, this does not prevent us from pointing 
out substantive problems with the arguments presented by any of the three waves of 
the debate. For example, where there is a reliance on technological determinism to 
make an argument about the growth of the market, the merits of the explanation will 
be queried.
Finally, not all theorists of globalization directly address the issue of 
privatization, referring instead to the ability of nation-states to determine the shape of 
their own national economies. In this sense any regulation of the economy is in 
question rather than the more dramatic intervention which nationalized production 
involves. Our argument here, therefore, is pitched in relation to the question of the 
‘retreat of the state’.
1.2.1 The Nation-State
It is important to understand what each of these theorists believe the state was so that 
what they currently believe it is can be recognised as a fundamental shift in its nature 
or at least a significant erosion of its previous powers. There is no point in discussing 
change without a baseline from which to judge its scale and scope. A historical 
account of the emergence of the traditional (pre-globalised) state is provided in each 
of the texts and the narrative takes three different forms which I have characterised as 
‘naturalised’ (Ohmae), ‘evolved’ (Reich) and ‘variable’ (Horsman and Marshall).
In The Borderless World Ohmae argues that the powers of the state are being, 
and should be, dramatically reduced. His main target is the Keynesian interventionist
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state which he likens to ‘sabre-rattling mercantilist ruling powers of centuries past’
thus condensing almost five hundred years of history into one ‘traditional’ model.
Not that long ago in the preconsumer era, ‘country’ was synonymous with a 
sovereign isolated island within which its government determined what made 
most sense to the people who lived there. A government’s role was to 
represent its people’s interest, serve their purposes and protect them from 
threat of foreigners or foreign corporations.23
He contrasts this largely unaccounted for, or ‘naturalised’, image of the state with
what he believes the state is currently becoming: a complement to the market, suitable
for providing minimal education and other essential services.24 The problem for
Ohmae is that ‘as it grew, the nation-state’s organizational right to manage economic
affairs fell victim to an inescapable cycle of decay.’ Now, ‘nation states have
become unnatural -  even impossible business units in a global economy.’ For
Ohmae, for reasons to do with its size, the state once represented its people and
protected their interests. In a global economy, its services are no longer required.
Reich takes a more historical approach in The Work o f Nations where he gives
a simplified account of the transition from mercantilism to popular economic
nationalism which he sees as corresponding to the shift from absolutism to
democracy. He claims that, ‘[w]ith the spread of democratic ideas and institutions, the
overriding economic and political goal changed from increasing the power of the
sovereign to improving the well-being of the population.’27 The rise of nationalisms in
the nineteenth century and imperialist rivalries are seen by Reich to have caused
further changes in ideology in the context of a heightened sense of a single national
economy. He argues that this nationalistic trend continued through two World Wars
during which Western governments played an increasingly interventionist role. It
23 Ohmae 1990, p. 11.
24 Ohmae 1990, p. x.
25 Ohmae 1990, p. 141.
26 Ohmae 1995, p. 5.
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culminated in the 1950s and 1960s when ‘big government’ supported ‘big business’ 
so that the latter could provide for the nation as a whole.28 For Reich, there was a 
steady progression, or ‘evolution’ towards a state which took responsibility for an 
ever-increasing proportion of its citizens. Why the state did this is explained in terms 
of changes in ideology and radicalization of marginalized groups. All of this changed, 
according to Reich, due to various changes in the international economy in the 1970s, 
and this ‘evolved’ model now faces extinction.
In Horsman and Marshall’s After the Nation-State, we have the most nuanced 
account of the pre-globalised state, dating back to the fourteenth century. The early 
modem European state is seen by these writers to have its origins in war and the need 
for an administrative body to organise its financing.29 Early capitalism gave rise to 
what was essentially a monarch’s state, not yet representative of the nation. The 
Treaty of Westphalia extended sovereignty from the monarch to the territory and from 
this point forward we see the development of the modem nation-state, but not 
uniformly. This account has much in common with that of the ‘English School’ of 
International Relations.30
Horsman and Marshall go on to describe how the development of industrial 
capitalism in England corresponded to support for a rising entrepreneurial class using 
a model of the state which favoured the individual and played down the role of the 
collective. This was the heyday of classical English liberalism. The process of 
expanding the political elite was more violent on the continent, but the need to do so 
was determined by England’s success and the desire by others to compete. The French
27 Reich 1992, p. 15.
28 Reich 1992, pp. 43-57. Throughout the text, Reich is mainly concerned with the United States but 
generalizes greatly from that trajectory.
Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 4 acknowledge both Charles Tilly and Paul Kennedy as having 
theorised the development of the early modem state as a result of war.
30 On which see Bull 1977.
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Revolution saw the birth of ‘the nation’ and thereafter nationalism became a powerful 
force on the continent and elsewhere. The state in all European countries began to 
play a major role in shaping the economy through mass education and the imposition 
of a common language.31
In Horsman and Marshall there is recognition of the enormous controversy 
which existed over the role which the state should have in the economy. The free- 
trade ideology of Britain was not to be found on the continent, particularly not in 
Germany where late development favoured a more protectionist state. This divergence 
of models continued up until World War I at which point all European states took a 
major role in their economies. Thereafter, and due in part to the class conflict which 
had proceeded the war, states continued their intervention in the economy and 
increased their social protection duties including providing welfare to the 
unemployed. ‘Bourgeois liberalism...represented by good, non-interventionist 
government... was dead.’32
According to Horsman and Marshall, the size and influence of the state grew 
dramatically in the inter-war period but it was still powerless in the face of economic 
difficulties experienced by many war ravaged populations. It would take another war 
before the high point of the state’s role in the economy was reached. Thereafter, they 
argue, the Keynesian interventionist model brought about planning in the domestic 
realm, while the US as hegemon brought about coordination in the international 
economy through the creation of various international organizations. As with Reich, 
Horsman and Marshall see all of this changing in the 1970s due to growing problems 
with the Keynesian model and actions taken by the US, particularly the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system.
31 The authors acknowledge their debt to Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities which provides
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In the Horsman and Marshall characterisation of the ‘traditional state’ there is 
sufficient historical detail to suggest that ‘the state as protector of the national 
economy’ is a model which has gone in and out of use depending on the particular 
circumstances of the country involved: the level and type of domestic economic 
development, the balance of class forces, and the extent and nature of international 
competition. The role of the state prior to what is described as globalisation appears 
as neither ‘natural’ (in other words ‘what states do’ and why Ohmae wants to see 
them take a back seat) nor ‘evolved’ (the result of increasingly progressive ideologies 
and growing radicalisation of the masses and thus why Reich wants to see them 
protected). According to the narrative provided by Horsman and Marshall, the role of 
the state varied enormously up until the 1970s.
What is of interest to us here is that despite the considerable historical 
evidence that they themselves provide, contradicting the previous two simplistic 
models of the state, Horsman and Marshall insist on referring to the state prior to 
globalisation in much the same terms as Ohmae and Reich. Like Ohmae they describe 
the traditional state quite simply as ‘a rational, inevitable political structure’ a unit 
which protected national citizens within secure borders through the conduct of a 
national economic policy.33 Like Reich they refer to it as ‘the fruit of centuries of 
political social and economic evolution.’34
The idealised image of the ‘natural’ or ‘evolved’ state is difficult to understand 
given the historical variation which Horsman and Marshall acknowledge. It is, 
however, necessary in order to sustain the sharp distinction between the ‘before’ and 
‘after’ image of the state which the globalisation thesis ultimately requires. This
the theoretical basis for their understanding of the origins of nationalism.
32 Horsman and Marshall 1994 p. 20.
33 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. ix.
34 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. ix.
21
criticism of the globalists’ image of the state has been well-articulated by an unlikely 
ally, Stephen Krasner who, having given much attention to the historical variation 
within the Westphalian model, concludes that ‘[o]nly by creating a mythical past have 
contemporary observers been able to make facile comments about the impact of 
globalization on sovereignty.’35
Inexplicable in terms of the historical evidence, this commitment to a 
particular image of ‘the traditional state’ can be seen as a characteristic feature of the 
globalisation orthodoxy.
7.2.2 The World Market
The characterisations of the world market which the three authors provide have less in 
common with each other than their images of the state. However, taken together, they 
represent the key features of the current world market as other globalisation theorists 
have seen them: technologically driven and fiercely competitive, benefitting from an 
explosion of information technology and largely unbridled capital and goods markets. 
All see a change in the world market from one of competing national economies to 
one of multinational companies (MNCs) roaming freely across borders.
For Ohmae, what was previously a world market composed of separate and 
distinct national economies mediated by powerful states acting in their own interests 
has now become an Inter Linked Economy (ILE) where consumers are directly in 
control. ‘MNCs are truly the servants of demanding customers around the world. It 
is these customers who are driving them to operate, develop, make and sell in many
35 Krasner 1999, p. 49. He is an ‘unlikely ally’ in that as a realist theorist of IR he holds his own rather
traditional views about the nature of the state. Hay and Marsh, more likely critics, similarly complain
that ‘only the unscrupulous and/or selective use of evidence.. .can sustain the image.. .of the withering
away of the state.’ Hay and Marsh 2000, p. 4.
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countries at once and who in the process are helping to create a borderless 
economy.’37 The key to the emergence of the ELE is, for him, the spread of 
information. It is this development, made possible through technological progress, 
which he argues has given the world market a new character. Advances in 
communication and transportation technology have meant that customers are aware of 
better choices and prices which they demand for themselves through more liberal 
world markets.38
According to Ohmae, with maximum choice and the best possible prices, 
states are no longer required to protect their citizens because in a globalised economy 
there are no longer ‘winners and losers’.39 He explains that this is a result of flexibility 
and increased market responsiveness. As certain nation-states experience weakening 
currencies and high unemployment, their low-wage economies become more 
attractive to investment and their situation is turned around. Equally, prospering 
countries will adjust downward toward the mean of the ILE through changes in the 
value of their wages and currency.40 His argument is that ‘the market knows best’ and 
unhindered by the rigidities of the state is able to provide for all.
Ohmae differs from many other globalisation theorists in that he sees market 
forces as essentially benign. It is, for him, ‘the regulators we have to fear.’41 He is 
confident however that economic nationalism is a thing of the past. He bases this view 
‘on my faith in man as inventor and in the power of the informed customer to triumph 
over man as regulator.’42 The ability to innovate is seen to be a feature of human
36 Ohmae 1990, pp. xi-xiii.
37 Ohmae 1990, p. ix.
38 Ohmae 1990, p. 185.
39 Ohmae 1990, p. xii.
40 Ohmae 1990, p. xii.
41 Ohmae 1990, p. xiv.
42 Ohmae 1990, p. xiv.
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nature provided it is unobstructed by government. To restate, the dynamic of the 
market, for Ohmae, is its ability to create value through technological innovation.
The problems with technology-driven models of the market are many.43 If 
technological development is simply human nature, then how do we explain variation 
in rates of technological development or technological stagnation? The industrial 
revolution brought with it rates of technological growth unprecedented in human 
history. This can be explained neither in terms of human nature nor evolution. New 
social relations appear to have played a causative role - technological development 
was just one of the many consequences. What Ohmae requires, and fails to provide, is 
a theory of the social relations that have driven the expansion of technology and the 
development of the world market, which he now characterizes in terms of 
globalisation.
Reich’s view of the market prior to globalization is similar to that held by 
Ohmae. For Reich, the world market is made up of ‘national economic boats’ in 
which ‘we all sailed together’.44 Now however capital controls in most industrial 
countries are being removed and trade barriers are being reduced. The consequences 
of this are seen by Reich to be very serious: ‘global forces are reducing the 
interdependence of citizens and separating them into global winners and losers.’45
The dynamic of the world market is, for Reich, competition between 
corporations. He sees the global market as a sphere in which the need to compete has 
meant that companies have relocated to areas of the world where wages are cheaper in
43 On the interaction between ‘globalisation and technology’ see Talahay 2000 who argues that 
increasing levels of technological development may be made possible and considered necessary in a 
globalised world, but technology cannot be seen as the cause of globalisation. See also Jones 2000, p. 
247. A useful discussion of the problems with ‘technological determinism’ in general can be found in 
Wood 1995, pp. 110-115. See also Giddens 1985.
44 Reich 1992, p. 5. He refers to ‘...national economic boats in which we all sail together. The picture 
once represented reality, but it no longer does.’
45 Reich 1992, p. 304.
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order to reap greater rewards. His view is that perfect competition far from increasing 
welfare, eventually outstrips all profit and results in a global competitive downgrading 
of wages. For Reich, it is not so much that the essential character of the market has 
changed, but simply the role of the US within it. No longer competitive in the realm 
of manufacturing production, and unable to protect the American market indefinitely, 
they have been forced to shift into other realms of production in which not all US 
citizens are adequately trained.46 Reich refers to this as a shift from high volume 
to high value. The quintessential player in the new economy is not a producer of 
goods but a ‘strategic broker’, managing ideas and identifying opportunities 47 The 
new world economy favours problem-solvers able to discover new links between 
solutions and ideas; a high value-added service sector of the global market. For Reich, 
this is where large profits lie now that they have been squeezed out of other sectors by 
intense competition.
There is a lot which goes unexplained in this account. Two obvious issues 
present themselves when we consider Reich’s solution to this situation. He suggests 
that the US government (presumably returning to its ‘traditional role’ of protector of 
the national economy) should train its population in high value-added sectors so that 
as a national ‘community’ the US can be back on top 48 Even if the US government 
did that, the risk remains, given Reich’s characterization of the market, that 
corporations subject to competitive pressures would once again seek out lower wages 
elsewhere. Related to this is the question of who he thinks is going to buy the high 
value-added goods if wages around the world are so depressed? Capitalism may be 
even more flawed than Reich suggests. The competitive downgrading of wages and
46 Reich 1992, pp. 248-249.
47 Reich 1992, pp. 85, 87-88.
48 Reich 1992, pp. 268-281.
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therefore demand, means that overproduction exists even before a new highly skilled 
US workforce enters the ring.
Reich’s understanding of the dynamic of the market is that it is driven by 
relentless competition. As with technology, however, competition cannot be seen as a 
cause in itself. The conditions for competition need to be established and maintained. 
The kind of competition which Reich is referring to is capitalist, as he himself notes.49 
He does not however have a theory of capitalism. Capitalism is not explained in his 
thesis, it is merely recounted, described as a competitive system.
Horsman and Marshall’s understanding of the dynamic of the current world 
market combines Ohmae’s technological explanation and Reich’s focus on relentless 
competition. To this they add a focus on changing power relations following the end 
of the Cold War - they are concerned with the lack of a hegemon to sponsor the 
system. Like the previous authors they have an image of nationally controlled 
economies, but they emphasize the role of the US in managing the system through the 
Bretton Woods institutions of the IMF and World Bank as well as the GATT. A truly 
global economy is seen to emerge in the mid-1970s when the Bretton Woods system 
collapsed and the oil shock sent the economy into a tail spin.50 Financial deregulation 
in the U.S. combined with laissez-faire ideologies in the West, formed the backdrop to 
an explosion of foreign direct investment and the transnationalization of business. 
Trans-national corporations began to set the agenda and their recipe for success 
included the following: open markets for goods and services, open regulation in terms 
of ‘a level playing field’, and wide open capital markets.
49 Reich 1992, p. 63.
50 The significance of the oil crisis is often overplayed. For an insightful counter-argument see Brenner 
1998. Brenner argues that the conditions for crisis were already set due to the enormous over­
production of manufacturing goods. The oil crisis made the situation worse, but cannot be considered a 
major causal factor given the crisis of profitability which preceded it.
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Horsman and Marshall are unclear about their attitude to the market. On the
one hand they appear to agree with Ohmae when they state that:
Free trade, freedom of investment and market access are all important 
principles and need strengthening... Competition is important to promote, not 
just through rules but also through investment.51
On the other hand, they seem to share with Reich a concern about the downsides of
the global free market in terms of environmental degradation and job insecurity.
There is a clash between global capitalism’s mobility in the search for profit, 
its restless search for cheaper inputs and more lucrative markets and the 
state’s attempts to guarantee employment and investment.52
This mystery can be solved or at least postponed if we consider how Horsman and 
Marshall separate ‘the world market’ which is good, from what they call ‘consumerist 
capitalism’ which is bad.53 Unlike Ohmae, they seem to suggest that it is when 
consumers and corporations are alone in the market that we are most at risk. It is the 
regulators that Horsman and Marshall wish to embrace. What they desire is 
humanized capitalism -  a healthy world market regulated by responsible nation-states.
The problem with this image of the market will be taken up in more detail 
when we consider the authors understanding of state-market relations. However, it is 
hinted at by Horsman and Marshall’s need to specify bad capitalism as ‘consumerist’. 
What would capitalism be if it were not consumerist? How would it work? In order 
for profits to be made, goods must be purchased and this requires consumers. All 
things being equal, consumers will choose those goods which are the least expensive 
and corporations will attempt to gain larger market shares by making commodities as 
cheaply as possible. Equally, what do they mean by ‘humanised’ capitalism?54 They 
do not seem to have a theory of capitalism at all. Nebulous phrases like ‘increased
51 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 209.
52 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 210.
53 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 250.
54 Particularly given that they appear to have accepted that the interventionist welfare state was 
destined for failure.
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interdependence’ and ‘market forces’ are used as placemarkers for a largely 
undeveloped theme.
This is another characteristic feature of the globalist thesis: a superficial and 
eclectic characterisation of the capitalist world market.
1.2.3 State-Market Relations
There is a remarkable similarity among the authors when it comes to recounting the 
change in state-market relations which they characterise as globalisation. All three 
have a very similar understanding of what the role of the state was in relation to the 
market, and what it is now. It will be suggested below that the change in all three 
cases can be understood as a variation on the theme of ‘engendering one’s 
conquerors’.55 In each case the state can be seen to have created the world market to 
which it is then seen to have lost its powers. This is the central paradox of the 
globalisation literature: how it is that one social force loses its power to a second 
which it is responsible fo r  creating and maintaining?
For Ohmae, this process is both natural and desirable. Ohmae refers to states 
as having previously been ‘independent, powerfully efficient engines of wealth 
creation.’56 For him, it was the nation-state which created the world market we have 
today. He draws attention to the fact that the military used to back up a country’s 
commerical interests abroad. British plantations worldwide were guarded by its navy. 
American forces were fully behind their corporations in the Banana Republic and in 
the rest of the world to back up the multinationalization process in the 1960s and
55 This phrase is most famously used by Simone de Beauvoir in reference to the mothering of sons, de 
Beauvoir 1953, p. 517.
56 This particular description is found in Ohmae 1995, p. 12 but is compatible with Ohmae’s general 
characterisation of the traditional role of the state.
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70s.57 Now however, they have outlived their effectiveness and should adjust to their 
new role in the world economy. They should now simply take up the slack from 
market forces by providing minimal health care and education.58 No longer a driving 
force, the state has become merely a potentially attractive accessory to the market. 
There is a sense in which the state launched the market and should now stand aside.
One of the problems with this image of the market ‘outgrowing’ the state is 
that Ohmae ignores the ways in which the state is still often required to intervene 
militarily and ‘diplomatically’ on behalf of commercial interests. This makes sense in 
light of his image of the market as a benign force bringing about harmony rather than 
conflict of interests in which the US military may need to intervene. Yet, even strong 
advocates of the market have conceded that McDonald’s requires McDonnell Douglas 
to survive.
The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist. 
McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas... And the hidden 
fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies to flourish is 
called the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.59
There is no reason to believe that US multinational corporations are going to suddenly 
stop needing the US state to defend their interests all over the less developed world. 
Yet, Ohmae does not see any need for these practices. In fact, he seems prepared to do 
away with the defense industry altogether. He complains about inefficient industries 
being subsidized in the name of national security during the Cold War and looks 
forward to the end of this kind of suboptimal expenditure.60 The state has engendered 
its conqueror, the world market, and it should now step down gracefully from power.
Reich also acknowledges a traditionally close and supportive relationship 
between capital and the state. In fact, his concern is that this close relationship has
57 Ohmae 1990, p. 11.
58 Ohmae 1990, p. x.
59 Friedman 1999, p. 12. This argument was expanded at length in Friedman 2000.
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continued when the context has changed. He acknowledges that national corporate
planning in the US and elsewhere took on great importance in the period leading up to
and including the two world wars. Governments backed loans, guaranteed
investments and bailed out businesses in trouble.61 It was, for Reich, government
spending on an unprecedented scale which pulled the US out of the depression of the
1930s.62 After World War H, the interests of the US government and the interests of
US big business were seen to be virtually identical.
Government would contract with America’s core corporations to defend the 
nation, thus indirectly providing them the funds to research and develop new 
commercial technologies. And government would encourage American 
companies to invest abroad, and protect their interests after they did so.64
Reich cites examples of the CIA controlling opposition forces in other countries in 
order to secure markets for American goods.65 The US government also used its clout 
to secure ‘voluntary’ export agreements with rapidly developing economies in order 
that the American market would not be flooded with cheap goods. Reich identifies 
this as a heavily used, but ultimately short-term measure.
The imperatives of the market, the need to compete, meant that US companies 
began to relocate to areas of the world where wages were cheaper in order to reap 
greater rewards back in the US as well as other markets. As a result, as Reich points 
out, ‘America’s 500 largest industrial companies failed to create a single job between 
1975-1990.’66 Reich’s major argument is that the responsibilities of government 
should shift accordingly: from helping big national businesses who no longer help 
citizens, to helping citizens directly by investing in people so that they can compete.
60 Ohmae 1990, p. 13.
61 Reich 1992, p. 40-41.
62 Reich 1992, p. 44.
63 Reich recounts that Charles Wilson, President of GM, when asked to be Secretary of Defense, could 
not conceive of a conflict of interests between the two positions. ‘Our company is too big. It goes with 
the welfare of the country.’ Wilson quoted in Reich 1992, pp. 47-48.
64 Reich 1992, p. 67.
65 Reich 1992, pp. 64-65.
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What this means in practical terms is that governments should stop protecting,
subsidizing and supporting their corporations above others and should continue to
maintain public expenditures and collect taxes.
Neither the profitability of a nation’s corporations nor the success of its 
investors necessarily improve the standard of living of most of the nation’s 
citizens. Corporations now scour the world for profitable opportunities. They 
are becoming disconnected from the home nation.67
The logic behind Reich’s account of globalisation is that the ‘real’ purpose of 
the nation-state, evolved as it has from its mercantilist days, is to improve the standard 
of living of its citizens. Where it once did this in the US by backing big business, this 
no longer makes sense. With heightened international competition and capital 
mobility there is no such thing as the national corporation or economy and to continue 
acting as though there is, only diverts resources from where they are actually needed. 
To compete in the new world economy requires a highly skilled citizenry which a 
responsible state should be aiming to create. What Reich advocates for the twenty- 
first century is ‘positive economic nationalism’, the elimination of all barriers to trade, 
but increased government intervention, the provision of wide-ranging social goods 
and public subsidies to firms which are ‘adding-value’ regardless of company 
nationality.68
As with Ohmae, the problems with this image are multiple. They stem in large 
part from the idealised image of the state. The argument that the real ‘evolved’ 
purpose of the state is ‘to improve the standard of living of its citizens’ is not borne 
out when we look at the history of the US, let alone the rest of the world. Reich would 
have great difficulty explaining the conscious role of the post-war US government in 
setting up the competition: low wage economies in Japan and elsewhere. Immediately
66 Reich 1992, p. 85.
67 Reich 1992, p. 8.
68 Reich 1992, pp. 311-314.
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following World War II the United States occupied Japan and restructured domestic 
society, writing a new constitution and disciplining labour unions. The US spent 
billions of dollars of aid and military expenditure to bring the Japanese economy from 
its knees back to pre-War levels of GNP. This goes unacknowledged in Reich’s 
model, where the competition from Japanese industry seems to appear out of 
nowhere.
Having asserted that the state’s role is to improve the standard of living of its 
citizens, Reich is in the odd position of arguing that the state, a social form, has 
essentially ‘made a mistake’. It was right to cater to big business once upon a time, 
but it should realise that it has been backing the wrong horse for almost thirty years. 
Now, as a result of advice from Reich and others, it should completely change its role 
in relation to the market. ‘The choice’, he says in a rather utopian fashion, ‘is ours to 
make.’69 This sounds more like an election slogan than a reasoned conclusion.70 Reich 
outlines what is ultimately a wish list of functions for the state, once it has realised the 
error of its ways.
[T]his approach would encourage public spending within each nation in any 
manner that enhanced the capacities of its citizens. Positive economic 
nationalism would include pre and post natal care, childcare and preschool 
preparation, excellent primary and secondary education, access to college 
regardless of financial condition, training and retraining, and good 
infrastructure.71
Positive economic nationalism is, for Reich, what the state would do if only it 
realized what was the best course of action for its citizens. On his analysis, thirty of 
the last fifty years are to be seen as anomalous, as an error in judgment by the US 
state. Did we accidentally engender our conquerors? This is the unavoidable 
conclusion to which Reich’s analysis leads.
69 Reich 1992, p. 315.
70 Reich became President Clinton’s Labor Secretary shortly after writing the book.
71 Reich 1992, p. 313.
32
The changed relationship between state and market follows similar lines in the 
Horsman and Marshall text while the sense of paradox is even greater. Like Ohmae 
and Reich, Horsman and Marshall have a sense of the traditional nation-state as 
having been ‘charged with protecting national citizens within secure borders and with
79the conduct of national economic policies.’ They have a strong sense of the nation­
state as a counterweight to the world market. The post-war role of the United States is 
seen as very important in reconciling these opposing forces.
Ironically, one of liberal capitalism’s natural enemies - the nation-state - 
would give it a new lease, by finding a new balance between liberalism, 
capitalism and democracy under the direct and careful watch o f a sponsoring 
hegemon.73
It is worth noting that this is only ‘ironic’, if the nation state is liberal-capitalism’s 
‘natural’ enemy, which is not a conclusion one could arrive at without an essentialist 
view of the state. This is the embedded logic of these positions.
‘Pushed by its need for bases for its forces and resources and markets for its 
companies’, the United States became more and more involved in the world economy. 
Its establishment of the international economic institutions: Bretton Woods and the 
GATT were intended to bring about a system of fixed exchange rates and lower trade 
barriers. The IMF and the World Bank also emerged in this period, products of a 
nation-state, the US, designed to further the long-term interests of global capitalism. 
Yet it would also be the United States that terminated the Bretton Woods agreement 
in 1971.
For Horsman and Marshall, the early 1970s are seen as the time when the 
dysfunctional nature of the national management model became most apparent 
throughout the world. What was dubbed as ‘stagflation’ was seen as the inevitable 
result of government attempts to control the capitalist economy. An explicitly political
72 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. xi.
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argument began to take place about the appropriate role for the state in relation to the
economy and the lives of its citizens. Horsman and Marshall claim that it was
advocates of laissez-faire who won the arguments this time around with anti-state,
market-oriented governments emerging in the early 1980s.74 In this way ‘the
privatization revolution’ and globalization in general appear for these authors to be
the result of an exchange of views between economists and academics.
Horsman and Marshall share the view that the post-war period provided
evidence of the fact that ‘[i]n co-operation with the private sector, the state was weak,
in competition it was likely to lose.’75 But, what exactly had this cooperation
involved? The post-war Keynesian model of direct government intervention in the
market economy is described as follows:
Government spending, including deficits, and government intervention in 
private industry were legitimised as the way to reconstruct and develop 
economies. The state provided a stable macro-economic basis; it evened out 
the business cycle; it provided trained labour, kept fit and healthy by new 
provision of state services; and it ensured that sufficient capital was provided 
to lubricate the wheels of industry.76
The comparison with today, described 70 pages later, could hardly be more stark.
Few governments could now hope to be able to manage the business cycle.
Stability has been removed; the degree to which governments belive they can 
affect welfare through state intervention is strictly limited and modernization 
is no longer a function of state control.77
To understand how Horsman and Marshall view this change, it is useful to 
repeat the quote above, ‘in co-operation with the private sector, the state was weak, in 
competition it was likely to lose.’ What Horsman and Marshall do not seem to 
acknowledge is that the competition which the state sector subsequently faced can 
only be understood to have come from a healthy private sector which the state itself
73 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 22
74 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 36.
75 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 34.
76 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 27.
77 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 98.
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was responsible for creating. It was the post-war cooperation which created the
competitor. Just as with Ohmae and Reich we have the apparent paradox that the state
brings about its own demise. The same institutions which provided the conditions for
dynamic market activity have subsequently been discredited and are now quite
powerless in the face of that activity. We are left with the impression that states have
the power and motivation to create forces which then simply escape their control.
Horsman and Marshall conclude that:
If the lesson of the pre-war years was that unfettered capitalism could not 
sustain stable governments, the lesson of the post-war years was that the state 
proved inadequate to the task of managing capitalism.78
It could be argued that these two lessons are in fact one lesson about the nature 
of the relationship between the state and capitalism: that the forces of capitalism are 
stronger than those of the state. But what is missing from this is the intervening 
period: the fact that without the state, the conditions for capitalism in the post-war 
period could never have been re-established. The enormous post-war reconstruction 
could never have taken place on the basis of competitive or market forces alone. The 
state steps in and secures the conditions for a capitalism that then defeats it once 
again. Depicted as a kind of battered spouse, the state just keeps coming back for 
more. This is the paradox of the modem state within the logic of the globalisation 
thesis.
1.2.4 Paradox Within
These three texts taken together are seen as representative of the initial ‘globalisation 
thesis’. The state, government or nation-state is counterposed to the market, economy, 
or capitalism in varying combinations. We have a sense of separate social spheres,
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each with their own autonomous dynamics, which from time to time, for better or 
worse, interrrelate. What are these two spheres? It has been argued that a 
characteristic feature of the globalisation orthodoxy is a historically unsupported 
commitment to a particular image of ‘the traditional state’ and that this has been 
accompanied by a superficial ‘eclectic’ characterisation of the capitalist world market. 
The result has been that understandings of the changes in the relationship between 
these two social forces are characterised by paradox and confusion. With Ohmae this 
paradox, this ‘engendering of the conqueror’ is welcome, the market is a superior 
force. With Reich, it is accidental, the state has made a mistake. With Horsman and 
Marshall, we are offered an ‘ironic’ chain of events leading to the paradoxical 
conclusion that the market has become more of a political force than the state. ‘[T]he 
market has become a form of political authority, passing judgment on policy which is 
not easily refuted.’79
The degree of paradox involved in these accounts of globalisation is 
unacceptable. How far do we go in permitting ‘the seemingly contradictory’, ‘the 
paradoxical’ and ‘the ironic’ to enter our explanations of social change? In the natural 
sciences, it is precisely the ‘apparently anomolous’ or ‘seemingly paradoxical’ which 
triggers the need for further analysis. The fact that the globalisation literature is so 
riddled with what it recognizes to be apparently contradictory events, suggests a 
wholly inadequate approach.
To what extent does this first stage of the globalisation debate explain the 
‘privatisation revolution’ of the last two decades? It does not. Privatisation, ‘the 
retreat of the state’, is a paradox in the terms in which it has been presented, the 
market forces which are said to be destroying the state are of its own creation. This
78 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 96.
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sense of paradox is not an answer, it is a question. It is the question Susan George 
asked at the beginning of the thesis: ‘why are governments giving up so much and 
getting so little in return?’
1.3 The Internationalisation Counter-Thesis
The ‘globalization thesis’ has not been without its critics. Many have questioned the 
central assumption that nation-states are becoming increasingly powerless in the face 
of a borderless world. These can be separated into those who have modified the thesis 
and those who have fundamentally challenged it. Those who modify the thesis 
represent the second wave of the globalization debate in which the pendulum has 
swung back to a position of considerable skepticism. The modifiers shall be 
considered in this section. In terms of their relation to the question of the ‘retreat of 
the state’ which will be the focus here, they all attempt to show that the state retains 
its power despite the changes in the market which they acknowledge to varying 
degrees.
First we will consider those theorists who acknowledge strong globalisation 
forces but deny a dramatic reduction in the power of the state. The Economist 
exemplifies this position, claiming in 1995 that, ‘the world has changed, the global 
economy has indeed arrived: nonetheless the emasculated state is a myth.’80 They 
agree wholeheartedly with the description of the world market provided by the 
globalists and while they do offer greater detail, they fail to add anything by way of 
explanation of its dynamics. They differ somewhat in their view of the role of the 
state, but only in that they naturalise its opposition to the market to an even greater
79 Horsman and Marshall 1994, p. 97.
37
extent than Ohmae. The end description of a ‘weak state’ is essentially the same as 
Ohmae’s, it is just that for the Economist, it is quite similar to the one that they started 
with, and it is still too strong for their liking.81
The Economist wishes to make clear that ‘nobody disagrees that elected 
governments now have less control over their economies than they used to.’82 They
Q-5
argue that ‘wise governments learn to work with markets, not against them’ and that
‘markets take power away from governments that do the wrong things’.84 All of this
points in the direction of a state powerless to resist market forces. And yet, they warn
that ‘global integration could be reversed’, ‘given the will, governments could do it.
Call it their sovereign right.’85
This lays out exactly the paradox we first encountered and the statements
about the state’s ability are as contradictory as ever. This unsatisfactory situation is
exemplified by the following sage advice:
paradoxically, governments best defence against the increased clout of 
financial markets is to forsake even more discretionary power. By tying their 
own hands and so removing themselves from temptation, policy-makers will 
retain more influence over their economies.86
The Economist's position modifies the original globalization thesis of the retreat of 
the state but does not move us beyond the paradox of the state’s role in its own self- 
destruction. It is less clearly a sense of the state having engendered its conqueror 
because The Economist does not deal with the role of the state in fostering the market
80 Economist 1995, p. 15. The profile of the Economist in debates over globalization is something noted 
by other theorists of globalization. See Burbach and Robinson 1999, p. 11.
81 This is largely due to their focus on the effectiveness of state fiscal policy rather than considering the 
broader range of state roles in terms of legal and military defence of markets. Where Ohmae ignores 
those today but recognizes them in the past, the Economist does not even consider them.
82 Economist 1995, p. 44.
83 Economist 1995, p. 40.
84 I.e. borrow recklessly, run inflationary policies or try to defend unsustainable exchange rates. 
Economist 1995, p. 43.
85 Economist 1995, p. 16.
86 Economist 1995, p. 42. This is a reference to the benefits associated with having an independent 
central bank.
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even at an early stage. However, we are still left with a state which has the potential to 
interfere in the market but which also should know better -  a state which coexists with 
its conqueror.
It is true the Economist, and liberal economics in general, would see no 
paradox in this position as they would argue that states have learned to intervene less 
because this will help citizens more. Here however, we come up against the lived 
experience of those citizens who, as discussed in the introduction, are being asked to 
accept declining social provision and higher costs in order to serve the interests of the 
market. The Economist avoids paradox by ignoring this reality, a luxury which few 
can afford.
Also falling into the category of ‘modification’ of the thesis are those who 
prefer the term ‘internationalisation’ to globalisation but who agree that the power of 
the state has been reduced. This position has been well articulated by Hirst and 
Thompson in their text, Globalisation in Question.87 They argue that world financial 
markets, world trade and FDI and the growth and changing role of MNCs indicate 
greater international integration of the economy since the 1970s, but that this is part of 
a longer term process of internationalization not globalisation.88 The difference for 
them is that states are not going to disappear completely as players in the world 
economy. They do however accept that ‘[t]he power of nation states as administrative 
and policy-making agencies have declined.’89 Their critique is essentially that the 
process is not as novel as the orthodoxy would suggest, nor are the consequences for 
nation-state autonomy quite so dramatic.
87 Hirst and Thompson 1996.
88 For instance, they argue that very few truly transnational corporations exist, claiming that most 
continue to operate from distinct national bases.
89 Hirst and Thompson 1996, p. 192.
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Hirst and Thompson’s critique of the globalization thesis is motivated by
opposite intent from that of the Economist. Hirst and Thompson are unhappy
suggesting that the state is powerless in the face of market forces, because of what
they believe to be the negative political implications of that conclusion. On the first
page, they express concern that ‘one key effect of the concept of globalization has
been to paralyse radical reforming strategies, to see them as unviable in the face and
judgement and sanction of international markets.’90 By the end of the book however,
they have come to the conclusion that:
[t]hese arguments have some force. There is no doubt that the salience and 
role of nation states has changed markedly since the Keynesian era. States are 
less autonomous, they have less exclusive control over economic and social 
processes within their territories and they are less able to maintain national 
distinctiveness and cultural homogeneity.91
1.3.1 Paradox Retained
Reaching the conclusion they hoped to avoid, Hirst and Thompson shift the terrain of 
debate to ‘governance’ rather than ‘government’. Here the implications for 
understanding privatisation come into view. It is worth quoting them at some length 
on this issue.
The issue of control of economic activity in a more integrated 
internationalized economy is one of governance not just of the continuing 
roles of governments. Sovereign nation states claimed as their distinctive 
feature the right to determine how any activity within their territory was 
governed, either to perform that function themselves or to set the limits of 
other agencies. That is, they claimed a monopoly of the function of 
governance. Hence the tendency in common usage to identify the term 
‘government’ with those institutions of state that control and regulate the life 
of a territorial community. ‘Governance’ -  that is, the control of an activity 
by some means such that a range of desired outcomes is attained -  is, 
however, not just the province of the state. Rather it is a function that can be 
performed by a wide variety of public and private, state and non-state, 
national and international institutions and practices.92
90 Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 1.
91 Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 170.
92 Hirst and Thompson 1996, pp. 183-184.
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What we find is that Hirst and Thompson actually acknowledge to a very 
significant degree precisely what it is that has troubled those concerned with the 
‘retreat of the state’. The distinction between public and private is being broken down, 
as the nation-state is unable to claim control over the public sphere and must delegate 
to the private sphere. They agree that ‘classical national economic management’ 
which was evident in the period between 1945-1973 is now ‘largely obsolete’.93 What 
we have in its place are ‘possibilities of governance that require theoretical 
specification and analysis’, which are nowhere provided.94 Paradox is retained.
These two criticisms of the globalization thesis, that of The Economist and that 
of Hirst and Thompson, offer a number of significant qualifications but have 
essentially softened rather than refuted the central argument of the globalisation 
orthodoxy. We still have an image of the state subject to the forces of the market, as 
an object subject to changing circumstances. The history of the state provided by the 
Economist is completely abstracted from the market and that provided by Hirst and 
Thompson is very similar to the globalisation orthodoxy. We do not have a more 
sophisticated explanation of market forces, nor do we have a more nuanced theory of 
the state. Above all, we retain a sense of paradox.
1.4 An Attempt at Transcendence
This image of state self-destruction was swept aside in a groundbreaking work by 
Linda Weiss entitled The Myth o f the Powerless State.95 This text differed crucially 
from other critiques of globalisation in that it attempted to resolve rather than simply
93 Hirst and Thompson 1996, p. 199.
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modify the central paradox. Weiss accepted the factual basis of the modified 
globalisation thesis of Hirst and Thompson, better known as ‘internationalization’, but 
parted company over whether the resultant changes in the state could be characterized 
as its weakening. She rejected the idea that we are moving toward a ‘weak liberal 
state’ as simply a source of legitimacy and the rule of law, insisting instead that the 
state remains ‘where the action is’.96 For Weiss, the changes in state behaviour vis a 
vis the world economy are not evidence of weakness but in many cases of what she 
calls ‘transformative capacity’, in fact power. With this thesis, we are effectively 
freed from any sense of the state as conquered or victimised. As she explicitly points 
out, ‘states may at times be facilitators (even perhaps perpetrators) rather than mere 
victims of so-called globalisation.’97
How does Weiss reach this conclusion? By rejecting two key assumptions of 
the original globalisation thesis. First, in terms of the strength of the state, the idea 
that we can talk about power or capacity ‘in general’ is seen as highly problematic. 
Instead, she focusses on ‘transformative capacity’: ‘the ability to coordinate industrial 
change to meet the changing context of international competition.’98 She points out 
that this is not synonomous with intervention, as all states intervene but often 
ineffectively or inappropriately in terms of inducing change. The key to 
transformative capacity, for Weiss, is power-sharing arrangements involving 
government and industry.99 Japan provides the quintessential case of power sharing 
resulting in what is identified by Weiss as a strong state. Weiss argues that the key to
94 Hirst and Thompson 1996, p. 199.
95 Weiss 1998.
96 Weiss 1998, p. 195
97 Weiss 1998, p. 204 She also distinguishes herself from the position taken by the Economist in that 
she does not see the state as a natural obstruction to market forces.
98 Weiss 1998, p. 7
99 Interestingly she adds, ‘though not necessarily labour’. Weiss 1998, p. 25
42
state power or state capacity is the ability to effectively adapt to the changing
circumstances of the international economy.100
What this means for our understanding of state market relations is quite
significant. The zero-sum relationship, so prevalent in the globalisation literature, is
consequently rejected by Weiss. In fact she identifies it with ‘the dualism of Cold War
politics, which counterposes state (plan) against market.’101 She rejects the idea that
‘strong states (read ‘autonomous’ or ‘capable’ states) are such because they have
power over society’, ‘the ability to get their way in spite of opposition’ from, for
instance, organised forces in society or other states. Using the concept of
‘transformative capacity’, Weiss sees the utilization of links to inter and intrastate
organizations (therefore not autonomy) as a means of increasing state power. The
debate about whether the state is ‘leading’ or ‘following’ is meaningless for Weiss
who argues that state power has been fundamentally misconceived.102
Second, she rejects the idea that we can talk about states in general given that
different states have different ‘transformative capacities’.103 It is this uneven
institutional capacity that separates the weak from the strong and Weiss predicts that
it is a feature of international politics that will become increasingly important in the
twenty-first century, thus indicating a powerful role for states into the future.
[T]he ability of nation-states to adapt to internationalization (so called 
globalisation) will continue to heighten rather than diminish national 
differences in state capacity as well as the advantages of national economic 
coordination.104
100 Weiss credits Mann for establishing the distinction between despotic and infrastructural power and 
noting the reduction of the former concurrent with an increase in the latter. Weiss 1998, p. 18.
101 Weiss 1998, p. 26.
102 Weiss 1998, p. 27.
103 Boyer and Drache 1996 take a similar approach.
104 Weiss 1998, p. 11.
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For Weiss, states will become more rather than less important as they attempt to
manage change in the international system.
Perhaps the most significant feature of the Weiss text is that she appears to
reject the original globalizers’ ideological predisposition toward a particular model of
the state. This she argues, borrowing the phrase from Ikenberry, amounts to treating
states as ‘prisoners of a fixed genetic code’.105 Instead she recognizes that ‘change is
hardly novel to the state: it is the very essence of the modem state, by virtue of the
fact that it is embedded in a dynamic economic and inter-state system...’106 She
makes the observation that,
[o]ver the long run, most states have (with some notable revolutionary 
exceptions) proved highly adaptive to changing circumstances. Failure to 
recognize or acknowledge adaptation has led too readily to the conclusion 
that the nation-state is in decline.107
This is a very valuable observation. On the basis of detailed historical analysis, 
provided by herself and others, and in the absence of an ideological predisposition 
toward a particular model of the state, Weiss recognizes that the state adapts to 
changing circumstances. But curiously, at no point in the text are those ‘changing 
circumstances’ theorised. This represents a major shortcoming of the text, given that 
by, her own account, it is only in relation to those ‘changing circumstances’ that state 
behaviour can be understood.
1.4.1 Paradox Lost?
The toll which this (lack of) analysis of the market takes on the model of the state 
itself is profound. Weiss, very much in the mould of the historical sociologists who
105 Weiss 1998, p. 196 quoting from Ikenberry 1995.
106 Weiss 1998, p. 195.
107 Weiss 1998, p. 9.
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have influenced her work,108 defends the role of the eclectic and the indeterminable in 
establishing an ‘anti-reductionist theory of the state’.109 In the Weiss text, we have no 
theory of the state or market, just a detailed account of what has gone on between 
them leading to the conclusion that their relationship is essentially functional.
It is argued here that W eiss’s apparent resolution to the globalisation paradox 
has been arrived at through descriptive rationalization and the manipulation of 
terminology. There are two key phrases which Weiss uses to make sense of the 
current status of state-market relations. They are: ‘embedded autonomy’ and 
‘governed interdependence’. Both these phrases represent something of a 
contradiction in terms.110 They are semantic solutions to what are deeply rooted 
issues. Meanings are turned inside out to justify Weiss’s central thesis that state power 
is not diminishing.
Embedded autonomy is a phrase coined by Peter Evans111 to solve the puzzle 
of why some highly interventionist states (eg. Korea) have had success in the global 
economy while others have not (eg. Brazil, India, most of the underdeveloped world). 
Evans argued that states which are more effective in achieving their transformative 
goals tend to be ‘not merely sufficiently autonomous to formulate their own goals, but 
also sufficiently embedded in particular industrial networks to implement them.’112 
What we might ask are their ‘own goals’ in this context? These, Evans argues are up 
for ‘continual negotiation and renegotiation’ through the state-society linkages. 
Surely, that weakens the idea that they are in any significant sense ‘their own’ goals. 
Nevertheless, as Weiss triumphantly concludes:
108 Weiss follows closely the approach taken by Mann to be discussed briefly in the next chapter.
109 Weiss 1998, p. 16.
110 If we take ‘embedded’ to mean within or attached to and ‘autonomy’ to mean detached from or 
separate and if we take ‘governed’ to mean asserted over or authoritative and ‘interdependence’ to 
mean something more like cooperation or mutual dependency.
111 Evans 1995.
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Embedded autonomy thus draws attention to the capacity of the state to 
combine two seemingly contradictory aspects: ‘Weberian bureaucratic 
insulation’ with ‘intense immersion in the surrounding social structure’.113
The key here is the possibility that these are not ‘seemingly contradictory’ at all, but
rather ‘entirely contradictory’ as they have been formulated and therefore in need of
rethinking. Even Evans himself believed that a state could only have transformative
capacity while capital remained in a relatively weak position.114 Weiss however feels
the concept simply needs reformulating if it is to more accurately characterise the
situation of a strong state and a strong private sector. She arrives at the term
‘governed interdependence.’
‘Governed interdependence’ (GI) refers to a negotiated relationship, in which 
public and private participants maintain their autonomy, yet which is 
nevertheless governed by broader goals set and monitored by the state. In this 
relationship, leadership is either exercised directly by the state or delegated to 
the private sector where a robust organizational infrastructure has been 
nurtured by state policies.115
This is a remarkable statement: leadership is either exercised directly by the state or 
delegated to the private sector. The distinction for Weiss is meaningless. She has 
resolved the paradox by breaking down the distinction between state and market, 
public and private. The fact that the state is seen to ‘set’ goals can mean little more 
than that it articulates goals jointly arrived at. Weiss points out, ‘GI solves the 
problem of how conceptually to preserve state effectiveness, when capital is strong, 
without compromising autonomy.’116 This seems an odd claim to make given that it is 
not ‘conceptual autonomy’ that many who fear ‘the retreat of the state’ wish to see 
preserved, it is real autonomy vis a vis the interests of capital. Weiss offers no
112 Evans quoted in Weiss 1998, p. 35.
113 For Weiss, in the case of East Asia this involved ‘a meritocratic bureaucracy with a strong sense of 
corporate identity and a dense set of institutionalized links to private elites.’ Weiss 1998, p. 35.
114 Evans 1995.
1,5 Weiss 1998, p. 38.
116 Italics mine.
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reassurance, as we see from the following quote, the autonomy o f the state is evident
in its role as coordinator o f  private interests.
GI refers to a relationship that evolves over time, whereby the state exploits 
and converts its autonomy into increasing coordinating capacity by entering 
into cooperative relationships with the private sector, in order thereby to 
enhance the effectiveness of its economic and industrial policies.117
Most striking about the Weiss text is its own adaption to circumstances. In a
period in which the state appears to have very little power over and in opposition to
market forces, Weiss argues that we should redefine power. Power as autonomy and
capability, virtually the definition of the term, is now merely ‘the orthodox notion of
strength’ -  the new notion of strength is a state with strong organizational linkages
with industry. Why do we need to alter the definition of power? Weiss stresses the
answer to this question: because ‘state power has been conceptualised in such a way
that makes it virtually impossible to apply to m odem  s ta te s '119.
One could argue that this was precisely what the first wave of globalisation
theorists were getting at: modem states appear to no longer possess the features which
are associated with strength (in terms of autonomy or power over other agents). That
was, after all, their thesis.
1.4.2 Paradox Postponed
The Weiss text is extremely valuable in that it rejects an idealized image of the state 
and instead effectively ‘tells it like it is’: the state appears to have consistently adapted 
to circumstances. Yet, without theorising those ‘circumstances’ we have no idea what 
is going on. Although she appears unwilling at various points to take it this far, the
117 Weiss 1998, p. 39.
118 Weiss 1998, p. 40. Italics and bold in the original.
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state, in her thesis, has no motives ‘of its own’.119 Nor can we identify any causal 
mechanisms outside the state. The buck must stop (or start) somewhere. If the state 
can only be explained in terms of the market, the market must be explained. The final 
straw in terms of the poverty of her theory is her contrasting of ‘statist’ and ‘non­
statist’ states.120 This is the collapse of analysis. That we have no better way of 
conceptualising the current adaptations of the state to market forces than by referring 
to it as evidence of a ‘non-statist state’ tends to suggest that our current understanding 
of states and markets are wholly inadequate. Paradox is not lost, it is merely 
postponed.
This ‘third gear’ position that the globalization debate has reached is shared by
a number of theorists. Philip Cemy’s ‘competition state’121 and Michael Lind’s
‘catalytic state’122 both follow a similar pattern of logic and it is a method of
overcoming the ‘state-market divide’ that has been heralded as a new way forward for
IPE.123 While Weiss herself has not spent much time on the question of the
privatisation of public services, Cemy, an IPE theorist influenced by Cox, has
considered the issue from within the same analytical framework and come to the
following conclusion.
[Liberalization, deregulation and privatization have not reduced the role of 
state intervention overall, just shifted it from decommodifying bureaucracies 
to marketizing ones. ‘Reinventing government’, for example, means the 
replacement of bureaucracies which directly produce public services by ones 
which closely monitor and supervise contracted-out and privatized services 
according to complex financial criteria and performance indicators.124
119 At one point in her writings Weiss does seem to suggest that the state is motivated by the welfare 
maximisation of its citizens, but she provides no evidence to support the assumption. Weiss 1999, pp. 
70-71. Thanks to Michael Webb for this reference.
120 Weiss 1998, p. 40.
121 Cemy 1989,1997.
122 Lind 1992.
123 Palan et al. 1996, p. 36.
124 Cemy 1997, p. 267.
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‘Reinventing government’ is precisely the banner under which the
1privatization of public services have been advocated. For Cemy, as for Linda 
Weiss, the state is no less powerful, it has simply changed from a ‘welfare state’ to a 
‘competition state’.126 This change in description is offered in place of explanation. 
Cemy’s explanation for privatisation is that the state has changed its form. The 
competition state has become a non-statist state.
It is important to note that the criticism here is not that Cemy’s account is 
politically reactionary. He is concerned about the societal effects of these changes in 
the state, in a way that Weiss appears not to be. What is wrong with Cemy is that he is 
methodologically reactionary and in this he has much in common with Weiss. To 
conclude that ‘the state’ has become a ‘non-statist state’ is not to shed insight on the 
social relations involved. Yet, this is the project with which Cemy and many others in 
contemporary IPE concern themselves. The rejection of ‘statist’ models of the state 
has become the central task of IPE, rather than explaining why it is that the state has 
changed.127
If evidence of outstanding paradox were required, the article in which Cemy 
discusses this issue is entitled ‘The Paradoxes of the Competition State’. He ends this 
article with a statement so ironic, ‘irony’ alone cannot capture it, the additional 
adjective of ‘post-modern’ is deemed necessary. ‘The post-modern irony of the state 
is that rather than simply being undermined by inexorable forces of globalization, the
125 Cemy acknowledges this link as he credits the pro-privatisation advocates Osbourne and Gabler 
with the concept. See Osbourne and Gabler 1992.
126 Cemy 1997.
127 For an explicit reference to this project see Palan et al. 2000, pp. 40-42. Explaining why the state 
has changed must go beyond identifying such factors as international capital mobility which remain 
shrouded in the mystery of ‘the market’ in similar terms to that adopted by the original globalisers.
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competition state is becoming increasingly both the engine room and the steering 
mechanism of political globalization itself.’128
Was this not exactly the paradox that those who fear the retreat of the state 
were trying to understand? This is the question they asked, only to have it returned to 
them in the third stage of the globalization debate in the form of an answer.
1.4 Conclusion
It is necessary at this point to retrace our steps in order to identify the problem more 
clearly. The globalisation thesis was seen to depend upon an idealised image of the 
traditional state, or strong state and an eclectic understanding of the market. The 
relationship between the two was marked by paradox: the state was heavily implicated 
in the development of the same market forces to which it was now losing power. The 
state appeared to have ‘engendered its conqueror’. While most of the critiques of the 
globalisation thesis left this paradox unchallenged, the Weiss text attempted a 
resolution by pointing out that what appeared as state victimization, was in many 
cases orchestrated by states themselves. States were the agents of their own 
transformation. In order to make sense of this development she redefined power as the 
ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Essentially, she rationalized the 
conquering.
What we can take from Weiss is an appreciation of the fact that the state 
cannot be idealised, but must be understood in terms of its actual relationship to 
society, which in the period under discussion is such that it is ‘strengthened’ by 
adapting. What is problematic in Weiss is that we have no analysis of what it is
128 Cemy 1997, p. 274.
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‘adapting’ to and as a result, we have no theory of the state. The fact that our most 
historically accurate description of state-market relations concludes that states are still 
strong they are simply ‘non-statist’ begs the question of what the state in ‘statist’ 
really means. To avoid returning to the idealised image, we must examine the state in 
a broader social and historial context. We need to consider what it is that the state is 
adapting to in Weiss’ scenario. We need an understanding of the social relations out 
of which the modem state and market have developed.
Ultimately we need an understanding of capitalism as it actually exists, such 
that we can explain changing state-market relations. This is the central task of this 
thesis and will be developed at length in Part Two of the thesis. First, however, in the 
next two chapters, we will look more closely at the analytical underpinnings of the 
globalization debate in order to determine the origins of its limitations.
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PART ONE
STATES AND MARKETS: A QUESTION OF METHOD
In the introduction to this thesis we drew attention to the ‘privatisation revolution’, 
ongoing over the last two decades or more, during which there has been a dramatic shift 
in ownership and control from the state to the private sphere on a global scale. This 
transfer of power represents a puzzle for many opposed to the privatization process. Why 
is the state giving up so much and getting so little in return? Privatisation, it was 
suggested, can be seen as material evidence of the ‘retreat of the state’ thesis central to 
the literature on globalisation.
In the first chapter it was argued that the answer to the question of whether or not 
the state is meaningfully ‘in retreat’ requires a deeper understanding of the nature of 
state-market relations than exists within mainstream globalisation theory. The arguments 
for and against the ‘retreat’ thesis slip past each other exchanging descriptions. Those 
theorists who have come closest to making sense of the state’s behaviour see it as neither 
retreating nor retaining power but rather as ‘adapting’. Unfortunately, without a theory of 
what the state is adapting to, it is difficult to make sense of its behaviour now, or in the 
past. We can describe periods of nationalisation and privatization, but we cannot really 
explain them.
In this part of the thesis we will consider two alternative ways of approaching the 
question of the relationship between states and markets. It is hoped that we can find a 
way to move beyond description to explanation.
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Chapter Two looks at the theoretical assumptions behind mainstream 
globalisation theory in the discipline of International Political Economy. It is argued that 
IPE is based on an essentially Weberian approach to social theory. Critical marxist 
theorists have argued that the Weberian method naturalises and tranhistoricizes categories 
that are, in fact, peculiar to modem capitalism and as a result reifies the separation of 
‘politics’ and ‘economics’, ‘states’ and ‘markets’. Having simply asserted that politics 
and economics are separate spheres with separate logics, their interaction becomes, for 
IPE theorists, a matter of description rather than explanation. It will be shown that the 
superficiality of mainstream globalisation theory can be attributed to the Weberian 
methodology which underpins it.
In the third chapter we will look at those critical marxist theorists who see the 
separation of the ‘political’ and ‘economic’ as a constitutive feature of capitalism. This 
analysis, which has recently been influential in IR, is valuable in that it provides an 
explanation for what the Weberian theorists have only described. Under capitalism, 
private property guarantees the expropriating class its ability to extract surplus from wage 
labourers with no need for extra-economic coercion, thus providing the appearance of a 
purely political state removed from an economically ‘free’ market.
But it is here that we will part company with the so-called ‘classical marxists’. It 
will be argued that the problem with this ‘separation of spheres’ approach, is that it 
confuses one of the various forms which capitalism can take, one in which political and 
economic spheres appear separate, for the essential nature of capitalism. Once this model 
of ‘pure capitalism’ is set up, much of the history of capitalism, including shifts back and 
forth between periods of privatisation and nationalisation, is explained in terms of states
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behaving in ‘more’ or ‘less’ capitalist ways. What determines the movement from one 
phase to another is left unaccounted for and the status of ‘less capitalist’ moments or 
countries is highly problematic. This analytical ambiguity leaves the door open to the 
kind of eclectic explanations of state behaviour that the classical Marxists have so 
thoroughly critiqued in terms of the Weberian approach. We reach an intellectual 
impasse, movement beyond which will require the development, in Part Two of the 
thesis, of an understanding of capitalism based on a rereading of classical Marxist texts.
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Chapter Two
Weberian Pluralism: The Separation of State and Market in IPE
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we approached the globalisation debate and posed the 
question introduced at the start of the thesis of why states appeared to be in retreat, to 
be, in Susan George’s words, ‘giving up so much’. After following this question 
through three waves of globalisation literature, we were given an answer. The most 
historically-attentive attempt to resolve the apparent contradiction of ‘the self­
destructive state’ concluded that the state is not, in fact, ‘in retreat’, rather, it has 
become a ‘non-statist’ state. The state is not ‘giving up so much’, rather, it has 
become ‘a state which gives up so much’. In the third wave of the globalisation 
debate, the very events to which we were drawing attention,1 were hidden in a 
reconceptualisation of the meaning of the state. Our original question: ‘what has 
happened to the state?’ had been returned to us in the form of an answer: ‘it has 
become a state to which something has happened’.
The inability of the globalisation debate to deal with the paradox of the 
‘retreat of the state’ raises the more fundamental question of how we understand 
states and markets and the relationship between the two. Where have the models of 
state-market interaction in the globalisation debate come from and what is the basis of 
their limitations?
1 I.e. state relinquishment of ownership and control of vast areas of industry and service.
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In this chapter, to begin to answer these questions, we shall focus on the 
discipline of International Political Economy (IPE).2 Of all the social sciences, it is 
the discipline (or sub-discipline)3 of IPE which has the explicit remit to understand 
the relationship between states and markets on a global scale. It is a task that theorists 
of IPE have been concerned with since the first glint of ‘globalisation’ theory in the 
1960s and 1970s. In fact, the events which sparked discussion of ‘interdependence’ 
and ‘globalisation’ provided the justification for the emergence of IPE as an area of 
study separate from IR over three decades ago.4 In a sense, the analysis of 
globalisation is the project of IPE and IPE the discipline of globalisation. The first 
section of this chapter will consider the progress IPE has made covering much the 
same ground as the globalisation debate, over a longer period of time.
The second section of this chapter will make the argument that, despite 
significant differences among IPE theorists, it is possible to discern a commonly held 
approach to theorising state-market relations within the discipline. While their final 
representations of such relations on a global scale may differ quite dramatically, they 
begin at the same place. What this ‘IPE approach’ entails is a starting assumption that 
states and markets have separate logics and that while their interactions may be 
numerous and highly involved, they are just that -  interactions of fundamentally 
separate spheres. This approach to states and markets, politics and economics is based
2 Throughout this chapter I will be using the term ‘international political economy’ (IPE) as the generic 
label for the sub-discipline and ‘global political economy’ (GPE) to describe a particular frame of 
reference employed by some theorists within that sub-discipline. See Gill and Law 1988, pp. xxii-xxiii, 
for a discussion of their preference for the term ‘global political economy’. See Palan 2000, p. 1, for a 
recent discussion of the relationship between the two phrases.
3 IPE was originally a sub-discipline of the discipline of International Relations, but has since 
developed quite independently. It is now possible to obtain degrees in IPE as opposed to IR, and the 
field of EPE has its own journal The Review o f International Political Economy.
4 Susan Strange’s 1970 article in International Affairs can be seen as a founding document of the 
discipline of IPE.
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on an essentially Weberian methodology to which several IPE theorists explicitly 
refer.5
That this Weberian-based ‘IPE approach’ exists is not a position original to 
this thesis. It has been well-developed by a number of Marxist theorists with an 
interest in the ‘IPE project’ but who reject what they consider to be the enormous 
limitations of IPE as it is currently conceived.6 The existence of an ‘IPE approach’ 
has been the sometimes explicit, more often implicit, assumption of these Marxists as 
they have powerfully exposed the theoretical shortcomings of the discipline as a 
whole. The final section of this chapter will draw out their arguments and assess the 
extent to which IPE is guilty as charged. Central to this discussion will be the 
question of whether the Marxist critique is capable of explaining why IPE has been 
unable to assist in moving the globalisation debate beyond paradox.
2.2 Why IPE?
We start with the question of why we should seek an answer to the methodological 
underpinnings of the globalisation debate in the discipline of IPE. The globalisation 
debate been widely recognised as ‘inter-disciplinary’ in its nature.7 Yet we are 
suggesting that IPE, a single discipline, should be able to offer particular insight into 
the apparent retreat of the state as a result of globalisation. This section explains why 
IPE is the discipline of globalisation and considers what progress IPE has made in 
understanding the subject, given an extra two decades to study the key issues.
5 Gilpin, 1987 n 2, p. 11. See also Crane and Amawi 1991 [1997], pp. 17-18.
6 Among them, to be discussed, are Justin Rosenberg, Simon Bromley, Chris Boyle and Peter 
Burnham, although arguably Rosenberg is not, in fact, interested in the IPE project and sees his 
contribution to be to IR itself through a method of historical sociology or Marxist historiography. See 
Rosenberg 1994, p. 3.
7 Baylis and Smith 2001, Held and McGrew 2000.
57
It is beyond the scope of this section to discuss the development of IPE as a
Q
discipline in any great detail, a task which has been well undertaken elsewhere. 
Instead we shall concentrate on the emergence of IPE out of studies of 
‘interdependence’, it is this area of the discipline that has most bearing on the 
question of globalisation and the ‘the retreat of the state’.
2.2.7 IPE on Interdependence
In 1968 Richard Cooper wrote a book entitled the Economics o f  Interdependence in 
which he addressed what he perceived to be ‘the central problem’ of how to keep the 
benefits of increasing international economic intercourse free of restrictions, while 
still allowing the nation state significant freedom to shape and control its own 
economy.9 Posed in slightly different terms, this is the question of how to allow for 
the fullest development of the global market without it threatening state autonomy. 
Cooper described growing interdependence in terms of unprecedented levels of 
international trade, technological improvements in transportation and communication, 
the growth of ‘foreign business investment’ and the increased sensitivity of financial 
capital to yield differentials in financial markets.10 The key ingredients of what would 
come to be known as globalisation were recognised. Shortly afterward, Cooper 
concluded that ‘market forces increasingly circumscribe the ability of nation-states to 
achieve their desired aims, regardless of their formal retention of sovereignty.’11 This 
is the phenomenon of the apparent ‘retreat of the state’ identified more than three 
decades ago.
8 See especially Katzenstein et al. 1998 and Woods 2001.
9 Cooper 1968.
10 This is spelt out in more detail in Cooper 1972, pp. 161-164.
11 Cooper 1972, p. 179.
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Cooper was not alone in identifying the ‘retreat of the state’ as a result of
interdependence in the 1960s and 1970s. Raymond Vernon, declared that ‘the
advances in transportation and communication, reinforced by the existence of
multinational business enterprises, have stimulated interaction between national
economies and reduced the effectiveness of national controls, particularly in advanced
countries.’12 Karl Kaiser warned that ‘[transnational relations and other multinational
processes seriously threaten democratic control of foreign policy, especially in
advanced industrial societies’.13 Edward Morse argued that ‘changes in the structure
of the global economy have resulted in a withering of governmental control of certain
activities presumed to be de jure  within the domain of governments.’14 And Charles
Kindleberger felt strongly enough to write in 1969 that ‘the nation-state is just about
through as an economic unit’.15
By 1970 the direction of events seemed undeniable to many and Susan
Strange, raised the alarm among IR scholars.16 She drew a direct connection between
increased economic interdependence, decreased state autonomy, and the need for a
new sub-discipline of IPE.
[W]hat I have in mind is more specific than the increase in interdependence 
and interaction. It is that the pace of development in the international 
economic system has accelerated, is still accelerating and will probably 
continue to accelerate. And that, in consequence, it is out-distancing and out­
growing the rather more static and rigid international political system.17
Strange suggested that if the discipline did not begin to address the way in 
which economic developments were altering international politics, it would find itself
12 Vemon 1971, p. 705.
13 Kaiser 1971, p. 706.
14 Morse 1971, p. 373. See also Morse 1976.
15 Kindleberger 1969, p. 209. See also Kindleberger 1970a, 1970b.
16 Strange cites Baldwin 1971 and Morse 1976 along with Keohane and Nye and Kindleberger, as IR 
scholars who argued for the discipline of IPE. Rosenau’s work on linkages may be seen to be pointing 
in a similar direction. Rosenau 1969.
17 Strange 1970, pp. 304-305.
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incapable of making sense of world affairs.18 She called for ‘an end to the long and 
harmful divorce of politics and economics in the study of the world system’.19 Three 
years later, Nixon had dissolved the Bretton Woods agreement and OPEC countries 
had quadrupled the price of oil, bringing home to many the idea that economic issues 
had a dramatic effect on international politics. A new discipline of IPE was well on its 
way to acceptance as an academic field.20
2.2.2 The IR Counter-thesis
Just as the recent globalisation debate has had its second wave detractors, so too did 
the IPE pioneers of interdependence theory. Kenneth Waltz was among those keen to 
discredit this new body of thought and re-establish the realist image of IR.21 He 
referred to the ‘myth of interdependence’ and denied that the state and concerns of 
state had become any less important. Waltz pointed to the fact that there was little or 
no economic interdependence between the Eastern and Western blocs and stressed 
that the Cold War continued to play a significant role in shaping world politics.22
Other skeptics included Robert Gilpin23 and Stephen Krasner.24 Gilpin reacted 
against the idea that multinational corporations could ever replace states as actors in 
world politics. He argued that power politics, particularly the role of strong states, 
was the causal, or at least permissive, factor explaining the rise of the multinational 
corporation as a global actor. ‘The multinational corporation exists as a transnational 
actor today because it is consistent with the political interest of the world’s dominant
18 Strange 1970, p. 310.
19 Strange 1995, p. 154 referring to her 1970 plea.
20 Strange 1995, pp. 154-155. Woods 2001, p. 279.
21 Waltz 1970.
22 Waltz 1964.
23 Gilpin 1975, 1981.
24 Krasner 1976, 1978.
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power, the United States’.25 For Gilpin ‘political values and security interests are
crucial determinants of economic relations’ and the military power of state remained
as central as ever to understanding world affairs.26
Krasner raised his objection to the new wave of literature in 1971, in a manner
that would not be out of place in the recent globalisation debate. He describes the
object of his derision in terms similar to those used to characterise the recent ‘retreat
of the state’ thesis.
In recent years, students of international relations have multinationalized, 
transnationalized, bureaucratised and transgovemmentalised the state until it 
has virtually ceased to exist as an analytic construct. Nowhere is that trend 
more apparent than in the study of the politics of international economic 
relations. The basic conventional assumptions have been undermined by 
assertions that the state is trapped by non-state actors. Interdependence is not 
seen as a reflection of state policies and state choices... but as the result of 
elements beyond the control of any state or a system created by states... This 
perspective is, at best, profoundly misleading.’27
Krasner’s skeptical response to the early globalists involved arguing that a 
dramatic increase in international trade was to the advantage of the United States and 
was therefore in keeping with the logic of power politics on an international level.28 
After a detailed study of international trade practices undertaken by various imperial 
powers throughout history, what he found, in fact, was that the picture was more 
complicated than he might have anticipated. He acknowledged that he found no easy 
fit between a hegemonic power and an open trading system which suits it.29 
Nevertheless, he concluded his text with a statement largely in keeping with his initial 
presupposition:
The existence of various transnational, multinational, transgovemmental and 
other nonstate actors that have riveted scholarly attention in recent years can 
only be understood within the context of a broader structure that ultimately
25 Gilpin 1971, p. 404.
26 Gilpin 1971, p. 403.
27 Krasner 1976, p. 317.
28 Krasner 1976.
29 Krasner 1976, pp. 340-343.
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rests upon the power and interests of states, shackled though they may be by
the societal consequences of their own past decisions.30
For Waltz, Gilpin, Krasner, and other ‘skeptics’, the sovereignty of the state 
remained intact because the system remained anarchical. Evidence provided by the 
‘globalists’, in terms of increased interdependence, could be accommodated without 
fundamentally transforming an image of the world in which states retained 
considerable power. For these authors, the state remained where the sovereignty buck 
stopped, even if it was increasingly becoming a legal fiction. All of this closely 
echoes the developments in the last chapter. We have not yet reached the mid 1970s 
in the discipline of IPE, and the first two waves of the globalisation debate of the 
1990s, have already been starkly foreshadowed.
2.2.3 Third Wave Interdependence Theory
By 1977, we see the emergence of an early ‘third wave’ contender’. Keohane and Nye 
had contributed to the literature on ‘transnational relations’ in the early 1970s, 
attempting to address the range of non-state factors and actors that were conditioning 
world politics.31 In 1977, they wrote a book which became a core text for IPE 
describing world politics in terms of ‘complex interdependence’. This phrase was 
intended to describe a qualitative shift toward a situation in which ‘actors other than 
states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does 
not exist, and in which force is an ineffective instrument of policy’. As such,
30 Krasner 1976, p. 343.
31 Keohane and Nye 1971.
32 Keohane and Nye 1991 [1997], p. 134. The last point was informed by the US experience in 
Vietnam.
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‘complex interdependence’ expressed a view of international relations which was ‘the
“3 -J
opposite of realism’, distinguishing IPE even more sharply from mainstream IR.
On the question of the power of the state in relation to non-state actors, 
transnational corporations, and international organisations, Keohane and Nye 
explicitly located themselves between those who argued that a ‘world without 
borders’ had come into existence and traditionalists who considered such assertions to 
be ‘globaloney’.34 (It is interesting to note that even the term ‘globaloney’ is not 
original to the current round of globalisation debate, though some have suggested it 
is.)35 Keohane and Nye attempted to resolve the two positions, which are roughly 
parallel to the first two waves of the recent globalisation debate. In this context, the 
theory of ‘complex interdependence’ may be seen as a first round ‘third wave’ 
attempt to transcend these two extreme positions.
But is it really fair to suggest that ‘globalisation’ is simply ‘interdependence’ 
thirty years on? Certainly there are those who would argue it is. In a recent discussion 
of the two concepts, Jones claimed that the ‘idea of globalisation has assumed much 
of the role played by the concept of interdependence’.36 In a text on global 
governance, Reinicke went further to suggest that ‘we have yet to determine the 
distinguishing features of globalization that differentiate it from interdependence’.37 
Cemy, however, has argued that the concept of interdependence differs considerably 
from globalisation in that even Keohane and Nye’s image of the world retained much 
of W altz’s neo-realism.38 For Cemy the state, as actor, remains too central to notions
33 Keohane and Nye 1977.
34 Keohane and Nye 1977 in Amawi 1991, p. 122.
35 Ellen Wood thanks Doug Henwood for the term, which Henwood attributes to Bob Fitch. Wood 
1997, p. 31 n2.
36 Jones 1995, p. 3.
37 Reinicke 1998, p. 11.
38 Cemy 1996 p. 623.
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of interdependence and as such it lacks the radical potential of the notion of 
globalisation.39
What is at stake in Cemy’s critique of ‘interdependence’ as a concept is the 
very question of the relationship between states and markets. Cemy believes that 
Keohane and Nye concede too much to a neo-statist position. We have considered 
Cemy’s own position in the last chapter, it has a great deal in common with Weiss. 
What this means is that Cemy may view the state and market as fundamentally 
separate, but he does not wish, in any way, to naturalise the activities of the state. His 
critique of Keohane and Nye is presumably on the basis that he believes they do. For 
the moment, it is sufficient to note that Keohane and Nye’s depiction of state-market 
relations engages directly with the subject matter of contemporary globalisation 
theory, though it may not have reached the same ‘third wave’ position that Cemy and 
others have developed.
A closer contender for an early ‘third wave’ is arguably to be found in the 
work of Camilleri who asserted in 1981 that the state must be seen as ‘both agent and 
victim’ of the crisis of capitalism as it was developing on a global scale.40 Camilleri 
developed his work as part of a discussion with another group of scholars observing 
similar changes in the ‘real world’ to those which had triggered the development of 
IPE. These ‘world order theorists,’41 among them Burton,42 Falk,43 and Brown44, were 
tracing the same developments, in terms of growing interdependence among states, 
but accommodating a more eclectic vision. They were highlighting the emergence of 
a world society in which the state was increasingly taking a back seat to economic,
39 Cemy 1996, p. 624.
40 Camilleri 1981, p. 140.
41 This term is used by Camilleri 1981.
42 Burton 1968 and 1972.
43 Falk 1975.
44 Brown 1974.
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scientific, cultural, or ideological ‘systems’ which did not correspond to national 
borders.
Camilleri was engaged with precisely the question of the apparent ‘retreat of 
the state’. He saw ‘an erosion of traditional national boundaries’ contributing to the 
‘growing ineffectiveness of governments in many significant areas of policy’.45 He 
was led to the view that ‘the problem of “territorial non-coincidence” [...] raises 
difficult questions not only about the adequacy of the state centric model of 
international relations, but about the future of the state and its relationship to the 
world economy.’46 His was a strand of IR theory that coexisted with developments in 
IPE given that most theorists of interdependence would have accepted many of its 
insights. Camilleri, well in advance of Cemy, articulated a ‘nuanced’ third wave 
position, claiming that ‘increasing economic interdependence enhances the economic 
and political functions of the state while at the same time diminishing the efficacy of 
its intervention.’47
In other words, the state is still important, it is just a different kind of state. 
This early third wave position possesses all the strengths and weaknesses of that 
which was to follow three decades later. In both cases we end up with a fuller, more 
accurate description, in that complex circumstances are not denied, but we still have 
no explanation of this new reality.
45 Camilleri 1981, p. 130.
46 Camilleri 1981, p. 130.
47 Camilleri 1981, p. 157. Italics mine, indicating the point at which description attempts to pass for 
explanation. ‘While at the same time’ essentially means ‘and’ in this context, providing for more 
accurate description without explanation.
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2.2.4 IPE Beyond Interdependence
It has been argued above that the discipline of IPE was bom of the need to make 
sense of state-market relations as a result of ‘interdependence’ in the world economy 
which has developed into ‘globalisation’. With the not unimportant exception of the 
‘end of the Cold W ar’ all of the features of modem globalisation were identified in 
the 1960s and 1970s and the consequences for the nation-state were considered.48 
There were those who argued that the state was in decline, those who argued it was as 
important as ever, and those, like Keohane, Nye and Camilleri, who attempted to 
develop a more nuanced position.49 As such, the early development of IPE may be 
seen as a trial period for the globalisation debate. It is therefore reasonable to expect 
that developments in the discipline since, may reveal progress in terms of an 
understanding of state-market relations.
While we have not directly discussed the work of IPE theorists, as such, in the 
globalisation debate, it is a debate which has influenced much of their recent work. In 
fact we find that the three key theorists who have been long-standing contributors to 
IPE: Strange, Gilpin and Cox, have recently taken positions roughly corresponding to 
the three waves of the globalisation debate, respectively. Strange’s work on the 
‘retreat of the state’ represents an early articulation of the first wave.50 Gilpin’s 
reassertion of Realist principles, vis a vis the ‘retreat of the state’ characterisation of 
world politics, has been articulated in a manner quite similar to many of the second 
wave sceptics.51 Finally, Cox, with his ‘internationalised state’ has, throughout his
48 Notably interdependence theory did coincide with a period of detente between East and West, 
marked not least by Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, suggesting even greater similarity between the two 
periods.
9 Keohane and Nye’s 1977 book was entitled Power and Interdependence.
50 Strange 1970, 1972.
51 Gilpin 1987.
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career, taken an approach very similar to that held by Weiss and Cemy, with their 
‘adaptive’ and ‘competition’ states.52 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss 
these arguments in detail, what we are interested in is what it suggests about the way 
IPE has developed over the history of the discipline.
What we find is that IPE theorists engaged in the globalisation debate of the 
1990s have simply rehearsed positions which they and others developed in the 1960s 
and 1970s. This suggests that the ability of IPE scholars to theorise the relationship 
between states and markets has not significantly improved over the lifetime of the 
discipline. It is as though the initial period of ‘interdependence’ animated the 
discipline to the point of providing a detailed description of state-market relations, but 
theoretical development of the subject stalled at that stage, only to be reanimated in a 
similar form in the 1990s. It would seem that the method of theorising states and 
markets, which caused the interdependence debate to stall at the point of description, 
remained unchallenged in the intervening period. This speculation accords with a 
reference by Murphy and Tooze to a ‘period of relative calm in the second half of the 
1980s [which] was used by many scholars as an opportunity for strengthening the 
scholastic rigor of IPE without questioning, its often unstated foundations.’53
This is not, however, to suggest that the limitations of these ‘unstated 
foundations’ were not recognised by any IPE theorists within the discipline, simply 
that they were struggled with unsuccessfully. Staniland, was among those who, in the 
1980s, felt that the philosophical naivety of the discipline of IPE was hampering its 
progress. He noted that political economy, as it stood, ‘recognises the connection 
between politics and economics and thus transcends the narrow assumptions of 
economics and political science’.
52 Cox 1996,2002.
53 Murphy and Tooze 1991, p. 5.
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But this position is like that of a man who thinks he knows how to win at 
poker because he has noticed a connection between playing cards and getting 
money. The existence of a connection is not problematic: the problem is how 
to understand what the connection is and how it works.54
By the 1990s the sense of frustration with the theoretical underpinnings of IPE
had grown and Strange, one of the most self-reflexive of IPE scholars, had identified
a crisis in the discipline.
There is a kind of malaise, a sense of uncertainty about where to go from 
here, even of confusion about where we have reached so far, prevailing 
among the rather large number of people engaged in the field.55
Strange argued that the discipline had experienced a boom over the two
decades or more of its existence, not because of the strength of its ideas, but because
of the sheer volume of events which shaped the international political economy over
that time. These included those coinciding with the emergence of the discipline, the
collapse of Bretton Woods and the oil crisis, but also the debt crisis of the 1980s and
its consequence for many developing states.56 Strange argued that now, new events,
particularly the end of the Cold War and ‘the increased integration of national
economies in the world market’, had contributed to ‘an increased confusion about
what the subject is and where it should be going’.57
It is possible to see in Strange’s characterisation of the discipline a concern
that the globalisation debate may have boosted IPE in quantitative terms, but that in
qualitative terms the discipline has made remarkably little progress. As one might
expect, this unfortunate result is particularly disheartening, and disorienting, for those
theorists, like Strange, who were present for, and made contributions, to both periods
of debate. Part of the same problem is a lack of attention to early debates in the
54 Staniland 1985, pP. 3-5.
55 Strange 1995, p. 157.
56 Strange 1995, pp. 155-56.
57 Strange 1995, p. 160, p. 158.
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discipline that allows more recent theorists of IPE to imagine that their contribution to
c o
the globalisation debate may be more original than is, in fact, the case.
Twenty-five years after she had pleaded for the establishment of IPE as a 
separate discipline Strange was taking a very dim view of its progress. She was 
arguing that IPE, not strong on ideas, had been vulnerable to intellectual fashion and 
buffeted along by current events. She went further to suggest that given the directions 
in which it appeared to be headed, ‘sooner or later, it will be necessary to go back and 
start again at the beginning if we are to achieve a genuine synthesis of political and 
economic activity.’59 This indeed is a very poor bill of health for a discipline which 
emerged out of, and has dedicated itself to understanding, the changing relations 
between international politics and economics, states and markets on a global scale.
This section of the chapter has made the argument that if we want to find out 
why the globalisation debate has failed to move beyond paradox, the answer can be 
found within the discipline of IPE. IPE has tried and failed to move beyond mere 
description of state-market relations since its inception. In fact, it may be said that 
proof of IPE’s failure is to be found in the globalisation debate -  the superficiality and 
eclecticism of current characterisations of the ‘paradoxical’ relationship between 
states and markets on a global scale. The important question, for the next section is, 
therefore, what is it that has caused IPE to fail? What is it about the ‘IPE method’ 
which might explain why the discipline has found itself so incapable of making 
progress on the question of globalisation and the retreat of the state?
58 Cemy, in particular, seems unaware of the extent to which he is traveling a similar path to those 
before him. Perhaps to avoid this conclusion he argues that interdependence theorists remain trapped in 
a model of state-centredness that he himself has escaped. Cemy 1996, p. 624.
59 Strange 1995, p. 171.
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2.3 The IPE Method
IPE has famously been described as ‘a field defined more by agreement among 
scholars about what to study than by agreement of how to study it.’60 Yet each time 
that IPE scholars have attempted to escape what they perceive to be the limitations of 
the discipline’s methodology, they have identified an ‘IPE mainstream’ from which 
they hope to depart. Murphy and Tooze, for instance, refer to ‘an IPE orthodoxy’61 
before attempting to break free from it. Hay and Marsh seek a New  International 
Political Economy without the ‘limitations, biases and distortions’ of the classical 
variety.62 The following section has a similar intent, although it involves casting an 
even wider net. As such, it provides the basis for a critique, in the final section of the 
chapter, which extends to even the discipline’s most recent would-be escapees.
It shall be the argument of the following section that despite significant 
differences amongst IPE theorists, it is possible to discern a commonly held approach 
to theorising state-market relations. What this ‘IPE approach’ entails is a starting 
assumption that states and markets have separate logics and that while their 
interactions may be numerous and highly involved, they are just that - interactions of 
fundamentally separate spheres. It will be argued that this kind of theorizing is based 
on an essentially Weberian methodology, a connection to which several IPE theorists
60 Murphy and Tooze 1991, p. 1. Strange 1995, p. 157 restates this point.
61 Murphy and Tooze 1991, p. 5. The IPE orthodoxy for these scholars is one which ‘ignores 
significant developments in the philosophy of social science in favour of a very simple model of the 
accumulation of knowledge’. They seek to move beyond the orthodoxy by increasing the issues and 
areas covered by IPE, to focus for instance on marginalised economies, and they also attempt to 
include ‘unorthodox’ theoretical perspectives like feminism.
62 Hay and Marsh 1999, pp. 5-19. A ‘new IPE’ for Hay and Marsh means putting the ‘p ’ back in IPE, 
which involves, not a return to realism, but a reconceptualisation of ‘the political’ in terms of its 
interplay with economic and ideological factors. This is a ‘new IPE’ within which the third wave of the 
globalisation literature sits, recognising, but redefining, the political sphere.
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explicitly refer. We shall first consider those aspects of Weber’s methodology which 
have influenced IPE theorists and then manifestations of his method in their work.
2.3.1 Weberian Pluralism
It is beyond the scope of the current enquiry to provide a full discussion of the 
Weberian method of social science, a task which has been usefully attempted 
elsewhere.64 Instead, we shall focus on the features of the Weberian approach most 
significant for our purposes here. The focus of our discussion shall be on Weber’s 
attachment to a method of causal pluralism.
In his analysis of society, Weber was determined to account for all the various 
structures of social reality: social, political, economic and ideological. No one sphere 
could be seen as causally determinant as, for Weber, they all have a real autonomy. 
Our interest in relation to the discipline of IPE is the real autonomy granted to 
political and economic spheres, but it may be useful, by way of illustration, to 
consider the way in which real autonomy is granted, by Weber, to the realm of ideas 
in his explanation of the origins of industrial capitalism. For Weber, the peculiar 
rationality of modernity was not caused by capitalism, rather modem industrial 
capitalism presupposed that this form of rationality was already in place.65 The 
protestant ethic accelerated the process of economic rationalism leading to modem 
industrial capitalism. This is evidence, as W. G. Runciman explains, that ‘for Weber, 
ideas can and sometimes do have an independent and decisive influence on events.’66
63 Gilpin 1987, p. 11 fh 2. ‘The concepts of state and market used in this book are derived primarily 
from Max Weber.’ See also the discussion of Weber in Crane and Amawi 1997, pp. 17-18.
64 See for instance Gerth and Mills 1946 and Freund 1969. For an especially useful recent critical 
engagement with Weber’s work see Wood 1995, pp. 146-178.
65 Weber 1974, pp. 31,92, 183,266.
66 Runciman 1978, p. 3.
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For Weber, politics and economics also have independent existences. This 
notion of the autonomy of the two spheres is related to Weber’s understanding of 
capitalism, which differs greatly from that of Marx. Weber describes a ‘capitalist 
economic action’ as one ‘which rests on the expectation of profit by the utilization of 
opportunities for exchange’. Capitalism is defined, for Weber, in terms of the 
market and can therefore be seen in various forms throughout history. For him, the 
modem capitalist market is simply a highly rationalized autonomous form of 
exchange relations brought about through a cultural transition to modernity. As for 
the state, there has always been spheres of authority and the modem state is simply a 
highly rationalised version of that. Weber was struck by the novelty of modernity, but 
only in terms of the culturally altered nature of the already existing separate spheres 
of state and market, politics and economics. In the economic sphere modernity meant 
industrial capitalism and in the political sphere it meant the bureaucratic state.
Despite his emphasis on the determinant power of ideological forces, it should 
not, however, be assumed that Weber had an idealist vision of history. Gerth and 
Mills make the argument that Weber was, in fact, a materialist, and that his work 
should be seen ‘as an attempt to “round out” Marx’s economic materialism with 
political and military materialism.’68 This interpretation however appears to deny 
altogether the importance Weber placed on the realm of ideas as well as ‘non­
economic’ material considerations. Giddens argues, more convincingly, that Weber is 
neither a materialist nor an idealist ‘rather, the work [The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit o f  Capitalism] expresses his conviction that there are no ‘laws of history’, the 
emergence of modem capitalism in the West was the outcome of a historically
67 Weber 1974, p. 17.
68 Gerth and Mills 1946, p. 47.
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specific conjuncture of events’.69 What Giddens is revealing here is that to attribute to 
Weber an idealist vision of history is to credit him with too great an interest in 
causation.70 For Weber, different features of social reality are determinant at different 
points of time and none can be considered ultimately determinant. This is what we 
mean by causal pluralism.
Weber’s approach was developed in opposition to Marx, whose method of 
historical materialism Weber interpreted as economically reductionist. The way in 
which Weber’s method relates to his [mis]understanding of Marx is well explained by 
Derek Sayer.
Herein lies W eber’s major disagreement with ‘the materialist conception of 
history’, as he encountered it. He defined this as a ‘dogmatic need to believe 
that the economic factor is the “real” one, the only “true” one and the one 
which “in the last instance is everywhere decisive’” .71
Weber’s multi-causal approach springs from a desire to avoid reductionism of any
kind, and particularly, in relation to Marx, economic reductionism. Having defined
capitalism in ‘purely economic’ terms of market exchange, Weber understandably
found fault with a Marxist analysis which seemed to seek to explain other aspects of
social life, political and ideological, in terms of this market-driven realm of society.
That this is an inaccurate understanding of Marx’s analysis of capitalism is an
argument which will be taken up below.
Of interest here is that one of the effects of Weber’s multi-causal perspective
is a division of reality with no sense of what is that has been divided. Weber is
vulnerable to the criticism made by many, including Talcott Parsons, one of his great
admirers, that he has formulated categories ‘without the analysis of the structure of a
69 Giddens 1992.
70 Weber’s ‘historically specific conjuncture on events’ may be seen to serve a similar purpose as the 
neo-Weberian historical sociologist’s notion of ‘path-dependence’.
71 Sayer 1991, p. 114. Sayer goes on to say that, ‘It is a fair enough summary of much fin de siecle 
Marxism, if (in the light of much posthumously published material unavailable to Weber) a travesty of 
Marx, for whom, as we have seen, the very separability of an ‘economic factor’ is a modem product.’
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total social system which is a logically necessary prerequisite.’72 He has formulated 
parts without the whole -  yet it is arguably only in the context of a whole that parts 
have any meaning.
It is important to understand why Weber felt justified in this approach. In very
simple terms, Weber was an epistemological relativist: highly pessimistic about the
possibility of objective knowledge.73 Runciman writes:
If there is one basic assumption, or set o f assumptions, underlying Weber’s 
thought which distinguishes it from that of M arx... it is the assumption 
deriving from the joint influence of Kant and Nietzsche that reality cannot be 
objectively grasped by the human mind as a meaningful whole. Any view of 
the world must, Weber holds, be limited and partial.. .,74
But this did not deter Weber from the view that propositions once arrived at could be 
reliable or objectively valid. Although there was a certain mysticism to ‘the whole’ 
given the unattainability of full knowledge, this did not mean that the parts one could 
discern were unuseful for social theory. For Weber, it was the job of the social 
scientist to engage in a process of selection and abstraction of reality. Weber 
developed the notion of the ‘ideal type’, an analytical construction which provides a 
point of comparison for concrete cases.75
Parsons has pointed out that this aspect of Weber’s approach leads to a kind of 
‘type atomism’, ‘one aspect of which is to minimize the elements which link the type 
in question with other elements of the structure within the same system.’76 When what 
you are precisely trying to understand is the link between two social forms, such as 
states and markets, politics and economics, Weber’s multi-causal approach does little 
to assist. A descriptive, eclectic image of reality may appear to capture the complexity 
of the social world better than one which is economically reductionist, but it allows
72 Parsons 1978, pp. 14-15.
73 See MacRae 1974, pp. 64-65 for a discussion of Weber’s epistemological skepticism.
74 Runciman 1978, p. 4.
75 For a discussion of Weber’s ideal type see Coser 1977, pp. 223-224.
76 Parsons 1978, p. 15.
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for little understanding of the relationship between social forms or their changing 
nature over time.
2.3.2 The Spectre o f  Weber in IPE
The separation of spheres is the unquestioned basis of study in one of IPE’s most
77classic texts, Gilpin’s The Political Economy o f International Relations. The first
footnote of the text asserts quite plainly that,
[t]he historical relationship of state and market is a matter of intense 
scholarly controversy. Whether each developed autonomously, the market 
gave rise to the state, or the state to the market are important historical issues 
whose resolution is not really relevant to the argument of this book. State and 
market, whatever their respective origins, have independent existences, have 
logics of their own and interact with one another.78
This assertion involves a basic logical inconsistency which relates to the 
observation above that Weber’s approach involved the analysis of parts within an 
unknown whole.79 How can it be possible to know whether two social forms share 
any kind of broader logic without examining their historical development, without 
having some sense of the whole within which they exist as parts? At best, one could 
conclude that the more fundamental nature of their relationship is unclear. Instead, 
with Gilpin we have the bold assertion that these two forms have logics of their own. 
They are understood by Gilpin to be ‘two fundamentally different ways of ordering
77 Gilpin is known as a neo-realist IPE theorist and as such he shares with mainstream IR a concern 
over power relations between states. To this standard image of the international he has added other 
factors. We are not here concerned with criticisms of his work from others in the field, which are fairly 
standard criticisms of neo-realism, but rather with that which he has in common with his colleagues -  
the extent to which he exemplifies ‘an IPE approach’.
78 Gilpin 1987 fill, p. 10.
79 The logical inconsistency here being: ‘X and Y are unknown entities, from which we can conclude 
that X is not Y \ Gilpin admits that he is not interested in, nor is he confident that there can be an 
answer to, the question of the origins or nature of the state or the market. The implication is that for 
him, X and Y are unknown entities. As a result he cannot, with any certainty claim that X is not Y, yet 
this is exactly what he does claim.
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human relationships’. ‘For the state, territorial boundaries are a necessary basis of 
national autonomy and political unity.’ Whereas, ‘for the market, the elimination of 
all political and other obstacles to the functioning of the price mechanism is 
imperative.’81
As a neo-realist Gilpin constructs the two competing logics of states and 
markets in terms of ‘international power relations’ within which ‘international 
economic relations’ take place. ‘Neither state not market is primary, the causal 
relationships are interactive and indeed cyclical’.82 Gilpin shares the Weberian 
approach of multi-causality and does so based on a very similar understanding of 
capitalism and a related fear of Marxist economism. Gilpin shares with Weber an 
understanding of capitalism as a ‘purely economic’ category associated with the 
market. In fact, he uses the terms capitalism and market interchangeably.83 He also 
makes the claim that, ‘the principal weakness of Marxism as a theory of international 
political economy results from its failure to appreciate the role of political and 
strategic factors in international relations.’84 What Gilpin has done in his work is to 
try to ensure that those factors are ‘added’. Strange has noted this as a limitation in 
Gilpin’s approach, arguing that he and other PIER theorists essentially uncritically 
lump together information about states and markets to form the subject matter of 
IPE.85 For Strange, Gilpin’s approach to political economy involves a basic equation: 
S (states) + M (markets) = P/E (political economy).86
80 Gilpin 1987, p. 11.
81 Gilpin 1987, pp. 10-11.
82 Gilpin 1987, p. 9.
83 Gilpin 1987, p. 65. ‘Marx observed that the market, or capitalist system, was a revolutionary 
departure...’
84 Gilpin 1987, p. 53.
85 Strange uses PIER, a reference to the title of Spero’s 1977 book The Politics o f International 
Economic Relations, to refer to a particular approach to IPE which takes the form of ‘economic foreign 
policy’ Strange 1995, pp. 164-65. She includes in this camp Blake and Walters 1976.
86 Strange 1996 p. 37.
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In Gilpin’s case, this leads to a number of fascinating investigations of 
international finance and exchange rate mechanisms, international trade practices, 
multinational corporations and international production as well as economic 
development issues. As such, his work contributes to a much fuller image of 
international political economy. However it does so in largely quantitative terms -  he
R7seeks to understand ‘the totality of political and economic reality’ by adding data
about the other to the one. No broader sense of the relationship between the two
spheres can be gleaned. We have more information but no explanation.
Strange, though considerably more sophisticated in terms of the criteria she
sets for good theory88 falls into a pattern of analysis similar to the one described
above. At no point is the assumption that there exists separate state and market
spheres explained. The primary concern for Strange as for most IPE theorists is to get
to the issue of how they ‘actually’ relate.
A problem universally acknowledged but never satisfactorily resolved is how 
to relate in one synthesizing study the political system of states and the 
economic system of markets.89
Her interpretation of the globalisation trend illustrates her approach. She argues that 
globalisation ‘affects states but originates outside the state -  in all four of the primary 
structures of the global political economy: the security structure, the production 
structure, the financial structure and the knowledge structure.’90 In what sense these 
structures are truly ‘primary’ remains undisclosed. What we are told is that ‘in each of 
these [structures], markets as well as states determined processes.’91 What we have 
with Strange is the same assumption about a separate logic to states and markets, but 
added to this is a further breakdown of reality asserted in terms of structures of
87 Gilpin 1987, p. 5.
88 See prologue to Strange 1988.
89 Strange 1996, p. 37.
90 Strange 1995, p. 166.
91 Strange 1995, p. 166.
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activity. In some sense Strange provides a fuller, more multi-variable picture of state- 
market relations, than Gilpin, but it remains nonetheless a picture rather than an 
explanation.
Even Robert Cox who has gone furthest to break with the IPE tradition, can be 
seen to remain locked in a conceptual framework involving fairly rigid analytical 
structures, the origins of which remain unclear. Cox is representative of a neo- 
gramscian approach to IPE and has been at the forefront of establishing a critical 
theory tradition of IPE.92 Cox’s work attempts to take seriously the project of 
denaturalising social forms and explaining historical change. He argues that his 
approach to IR ‘does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted 
but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and whether they 
might be in the process of changing.’93
In Production, Power and World Order Cox identifies three main spheres of 
activity: social relations of production, the state, and world order.94 Social relations of 
production are the basis of power in society, they engender social forces which 
operate across all three spheres.95 The state, or rather ‘the state-civil society complex’, 
includes the societal apparatus through which the interests of the hegemonic class are 
represented on a national scale. Finally world orders develop where a particular mode 
of social relations of production expands beyond the boundaries of a single state- 
societal complex to the level of the international.96 These three elements are 
interrelated but with no universal causality assumed.
92 Other neo-gramscian IPE theorists include Stephen Gill, see Gill and Law 1988, Gill 1993, 1997; 
Kees van der Pijl, See Pijl 1984, and Mark Rupert, see Rupert 2002. For a general discussion of the 
neo-gramscian approach to IPE see Gill 1993 and Cox and Schecter 2002.
93 Cox 1981, p. 129.
94 Cox 1987.
95 Cox 1987, pp. 1-10.
96 Cox 1987, pp. 149-150.
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The unity of the three spheres is to be found in what Gramsci referred to as 
‘historic blocs’. For Cox these are periods of time in which certain powers dominate 
international relations. Stable order is brought about by a hegemon ‘manufacturing 
compatibility’ ‘between ideas, institutions and material capabilities, each of which 
possesses a real autonomy -  ‘no determinism need be assumed’.97 This granting of a 
real autonomy within a broader, more sophisticated, understanding of capitalism 
stems from what some have characterised as a desire by Cox to ‘avoid the twin evils 
of economism and idealism’.98 Cox sees his approach as eclectic, taking a focus on 
class and production from Marx, but giving autonomy to the realm of ideas in order to 
make sense of changing state-market relations within the history of capitalism.
The ‘historic bloc’ is a device used by Cox to explain why state-market 
relations take one form at one point in capitalism’s history and another at another 
point in time. As such the historic bloc seems to provide an explanation additional to 
that provided by the changing nature of capitalist social relations themselves.99 It is an 
explanation rooted in the realm of ideology and grants an autonomy to this sphere. 
With this ‘historic bloc’ approach Cox has examined phases of imperialism, 
hegemony and crisis, all of which are of vital interest to the study of International 
Relations.
Ultimately however we are left with an analysis involving disparate parts of 
the social world which need to be melded together by the theory of hegemony. In 
Cox’s image of international relations, the spheres of economics and politics have 
been recharacterised as ‘production’ and ‘power’. These are separate spheres, the 
relationship between which can only be explained in terms of the hegemonic projects
97 Cox 1986, p. 218.
98 Cox embraces the description of his work as ‘eclectic’.
99 For a useful discussion see Lacher 2000, briefly outlined below.
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of specific social classes. We are left with a sense that even this most sophisticated 
strand of IPE theory has not entirely escaped the logic of the separation of spheres.
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the desire to better understand 
the relationship between states and markets in IPE is widely shared. One might go so 
far as to say that all efforts in the discipline are oriented to this goal. Ronen Palan, in 
an introduction to the recent New Trends in Global Political Economy, refers to the 
‘current theoretical realignment’ which the contributions to the book represent, all 
attempting to meet the theoretical challenge of IPE to ‘overcome the conventional 
distinction between politics and economics and come up with a truly integrated 
political-economy approach’.100 Unfortunately, none of the perspectives on offer, 
which include Cem y’s compromise,101 propose a theory of the totality within which 
state and market parts might be understood to exist. All recent attempts within the 
discipline of IR to make sense of this relationship have done so from the starting point 
of two or more separate spheres which must be correctly put back together. Even 
Nitzan and Bichler’s contribution to Palan’s collection which is most sophisticated in 
its explicit attempt to ‘break the dualism of “economics” and “politics”’only gets as 
far as saying that ‘state and capital are not separate entities standing against each 
other, but rather [are] partly overlapping institutions with intimately intertwined 
histories.’102 What remains missing is a sense of the broader context, the totality of
100 Palan 2000, p. 3.
101 Cemy’s adherence to a separation of spheres approach can be seen in the following statement, ‘The 
“capitalist world-system” is a system of powerful but tension-ridden (non self-regulating) capitalist 
markets intertwined with nation-states with their own autonomous sources of structural power.’ Cemy 
1990. It is unclear why he footnotes this comment to Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation. The 
status of Polanyi in relation to these debates over the separation of states and markets is complicated. 
Considerable debate on the subject has taken place, with many in IPE using Polanyi’s notion of 
‘embedded liberalism’ quite uncritically. See, for instance, Ruggie 1991, 1994. Wood, however, 
attempts to separate Polanyi from Weber, citing Polanyi’s criticisms of Weber’s method. For an 
invaluable discussion of what is at stake in this controversy see Lacher 1999. See also Bienefeld 1991, 
Block and Somers 1984 and Block 1991. For the original text see Polanyi 2001.
102 Nitzan and Bichler 2000, p. 68.
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historical social relations within which these two institutions have developed and 
intertwined in various ways.
What unites these otherwise dissimilar theorists of IPE is a desire to avoid 
economic reductionism. It is for this reason that they add other factors, political, 
military, etc. to their analysis. Their methodological approach is based on what we 
might call a ‘thin’ definition of capitalism which associates it with the market, leaving 
vast areas of social life seemingly unexplained and irreducible to this single 
‘economic’ sphere. In Cox, and among the neo-gramscians more generally, the 
understanding of capitalism is more developed, but an autonomy is granted to 
political, economic and ideological factors in order to make sense of the shifting 
patterns of state-market relations. All these writers, from Gilpin to Cox and beyond, 
share an understanding of states and markets as intertwined and interactive. What is 
lacking is a sense of the broader logic within which these two social forms exist. 
Without this sense of broader logic we can shed little light on the nature of their 
changing relationship.
It is worth noting here, before we move on to the critique of this Weberian 
method, that the above characterisation of IPE applies also to what is known as a 
historical sociological approach to IR and IPE. Weber is, in the words of Raymond 
Aron, 'the sociologist’103 and historical sociology has become increasingly popular in 
IPE, as the globalisation debate informs the discipline.104 The Weberian approach is 
epitomised in the work of Michael Mann but is also evident in the writings of Theda 
Skocpol and Anthony Giddens.105 These neo-Weberian sociologists explicitly
103 Aron 1968, p. 245.
104 See Halliday 1994 and Hobden 1998 for a discussion of the possible role for historical sociology in 
IR. See Shaw 2000, and Hobson 1998, for a discussion of the merits of historical sociology for the 
discipline of IPE. See Weiss 2000 and Mann 1997 for examples of a historical sociological approach to 
the question of the retreat of the state and globalization.
105 See for instance Mann 1993, Skocpol 1979, Giddens 1985.
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embrace a multi-causal explanation of history based on a ‘thin’ definition of 
capitalism -  one which cannot account for ‘non-economic’ factors. These theorists 
base their critique of Marx on his apparent economic reductionism -  his inattention to 
other sources of social power -  political, military and ideological.
For Mann the corrective to Marx’s approach involves giving adequate 
attention to what he considers to be ‘all four sources of social power’: military, 
economic, political and ideological, and a consideration of the way in which these 
spheres interact.106 For Giddens, this involves a recognition of the independent social 
force of both political and ideological factors. The Nation State and Violence, and 
indeed Giddens’ entire oeuvre, is an attempt to account for factors which his (though 
not, as we shall see below, Marx’s) understanding of capitalism alone cannot 
provide.107 Finally, for Skocpol, it was considered essential to ‘bring the state back in’ 
because of the apparent failure of Marxist theorists to account for the activities of the 
state within a theory of capitalism.108 For Skocpol, as for Mann and Giddens, the state 
has interests and a logic of its own that may at times correspond to the logic of 
capitalism, but cannot be reduced to it. With these historical sociologists who have so 
influenced the third wave of the globalisation debate, particularly Mann in the case of 
Weiss, and Giddens in the case of Cemy and Cox, description persists, explanation 
eludes.
Incidentally, Wallerstein and the ‘world systems approach’ more generally is 
included in some accounts of historical sociology in IR,109 and should not be ignored
106 Mann 1993.
107 Giddens 1985. See also Giddens 1984,1994 and 1996.
108 Skocpol 1979. Skocpol was responding to Marxist theories of the state which appeared to account 
for its behaviour in terms of its direct representation of the interests of the capitalist class. This was the 
perspective taken by Miliband, for instance, and which sparked a debate over the nature of the state 
throughout the 1960s and 70s. See Clarke 1991 for a discussion of the state debate as a whole, 
including Miliband’s contributions.
109 On the ‘world systems approach’ see especially Wallerstein 2000 and Chase-Dunn 1977, 1989. 
Hobden 1998 includes them in his discussion of historical sociology in IR.
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here. While it is impossible to do justice to what is an enormous body of highly 
sophisticated work, it is possible to make one observation which places Wallerstein in 
the camp above. Wallerstein defines capitalism in terms of exchange, in other words, 
market relations rather than relations of production, which is why he dates the 
beginning of capitalism centuries ahead of most classical Marxist approaches. His 
argument with Skocpol over whether the ‘state’ postdates or predates capitalism, is 
illustrative of his tendency to see the two social forms as separate.110 For Wallerstein, 
as for the theorists above, the state, or in his case a hierarchal system of states, is 
something which has a relationship to capitalism which can be examined in terms of 
the interrelation of two spheres.
2.4 A Classical Marxist Critique
2.4.1 A Marxist Critique o f Weberian Pluralism
A powerful critique of Weber’s method has been undertaken by the Marxist Ellen
Wood. It is here that we can begin to link up more closely the two features of Weber’s
thought discussed above, the separation of political and economic spheres and his
particular understanding of capitalism. Wood acknowledges that the case for the
multi-causal approach of Weber and his followers is that it avoids economic
reductionism. Her response is as follows.
Weber’s causal pluralism has been won at considerable cost. It is not just, as 
some critics might argue, that a causal pluralism as eclectic as this is 
tantamount to denying causation altogether. It is rather that the complexity of 
Weber’s theory of social causation is, to a large extent, spurious. The 
autonomy, indeed the definition, of, say, political or military as against 
‘economic’ power as Weber understands them depends on universalizing a
110 The debate between Skocpol and Wallerstein relates to their respective texts Skocpol 1979, see 
Wallerstein 2000, see also Skocpol 1977.
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conception of the economic which is peculiar to a specific -  capitalist -  
social form which already presupposes a distinctive separation of ‘economic’ 
from political or military power.111
What Wood is suggesting here is that Weber, ignorant of the totality from 
which he has plucked his notion of ‘economic’ and ‘political’ spheres, has read back 
into the past categories which only make sense in the present, under capitalism.112 
Weber’s approach transhistoricises and therefore naturalises social forms which are 
historically and geographically specific. Weber has taken the separation of political 
and economic spheres, a feature which Wood argues is specific to modem capitalism, 
for granted.
Wood argues that for Marx the appearance of separate ‘political’ and 
‘economic’ spheres was a peculiar feature of capitalism that required explanation. In 
Capital Marx explains that the categories of state and civil society, politics and 
economics, which the political economists take for granted, naturalise and 
transhistoricise, i.e. read back into history, are in fact historically novel, peculiar to 
the capitalist mode of production.
For Marx, capitalism is not an ‘economic’ sphere reducible to the market, 
rather it is a historically-specific set of social relations which take the appearance of 
separate ‘economic’ and ‘political’ forms.113 As Wood explains, capitalism takes this 
form, which did not exist previously, because of the peculiar method of surplus 
extraction which the capitalist mode of production involves.114 Under feudalism, for 
instance, direct political and military coercion was applied in order for the surplus 
product of one class to be appropriated by the other. Under capitalism, by contrast,
111 Wood 1995, p. 174.
112 This is an argument which is well presented by Sayer 1985.
113 As Burnham notes, it is this form analysis which really distinguishes Marx from other theorists of 
his time. Burnham 1995, p. 135. Marx explained the social forms which capitalism created and 
political economists only described.
114 Wood 1995, pp. 28-29.
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given the expropriation of the peasantry from the land and the commodification of 
labour power, direct (what Wood calls ‘extra-economic’)115 coercion is not required. 
The labourer, no longer attached to a piece of land from which he may be able to 
secure his own reproduction, as well as the surplus required by his ‘political’ superior, 
lord or king, is forced to sell his labour power in return for wages. As Wood argues 
‘economic need supplies the immediate compulsion forcing the worker to transfer 
surplus labour to the capitalist in order to gain access to the means of production’.116
As Marx explains in Capital in this apparently equitable exchange of labour 
power for wages is hidden the exploitation of the worker and the source of all profit
117for the capitalist. The fact that it takes place in an apparently separate ‘economic’ 
sphere of exchange is what allowed the political economists of the day to place this 
extremely ‘political’ act, the expropriation of the peasantry, in the realm of 
economics. In this way an area of study was bom which sought to understand the way 
in which the political interacts with the economic and vice versa. For Marx, this 
political economy approach, was not wrong, in that it reflected a new reality, but it 
was superficial, guilty of bringing into merely mechanical relation features which 
were organically connected in a particular set of social relations. He said of bourgeois 
economists that ‘[i]n bringing things which are organically related into an accidental 
relation, into a merely reflexive connection, they display their crudity and lack of 
conceptual understanding’.118
In sum, Wood explains that, for Marx, capitalism refers to an historically 
specific set of social relations in which economic and political spheres are 
differentiated on the basis of those very social relations. It is the development of
115 Wood 1995, p. 29.
116 Wood 1995, p. 29.
117 This is a reference to the ‘labour theory of value’ which runs throughout Capital.
118 Marx 1973, p. 88.
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capitalist social relations, which she describes as the ‘privatisation’ of formerly 
political functions of production, i.e. surplus extraction and appropriation, which 
creates an apparently separate sovereign state and an apparently autonomous world 
market.119 It is this apparent separation which Weber so uncritically accepted as a 
transhistorical fact.
This has obviously been an extremely brief and schematic account of the way 
in which the apparently separate spheres of politics and economics emerge under 
capitalism. In the next chapter, we will look critically and in more detail at precisely 
what this image of capitalism involves. For now, however, the summary of W ood’s 
argument above, contrasting Marx and Weber’s theories of capitalism serves as the 
basis of the classical Marxist critique of the Weberian approach. We will now turn to 
look at how this argument, whether derived from Wood or from other classical 
Marxists, has informed a critique of the method of IP E .120
2.4.2 A Marxist Critique o f IPE
The critique of the Weberian approach outlined above is the basis for a now well- 
established critique of IPE from a classical Marxist perspective, undertaken by Peter 
Bumham, Chris Boyle, and Simon Bromley.121 It is no exaggeration to say that this 
critique is directed at all theorists of IPE who do not have a classical Marxist 
approach. This is indicated by Burnham’s comment that ‘almost without exception the
1,9 Wood 1995, pp. 28-29.
120 Burnham for instance cites Holloway and Picciotto as a source of this argument about the nature of 
capitalism as the apparent separation of spheres. Bumham 1991. Holloway and Picciotto 1977. Wood 
and Rosenberg credit Sayer with a useful exposition of the argument. Sayer 1985.
121 See Boyle 1994, Bromley 1995 and Burnham 1991,1994 and 1995. See also Rosenberg 1994 where 
the critique of IPE is implicit in his critique of realist IR, and as such is not fully developed as an IPE 
intervention. We shall look at Rosenberg’s work in detail in the next chapter as it is one of the most 
extended expositions of the ‘apparent separation of spheres’ theory of capitalism in relation to the 
international sphere.
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discipline [IPE] eschews a study of social relations, opting instead for a crude
amalgam of neoclassical economics, pluralist domestic political science and realist
international theory.’122 It is the fundamental nature of this critique, directed as it is
against all those who do not share a classical Marxist analysis of capitalism, that has
made it plausible to throw the net so widely over IPE, as has been the case above. It
also suggests that a real break through in the theoretical development of IPE may be
possible, involving leaving behind all that has come before, starting over from first
principles as Strange indicated may be necessary. As will be argued below, even the
neo-gramscians cannot, in their current state, be rescued. In fact, the neo-gramscians,
perhaps because they come closest to the Marxist analysis of capitalism but ultimately
fall short, come under particular attack. There will, accordingly, be a relative focus on
the critique of neo-gramscianism here.
First, in terms of IPE as a whole, in 1995, Bromley proposed a ‘rethinking of
IPE’,123 inspired by the work of Derek Sayer.124 Sayer, like Wood, has argued that
Marx conceived of capitalism in terms of social relations, characterised by the
historically novel differentiation of ‘economic’ and ‘political’ spheres. He argues that,
[t]hese [capitalist] forms of modem sociality include what is, for the first 
time in human history, conceivable as ‘the economy’ and it essential 
counterpart ‘the state’. Both rest on a radical transformation of the character 
of social relationships and the nature of social power, in brief, from what 
Marx called relations of personal dependency to relations which are 
‘impersonal’ and mediated by ‘things’: money, bureaucracy.125
Bromley’s argument, follows the lines of W ood’s in terms of historicising the 
apparent separation of state and market, insisting upon its basis in capitalist social
122 Bumham 1994, p. 2. It is likely that the only exception Bumham has in mind is himself and 
possibly Bromley and Boyle.
23 This is the title of Bromley’s article and an invitation which few have taken up in the manner in 
which he intended. Possible reasons for this will be explored in the next chapter when we discuss the 
approach in more detail. Bromley 1995.
li4 Sayer 1985.
125 Sayer 1991, p. 2 cited in Bromley 1995, p. 239.
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relations.126 The effects on IPE of not developing this understanding of the basis of 
separate political and economic spheres is explained by Bromley in the following 
terms: ‘[b]y taking the reproduction of capitalist social forms for granted, IPE has 
ignored large swathes of the historical creation of the sovereign states system and the
197world market as well as their continual social reproduction.’ Bromley’s attempt to
alert IPE to the problems associated with a Weberian methodology was followed by
an analysis by Boyle who argued that ‘IPE as a discipline fails to demonstrate how
the global forces which shape our lives really are rooted in specific historically-
constituted relations between people.’ 128
Instead of uncovering the social relations which actually constitute the 
unique differentiated structure of the modem international system, IPE tries 
to weld together the political and economic pieces of that system into a 
complex theoretical model. The effect is to obscure the dynamic social 
process underlying the modem international system’s expansion over the past
19 0two centuries...
This is a critique which Boyle applies to the entire discipline of IPE from neo­
realism to critical theory.
Both Gilpin and Cox take the distinctive form of the modem international 
system - a state system embedded in networks of money and trade - as the 
expression of a progressive elaboration of an essentially autonomous mode of 
economic organsisation. Whether this is seen as the consequence of the 
inherent dynamism of exchange or the hegemonic class strategy, what is not 
disputed is the self regulating character of money and commodity circulation.
So intuitively obvious is this thing called the ‘economy’ that IPE while 
recognising that an autonomous world market is a relatively novel 
development, never once questions the fundamental political-economic 
categories it employs to theorise the international system.130
126 Bromley 1995, p. 240.
127 Bromley 1995, p. 235.
128 Boyle 1994, p. 352. This article was inspired by Rosenberg’s application of C Wright Mills 
Sociological Imagination to the study of IR. Boyle then attempted to apply Mills approach to the study 
of IPE. The fact that Mills was quintessentially a sociologist and had a rather pick and mix relationship 
to Marxist theory appears not to have deterred Rosenberg or Boyle in applying his standards for good 
theory to IR/IPE.
129 Boyle 1994, p. 352.
130 Boyle 1994, p. 354 Boyle notes that this was one of the key criticisms levelled at Polanyi forefather 
of IPE by Maurice Godelier.
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Boyle, like W ood and Bromley, argues that what needs to be uncovered are 
the social relations which gave rise to the autonomous form of the ‘economy’ in the 
first place.131 His examination of international trade in early modem Europe suggests 
that the separation of coercion and commerce is a relatively recent development 
corresponding to the emergence and spread of global capitalism. ‘Commodity 
exchange and money are ancient but it was only in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century that we encounter the appearance of an autonomous economic system with its 
own law-like dynamics’.132 IPE theorists fail to ask why this was the case. Boyle, 
adopting a classical Marxist approach, asks the question and then explains the 
development in terms of a society based on wage labour, and impersonal price 
relations, i.e capitalist society. The resulting perspective is that the separate existence 
of an international system of states and a world market is not a timeless reality nor is 
it simply a difference of degree or scale of activity, rather it is seen to be a product of 
capitalist relations and as such represents a much deeper transformation of social 
relations.
The perils of not taking a classical Marxist approach are explained in the 
following terms.
EPE’s attempt to model the crisis-ridden history of the last two centuries in 
terms of the ‘dialectical interaction’ between economic and political levels,133 
or national and global structures, in other words, reifies the actual social 
relations and processes at work, squeezing these into a set of false 
dichotomies which obscure the narrative thread of capitalist society’s 
contradictory development.’134
131 Boyle 1994, p. 357.
132 Boyle 1994, p. 356.
133 This is a reference to Gill’s description of ‘the historical dialectic between economics and politics’ 
as that which constitutes the focus of IPE’s analysis. See Boyle 1994, p. 353 and Gill 1993, p. 15.
134 Boyle 1994, p. 362.
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It is this kind of ‘obscuring of the narrative thread’ which may be key to the
inability of IPE to move beyond description to explanation. Before taking this up, we
turn to the final contributor to the classical Marxist critique of IPE.
Peter Bumham has been at the forefront of critiques of the IPE method and
has led the charge against neo-Gramscianism.135 Bumham, has described the
implications of W eber’s method in the following terms.
The Weberian approach to the social order is committed to accepting both the 
structural variability and historical specificity of data. Variables which 
comprise a social order -  the economy, the polity and civil society -  are 
given no overall structure, but rather each has a real autonomy which 
precludes overall determination.136
It is Bumham who has described Cox’s method as ‘little more than a version
of Weberian pluralism oriented to the study of IPE’.137 Bumham argues that Cox’s
attempts to navigate between economism and idealism, his insistence that within a
historic bloc, material capabilities, ideas and institutions have a real autonomy, leads
him into the trap of Weberian multi-causality.
However laudable in theory, the true consequence of this position is to 
produce a pluralist empiricism which lacks the power to explain either the 
systematic connection between values, social relations and institutions or the 
extent to which the historical appearance of capital as a social relation 
transforms the social order in such a way that all relations are subsumed 
under the capital relation as the basis of the valorisation process.138
Burnham’s criticism of Cox is strongly put. It is worth investigating it basis 
more closely. We have noted above that Cox and other neo-Gramscians do not hold a 
Weberian-style ‘thin’ definition of capitalism in terms of the market. Cox places a 
great deal of importance on classes and on the sphere of production as aspects of 
capitalist social relations. In this way it is relatively more difficult to characterise his
135 Bumham extends his critique to the ‘Amsterdam school’ which includes van der Pijl 1984 and 
Overbeek 1990 who have developed the notion of a ‘comprehensive concept of control’ to describe a 
bid for hegemony. Bumham argues that this concept serves the same function as the ‘historic bloc’ and 
Overbeek and van der Pijl are consequently vulnerable to the same critique. Burnham 1991 p. 87.
136 Bumham 1991, p. 77.
137 Bumham 1991, p. 77.
138 Bumham 1991, p. 78.
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work as neo-Weberian. It is perhaps safer to say that he leaves himself vulnerable to 
the accusation.
A useful explanation of the way in which Cox unwittingly reinforces a 
Weberian multi-causal approach can be found in the work of Hannes Lacher. Lacher 
rejects the easy association of Cox with Weber, arguing instead that the separate 
logics accorded to economic, ideological and political forces exist for Cox not as 
transhistorical realities, but as the result of the struggle among classes within a 
particular historic bloc.
It must be noted that the historical structures of society do not, for Cox, 
possess distinct logics which derive from the nature of the economy or the 
timeless laws of international politics, laws which would then combine so as 
to generate specific historical processes (as in the work of, for instance,
Michael Mann). The relationships between the levels of an historic bloc can 
only be understood in the context of the others, their logics can only be 
derived from their social purposes which social classes in their struggle for 
hegemony have implanted in them for the period of the existence of an 
historic bloc.139
What this means however, as Lacher notes, is that ‘the concrete relation between 
political and economic structures is, for Cox, the product of the hegemonic order of 
an epoch, not of capitalism per se.’140 Cox’s method involves ‘an understanding of 
historic blocs as discrete chunks of history each embodying a petrified 
constellation’.141 The consequence of this is that ‘[n]o meta-structure exists on which 
capitalism as a mode of development could be located.’142
What Lacher is suggesting is that Cox’s historic bloc model acknowledges the 
overarching significance of capitalist social relations, (producing as they do the class 
factions which vye for hegemonic control), but within the historic blocs is reduced to
w  143empiricism.
139 Lacher 1999, p. 18.
140 Lacher 1999, p. 18 in relation to Cox 1987, p. 50.
141 Lacher 1999, p. 20.
142 Lacher 1999, p. 20.
143 Lacher 2004.
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As a mode of development capitalism disappears almost completely in 
theoretical terms while being all pervasive empirically. Most crucially, it has 
no theoretical purchase on explanations of the transitions from one capitalist 
historic bloc to another. ‘Capitalism’ remains historically vacant.144
For all the talk about capital, classes and production, Cox has evacuated his concept
of capitalism of much of its substance by saying that capitalism is ‘different’ in
‘different’ periods. It may be, but what makes them all capitalist? What dynamic is
being reproduced and how can it account for capitalism’s different forms? Cox
appears to have given up attempting to answer that question. Lacher argues that it is
in order to escape from the structuralist approach of his reference points, Poulantzas
in particular, that Cox allows each historical structure to be understood in its own
terms. There exists an instrumentalist bias in explaining the transition between
historic blocs and a lack of interest in developing a theoretical model of the state.
According to Lacher, ‘the price is a descriptive approach which represents change but
provides only an instrumental theory of it.’145
We will return to Cox briefly in the next chapter as it will be argued there that
he was correct to seek an explanation of changing state-market relations within the
history of capitalism. Where he went wrong, is to think he had found one. What is
unfortunate with Cox is that in his effort to catch the empirical detail of mainstream
IPE, he dropped the classical Marxist analysis of capitalism. The next chapter, and
indeed the rest of the thesis, will make the argument that it is possible, and quite
necessary, to hold onto both.
While the case of the neo-gramscians is somewhat complicated, it would
appear from the above that the basic classical Marxist criticism of IPE holds and has
some very serious implications. IPE theorists do not have, and may need, a theory of
144 Lacher 1999, p. 20.
145 ‘Cox has to rely on the instrumental agency of particular ruling class factions in choosing the new 
modes of accumulation.’ Lacher 2004.
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capitalism as a set of social relations in which separate state and market spheres are
differentiated. Herein may lie the cause of the fact that IPE has been incapable of
understanding the relationship between states and markets, and has offered little
insight into the question posed by the globalisation debate, of the apparent retreat of
the state. Burnham indicates that for IPE theorists,
[s]tates and markets are treated as self-evident entities and no attempt is 
made either to develop or relate to existing theories of ‘the state’ or to 
consider the inner connection (rather than the apparent external relationship) 
between the state and the market. Instead ‘the state’ is fetishised whilst the 
market is dehistoricised and viewed as a technical arena in which the external, 146state intervenes .
This is, in fact, a very accurate description of the approach taken by those 
engaged in the globalisation debate. Precisely the problem we identified, in the first 
chapter, was an idealised image of the state combined with an eclectic model of the 
world market. In the third wave, to provide the most empirically accurate image of 
events, it was understood that the state was intervening as an external force with its 
own motives. At the end of the last chapter, Weiss described these changes in state- 
market relations in terms of the states adaption to ‘circumstances’. It was unclear 
what the circumstances were which could explain the states altered state.
What the above analysis seems to confirm is that what was missing in W eiss’ 
account was a theory of these ‘circumstances’, some sense of the broader historical 
and social context within which the transformation of state and market was taking 
place. The classical Marxist analysis of ‘thick capitalism’ within which both state and 
market forces can be understood holds that promise. It is this theory of capitalism 
which may be capable of dealing with the paradox of the apparent ‘retreat of the 
state’. A more detailed exposition of this theory of capitalism will be developed in the 
next chapter.
146 Burnham 1995, p. 136.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have laid the responsibility for the superficial and eclectic nature of 
the globalisation debate at the door of IPE. I have attempted to show that IPE 
emerged as a discipline precisely to investigate the central problem of globalisation -  
the apparent retreat of the state. Despite over three decades dedicated to analysing the 
changing nature of state-market relations, IPE has made remarkably little progress. It 
has been described by even its most loyal supporters as a discipline in a state of 
theoretical crisis. Through a brief examination of the debates surrounding 
‘interdependence’ in the 1960s and 70s, we see that theorists of IPE are now simply 
applying the same theoretical assumptions to the globalisation debate and as a result, 
they are having precisely the same debate. Understanding the relationship between 
states and markets on a global scale has been the task of contemporary IPE, but it 
remains a mystery unsolved.
In the second section of the chapter, I argued that there was a common IPE 
method which may provide some explanation for why the discipline as a whole has so 
spectacularly failed to produce an explanation as opposed to a description of the way 
in which states and markets interact. It was argued that this IPE approach was rooted 
in an essentially Weberian methodology of multi-causation, motivated by an 
epistemological pessimism and a concern to avoid economic reductionism. Weber 
added political and ideological factors to his image of purely economic capitalism in 
order to derive a fuller image of the social world. IPE theorists, equally motivated to 
avoid economism accepted, to varying degrees, the Weberian model of separate 
political and economic spheres, corresponding to the activities of states and markets. 
All granted a real autonomy to ‘non-economic’ forces after which point, however
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highly involved they believed the relationship between states and markets to be, they 
understood it as a relationship between two separate social forms with their own 
distinct logics. It was further argued that the historical sociological approach to IR 
and IPE was employing the same method of multi-causality to the same descriptive 
effect.
Finally, in the last section of the chapter I have outlined the classical Marxist 
critique of the Weberian method, as it applies to Weber and to the neo-Weberians in 
IPE. The argument has been that the Weberians have naturalised a separation between 
economics and politics which Marx has shown to be historically specific to 
capitalism. It has been suggested that this criticism of IPE, and the alternative ‘thick’ 
theory of capitalism upon which the criticism is based, may provide the means for 
moving beyond a mechanical interaction model of state-market relations toward 
something which is more organically formed and historically located. Exactly what 
this more nuanced definition of capitalism entails will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
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Chapter Three
Classical Marxism: The ‘Apparent’ Separation of State and Market in IR
3.1 Introduction
In the last chapter we introduced a ‘classical marxist’ critique of the Weberian 
approach to state-market relations. It was argued that the neo-Weberians, in the 
globalisation debate and in the discipline of IPE, took for granted a separation of state 
and market spheres, economic and politics, which was in fact peculiar to capitalism. 
In uncritically representing these forms as separate spheres, the neo-Weberians 
naturalised and transhistoricised features of historical social relations, rendering them 
impermeable to explanation as opposed to description. Relocating these apparently 
separate realms within a historical understanding of the social relations of capitalism 
was understood to be the way out of mere description toward a deeper understanding 
of many developments of interest to IPE including, the apparent ‘retreat of the state’. 
We did not, however, have the space to fully explore this alternative ‘classical 
marxist’ theory of capitalism and its implications for understanding state-market 
relations. This will be the task of the present chapter.
In the first section of this chapter we will flesh out the ‘apparent separation of 
spheres’ theory of capitalism upon which the critique of the neo-Weberians is based. 
Here we introduce the work of Justin Rosenberg who has perhaps done most to bring 
this perspective to the discipline of IR. Rosenberg’s work provides the fullest 
presentation of the ‘separation of spheres’ theory of capitalism within IR, but has as 
its focus not a critique of DPE, but of the Realist school of international relations.1 The
1 Rosenberg 1994.
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methodological connection between EPE and realist IR, which we have not yet 
specified, is that Realist IR takes for granted the separation out of ‘purely political’ 
states, concerned as it is with the interactions of these sovereign bodies in abstraction 
from other social forces.2 Rosenberg attempts to reappropriate ‘the fantastic forms of 
states and markets’ upon which, he argues, both realist IR, and IPE, are based.3 His 
use of M arx’s analysis of capitalism historically roots the modem states system in 
capitalist social relations, thus moving beyond an IPE critique to what may be the 
positive project which this alternative approach has to offer. Rosenberg’s work 
represents the ‘separation of spheres’ theory of capitalism applied to the international 
sphere, taken to it logical conclusion and, as such, shall be the central focus of our 
discussion here.
In the second section of the chapter I develop an intensive critique of 
Rosenberg’s explanation of the Realist description of the international system. This 
discussion shows the limitations of the direct application of a ‘classical Marxist’ 
understanding of capitalism to the international relations of states. In so doing, it 
draws out a number of the contradictions involved in the ‘separation of spheres’ 
approach as applied to the critique of Realist IR. It is argued that Rosenberg is unable 
to explain much that Realism describes and that, in his effort to do so, his 
understanding of capitalism is compromised. These problems arise directly from 
Rosenberg’s ‘classical marxist’ image of the ‘purely political state’.
In the third section of the chapter we consider the practical and theoretical 
implications of this ‘purely political’ state and its limitations for explaining much of 
the behaviour of states as we know it. Here we look at a range of theorists who take 
this approach and consider how it relates to the Marxist state debate of the 1970s. It
2 Realist IR scholars include Waltz 1959, 1979; Morgenthau 1985; Bull 1977; Gilpin 1981; and, 
although less-easily categorised as such, Carr 1946.
3 Rosenberg 1994, p. 173.
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will be argued that ‘the relative autonomy of the state’ position is one with which 
most Marxists have never adequately dispensed. The common ground between a 
Weberian understanding of the ‘separation of state and market’ and the classical 
Marxist understanding of their ‘apparent separation’ is shown to be much greater than 
the latter would like to acknowledge. We conclude this section with a discussion of 
two very different understandings of the state and state sovereignty held by Weberians 
and Marxists and we consider how these distinct definitions have very different 
implications for our understanding of the ‘retreat of the state’.
The conclusion of this chapter is that the ‘separation of spheres’ theory of 
capitalism provides an important critique of the neo-Weberian method, but is 
incapable of explaining much that we have come to understand as ‘actually existing 
capitalism’ in terms of the variety of state-market relations which have obtained. It is 
a further conclusion that this limitation is unnecessary and that the ‘separation of 
spheres’ approach can be rescued from marginalisation through modifying this theory 
of capitalism so that it can, in fact, accommodate more of the variety of capitalist 
relations which IPE theorists have usefully described. It is that mismatch, of ‘classical 
Marxism’ as a critique which accounts for context (capitalism) but not the variation 
within it, and IPE as a project which describes variation without a sense of its context 
(without a theory of capitalism which could explain it), which is explored in this 
chapter, and which motivates the thesis as a whole.
3.2 The Empire o f Civil Society
Hobden and Wyn Jones use the label ‘New Marxism’ to refer to theorists of 
international relations who have ‘returned to the fundamental tenets of Marxist
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thought and sought to reappropriate ideas that they regard as having been neglected or 
somehow misinterpreted by subsequent generations.” These are theorists ‘who derive 
their ideas more directly from M arx’s own writings’.4 One of the most influential of 
these, has been Justin Rosenberg who epitomises ‘new Marxism’s’ attention to the 
canon, as he directly applies the insights of Capital to theorising the international 
system. Rosenberg’s work is worth examining in some detail as it involves an 
application of the classical Marxist ‘separation of spheres’ theory of capitalism 
beyond the critique of neo-Weberian description towards an explanation of the social 
world. In other words Rosenberg’s work tests the explanatory potential of this 
alternative theory of capitalism.
Empire o f Civil Society is Rosenberg’s core text, an ambitious and important 
book, both for the discipline of IR and for the development of classical Marxism. In 
this text, he takes seriously Martin W ight’s observation that ‘there is no such thing as 
international theory’5 and attempts to remedy that by developing ‘Marx’s social 
theory of capitalist society’ into ‘an alternative, non-Realist, framework for 
understanding the modem international system’.6 He does this by redefining two core 
categories of Realist IR theory: sovereignty and anarchy. He seeks to show that these 
two concepts can be reinterpreted to ‘illuminate the ways in which the modem 
international system is unmistakably of a piece with the capitalist social structures 
which compose its leading constituent national societies.’7
Rosenberg’s theory of sovereignty as a ‘capitalist political form’ stems from 
his ‘classical Marxist’ understanding of capitalism, as discussed in the last chapter, as
4 Hobden and Wyn Jones 1997, p. 142.
5 Wight 1966, p. 26.
6 Rosenberg 1994, p. 7.
7 Rosenberg 1994, p. 7.
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a set of social relations in which surplus extraction takes a ‘purely economic’ form.8 
The reasons it takes this form have to do with the expropriation of the labourers from 
the land and their subsequent requirement to sell their labour-power on the market in 
order to survive.9 Exploitation via the market grants capitalism a ‘purely economic’ 
form, but that does not mean that a surplus has not been appropriated from one class 
by another as in all class societies. What distinguishes capitalism is that this 
exploitation takes place indirectly through the market rather than directly in the form 
of a tribute or tax.10
We did not in the previous chapter sufficiently specify how it is that this 
‘purely economic’ market transaction of apparently equal exchange of labour for a 
wage, results in the enrichment of one class at the expense of the other. We can do so 
here, only in brief. Marx explained that capital should be understood not as a thing, 
but as a set of social relations.11 It is on the basis of particular social relations, where 
one class owns the means of production and another class is compelled to sell their 
labour power in exchange for a wage, that capital can emerge. Capital is the self­
expansion of value made possible through these social relations.12 Labour power, 
which is the labour of human beings as sold on the market, is uniquely capable of 
creating surplus value, or value in excess of the costs of its own reproduction.13 Marx 
expresses the circuit of capital in the following way:
8 Rosenberg 1994, pp. 124-129.
9 In this way, the origins of modem industrial capitalism, in England, are a dramatic act, the 
expropriation of the peasantry, rather than the unfolding of the logic of the market as Weber believed. 
This understanding of the origins of capitalism is based on the work of Brenner. See Brenner 1977, 
1986, 1999 and Wood 1991. For Brenner and Wood, the origins of capitalism are the outcome of class 
struggle in Britain which resulted in the peasant’s expropriation.
10 As Barker points out, the role of taxation under capitalism, within capitalist societies, is something to 
which Marxists have paid very little attention. Barker 1997.
11 This understanding of Marx’s approach is clear in Sayer 1991.
12 On the general formula for capital and on the circuit of capital accumulation see Marx 1976, pp. 247- 
257; Marx 1978, pp. 109-199.
13 On the labour theory of value see especially Marx 1976, pp. 283-305.
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M -  C (LP/M P)... P . . . . C ’ - M ’
Money (M) is advanced to obtain commodities (C), in the form of labour power (LP)
and means of production (MP), which combined in a production process (P) produce
commodities of a greater value (C’) than those which, were initially purchased. The
sale of these commodities (C’) results in more money than was originally possessed
(M’).14 In this way a profit is obtained. It is the competitive accumulation of profit
which drives the capitalist process. But it is the commodification of labour power
which makes it possible. It is for this reason that the separation of labourers from the
land is so significant to the origins of capitalism.
So what does this analysis of class exploitation have to do with the realist
notion of the sovereignty of nation-states in an anarchical world? For Rosenberg,
much is revealed by the following statement from Marx:
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of 
direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers to ru led .... It is always 
the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the 
direct producers ... which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the 
entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relation of 
sovereignty and dependence, in short the corresponding specific form of the 
state.15
For Rosenberg, the ‘privatising’ of surplus extraction under capitalism allows for the 
emergence of a ‘purely political’ public institution in the form of the modem 
sovereign state. He traces this process historically arguing that it is only under 
capitalism that this differentiation of state and ‘civil society’ emerges.16 The 
sovereignty of the modem state -  its monopoly of political power internally, and its
14 Marx 1978, pp. 180-181.
15 Marx 1981, p. 791 cited in Rosenberg 1994, p. 84.
16 Rosenberg uses civil society to express all that is not the state. He cites early writings by Marx’ on 
‘the establishment of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into independent 
individuals’. Marx 1989, p. 125. Rosenberg attributes much of his own understanding of the concept to 
Sayer who provides an in-depth discussion of what Marx meant by ‘civil society’ in Sayer 1991, pp. 
112-147.
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formal equality with other states, externally, in the international system -  is made
possible because of its abstraction from direct relations of production. He suggests,
we should think of it [sovereignty] as form of political rule historically 
specific to the distinctive configuration of social relations which define 
capitalism as a kind of society. For sovereignty also, crucially, involves the 
idea of the state being outside, over and against civil society, autonomous,
‘purely political’.17
While this characterisation of the state as ‘autonomous’ may sound no different from 
that of Weberian IPE or historical sociology, it is important to note that for 
Rosenberg, this is an autonomy within capitalism, not apart from it.18 Capitalism is no 
longer an ‘economic’ or ‘market’ phenomenon which the ‘state’ stands outside. 
Capitalism is now a system of social relations in which the ‘state’ and ‘market’ appear 
separate. As Rosenberg notes, ‘[t]he difference of course is that Marx does not regard 
this autonomy as an attribute of institutions of rule sui generis.’ Rather, ‘the 
emergence of a ‘purely political sphere’ is a historical development which rests upon 
a determinant structural configuration of social relations.’19
Note, however, that Rosenberg makes no effort to argue that the capitalist state 
is not autonomous under capitalism and it only appears that way, rather he seems to 
suggest that it is autonomous, but that this is a historically novel development.20 This 
is a feature of his thought which he shares, to varying degrees, with all theorists of 
capitalism as the ‘apparent separation of spheres’, and which we will discuss below in
17 Rosenberg 1994, p. 127.
18 Rosenberg 1994, p. 126. He quotes Wood approvingly, to the effect that ‘the differentiation of the 
economic and political in capitalism is, more precisely a differentiation of political functions 
themselves’. Wood 1981, p. 82.
19 Rosenberg 1994, p. 70
20 Elsewhere Rosenberg says that ‘this differentiation is not a substantive separation or ‘autonomy’ and 
uses the example of the miners’ strike of 1984-1985 to make this point. Rosenberg 1994, p. 134. His 
discussion of the 1970s however, specifically the Winter of Discontent, suggests that he precisely does 
understand it as a substantive separation because when ‘the separation of state and society’ is blurred 
by the intervention of the state in the strike, for Rosenberg, ‘the sovereignty of the state, [and therefore 
its capitalist nature,] was eroded because the day-to-day separation between politics and economics was 
blurred.’ Rosenberg 1994, pp. 128-129.
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terms of the possibility that they have left the door open to an interpretation of the
state as ‘relatively autonomous’.
For Rosenberg, the ‘emergence of distinct institutional spheres called the state
and the economy is a signature of capitalist society’21 and it is from here that an
explanation of the international system of states is derived. It is this ‘abstraction of the
political from the economic’ which separates international politics from international
economics, making it possible, as Rosenberg notes, to find formal juridical equality
among states, alongside enormous material inequality. Under capitalism, power
struggles continue in the non-political realm of the world economy, that is ‘the empire
of civil society’, while at the level of the state system, sovereignty remains intact.
On the basis of his analysis of sovereignty as a capitalist form, Rosenberg then
offers a theory of another key realist concept, the ‘balance of power’.22
The ‘pure’ power o f the political scientists, the medium of the balance of 
power, is in fact the power of the ‘purely political’ state, the sovereign state, 
the state which stands outside production and is therefore abstracted from the 
particularities of civil society -  in short, the capitalist state.
The balance of power, for Rosenberg, is itself a peculiarly capitalist relationship 
comprehensible only on the basis of ‘purely political’ sovereign states. Wars under 
capitalism take place, for Rosenberg, ‘not because one has what the other wants’ but 
rather as a result of a conflict over public policy. Military force is no longer a means 
of surplus appropriation under capitalism, so conflict takes on a ‘pure’, ‘technical’ 
character. The object of war is not political control as, he notes, ‘the fruits of power 
lie elsewhere’ in a global civil society, a world market, which is not bound within 
territorial states. It is possible for overt political struggle between states to be minimal 
and for power to therefore appear ‘balanced’, because the struggle which counts is
21 Rosenberg 1994, p. 126
22 See Bull 1977, pp. 97-121.
23 Rosenberg 1994, p. 141.
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economic and continues beneath the surface of territorial control. These are, for
Rosenberg, the conditions which make a balance of ‘formal political’ power possible
in an anarchical system of states.24
Having examined the way in which Rosenberg has accounted for the
‘sovereignty’ of states and the ‘balance of power’ as ‘geopolitical expressions of a
wider social totality,’25 we can now turn to the wider social totality as the Realists
understand it, and Rosenberg explains it. This is Rosenberg’s explanation of the
realist description of anarchy.
For realists, anarchy is the ‘law of nature’ existing between sovereign states
given that each recognises no higher authority. The alternative to anarchy is
understood, by Realists, to be global despotism which would limit the liberty of
individual states. On the basis of this Realist image of anarchy between states and
absolute authority within, Rosenberg makes the ‘unexpected discovery’27 that Marx
had a theory of anarchy that can be used to explain the relations between states that
Realists only describe. He quotes Marx at length.
Division of labour within the workshop implies the undisputed authority of 
the capitalist over men ... The division of labour within society brings into 
contact independent producers of commodities, who acknowledge no 
authority other than that of competition, of the coercion exerted by the 
pressure of their reciprocal interests, just as in the animal kingdom the ‘war 
of all against all’ more or less preserves the conditions of existence of every 
species. The same bourgeois consciousness which elaborates the division of 
labour in the workshop ... denounces with equal vigour every conscious 
attempt to control and regulate the process of production socially as an inroad 
upon such sacred things as the rights of property, freedom and the self- 
determining ‘genius’ of the individual capitalist. It is very characteristic that 
the enthusiastic apologists of the factory system have nothing more damning 
to urge against a general organisation of labour in society than that it would 
turn the whole of society into a factory... in the society where the capitalist
24 Burnham makes a similar argument. ‘[W]hilst each nation-state is involved in a competitive struggle 
to secure individual economic growth, the overall interests of nation-states are not directly opposed, 
and the relation of antagonism and collaboration is reproduced on the world stage.’ Burnham 1990, p. 
185.
25 Rosenberg 1994, p. 55.
26 Bull provides one of the clearest discussions of the Realist concept of anarchy. Bull 1977, pp. 22-50.
27 Rosenberg 1994, p. 142.
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mode of production prevails, anarchy in the social division of labour and 
despotism in the manufacturing division of labour mutually condition each 
other.
98Rosenberg is concerned with ‘the uncanny detail of the parallels’ between the way
in which Marx has described the condition of capitalist firms and the way in which
Realists describe the system of states: ‘internal authority coupled with external
anarchy, the Hobbesian state of nature, the nexus of competition, equilibrium and
freedom, even the nightmare vision of a world state/factory’.29 Moreover, the anarchy
of capitalist production, as understood by Marx, ‘consists precisely in this, that a
priori there is no conscious social regulation of production’.30 There is no
overarching authority formally coordinating the activities between capitalist firms and
there need not be, because the compulsion of market competition shapes their
behaviour in relation to each other. This relationship has its parallel at the level of 
81state. Rosenberg cites Wight’s characterisation of an anarchical international system 
where ‘social action is most regularly necessitous.’32
Rosenberg explains that capitalism is a system in which isolated producers 
secure their social needs, not directly through planning or allocation, but through the 
mechanism of market exchange. Market competition is the ‘anarchical system’ within 
which individual needs may or may not be met. Capitalism is unique in the history of 
human societies as it is through the exchange of commodities, rather than directly 
through personal relationships, that individual labours take a social form. The key 
phrase from Marx for Rosenberg is that ‘personal independence [hence the category 
of the individual] is based on relations of dependence [individuals depend on mutual
28 Rosenberg 1994, p. 143.
29 Rosenberg 1994, p. 143.
30 Rosenberg 1994, p. 143.
31 Again, Burnham makes a similar point, arguing that ‘since accumulation of capital within the 
“domestic economy” depends upon the accumulation of capital on a world scale, nation-states have a 
similar relation of conflict and cohabitation as individual capitals’. Burnham, 1990 p. 187.
32 Rosenberg 1994, p. 144, citing Wight 1966, p. 26.
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exchange] mediated through things [the exchange relations established between their
■5 '3
commodities]’. This is what makes capitalist society ‘anarchical’.
Rosenberg acknowledges that, following on from his analysis provided above,
‘a determinate task of sociological recovery has yet to be undertaken, in order to
resolve the actual workings of these anarchical mechanisms back into their constituent
social relations.’ This task will involve ‘theoretical explication’ and ‘historical
reconstruction’.34 Elsewhere in the text he indicates that,
the contingent historical processes by which this sovereign states-system 
came into being, and by which it continues to develop and to be reproduced 
by real living individuals, remains to be recounted and explained. History 
(hence the need for historical explanation) does not end. In this respect, the 
conclusions reached here do nothing more than probe the broadest contours 
of an alternative, non-realist terrain of IR theory.
In the final chapter of Empire o f Civil Society Rosenberg offers a ‘prospectus for an 
alternative history of the international system’ based on Marx’s insistence that ‘the 
expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant from the soil, is the basis of 
the whole process’.36 Rosenberg argues that the nineteenth century is of particular 
significance, as it is the point at which a single geopolitical system develops, a system 
of sovereign states made possible through the uprooting of peasants and countrymen 
throughout the world. He acknowledges, however, that this process has been ‘uneven 
in the extreme’, noting that Britain is ‘the only country that followed the “classical” 
road to capitalist industrialisation’.37 The other great model of the modem state, for 
Rosenberg as it was for Marx, is the United States, ‘the child of the industrial- 
capitalist transformation in Europe’ and the power which remade ‘the institutional
33 Rosenberg 1994, p. 144, Marx in the Grundrisse, this translation of which Rosenberg finds in Sayer 
1991, pp. 13-14.
34 Rosenberg 1994, p. 155.
35 Rosenberg 1994, p. 88.
36 Rosenberg 1994, p. 162 citing Marx 1976, p. 876.
37 Rosenberg 1994, p. 164. For a similar view see Wood 1991, p. 23.
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framework of the international system in the 1940s and after.’38 Rosenberg is 
acknowledging here that Britain (and, he seems to suggest, especially Thatcher’s 
Britain) and the US fit his model of the separation of the political from the economic 
most clearly.
At this late stage in the book, he raises an important question, which he
mistakenly assumes is rhetorical.
Should it really be a matter for controversy to suggest that, whatever the 
enormous diversity and uneven development of human societies in the world 
today, the dominant institutions of the international system reflect the 
distinctive social forms of capitalism?39
The unfortunate answer for Rosenberg is ‘absolutely’. It is the enormous 
diversity in state-market relations, not just between states but within the history of 
capitalist states, that leads the neo-Weberians to doubt that capitalism, and therefore 
Marxism, can explain the social world in its entirety. Germany of the 1930s, Britain 
of the 1950s, South Africa of the 1980s -  all of these manifestations of state-market 
relations, including, in fact, any state at war, deviate from the ‘separation of spheres’ 
model of capitalism, apparently needing explanation from some other source. The 
neo-Weberians account for those other features of the social world by adding together 
various spheres with autonomous logics: militarism, ideology, politics, etc. How do 
their Marxist critics explain the same variation?
In the introduction to Empire o f  Civil Society Rosenberg referred to the fact 
that IPE as a discipline is ‘seen as an innovation which presses hard against the 
boundaries of IR and economics’.40 However, he suggested that the question with 
which IPE concerns itself: ‘what is the relationship between states and markets?’ 
cannot be answered without first answering the more fundamental question: ‘in what
38 Rosenberg 1994, p. 166.
39 Rosenberg 1994, p. 167.
40 Rosenberg 1994, p. 3.
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kind of society do distinct spheres of politics and economic open out in this way and 
why?’41 He has provided an answer to this second question in his book, as outlined 
above. The first question, however, is neglected. This is a problem we find in the 
work of all ‘separation of spheres’ theorists of capitalism. An adequate explanation of 
the variation in state-market relations is difficult to discern. This is the primary 
problem with this approach as it relates to the starting point of this thesis, i.e. as it 
relates to the question of the apparent ‘retreat of the state.’
Before discussing that limitation of the approach as a whole, however, it is 
worth critiquing Rosenberg’s particular analysis in some detail. Our focus on 
Rosenberg, rather than Wood for instance, is not simply because this is an 
International Relations thesis, but also, as will be discussed below, because his 
theoretical model of capitalism informs his analysis of the concrete world in a way 
that it does not so obviously with other theorists. Other theorists use the apparent 
separation of spheres theory of capitalism as a means of critiquing Weberians, but 
tend not to employ it in any more constructive pursuit. Rosenberg does and, in doing 
so, exposes the inherent limitations of the approach.
3.3 Rethinking Empire o f  Civil Society
I want to suggest that there are two major grounds upon which Rosenberg’s analysis 
can be criticised. The first is that he does not, in fact, explain what Realists describe, 
in terms of sovereignty, anarchy and the balance of power. The second is that his 
work uncritically accepts that it is what Realists describe that needs explaining. In 
other words, Rosenberg accepts that the Realist description of reality is accurate in a
41 Rosenberg 1994, p. 3.
108
way that IPE theorists, for instance, have not. It is, after all, for reasons to do with the 
limitations of Realist IR, that IPE as a sub-discipline emerged in the first place. In that 
sense, the very existence of IPE as a discipline serves to critique Rosenberg in the 
second respect. It is up to us here to critique him in the first.
3.3.1 The Poverty o f  Analogy
Our central charge against Rosenberg is that he is unable to explain what the Realists 
have described in terms of sovereignty, the balance of power and anarchy. We shall 
deal with each of these concepts in turn, demonstrating that no such explanation has 
been provided. Instead we find an illusion of explanation rooted in carefully 
constructed analogy. But analogy, no matter how sophisticated, is not, in itself, 
explanation. In making this case against Rosenberg our treatment of the Realist school 
will, of necessity, be quite crude, but it does cover the basic features of a Realist 
understanding of the international. In other words, it will engage with those most 
obvious aspects of their description, for which any explanation of their position 
should be expected to account.
For Rosenberg, as discussed above, the sovereignty of the state is a product of 
its abstraction from the realm of civil society. Its ‘purely political’ character stems 
from the fact that, under capitalism, it is not directly engaged in production or 
exchange, but is rather abstracted from both. The historical development of this state 
through the expropriation of the peasantry is something which Rosenberg has 
explained, the question which remains is whether the model he arrives at matches the 
Realist image of the sovereign state.
109
For Realists, sovereignty has both an internal and an external dimension. 
Internally, the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, externally, it 
recognises no higher authority and its behaviour is shaped by the anarchical context in 
which it finds itself. Rosenberg is capable of explaining the internal sovereignty of the 
state. He is not however, able to explain the equally important external dimension.
For Realist theorists of international relations, the international system is 
analogous to the Hobbesian state of nature in which, lacking an overarching authority, 
human beings were forced to live a life which was ‘nasty, brutish and short’, given 
what is assumed to be the natural scarcity of resources and the resulting ever-present 
conflict.42 For individuals, the Leviathan, the strong state, is seen to be the solution to 
dealing with this relentless condition of insecurity. Without the Leviathan, society 
could not exist because there is no opportunity for prosperity or development in an 
environment without law and order. Sovereign territorial states are the Hobbesian 
answer to the human condition. What Realist IR theorists have taken from this is that, 
given the absence of a Leviathan at the global level, states themselves exist in a 
situation of ever-present conflict. This is, as Hobbes described it, a situation of 
permanent war of ‘all against all.’43 Competition between sovereign states creates the 
anarchical environment and the anarchy of the international system necessitates the 
sovereignty of states.
What is essential to understand here is that, in the Realist model of the 
international, war is the default condition of all sovereign states. War is, in the words 
of the celebrated IR Realist, Machiavelli, the ‘raison d’etat’.44 The sovereignty of 
states and their capacity for war-making, are absolutely inseparable. War is part of the 
Realist definition of state. And yet, what we find with Rosenberg is a very limited
42 Hobbes 1651 [1968].
43 Hobbes 1651 [1968].
44 Machiavelli 1505 [1944].
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understanding of the relationship between war and capitalism, and, at the same time, it 
is precisely this understanding of capitalism upon which his theory of sovereignty 
relies. For Realists, war is synonymous with the state, however, for Rosenberg the 
state is synonomous with capitalism, and capitalism is by no means synonomous with 
war.
For Rosenberg, war has a very limited role in a capitalist international system. 
He acknowledges that ‘capitalist states, do resort to military means in order to 
prosecute policy, where this is judged necessary.’ However, he argues that ‘the use of 
military force is no longer the means of surplus appropriation...’ We learn that under 
capitalism ‘imperial processes of expansion (or rather those connected directly with 
surplus extraction) are now accomplished principally in the private sphere.’45 In this 
way, those periods in history in which there was a direct struggle for resources, were 
not characteristically capitalist. This includes periods which Rosenberg would 
consider pre-capitalist, but also, for instance, Hitler’s geopolitical concept of 
‘Lebensraum’ during the Second World War does not fit Rosenberg’s model. Nazi 
Germany was not, therefore, for Rosenberg, a capitalist state 46 This view of the 
Second World War as ‘not capitalist’ is not atypical among the ‘separation of spheres’ 
theorists. It stems from their more general tendency to elide the notion of capitalism 
with that of liberal democracy, a feature of their work which they assiduously avoid 
making explicit.47 An important consequence here is that Rosenberg has provided a 
theory of states and war which cannot explain either world war, both of which 
Realists consider to be extremely important features in the development of the 
contemporary international system.
45 Rosenberg 1994, pp. 140-141.
46 This is not something that Rosenberg states explicity in Empire o f Civil Society but is a position he 
comes to in Rosenberg 1995 where he associates the capitalist state with the liberal democratic state 
and distinguishes it from Fascist and Stalinist varieties.
47 See Rosenberg 1995 and Wood 1995.
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To what extent can Rosenberg’s analysis explain any situation of war? There
is a further dimension to the incompatibility of war and capitalism and therefore war
and the sovereignty of states, from Rosenberg’s perspective. The problem for any
theorist whose understanding of capitalism is based on the abstraction of the political
from the economic is that a state at war does not fit this model. Any state engaged in
military conflict is placed in a position where the interests of state are at stake, and the
need to defend them with force is paramount. The process of developing military
capacity is a productive one into which states are unavoidably drawn. In periods of
war, the ability of the state to organise and control production and distribution is
fundamental. Yet, for Rosenberg, in these periods, the state is no longer a capitalist
state, because it does not ‘stand outside production’.48 In this way, the state at war is
not a sovereign state -  a position which directly contradicts a core principle of
Realism that the state at war is quintessentially a sovereign state.
The poverty of his explanation of the Realist image of sovereignty takes its
most striking form in Rosenberg’s attempt to explain the balance of power. This is an
explanation based on the model of sovereignty and anarchy which Rosenberg
constructs throughout his text.
[T]he medium of the balance of power, is in fact the power of the ‘purely 
political’ state, the sovereign state, the state which stands outside production 
and is therefore abstracted from the particularities of civil society -  in short, 
the capitalist state.49
And yet,
[t]he Soviet Union was precisely not a sovereign state, in the sense that we 
have been discussing sovereignty. It did not stand outside a distinct private 
sphere of surplus extraction. It moved in and took it over... This was 
ultimately the political content of the Cold War.
48 Rosenberg 1994, p. 141.
49 Rosenberg 1994, p. 141.
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For Rosenberg, as we know, sovereignty is a capitalist form. He argues that the USSR 
was therefore not sovereign because it was not capitalist.50 His theory of the ‘balance 
of power’ is dependent on an image of sovereign capitalist states in an anarchical 
capitalist world market. He has therefore developed a theory o f the Realist ‘balance of 
power’ which must exclude what Realists consider to be the most significant balance 
of power of the twentieth century. No less an authority than Hedley Bull, clearly 
states that, ‘the balance of power is exemplified... by the clash of the United States 
and the Soviet Union in the Cold War.’51 Once again, Rosenberg’s model of 
sovereignty does not fit the bill if it is designed to explain what Realists have only 
described.
On the question of anarchy, Rosenberg claims to be able to explain anarchy 
which, for Realists, is the product of the fact that there exists no overarching 
authority. In other words, there exists a multiplicity of sovereign states, rather than a 
single world state. Realists do not make much effort to explain this multiplicity, as 
such, because they begin, based on a Hobbesian model, with the multiplicity of the 
individual. What they are concerned with is how individuals become groups, i.e. 
states. This takes place, as mentioned above, according to Hobbesian lore, due to 
mutual self-interest in avoiding the destructive effects of never-ending conflict.
Rosenberg’s understanding of the multiplicity of territorial states is unclear. 
There is nothing in his model of capitalism, as the separation of state and market, 
politics and economic, which provides an explanation for why the ‘political’ under 
capitalism should take a fragmented territorial form. In fact, this was a criticism of the 
‘separation of spheres’ approach to capitalism articulated within the Marxist state
50 Rosenberg 1994, p. 134.
51 Bull 1977, p. 97.
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debate of the 1970s in the work of Barker and Von Braunmuhl.52 They asked why, 
given the existence of a single capitalist world market, does the political under 
capitalism not take the form of a single state authority? This is the point at which the 
state debate, which we will discuss more below, concluded.53 Rosenberg, unaware of 
the well-worn path he treads, tries to do what was concluded in the state debate to be 
impossible -  he tries to read off the multiplicity of states directly from the capital 
relation. He does this through the use of analogy.54
For Rosenberg, states are like units of capital. Units of capital according to 
Marx, are islands of ‘order’ (factories within which there are direct relations of 
control) in a sea of ‘anarchy’ (in which human relations are mediate by relations 
between commodities) where there is no overarching authority. Rosenberg maps this 
description of capitalism by Marx onto the description of the international as 
characterised by the Realists through a process which one Marxist critic has described 
as a kind of ‘sympathetic magic’. No actual understanding of a relationship between 
the two is sought or found, the connection is based on a superficial similarity of 
form.55
First, the anarchy of capitalism:
the plurality of independent individuals; the lack of a superordinate direction; 
the emergence none the less of an impersonal mechanism of social 
organisation which lies beyond the control of individuals; the paradoxical 
role of this collective alienation as the basis of individual freedom; and the 
peculiar objectified form in which individuals confront their relations with 
each other.56
52 See Barker in Clarke 1991, pp. 204-213. See Braunmuhl 1978.
53 Clarke 1991.
54 Michael Webb has noted that some similarity exists here between the method of Rosenberg and 
Kenneth Waltz, who also made his core argument about the nature of the international system through 
analogy, specifically analogy to competition in markets. This is somewhat ironic given Waltz’s status 
as an arch neo-realist and Rosenberg’s desire to distance himself from Realism of any kind.
55 Anthropologists have described this practice of using secondary objects that look like primary 
objects, where the manipulation of the former is believed to aid in a task related to the latter. As when, 
for example, the shaking of seeds from a plant is believed to aid in the birth of a child. I thank China 
Mieville for this characterisation of Rosenberg’s argument.
56 Rosenberg 1994, pp. 149-150.
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Then, the anarchy of Realist IR:
the plurality of sovereign independent states lacking superordinate direction; 
the emergence none the less of impersonal mechanisms of social 
organisation, (the balance of power and the invisible hand of the market) 
which escape the command of individual states; the paradoxical role of this 
collective alienation as the precondition of sovereign independence; and the 
novel forms of international power which characterise such an order.57
For Rosenberg, the similarity between the two descriptions is evidence that
they ‘clearly belong to the same genus’.58 No further explanation is provided.
Obviously there is an historical explanation for the development of units of capital, a
history of which Rosenberg is well aware. But this does not, by analogy, provide an
historical explanation for the existence of multiple sovereign states. It will not do to
use the history of one phenomenon to explain the history of another simply on the
basis of, what in Rosenberg’s own words are ‘descriptive affinities’.59
States are not necessarily analogous to units of capital, given that they possess
within them competing domestic units of capital and have extended between them
transnational units of capital. Yet, it could be argued that they do, at times, represent
aggregate units of capital. This could be the case, for instance, when states are at war
which we know is the situation with which Realists scholars are centrally concerned.
However, in this case, for Rosenberg, states are no longer capitalist and no longer
sovereign because, in war, the state is not abstracted out as a ‘purely political’ sphere.
Here we reach the crux of the problem. Rosenberg’s argument by analogy is
not wrong because the state can never be like a unit of capital, but it is wrong because
Rosenberg has not done the work to show how that might be the case and if he did, he
would find it contradicted his model of capitalism. In suggesting that states compete
‘like’ capitals, Rosenberg is unwittingly suggesting that war may be a ‘kind’ of
57 Rosenberg 1994, p. 150.
58 Rosenberg 1994, p. 150.
59 Rosenberg 1994, p. 134.
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capitalist competition. This is an understanding of capitalism which some Marxists, 
like Bukharin for instance, have held, but it is one to which Rosenberg’s own analysis 
is anathema.60
In his own terms, far from explaining Realist IR through his understanding of 
capitalism, Rosenberg actually gives up his understanding o f capitalism to the extent 
he explains the realist image o f IR. And, to the extent that he retains his 
understanding o f capitalism he is unable to explain the Realist image o f IR. While 
Burnham, Wood and others versed in the state debates of the 1970s have been aware 
of the argument against reading off the multiplicity of states directly from the capital 
relation, Rosenberg, uninterested in these debates, has not. Rosenberg’s fault, 
therefore, is not that he cannot explain the multiplicity of states from the capital 
relation. It cannot be done. His fault is that he cannot and yet he thinks he has.
To return to the question of how we might explain the fragmented territorial 
form of the state under capitalism, a more suggestive way forward is indicated by 
Lacher who argues that the territorial state, the multiplicity of states, is a pre-capitalist 
phenomena which cannot be explained by the capital relation.61 This does not 
however mean that the state system is somehow external to capitalism. The state 
system may not be internal to capitalist relations of production, but it has, in Lacher’s 
words, been ‘internalised’ and as such cannot be understood to possess a distinct logic 
from the market along neo-Weberian lines. For the moment, in our analysis, this 
understanding of the internalisation of the multiplicity of states within capitalism is 
adequate. What we are left with from Lacher is that the apparent separation of spheres 
approach to capitalism is not necessarily wrong, Wood and others are correct, but it
60 We will look at Bukharin’s understanding of capitalism in Chapter 5.
61 Lacher 2005.
62 Lacher 2005.
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cannot be used to explain the multiplicity of capitalist states, Rosenberg is 
overextended.
In the critical discussion of Rosenberg’s text above we have shown the 
limitations for understanding the Realist approach to international relations via an 
analogy with Marx’s theory of the social relations of capital. We found that 
Rosenberg had mixed success explaining what it was the Realists were describing. He 
had attempted to do so, modelling his work on Marx’s own method of explaining ‘a 
real appearance’, undertaking the critical elaboration and transcendence of bourgeois 
categories. He appears to have failed at this task. If we allow for the fact that what the 
Realists were describing was not straightforwardly how things appear, pace IPE, we 
are still left with the fact that much of what they described could not be explained by 
Rosenberg. Rosenberg could not explain, for instance, either of two World Wars or 
the Cold War, events which it would be an understatement to suggest were central to 
contemporary IR. We need to understand why this has been the case and what it 
means for the separation of spheres approach more generally.
3.4 Rethinking the ‘ Apparent’ Separation of State and Market
3.4.1 The Purely Political State
Theorists of the separation of spheres understanding of capitalism have a very specific 
model of the capitalist state. What they can explain in terms of their understanding of 
capitalism is what Rosenberg refers to as ‘the “purely political” state, the sovereign 
state, the state which stands outside production and is therefore abstracted from the
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particularities of civil society -  in short, the capitalist state.’ What they cannot
explain is what they would consider the ‘non-capitalist’ or ‘less capitalist’ behaviour
of states, those situations in which, within the history of capitalism, the state does not
stand outside production but becomes directly involved.
For Rosenberg any activities of the state which involve it directly in the
process of production cannot be seen as capitalist. The capitalist state simply ‘frames
laws, upholds contracts, raises taxes and implements policies designed to promote the
development of the sphere of production.’64 It would appear that, for Rosenberg, the
state may facilitate the capitalist economy, but plays no direct role. Burnham, another
‘apparent separation of spheres’ theorist, also makes this point,
The role of the state in the capitalist economy, is essentially negative, 
removing barriers to accumulation. While the state can act as an employer 
and intervene directly in some sectors of the economy, it cannot displace the 
market without destroying the capitalist mode of production. At best it can 
intervene to remove barriers to economic growth.65
Wood concurs,
Direct political coercion is excluded from the process of surplus extraction 
and removed to a state that generally intervenes only indirectly in the 
relations of production, and surplus extraction ceases to be an immediately 
political issue.66
For Wood, it is ‘the complete separation of the producers from the means of 
production and the concentration in private hands of the capacity for direct surplus- 
extraction’67 which gives the capitalist state is characteristic appearance of ‘class
<ro
neutrality’. Sayer argues that this ‘minimal regulatory framework’ model of the 
state, a state whose ‘activities are limited to those necessary to allow bourgeois
63 Rosenberg 1994, p. 141. Italics mine.
64 Rosenberg 1994, p. 127.
65 Burnham 1990, p. 183.
66 Wood 1995, p. 44.
67 Wood 1978, p. 229.
68 Wood 1978, p. 229.
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individuals to get on with their business’,69 is ‘an essential relation of bourgeois 
production, a capitalist production relation’.70 The idea, as expressed by Reuten and 
Williams, that the ‘the state is necessarily separate from the value-creating process of
n 1
the economic core of civil society’ is a dominant, if not the dominant, Marxist
understanding of the role of the state under capitalism.72
The desire to maintain an image of the capitalist state as abstracted from the
economy, from direct involvement in production results in a strange formalism in
these theorists’ approach to theory and history. What we have in some cases is an
‘ideal type’73 model of capitalism where the state is not involved in production,
heavily qualified by a history in which it frequently is, or whereby those aspects of its
behaviour are ignored. In Rosenberg’s analysis this tendency takes an unfortunate
direction as he seems, at times, to wish to deny altogether the coercive role of the state
as an agent o f capitalist social relations.
Having acknowledged that the separation of spheres ‘does not mean that all
capitalist societies are havens of human rights,’ Rosenberg admits that, ‘the historical
variation is considerable, and only a tiny number of capitalist societies have been able
to sustain durable political democracies’.74 He goes on from here to say that,
Often, upholding a rule of law in connection with the capitalist labour 
contract is a bloody affair -  drawing out the coercive arm of the state in 
routine acts of violent repression. South Korea still provides not infrequent 
examples of this. However — and here is the point -  the pitched battles
69 Sayer 1985, p. 244.
70 Sayer 1985, p. 240. Here Sayer is eliding the notion of bourgeois democracy and capitalism, as it was 
suggested above is a common practice among these separation of spheres theorists. A full accounting of 
this tendency is not possible here. See for instance where Wood refers to the ‘the separation of political 
and economic spheres that characterise the liberal state.’ Wood 1981, p. 181. Elsewhere she states that 
‘[t]he parliamentary democratic state is a unique form o f class rule because it casts doubt on the very 
existence of a ruling class.’ My italics. Wood 1981, p. 180.
71 Reuten and Williams 1989, p. 237.
72 As mentioned below, this is still the last word from the state debate as articulated by Holloway and 
Picciotto, collected in Clarke 1991.
73 The connection between the separation of spheres approach and a Weberian style ‘ideal type’ 
methodology has been discussed by Carling in relation to Robert Brenner. Carling 1991, p. 50. A 
discussion of this can be found in Blackledge 2003.
74 Rosenberg 1994, p. 124.
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between police and workers in South Korea take place not in the courtyards 
o f  state-owned factories, but on the premises o f  Hyundai and Samsung 
corporations, non-governmental organisations. And if it sometimes takes 
bayonets and tear gas to drive workers into factories, the rule to which they 
submit once inside is not that of the state, but rather that of so-called 
‘management’.75
Rather, I would suggest -  and here is the point -  for Rosenberg, scenes of striking 
South Korean workers being beaten and gassed back to work by agents of the state is 
being offered as evidence of the ‘non-political’ nature of surplus extraction under 
capitalism. The state’s punishment of trade unionists is for Rosenberg evidence of the
7 f iextent to which the state stays out <9/ the process of capital accumulation. Is this not
a contortion of reality to fit a particular theoretical model? That the state coercively,
or in Wood and Rosenberg’s terms, ‘extra-economically’, forces the labourers into the
‘purely economic’ factory seems to go against the separation of spheres model in
which this arrival of labour-power is meant to be due to market compulsion. Here, the
compulsion that forces the worker back into the factory under conditions of low pay
or no pay is the stick of the state. W hat’s more, as Rosenberg rightly points out, these
acts of repression are routine.
And what are we to make of his distinction that ‘the rule to which they submit
once inside is not that of the state, but rather that of so-called ‘management’? How
does this accord with, for instance, a recent report on Argentina, a state whose
capitalist credentials have been amply acknowledged?
Civil trials continue to unearth fresh evidence that foreign corporations 
collaborated closely with the junta in its extermination of the union 
movement in the 1970s. For example, last December a federal prosecutor 
filed a criminal complaint against Ford Argentina (a subsidiary of Ford), 
alleging that the company had inside one o f  its factory compounds a military 
detention centre where union organisers were taken. ‘Ford [Argentina] and 
its executives colluded in the kidnapping of its own workers and I think they 
should be held accountable for that,’ says Pedro Troiani, a former Ford
75 Rosenberg 1994, fh 2, p. 198.
76 Perhaps were the same activity to take place in North Korea it would be considered, by Rosenberg, 
as evidence of the extent to which the state is directly involved in production in a non-capitalist state.
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assembly line worker who has testified that soldiers kidnapped and beat him 
inside the factory walls.77
Whatever the strength of the separation of spheres approach, it does not seem 
sustainable when applied to explain the kind of ‘historical detail’ which Rosenberg 
attempts in the case of South Korea and would be hard pushed to do in the case of 
Argentina. Rather, the best that these ‘separation of spheres’ theorists can provide is a 
basic model of the capitalist state within which there is historical variation. To be fair, 
this is what they would, for the most part, claim to be able to do. For Rosenberg this 
was the ‘historical contingency’ he referred to towards the end of his book, i.e. the 
variation in state-market relations which his theory alone cannot explain.
What is worrying is that the use of the word ‘contingent’ here may not be 
entirely dissimilar from the phrase ‘path dependent’ so popular among historical 
sociologists,78 or the way in which Weiss referred to ‘circumstances’ in the last 
chapter. Is Rosenberg actually saying that the capitalist ‘differentiation of spheres’ is 
of theoretical significance, but the diversity of state-market relations is a matter of 
historical detail? He seems to be making a distinction between theoretical explanation 
and historical explanation such that he, and, on his reading, Marx, have done the 
theoretical work, and it now remains simply to apply that model to making sense of 
history, allowing for ‘diversity’ and ‘unevenness’. This is something which his 
approach appears to suggest, but it is difficult to pin down.
77 Mercedes-Benz (now a subsidiary of Daimler-Chrysler) is facing a similar investigation in both 
Germany and Argentina, which stems from allegations that it collaborated with the military in the 
1970s to purge one of its plants of union militants, giving names and addresses of 16 workers who were 
later "disappeared", 14 of them never to be seen again. Klein 2003.
78 See for instance Evans 1995, where this phrase is frequently used.
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3.4.2 The State Debate and the 'Relative Autonomy’ Trap
It is worth diverting for a moment here to a brief discussion of the state debate. It is 
well-known that Marx intended but did not live to produce a theory of the capitalist 
state. It has long been held that this is a lacuna in Marxist theory and that the subject 
of the capitalist state requires critical elaboration. In the 1960s and 1970s a fairly 
focused, self-conscious debate over the nature of the state began to develop.79 
Unfortunately it petered out in the 1980s having made great progress in terms of how 
the capitalist state should not be theorised, but leaving outstanding many questions as 
to how the state should be understood. Less charitably, one might say that this was a 
debate which began with the question of the ‘relative autonomy of the state’80 and 
ended with the conclusion that the state was ‘relatively autonomous’.81
What emerged from the state debate as a dominant position was the idea that 
under capitalism, social relations of production were privatised, leaving a separate 
‘purely political’ state. This is, in essence, the separation of spheres approach 
articulated by Wood and Sayer, who developed their position in parallel. As discussed 
above, this position involves a recognition that the separation of states and markets, 
politics and economics, is internal to the capital relation.82 We have already discussed 
the fact that this does not explain the multiplicity of territorial states, we must now 
consider how it leaves the ‘separation of spheres theorists’, including those who were
79 This has been collected in Clarke 1991.
80 By this I am referring to Poulantzas’ criticisms of Miliband which sparked the debate. Poulantzas 
argued that Miliband’s characterisation of the state as the instrument of the ruling class failed to 
account for those instances when the state behaved in a way which suggested it was ‘relatively 
autonomous’ from that class.
81 The state debate became dominated toward the end by the position held by Holloway and Picciotto, 
shared by Bonefeld, Burnham and others. It was that capitalism is a system distinguished by the 
separation out of a purely political sphere which represents the interests of capital in general.
82 The impression that this was the dominant position may be a distortion due to the fact that it was 
Simon Clarke, an advocate of this approach, who collected ‘the state debate’ into a single volume. 
Clarke 1991.
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involved in the ‘state debate’, open to the charge that they have developed a theory of
the state as ‘relatively autonomous’.
The thesis of the ‘relative autonomy of the state’ has been particularly
celebrated by the neo-Weberian, Theda Skocpol. Skocpol was interested in ‘bringing
the state back in’ to account for actions of the state which did not seem reducible to
capitalism. It would seem that all of the efforts of the Marxist critics of this approach
have been directed at demonstrating that none of the state’s behaviour falls outside
capitalism, because its very existence as a sovereign entity is a product of capitalism.
However, as we have seen from Rosenberg above, war, or in fact, any engagement by
the state in the sphere of production, cannot be explained by his theory of capitalism.
For Wood, this is a similar problem evident in her most recent theorising of the
subject, in which she refers to theories of imperialism which she believes to be
correct. Here she is saying that geopolitical coercion is non-capitalist behaviour.
[I]n these theories of imperialism, capitalism depends for its survival not 
only on the existence of these non-capitalist formations but on essentially 
pre-capitalist instruments of ‘extra-economic’ force, military and geopolitical 
coercion, and on the traditional intestate rivalries, colonial wars and territorial 
domination.83
Wood here seems to be suggesting that the extra-economic force associated 
with imperialism is essentially pre-capitalist. This brings us back to the problem we 
encountered with Rosenberg’s treatment of Realism -  the incompatibility of 
capitalism and war in the ‘separation of spheres’ theory of capitalism. This weakness 
is usefully challenged by Barker, in his critique of Wood, where he argues that ‘we 
would seriously misrepresent the concrete history of capitalist society across the globe 
if we assumed that the forms of capitalist competition based on ‘plunder’ and the like 
were only to be understood as ‘pre-capitalist survivals.’84 It is important to note that in
83 Wood 2003, p. 127.
84 Barker 1997, p. 60.
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her more journalistic discussions of contemporary politics, Wood would not wish to 
suggest that modem war was not part and parcel of capitalism.85 This is an example of 
the way in which her writings can operate on two distinct levels of abstraction, the 
compatibility of which is never made clear.
This is an important point. There are two levels of abstraction at work in the 
writings of most theorists of the ‘separation of spheres’: Burnham, Bonefeld and 
Wood included. Arguably, there is only one level in Rosenberg’s analysis because 
what he is trying to explain (Realist IR) is in itself so abstract, that to criticise it he 
need never descend to the material world at all. As we have shown above, where he 
does, he gets into trouble. This is not the case with other theorists who subscribe to 
Rosenberg’s general approach. Many ‘separation of spheres’ theorists have written 
usefully on such phenomena as nationalised production, the welfare state and war 
economies. However, and this is what is significant, they do not use the separation 
of spheres approach to explain those. None of the ‘separation of spheres’ theorists has 
developed the necessary intermediate concepts, and derived them systematically from 
the abstract ones, in order to allow for explanation of developments at this level 
rather than description.87
We will discuss throughout the rest of the thesis how modem war, including 
both World Wars and the Cold War, may be understood in terms of Marx’s theory of 
capitalism. For now, we are interested only in pointing out that the ‘separation of 
spheres’ theorists cannot do so. This results in an opening for a ‘relative autonomy’
85 See, for example, Wood 2003, p. 165.
86 See Burnham 1990, Wood 1995, Bonefeld 1993,1995, Holloway and Bonefeld 1991.
87 Arguably, it would be a better use of space to look at these writings of these theorists to suggest 
where they go wrong, rather than focus on Rosenberg. The point, however, is that they do not really go 
wrong. What is wrong is that what they have to say on these subjects is not linked to their more 
fundamental understanding of capitalist social forms. Rosenberg is of interest because he does try and 
make the link but only gets as far as ‘explaining’ Realist IR. Rosenberg is not a straw man within this 
approach, he is a warning to other ‘separation of spheres’ theorists of the serious limitations of their 
general theory, as it stands, for understanding the variety of state-market relations that exist under 
capitalism.
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image of capitalism given that the state itself may be explicable in capitalist terms, but 
much of its behaviour is not. There must be a distinction between saying that the state 
does not act directly in the interests of the capitalist class, which is correct, and saying 
that the state’s behaviour is sometimes an expression of ‘other’, non-capitalist, 
factors, as these Marxist appear to do. Like Skocpol, these theorists have identified 
aspects of the behaviour of states which falls outside their understanding of 
capitalism, whether they wish to acknowledge this or not.
3.4.3 A Tale o f Two Sovereignties
It may be useful to stop here and consider exactly how this ‘classical Marxist’ theory 
of the state relates to those which we have encountered earlier in the thesis. Up until 
this point, we have avoided pinning down what exactly we mean by ‘the state’. The 
reason for this is that there are at least two different understandings of the state at 
work in the debates we have been discussing over the last two chapters, and it is more 
interesting to contrast them as they arise from these debates rather than asserting them 
from the start. Now we can identify two distinct models of the state and briefly revisit 
the debates of the last two chapters in that light.
There is one understanding of the state as a legally territorially bound entity 
overseen by a bureaucratic structure which possesses a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of violence. The emphasis here is on horizontal sovereignty -  sovereignty vis a 
vis other territorial states. This is the transhistorical model of the state which Weber 
endorsed and which has been dominant in IR, IPE and historical sociology. There is a 
second Marxist model of the state as a manifestation of capitalist social relations, in 
that the state is distinct from society because of the nature of capitalist relations of
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production. The emphasis here is on vertical sovereignty -  sovereignty vis a vis the 
rest of society. We can call these two models of the state ‘the territorial state’ and ‘the 
state’ respectively.88
The fear of ‘the retreat of the state’ as it has been articulated by the anti­
capitalist movement is not a fear of the breakdown of horizontal sovereignty. It is not 
a fear that borders will be reduced, that social relations will flow freely across 
boundaries, etc. This depiction of anti-capitalism feeds into its mischaracterisation as 
anti-globalisation. Those who protest privatisation, for instance, do so on the grounds 
that it involves the further abstraction of the state from civil society, a vertical retreat 
of the state from its responsibilities. Those threatened, may sometimes be led to 
believe that the ‘erosion’ of borders is necessitating the ‘retreat’ of the state, and may 
develop protectionist sentiments on that basis, but it is not the erosion of borders per  
se which is of concern. It was the confusion of these two understandings of the state 
which much of the first wave of the globalisation debate rather uncritically
O A
reproduced. It was a wave of theory motivated by the changes witnessed in terms of 
a vertical retreat, but it associated it with a horizontal erosion it had difficulty proving 
was taking place.
The second wave of the globalisation debate simply reasserted the fact that 
very little horizontal erosion of the state had actually taken place. The state was still a 
legally territorially-bound unit with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The 
state remained sovereign, it remained the agent which acted on behalf of its respective 
national population, contracting with other sovereign states. The ‘territorial state’ was
881 prefer to avoid the term ‘nation-state’ in relation to the debates under examination here, given its 
added implication that language or culture are relevant characteristics of the state. See Benedict 
Anderson and Ernest Gellner for useful discussions of the development of ‘nation-states’, discussions 
which do not explain the existence of ‘the state’, as such, but do contribute to an understanding of 
discourses of nationalism surrounding ‘the territorial state’. Anderson 1983 [1991]; Gellner 1983.
89 I am thinking here particularly of Horsman and Marshall, as discussed in the first chapter of this 
thesis. Horsman and Marshall 1994.
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still in place. The less critical of the second wave used this evidence to suggest that no 
significant changes were taking place, a conclusion which involved simply ignoring 
much of the evidence of the vertical retreat of the state.90 The more critical 
globalisation skeptics made their name suggesting that the retreat of the state thesis 
was overstated because horizontal dissolution had not taken place, but, given their 
attention to detail, were forced to acknowledge that much of what was being said 
about the vertical retreat of the state was true.91 Their way of squaring these two 
aspects was to say that the discussion of the vertical retreat of the state was self- 
fulfilling rhetoric, it did represent reality, but it also fed into the hands of those who 
were engaged in the project of the state’s retreat, thus furthering the reality of that 
retreat. In this way they avoided analysing the vertical retreat of the state as anything 
more than the project of particular elites motivated by neo-liberal ideology, spurred 
on unwittingly by a disoriented majority. The possibility of the return to Keynesian 
capitalism is implicit in this critique, if only the ideological battle in its favour could 
be won.
The third wave of the globalisation debate attempted to have its cake, by 
explicitly acknowledging the events used to support an image of the vertical retreat of 
the state (eg. privatisation), and eat it, by claiming this was being done by a sovereign 
territorial state. Why this was taking place was not explained. Any kind of 
explanation reached a dead end in the ‘circumstances’ to which the state was 
responding. We were left only with the knowledge that the sovereign territorial state 
was capable of ‘adapting’ and this adaptive state was simply a ‘different’ model of the 
same old territorial state. It was then argued in chapter two that this understanding of 
the vertical retreat of the state, that it is simply a ‘different’ horizontal model, an
90 The Economist is particularly guilty of this, as discussed in the first chapter, above.
91 As was the case for Hirst and Thompson. Hirst and Thompson 1996 [1999].
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adaptive state (Weiss), a competition state (Cemy), an internationalised state (Cox), 
was as far as things had gone in the discipline of IPE given their neo-Weberian 
methodogy. Theirs was a description of the ‘territorial state’ not a theory of the 
‘state’.
What we have with the classical Marxist critique of the Weberian approach is 
a clear explanation of the vertical separation of the state from civil society, but it is 
not a theory of the state which can explain its horizontal dimension. Theirs is a theory 
of ‘the state’ but not the ‘territorial state’. The implications this has for our 
understanding of the ‘retreat of the state; can be shown if we return to our example of 
privatisation.
The problem with privatisation for those concerned was not that the state was 
becoming less sovereign in the Weberian sense, but that it was becoming more 
sovereign in the Marxist sense, i.e. it was becoming more abstracted from civil 
society, more social relations were being privatised. Unfortunately, because 
Rosenberg has an ideal type model of the capitalist state within a privatised economy, 
the significance of the present period of privatisation eludes him. He cannot explain 
the period of nationalisation which preceded this period of privatisation and therefore 
he does not acknowledge that any significant change has taken place.92 For 
Rosenberg, as for Wood, capitalism is privatisation.93
What we have discovered is that the ‘separation of spheres’ model of 
capitalism is based on an understanding which equates capitalism with privatisation, 
with the progressive abstraction of the state from the economic sphere.
92 Rosenberg 2000.
93 Wood 1995, p. 37 refers to the transition from feudalism to capitalism using precisely the term 
‘privatisation’.
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[T]he social functions of production and distribution, surplus extraction and 
appropriation, and the allocation of social labour are, so to speak, privatised, 
and they are achieved by non-authoritarian, non-political means.’94
The greater the degree of privatisation, the more capitalist the state.
It is quite unfortunate, given our task of making sense of the ‘apparent retreat
of the state’, that this is a theory of capitalism which only recognises the state in
retreat, in terms of its capitalist nature. There is no point of contrast, within the logic
of capitalism, for these theorists, because the state should not at any point, within the
logic of capitalism, be otherwise than in retreat. It should certainly not be directly
involved in the production process. As Rosenberg notes, where it is, it is less
sovereign and by implication, less capitalist.
Where it does do this, for example by extending its direct ownership through 
nationalisation, it can find that the sovereign character of its rule diminishes.
It no longer stands over against civil society... The private despotism of the 
workplace becomes the public despotism of the state.95
For Rosenberg the extent of a state’s nationalised sector, for purposes of war 
or for any other reason, is the extent to which it is a non-capitalist state.
This is a view shared by all the ‘separation of spheres’ theorists to varying 
degrees. It is clearly evident in the work of one of the earliest proponents of this view, 
Robert Brenner, who has stated that ‘the nationalised industries in the West during the 
post-war period’ and ‘state-directed economies of the East’ are non-capitalist 
economies.96 He argues that they suffer in certain respects, ‘as does the capitalist 
economy’, but since they are ‘state-supported’ they are ‘unable, as does a capitalist
07economy to make use of competition’ to their benefit. Brenner does not seem able to 
explain the nationalisation process in capitalist countries because, as for Rosenberg 
and Wood, capitalism is precisely about privatisation. Brenner states at one point that
94 Wood 1995, p. 29.
95 Rosenberg 1994, pp. 127-128.
96 Brenner 1988, p. 23. What appears to be a conceptual confusion of industry and economy in the case 
of the West, is in the original.
97 Brenner 1988, p. 23.
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neither ‘social democratic bureaucracies in the west’ nor ‘actually existing socialisms’
Q Q
see ‘increased state direction of the economy as a way out’ of economic crisis. Yet, 
at no point does he explain why they should ever have followed this strategy, as both 
did.
Where the state plays a direct role in the economy as in the case of 
nationalised industries or war economies, this is evidence, for these theorists of ‘less- 
capitalist’ social relations. One of the anomalies which results from this sort of 
perspective is that the privatisation revolution of the last several decades can now be 
understood as most of the world becoming ‘more capitalist’ often under direct 
pressure from the United States through the IMF and World Bank, while the US itself, 
is becoming ‘less capitalist’, as it is currently on track to becoming one of the least 
privatised countries in the world, with an enormous public sector in defense." We 
are, over the course of this thesis, seeking a more coherent understanding of 
capitalism to avoid these apparent absurdities.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to show how an understanding of capitalism as ‘the 
apparent separation of state and market’ prevents us from moving beyond the 
limitations of the Weberian model of ‘the autonomy of states and markets’ because 
the former fails to explain the kind of structural changes within capitalism which the 
latter describes. This is unfortunate because it means that despite providing the most 
coherent critique of Weberian methodology, the ‘classical Marxism’ of Rosenberg 
loses its potential audience in IR and IPE due to an inability to engage with the kinds
98 Brenner 1988, p. 24.
99 Consider that the fiscal 1997 budget plan of the Department of Defense was $265 billion, a sum 
which, Melman notes, ‘exceeds the economic product of entire nations’ Melman 1997, p. 313.
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of questions which have dominated the discipline since the 1970s. This sustains a 
marginalisation of Marxism within the discipline that has been noted by many.100
Rosenberg’s major theoretical insights were levelled at Realist International 
Relations theory. He claimed to provide an explanation for what Realists could only 
describe: the anarchy of an international system of sovereign states. In fact, what he 
provided was an analogy, without explanation. He was unable to explain much of 
what Realists described and to the extent he was capable of explaining key features of 
a Realist image of the international, such as nationalised production and war, he 
compromised his own explication of capitalism. This chapter has provided a critique 
of the ‘apparent separation of spheres’ approach in general and Rosenberg’s work, in 
particular, based on the fact that it is incapable of explaining much that we have come 
to understand as actually existing capitalism.
What begins to emerge from this discussion is that there exists a kind of stand­
off between the best of critical IPE and the most ‘classical’ of Marxism in IR. If we 
return to Burnham’s critique of Cox, he complained that:
[t]he true consequence of this [Cox’s] position is to produce a pluralist 
empiricism which lacks the power to explain either the systematic connection 
between values, social relations and institutions or the extent to which the 
historical appearance of capital as a social relation transforms the social order 
in such a way that all relations are subsumed under the capital relation as the 
basis for valorisation.101
Leo Panitch has responded to this by saying,
[i]f the charge of empiricism is perhaps not entirely off the mark, the general 
level at which Burnham demands primacy to be given to ‘the capital relation’ 
is hardly any answer. Indeed, Cox would readily grant determination at this 
level but then ask: so what? [...] Burnham’s critique of the Coxian approach 
for allegedly failing to recognise that ‘the state meets the interests of capital- 
in-general by enforcing the discipline of the market through the rule of law 
and the rule of money’, is entirely misplaced. Cox explicitly recognises this, 
as we have seen, as regards both the liberal state of the mid-19th century and
100 Most often, Marx is included in order to demonstrate what constitutes bad political theory and 
Marxist are marginalised within the discipline. See Smith and Rupert for a recognition of this and a 
recent attempt to remedy it. Smith and Rupert 2002.
101 Burnham 1991, p. 77.
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the hyperliberal state of the late 20th century; but what he wants to know is 
what disciplines the state to do this -  and what makes it do it again in 
another form  in another historical conjuncture? The role of the state is not 
best conceived as something given once and for all; but neither is it best 
conceived in terms of a transmission belt from the global economy to the 
national economy.102
For Bumham, Rosenberg, Wood, and other theorists of the ‘apparent’ separation of 
political and economic spheres under capitalism, the state represents the interests of 
capital-in-general through enforcing the discipline of the market. What they cannot 
explain is why state-market relations should take such dramatically different forms in 
periods, for instance, of nationalisation and privatisation. The neo-Gramscians find 
the answer to this question in the notion of historic blocs, but, as we have shown 
above, this is more of a description than it is an explanation. In their concern to 
explain the changes within capitalism they lose some of the sense of totality of 
capitalist social relations. The Marxists however, in their attempt to retain the sense of 
totality, end up ignoring the changes within capitalism. In terms of the state’s 
representation of the interests of capital, Panitch is correct to ask ‘what disciplines the 
state to do this -  and what makes it do it again in another form  in another historical 
conjuncture?
Without an answer to this question of why capitalist state-market relations 
take such a variety of forms, Marxism is doomed to remain a minority approach to IR, 
sitting on the sidelines while capitalism unfolds in ever original ways. This lack of 
analysis prevents much academic Marxism from fully engaging in the debate over 
globalisation and the ‘retreat of the state’. Throughout the rest of this thesis, we 
develop an alternative ‘classical Marxist’ analysis of capitalism, rooted in M arx’s 
writings, and capable of explaining the changing structure of state-market relations, 
the shift back and forth between private and state ownership we have witnessed over
102 Panitch 1994, pp. 73-74. Italics mine.
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the course of the twentieth century. We leave the theorists of the separation of spheres
with a warning from Leon Trotsky, the sentiment of which is at the core of this thesis.
There is nothing more dangerous, than to throw out of reality, for the sake of 
logical completeness, elements which today violate your scheme and 
tomorrow may wholly overturn it...103
103 Trotsky 1972, pp. 254-256.
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PART TWO
ACTUALLY EXISTING CAPITALISM: AN ALTERNATIVE TRADITION
We begin by revisiting the terrain covered by the thesis thus far, in order to remind 
ourselves of the objectives to be fulfilled by the alternative theory of capitalism to be 
sketched out in this part.
The point of departure for the thesis as a whole was the ‘privatisation 
revolution’, ongoing over the last two decades or more, during which there has been a 
dramatic shift in ownership and control from the state to the private sphere on a global 
scale. This real transfer of power is debated within the globalization literature in terms 
of whether or not the state is meaningfully ‘in retreat’. In the first chapter of the 
thesis, it was concluded that this is a superficial and unsatisfactory debate.
The second and third chapters of the thesis considered two approaches to state- 
market relations: Weberian and Marxist. It was argued that the first group of theorists 
analyse the social world from the point of view that ‘states’ and ‘market’ are 
ontologically distinct social forces. The latter group argue that they only appear that 
way under capitalism. It was concluded that the superficiality of mainstream 
globalisation theory can be attributed to the Weberian methodology which underpins 
it. The lack of an alternative explanation for the real structural changes we witness 
under the heading of globalization and privatisation, can be explained in terms of the 
high level of abstraction at which the classical Marxist approach operates. Intellectual 
impasse is reached
Hidden from this view is another reading of capitalism as it ‘actually exists’ 
which sees it as capable of taking a variety of state-market forms in order to ensure
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the reproduction of capital on ever-expanding scale. This alternate tradition of 
classical Marxism will be outlined and elaborated upon over the next three chapters, 
through a critical analysis of a chain of theorists who have applied Marx’s analysis of 
capital to the social relations of their day.
The work of these three chapters breaks down in the following way. In chapter 
four we will argue that in Marx and Engels own writings there exists the theoretical 
possibility that capitalism can take the form of state ownership and control of the 
means of production. In chapter five we will focus on the work of Hilferding, 
Bukharin and Lenin, to establish how this possibility became a reality in the 
imperialism and war of the early twentieth century. Finally in chapter six, we will 
look at the implications of this understanding of the ‘state as capital’ for making sense 
of the post-War and Cold War ‘nationalisation revolution’ in both the East and West, 
which preceded the recent global ‘privatisation revolution’.
What is original to this thesis is the characterisation of the ‘separation of 
spheres’ theorists as ‘volume one’ theorists, theorists who have read volume one of 
Capital in relative abstraction from volumes two and three and applied its insights in a 
significantly misleading way. The implications of this for our understanding of state 
market relations under capitalism are laid out in chapter four. In chapter five, the 
original contribution is a rehabilitation of the writings of Hilferding and an analysis of 
them such that the influence they had over Bukharin and Lenin can be clearly 
examined. The centrality of Bukharin’s writings for any Marxist understanding of 
International Relations, is also stressed here, while it has been seriously neglected in 
the discipline as a whole. Finally, in chapter six, a rethinking of the nature of what 
have been known as ‘actually existing socialist’ countries, employing the theory of 
capitalism developed in the previous two chapters, brings fresh controversy to our
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understanding of twentieth century international relations, a period in history when 
state-market formations of various kinds have been starkly contrasted.
This section of the thesis represents the intellectual core of the thesis as a 
whole. Beyond this point, in the final chapter, we shall be in a position to begin to 
speculate as to how this alternative theory of capitalism may be used to explain the 
events we are currently witnessing, which fall under the heading of ‘globalisation’.
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Chapter Four
R ereading Capital: From  Volume One to Volume Three
4.1 Introduction
This is the first of three chapters developing an alternative tradition of classical 
Marxism more capable of grasping the complexity of ‘actually existing capitalism’ 
than the ‘separation of spheres’ approach discussed in the last chapter. 
Specifically, we are interested in understanding capitalism as it has ‘actually 
existed’ including those instances where there has been state ownership and 
control of the means of production. In this chapter we are looking for evidence in 
the writings of Marx, and to a lesser extent Engels, of the theoretical possibility 
that capitalism can take this state form, a form at odds with the ‘separation of 
spheres’ model.
These three chapters begin with a look at Marx’s own understanding of 
capitalism because we are arguing for the classical Marxist credentials of this 
alternative approach. This means that the conclusions we reach over the course of 
these chapters, as to the capitalist nature of nationalized production, must be shown 
to have their basis in M arx’s own thought. It is important to stress this lineage to 
Marx for two key reasons. The first is that some of the theorists we will be 
examining in the next two chapters, are often misunderstood to have deviated 
considerably from Marx in the way in which they have applied Marx’s analysis to 
the social relations of their day. In other words, their status as legitimate heirs to 
the Marxist legacy has been debated. By examining the strand of analysis that runs
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from Marx through these writers we will argue that there exists a development of, 
rather than a deviation from, Marx’s own thought.
The second reason it is important to establish the classical nature of this 
alternative tradition is that the ‘separation of spheres’ theorists have stressed the 
extent to which it is they who directly apply M arx’s analysis of capital to making 
sense of contemporary capitalism. In this way they claim to have deviated least 
from his approach and therefore to be most capable of applying his analysis to 
make sense of contemporary capitalism. In this chapter I will argue that their 
‘direct’ application of some of Marx’s writings in fact operates against the 
meaning of his writings as a whole.
In this chapter, we will make the argument that the ‘separation of spheres’ 
theorists have tended to focus on the analysis contained in volume one of M arx’s 
Capital to the relative exclusion of volumes two and three, with significant 
implications for their understanding of the nature of capitalism. We will refer to 
the ‘separation of spheres’ theorists from now on, not as ‘classical Marxists; but as 
‘volume one’ theorists. What will be argued is that, as Marx moves from volume 
one to volume three of Capital, there emerges the basis for an alternative tradition 
of classical Marxism which differs from the ‘separation of spheres’ variety in the 
way in which it understands the geographical scope, historical trajectory and core 
dynamic of capitalism. The fact that this critique is so fundamental —  relating as it 
does to the space, time and motion of capitalism —  can be understood in terms of 
the dialectical approach taken by Marx throughout the three volumes. This is 
explained in the section which follows.
We will start the chapter with a discussion of Marx’s dialectical method. 
The main body of the chapter then compares the image we may derive of the
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geographical scope, historical trajectory and core dynamic of capitalism from 
reading volume one alone, and that which comes into view upon reading the three 
volumes of Capital together. What becomes apparent is that from our new 
understanding of the ‘space, time and motion’ of capitalism emerges the theoretical 
possibility that capitalism can take the form of state ownership and control of the 
means of production, a possibility which the ‘apparent separation of spheres’ 
approach denies.
4.2. The Dialectical Method in Capital
It is claimed above that those theorists who subscribe to a view of capitalism in 
terms of the ‘apparent separation of spheres’ might best be understood as ‘volume 
one’ theorists of capitalism.1 What does it mean to have formed one’s analysis of 
capitalism on the basis of volume one, in relative exclusion to two and three? How 
are the volumes of Capital related?
Volume one is arguably the richest of the three volumes of Capital and is 
the only one completed in Marx’s lifetime. In this first volume we are given 
essential conceptual building blocks for understanding capitalism, without which 
the remaining two volumes would be incomprehensible.3 But however 
indispensable the insights of volume one, they are not, on their own, sufficient for
1 Of course, given that some of the features of volumes two and three inform our understanding of 
one, of the essence of capitalism, it may be more correct to say that these theorists are not even 
complete ‘volume one’ theorists. I thank Colin Barker for this observation, that without the analysis 
of ‘many capitals’ in volume three, we cannot really make sense of the essence of capital as rooted 
in the commodity, exchange and money, explored in volume one. The label works however as it 
indicates the limitations of an understanding of capitalism which relies on volume one alone.
2 The other two were edited together by Engels who pulled Marx’s disparate writings into a 
coherent text. See Engels’ introductions to volumes two and three for his account of the difficulties 
he faced in doing this. Marx 1978, Marx 1981.
3 See Rosdolsky 1977, pp. 41-50 for a useful discussion of the relationship between the three 
volumes.
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making sense of all that Marx understood to be the ‘laws of motion’ of the 
capitalist mode of production. Part of the reason for this stems from Marx’s 
method over these three texts. Rather than simply providing additional 
information, volumes two and three offer the opportunity to reinterpret the 
abstractions, or essences, of volume one, in light of the greater approximation to 
appearance found in the latter two books. It is for this reason that any direct 
application of the ideas of volume one to the complex reality of ‘actually existing 
capitalism’ may be misleading.
Marx’s method in Capital is one of ‘dialectical materialism’, a complex 
apparatus of conceptual abstractions that provide a strategy for understanding the 
world. It is impossible, within the confines of this thesis, to provide an adequate 
examination of this method, which is, in any case, the subject of considerable 
debate among Marxists.4 As David Harvey notes, Marx, himself, never clearly 
stated the principles of dialectical materialism, preferring instead that the method 
be understood by following its application throughout Capital.5 There are, 
however, a few places in Marx’s notebooks where he does make specific reference 
to his method and these have been usefully drawn out by Harvey into a clear and 
coherent discussion of key elements of the dialectical materialist method which we 
shall look at below.
First however we shall consider Marx’s own limited writings on his 
method. The most developed explanation of his method in Capital can be found in 
the introduction to the Grundrisse, the notebooks in which he planned his critique 
of political economy. Marx begins the Grundrisse with an identification of the
4 See Bhaskar 1993 for a discussion of the many different Marxist approaches to the dialectic.
5 Harvey 1982 [1999], p. 48.
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object of political economy: ‘individuals producing in society’.6 The
methodological starting point here is ‘the concrete’. Marx argues that however 
obvious a starting point this might appear, it is a flawed one. To explain what he 
means, he takes the example of beginning with the concrete observation of ‘the 
population’. He describes this as a ‘chaotic conception of the whole’ which 
requires further determination, a movement toward ever more simple concepts, 
ever more abstract determinations. In his own analysis this involves seeing in the 
population, classes, and in classes, wage labour and capital, and in those two 
abstractions, exchange, a division of labour and prices, and on and on.7 Each level 
presupposes the next.
In this way Marx has started with a living whole, the population and 
concluded by ‘discovering through analysis a small number of determinant, 
abstract, general relations such as division of labour, money and value.’8 ‘From 
there’, he says, ‘the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at 
the population again, but this time not as a chaotic conception of a whole, but as a 
rich totality of many determinations and relations.’9 This movement from abstract 
to concrete is the correct method according to Marx because in this way we arrive 
at a concrete which is concrete ‘because it is the concentration of many 
determinations, hence unity of diverse’.10 He argues that ‘the method of rising 
from the abstract to the concrete is the only way in which thought appropriates the 
concrete, reproduces it as concrete in the mind.’11
6 Marx 1973 [1999], p. 83.
7 This is obviously not the only way of making sense of the population as a concrete determination. 
In neo-classical economics or modem jurisprudence, for example, class would usually be replaced 
by individuals as an abstraction from population.
8 Marx 1973 [1999], p. 100.
9 Marx 1973 [1999], p. 100.
10 Marx 1973 [1999], p. 101.
11 Marx 1973 [1999], p. 101. To illustrate this we can take the banal example of a Toyota Corolla, it 
is only as a sub category of vehicles, of products mass-produced, of imported goods, etc that we can
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Toward the end of the introduction to the Grundrisse Marx very usefully
goes on to map out his path of analysis from the abstract to the concrete and not
only for the first three books of Capital, but beyond.
The order obviously has to be (1) the general, abstract determinants which 
obtain in more or less all forms o f society, but in the above-explained 
sense. (2) The categories which make up the inner structure of bourgeois 
society and on which the fundamental classes rest. Capital, wage labour, 
landed property. Their interrelation. Town and country. The three great 
social classes. Exchange between them. Circulation. Credit system 
(private). (3) Concentration of bourgeois society in the form of the state.
Viewed in relation to itself. The 'unproductive' classes. Taxes. State debt.
Public credit. The population. The colonies. Emigration. (4) The 
international relation of production. International division of labour. 
International exchange. Export and import. Rate of exchange. (5) The 
world market and crises.12
That Marx did not complete the series of books he intended to write13 has been an 
ongoing source of frustration, particularly for those Marxists who have attempted 
to derive from Capital explanations for more complex social formations like the 
state.14 This is because, these social formations are by no means easily read-off 
from the more general abstractions of Capital. As Marx’s discussion of his method 
quite clearly indicates, each level presupposes the next. To take the first example 
in Capital ‘the commodity’, it presupposes later discussions of wage labour and 
capital, which themselves presuppose concepts still to come. The original 
illumination of the commodity must be constantly recast in light of those later 
discussions.15
If we take this basic principle and apply it to Capital volumes one to three, 
we have to accept that there are mediations introduced over the course of the three
appropriate it in our mind, that we can make sense of it as a kind of car. A person from a different 
time period would have different abstract categories and would be unable to appropriate the Corolla 
in their mind in those terms. The most domestic and uninteresting objects, to us, could, to them, 
appear as gods or monsters, on the basis of a different set of abstract categories.
12 Marx 1973 [1999], p. 108.
13 See Rosdolsky 1977 for a detailed discussion of Marx’s plans for completing Capital and 
continuing with studies which would have included a book on the state.
14 See the state-derivation theorists discussed in Clarke 1991.
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books which inform the earlier concepts.16 To try and apply the more abstract 
categories to ‘the real world’ directly would therefore be a mistake. It is this that 
the ‘volume one’ theorists may be prone to do. It is not that these abstractions are 
not in themselves ‘real’, but simply that they remain real in essence and not in
17appearance. Any direct application to reality would therefore be distorting.
Rosenberg’s theory of international relations derived, as it is, directly from the
‘real abstractions’ Marx develops in volume one represents perhaps the most
ambitious attempt to move directly from (1) to (5) above. This, it has been
suggested in the previous chapter, may explain why it is forced to limit its
application to a particularly crude or superficial image of reality corresponding
with the realist theory of International Relations.
The meaning of what is ‘real’ in essence and appearance has been well-
explained by Ernest Mandel in the introduction to Capital volume one.
[F]or Marx, the materialist dialectician, the distinction between ‘essence’ 
and ‘appearance’ in no sense implies that ‘appearance’ is less ‘real’ than 
‘essence’... The distinction between essence and appearance refers to 
different levels of determination, that is in the last analysis to the process 
of cognition, not to different degrees of reality. To explain the capitalist 
mode of production in its totality it is wholly insufficient to understand 
simply the basic ‘essence’ the ‘law of value’. It is necessary to integrate 
‘essence’ and ‘appearance’ through all their intermediate mediating links, 
to explain how and why a given ‘essence’ appears in given concrete forms 
and not others’18
In the introduction to Capital volume three Mandel describes Volumes 1 
and 2 as ‘initial stages in an analysis whose final aim is to explain how the system 
concretely operates -  in “essence” as in “appearance”’. According to Mandel, such
15 Being left with what we have is a bit like being left directions from the centre of a maze to a mid 
way point. We have first to get in, in order to find the way out
16 Lebowitz 1992 represents one of the most serious attempts to consider what it would mean to 
complete the remaining books and what the limitations on our understanding of Capital are without 
them. He does not however really escape the ‘volume one’ logic. On this see Barker 2004.
17 In brief, an abstraction is real insofar as it is a means through which we can appropriate reality. In 
a sense, the more abstract a concept, the more ‘real’ because it refers to that which is most general 
to capitalism, that which always exists. Barker 2003 personal correspondence.
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an explanation of the capitalist economy in its totality is precisely the object of 
volume three.’19 Given the other books that Marx intended, we must remember that 
even volume three cannot be directly applied to reality. What is the case, however, 
is that the analysis of production in volume one is brought together with the 
analysis of circulation in volume two, and developed into an analysis of the 
‘capitalist mode of production as a whole’ in volume three. It is argued here that 
the additional mediations involved are sufficient to have dramatic implications for 
the way in which we understand capitalism to operate.
It is with this in mind that Harvey describes, Marx’s method in Capital as 
looking at a phenomenon through one window, then another and then yet another. 
Citing Oilman20 Harvey argues that this is ‘the purpose of multiple and relational 
approaches to phenomenon’, ‘to try to identify a restricted number of very general 
underlying processes which simultaneously unify and differentiate the phenomena 
we see in the world around us.’21 It is interesting to note how different this 
methodology is from that so common to most social science in which ‘things’ and 
‘processes’ are assumed to be irreducible to one another, a view which is, in fact, a 
point of principle among the Weberian-influenced social theorists we discussed in 
chapter two of this thesis. It is on this basis that they criticise Marx for reducing 
one set of processes and things (politics, ideology, war, etc.) to another set of 
processes and things (economics). Whereas, in fact, as Harvey very usefully points 
out, if there is any reductionism in Marx it is not toward particular, (i.e. economic), 
things and processes, but to processes over things, ‘to an understanding of
18 Mandel 1976, p. 20. Mandel wrote the introductions to all three volumes of Capital published by 
Penguin in 1976, 1978 and 1981.
19 Mandel 1976, p. 10.
20 Oilman 1993.
21 Harvey 1996, p. 58.
144
99common generative processes and relations’. This is a kind of ‘process 
reductionism’, which in dialectical terms is entirely justified.
Harvey has drawn out a number of dialectical principles that can usefully 
inform our understanding of the geographic scope, historical trajectory and core 
dynamic of capitalism. This first, mentioned above, is that a dialectical approach 
emphasizes processes or flows, over structures or things, understanding the latter 
as a result of the former. The empiricist’s self-evident world becomes a complex 
environment in which all things are manifestations of relations.23 This is important 
for our understanding of the core dynamic of capitalism and how it may be 
manifest through different social structures over time.
Second, is the idea that things or events are constituted out of ‘flows, 
processes and relations, operating within bounded fields which constitute 
structured systems or wholes’.24 To understand how structures relate to a structured 
whole, you need to look at the processes by which both are constituted. In other 
words, where we draw boundaries in terms of geographic scope is not something 
that can be established other than by reference to the process under examination. 
This is made even clearer in Harvey’s next point, which is that things are internally 
heterogenous at every level in that every thing or structure can be seen to contain 
other things or structures that can be broken down ad infinitum. Given that every 
thing is heterogenous we can only make sense of things by understanding the 
relative significance of the processes they internalise from an environment whose
22 He goes on to say, ‘[i]n this way we can conceive, for example, of a common process of capital 
circulation giving rise to an infinite variety of... social forms.’ Harvey 1996, p. 58. This is a 
statement which bodes well for an understanding of capitalist state ownership and control of 
production.
3 Harvey gives the example of factories and cities, in future chapters we will be aware of structures 
like corporations, banks, trusts and states in terms of how they manifest in a particular way as a 
result of a common set of flows, the accumulation of capital of an ever-expanding scale.
24 Harvey 1996, p. 50.
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boundaries cannot be established a priori. The geographic scope of capitalism 
must be understood in terms of the flows of capitalist social relations, not through 
assumptions that may serve other social purposes.
Finally, in terms relevant to our analysis of both geographic scope and 
historical trajectory, ‘processes do not operate in, but actively create space and 
time and in doing so, distinctive scales for their development’. To this Harvey 
adds the idea that parts and wholes are mutually constitutive of each other. This 
relationship goes beyond the model of a ‘feedback loop’ to a situation in which the 
whole reconstitutes the parts, which in tum reconstitute the whole, there is an 
‘interchangeability of cause and effect’.27 This will be shown to be an important 
principle both in terms of how we understand the historical trajectory of 
capitalism, but also in terms of how particular units of social organization found 
under capitalism, for example states or corporations, relate to the whole 
geographic scope of capitalism in a global economy and the nature of the process 
of capitalist development, its core dynamic.
Throughout the course of this chapter, we will focus almost exclusively on 
Marx and Engels writings in the three volumes of Capital.2* As mentioned above, 
we will be uncovering the basis for a theory of capitalism that differs from the 
‘volume one’ variety in geographical scope, historical trajectory and core
25 This is an important aspect of the approach to international relations that we are developing, in 
that the relative significance of states, for instance, cannot be established a priori.
26 Harvey 1996, p. 50. The question of scale is an extremely important one that we will be coming 
to in chapters 7 and 8. Neil Smith 1984, pp. 135-147 provides a useful discussion of ‘the spatial 
scales of capital’.
27 Harvey 1996, p. 50, quoting Levins and Lewontin 1985, p. 274. This point is of particular 
relevance to Bukharin’s theory of state capitalism, which we will discuss in the next chapter, in 
which capital becomes organised nationally because of international competition which is itself 
fierce because of capital’s organising itself on a national scale.
28 There are other writings by Marx and Engels which arguably form the basis for a theory of 
actually-existing capitalism, and a few will be referenced here. But it is Capital Volumes 1-3, 
Marx’s great work that Engels was instrumental in developing and completing, that presents their 
analysis of capitalism in its strongest form.
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dynamic. The fact that this critique is so fundamental is a consequence of the 
dialectical approach outlined above. As Mandel indicated, the problem with the 
‘volume one’ approach is not that it is wrong— essence is no less real than 
appearance—but that it is operating at an advanced level of abstraction 
inappropriate for direct mapping onto the real world. Within this image of 
capitalism, its scope, its trajectory and its dynamic, are interrelated and mutually 
reinforcing, each appears true given the others. By changing one of these 
characteristics to that which more closely approximates capitalism as it ‘actually 
exists’, we can begin to problematise the other two. We will start by looking at the 
geographical scope of the capitalist mode of production and then deal with the 
other dimensions in turn.
4.3 Geographical Scope of Capital
What is meant by ‘geographical scope’ here is the social unit of analysis in which 
the capitalist mode of production might be understood, in other words, the 
‘society’ to which it might apply. This relates to the dialectical principle discussed 
above which asserts that the boundaries of the environment within which 
heterogenous things internalise processes cannot be established a priori. It will be 
argued that the ‘volume one’ theorists have done just that by naturalising the 
category of the nation-state or country as the social unit of analysis of capitalism. 
While they would acknowledge the existence of a capitalist world market, they see 
individual nation-states or countries, as societies within which capitalist relations 
may or may not prevail. This is implicit in their definition of capitalism -  as a
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separation out of a ‘purely political’ state from its respective civil society -  and is 
reinforced by a particular reading of Capital volume one. How this view might be 
altered in light of the insights provided by volumes 2 and 3 is the subject of this 
section.
4.3.1 The Country Model o f  Capitalism
In a review of Ellen Wood’s Pristine Culture o f Capitalism, Colin Barker suggests 
that Wood may share with the ‘British Marxist historians’29 a tendency to ‘see the 
development of the world in terms of single countries, taken one at a time.’ He 
questions whether these historians ‘entirely overcame the ‘national’ way of 
thinking that became predominant within most Marxism from the mid-1920s’.30 
Wood, a great, although not uncritical, admirer of E P Thompson’s work,31 
developed her own analysis of the development of capitalism in relation to what 
Thompson termed ‘the peculiarities of the English’. Barker notes that Wood refers 
in the Pristine Culture o f  Capitalism to England as ‘the world’s first capitalist 
society’ and that ‘she also refers in passing to “other capitalist economies” as if 
these were discrete entities.’ While acknowledging that this may simply be a useful 
shorthand, he considers whether there might be more behind it. He raises what is a 
central question in relation to volume one Marxism: ‘is it appropriate to treat a
-i t
country as equivalent to a society ?'
Obviously on one level nearly any specified group can be treated as 
equivalent to a ‘society’. Barker is asking whether a country is a meaningful social
29 Most notably Christopher Hill and E P Thompson.
30 Barker 1997, p. 54.
31 See Wood 1995, especially chapter 2.
32 Barker 1997, p. 54. Italics mine.
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unit for analysing the capitalist mode of production. His answer quite clearly is 
‘no’. For ‘volume one’ Marxists the answer appears to be ‘yes’. In fact, as the last 
chapter suggests, it seems to be extremely common practice among contemporary 
Marxists to distinguish capitalist and non-capitalist ‘societies’ or ‘economies’ 
along country lines, as in the case of ‘non-capitalist’ Germany versus ‘capitalist’ 
England in the Second World War. Moreover, this is done without specific 
theorisation of the way in which the borders of a territorial state might delineate 
the boundaries of a mode of production. This naturalisation of the territorial state 
appears to be an unresolved tension in ‘volume one’ Marxism which goes 
unchallenged by their definition of capitalism as a separation of spheres.
Rosenberg’s work represents this tension in stark form because he concedes 
a very large role to the global dimension of capitalism. Acutely aware of the 
significance of the international or global spread of the capitalist economy, a.k.a 
the ‘empire of civil society’, Rosenberg nevertheless clings to a national model of 
capitalism politically, the ‘bordered, sovereign state’.33 This tension in 
Rosenberg’s thought and his ultimate commitment to a country model of 
capitalism become clear when, in a short article, he attempts to employ the insights 
of Trotsky’s theory of combined and uneven development.34 Trotsky observed that 
capital was not creating ‘a world after its own image’,35 instead it was developing 
unevenly on a global scale and combining to produce unstable social formations.36
33 Rosenberg 1994, p. 146.
34 It is interesting that Barker suggests Wood and the ‘British Marxist historians’ may not have 
taken the country model path of analysis if they had considered Trotsky’s theory of ‘uneven and 
combined development’. Barker 1997, p. 54. And yet, as we shall see, Rosenberg manages to 
employ precisely that theory to come to even more nation-state-centric conclusions about capitalist 
and non-capitalist societies.
35 Marx 1967, p.84.
36 Trotsky 1962. See also Lowy 1981 on ‘combined and uneven development’.
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Rosenberg takes from this that capitalism spreads internationally leaving in 
its wake, ‘capitalist’ and ‘non-capitalist’ societies. He claims that, ‘capital did 
indeed create one world, but not a homogeneous one fashioned in the image of the 
capitalist societies at its centre.’37 Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, for instance, 
are, for Rosenberg, the result of international capitalism but not themselves 
capitalist. This places a great deal of emphasis on the territorial state unit to set the 
parameters of capitalist society.
Perhaps as a result of his own discomfort about the way this sounds—  
capitalism producing capitalism and non-capitalism—Rosenberg then appears to 
move the goal posts. He states that the ‘uneven and combined development’ of 
capitalism internationally ‘threw up within its own movement the tormented 
political forms which liberalism has then confronted as its military competitors.’38 
He has swapped ‘capitalist society’ for ‘liberalism’ to avoid the formulation that 
capitalism on a global scale threw up forms which capitalism on a national scale 
then confronted.
But this is exactly what he is saying. He recognises that ‘liberalism, fascism 
and Stalinism... for all their differences, were actually not separate historical 
experiences’39 they must be located within the uneven and combined development 
of global capitalism. And yet, of these three different formations, all produced by 
uneven and combined capitalism, only one of them, the liberal model, is, for 
Rosenberg, capitalist.
Rosenberg’s uncritical approach to territorial states as the societies of 
capitalism can also be found elsewhere. In Empire o f  Civil Society Rosenberg asks
37 Rosenberg 1998, p. 8.
38 Rosenberg 1998, p. 13.
39 Rosenberg 1998, p. 11.
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‘is there an ontological difference between society and the international system?’,40 
he answers that there is not. What he means by this is that both are comprised of 
social relations and therefore, contre Wight,41 the level of the international should 
be just as amenable to social theory. However, Rosenberg’s use of an analogy 
between units of capital within a state and states within an international system, 
suggests he is unaware of what is a profound ontological difference between 
society as he has conceived it (a country) and the international system. The former 
is a part of the latter, which is a whole. In contrast to Rosenberg, I would argue 
that the former (a country) cannot be seen as a whole analogous to the latter 
(international society), which is a whole when it comes to analyzing capitalist 
social relations. It is totality, not analogy, which counts.
This is not however to suggest that the totality is an undifferentiated whole. 
As David Harvey usefully points out in reference to ‘capital in general’, a totality 
is a differentiated unity, which is heterogenous and often internally contradictory. 
‘The discovery of which of these internal differentiations has primacy or 
significance depends on the historical geographical and theoretical interrogation of 
material circumstances’.42 In other words, it is through analysis of the processes 
under consideration that we can determine divisions within a whole and the whole 
itself.
The country model is implicit in the ‘volume one’ definition of capitalism 
and it is determined a priori. This is part of the mutual reinforcement of 
dimensions referred to earlier: the ‘country’ social unit supports the state/private 
property definition of capitalism and vice versa. For the ‘volume one theorist’, the 
separation out of the ‘purely political’ state from its respective civil society is what
40 Rosenberg 1994, p. 54.
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makes or breaks capitalist social relations. Looking around the world Rosenberg 
sees one sovereign state authority per territorial state. To find out if they are 
capitalist he simply checks, one by one, whether the state authorities in these 
territories stand outside a distinct private sphere of surplus extraction.
Has the ‘British Marxist historians’ tendency to ‘see the development of the 
world in terms of single countries, taken one at a time’ been overcome? It would 
appear not.
4.3.2 Reading Capital
In reading volume one, what is most striking is the artful way in which Marx
manages to delineate no geographical boundaries whatsoever. He speaks endlessly
of ‘social relations’, refers occasionally to the ‘world of commodities’43, but also
provides examples in which a particular country appears to be the relevant unit of
analysis.44 As Wallerstein comments, ‘the geographical boundaries to which the
analysis applies are obscure.’45 The reason for this is that Marx has made an
assumption in volume one, which does away with the international aspect of
capitalist systems.
In order to examine the object of our investigation in its integrity, free 
from all disturbing subsidiary circumstances, we must treat the whole 
world as one nation and assume that capitalist production is everywhere 
established and has possessed itself of every branch of industry.46
41 Wight 1966.
42 Harvey 1996, p. 66.
43 Marx 1976, pp. 165,168.
44 See in particular Chapter 10 ‘The working day’ where most examples are drawn from England 
and relate to English law and society. Marx 1976, pp. 340-416.
45 Wallerstein in Bottomore 1991, p. 590.
46 Marx 1976, p. 727. Rosenberg is quite seriously mistaken to assume from this that ‘Marx’s 
analysis is conducted at the level of “domestic” social reproduction.’ Rosenberg 1994, p. 154.
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What is under analysis in volume one, according to Roman Rosdolsky’s
careful interpretation, is what Marx described as ‘capital in general’.47 For
Rosdolsky this refers to that which all capitals have in common: valorisation 48
This focus on valorisation is evidence of what we discussed above as the ‘process
reductionism’ of Marx’s dialectical method. He is concerned in volume one with
‘capital becoming’ and the most general principles involved in that process. For
this purpose, he has abstracted from actual geographical scale, which will have to
be reintegrated through a series of mediations at a later point.
For now, however, what we learn in volume one, among other things, is
that labour power is the source of surplus value in production. All the other
‘factors of production’ machinery, tools, etc. contain value and transfer it to the
end product, but labour-power alone is capable of creating value. It is by
employing wage labour to produce commodities that capitalists valorise their
capital. So far so good, as this is the basis of Marx’s ‘labour theory of value’.
But a problem arises when we look at the different composition of capitals
in different sectors of production. On the basis of the assumptions above we would
expect to find the highest rates of surplus value, and therefore profit, in those fields
of industry which employ the most labour power relative to other factors of
production. But, empirically this is not the case. Moreover, according to Marx,
no such variation in the average rate of profit exists between different 
branches of industry, and it could not exist without abolishing the entire 
system of capitalist production.49
47 ‘The first two volumes of Capital do not fundamentally go beyond the analysis of ‘capital in 
general’, the third volume is the place where competition, credit and share capital are introduced...’ 
Rosdolsky 1977, p. 41. For references to Marx’s letter to Krugelman 28 Dec, 1862 and other 
instances of the use of ‘capital in general’ see Rosdolsky 1977, pp. 41-42.
48 Rosdolsky 1977, p. 43.
49 Marx 1981, p. 253.
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This is a serious puzzle in the labour theory of value, which is not
adequately addressed until chapter eight of volume three. At this point in Capital
we finally drop the assumption that individual commodities exchange in proportion
to the value contained within them. We leave behind the idea that the surplus value
accruing to each capitalist is the result of the labour-power of the workers that a
particular capitalist employs. Instead Marx explains that through a process of
competition between many capitals the rate of profit is averaged out.
As Rosdolsky points out, competition between ‘many capitals’ rather than
‘capital in general’ is the object of analysis in volume three. Under conditions of
competition, capitals constantly seek out those sectors with higher ratios of labour
power because, as we would expect from the assumptions of volume one, they are
the most profitable. But, a flooding of capital to these areas creates too much
competition, an excess of production, a lowering of demand and therefore price,
which affects the rate of profit obtainable in that sphere. Capital continues to move
in search of higher rates of profit but competition ensures that a higher rate of
profit in any sector does not last long.50 On aggregate, through this competitive
process of seeking the highest rate of profit, the profit rate is equalised.
This constant migration, the distribution of capital between the different
spheres according to where the profit rate is rising and where it is falling
is what produces a relationship between supply and demand such that the
average profit is the same in the various different spheres, and values are
therefore transformed into various prices of production.51
Prices of production are equal to the cost of producing the commodity plus
the average rate of profit applied to that cost price. This means that surplus value
which can potentially be realised, as opposed to created, in a particular sector of
50 Obviously this assumes ‘perfect competition’ without monopoly or other barriers to trade. This is 
another of Marx’s ‘necessary abstractions’. It is necessary to grasp the workings of capital under 
conditions of unhindered competition before introducing the distorting effects of competition 
modified by monopoly and other interferences.
51 Marx 1981, p. 297.
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capital depends on the size of the capital, regardless of its composition, and on the
general rate of profit of the total social capital.
This has been a very brief and simplified account of Marx’s argument in
volume three, but it should be obvious nonetheless that this introduction of ‘many
capitals’ and a profit rate based on total social capital marks a dramatic shift in
perspective from volume one. As Rubin states,
[I]t is hard to overstate the importance of the analysis of ‘the 
transformation of values into prices of production’ since it is the key that 
links the abstract theory of surplus value to the actual day to day workings 
of the capitalist economy.52
It is clear that Marx saw the third volume of Capital as introducing a
qualitatively new dimension, more than the sum of insights from Volumes 1 and 2.
In fact, he stresses at the beginning of volume three that he has already shown in
volume two that ‘the capitalist production process taken as a whole is a unity of the
production and circulation processes’ so,
[i]t cannot be the purpose of the present, third volume simply to make 
general reflections on this unity. Our concern is rather to discover and 
present the concrete forms which grow out o f the process o f  capital’s 
movement considered as a whole.53
What volume three shows is that surplus value in a given bourgeois society
as a whole is the starting point for the allocation of individual profit. Marx
considered this insight to be his original contribution to the labour theory of value
revealed for the first time in Capital volume three.54
The individual capitalist (or alternatively the sum total of capitalists in a 
particular sphere of production), whose vision is a restricted one, is right 
in believing that his profit does not derive just from the labour employed 
by him or employed in his own branch. This is quite correct as far as his 
average profit goes. How much this profit is mediated by the overall 
exploitation of labour by capital as a whole, i.e. by all his fellow- 
capitalists, this interconnection is a complete mystery to him, and the
52 Rubin 1972, p. 135.
53 Marx 1981, p. 117.
54 Harvey 1982, p. 61.
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more so in that even the bourgeois theorists, the political economists, have 
not yet revealed it.55
Marx revealed that the profit of any individual capitalist is entirely 
mediated by the exploitation of labour by capital as a whole. The totality of the 
social relations of capital is logically prior to the parts. The surplus value realised 
by individual capitals has as its prerequisite the total social capital of which it is 
merely an aliquot part. To what geographical space does ‘total social capital’ 
correspond? To what else could ‘total social capital’ be taken to refer, except ‘all 
the capital in the world’ or ‘global capital’?
4.3.3 The Society o f  Capital
Is it that individuals create society or that society creates individuals? It is both. 
This question relates to another principle of dialectical materialism that we 
introduced above: parts and wholes are mutually constitutive of each other. Having 
reached volume three of Capital we can see quite clearly that society, ‘total social 
capital’, creates individuals, ‘the profits of individual capitalists’ as much as ‘the 
profits of individual capitalists’ creates ‘total social capital’. If we imagine only the 
latter scenario, we are at risk of performing a simple addition of profits of 
individuals within a certain geographical space and coming to the conclusion that 
the result is simply the total social capital of that space.
In volume one where the assumption holds that values translate directly 
into prices each individual unit of capital appears relatively self-contained. It 
becomes possible therefore to draw the borders of society in a more a priori 
fashion, around the individual profits of the country’s nationals without regard for
55 Marx 1981, p. 270.
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actual processes and flows of capital between what may be considered by volume
one theorists as capitalist and non-capitalist states, e.g. between England and Nazi
Germany. But with the indication from Marx, in volume three, that the appropriate
model of ‘society’ for making sense of the capitalist mode of production is that
which corresponds to ‘total social capital’ we are forced to reject any a priori
specifications of geographical space. We are forced to consider the boundaries of
‘total social capital’. What indication do we have of what that might mean, beyond
the idea that it is this social dimension which creates the individual dimension?
Obviously we cannot speak of ‘total social capital’ on a truly global scale
from the moment capitalist relations of production first begin to develop. We must
recognize that capitalism starts as an international system differentiated into states,
but this international system is quite small to begin with and then expands
outwards.56 Equally, we should note that many parts of the world became
integrated into a global network of capitalist relations, i.e. played a role in the
establishment of ‘total social capital’ on a global scale, before they developed the
boundaries and infrastructure of nation-states. This, after all, was the nature of
Empire. We could argue that in India and China, for instance, capitalism preceded
the state. It certainly preceded the modem, sovereign territorial nation-state.
In The German Ideology Marx provides the following example to illustrate
the way in which the world market has developed world history and ‘world-
historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones’.
Thus, for instance, if in England a machine is invented, which deprives 
countless workers of bread in India and China, and overturns the whole 
form of existence of these empires, this invention becomes a world 
historical fact.
56 The World Systems theory model of capitalism grasps the fact of expansion, but is too limited in 
the way it depicts the method of that expansion as a relationship between a core, semi-periphery 
and periphery of states.
57 Marx 1974, p. 56.
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[T]his transformation of history into world history is... quite a materially 
verifiable act, an act the proof of which every individual furnishes as he 
comes and goes, eats, drinks and cloaks himself.
That the world is the ‘society’ relevant for making sense of the capitalist
mode of production, has great political as well as analytical significance for Marx.
The world market makes possible for the first time ‘the world-historical
cooperation of individuals’ which he sees as the prerequisite for a global
communist society.59
Empirically communism is only possible as the act of the dominant 
peoples ‘all at once’ and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal 
development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up 
with communism.60
Marx believed that communism was possible only because he also believed 
that capitalism was global and therefore the agent of change was global. ‘The mass 
of propertyless workers... presupposes the world market through competition. The 
proletariat can thus only exist world historically.’61 This image of the emancipatory 
potential of the totality is one of the unique features of M arx’s thought, as Barker 
notes.
Marxism is the only theory with the ambition to capture simultaneously 
the nature of global society as a single capitalist system and the practical 
prospect of humanity’s self-emancipation from that system.62
But how do we respond to Rosenberg’s argument regarding combined and uneven
development, that the world market may be capitalist, i.e. in terms of exchange, but it
gives rise to capitalist and non-capitalist nation-states in terms of the relations of
production which adhere within? The problem with this conception is that it separates
exchange and production on the basis of an assumption about the nation-state
boundedness of the mode of production. Marx had quite a different view.
58 Marx 1974, p. 58.
59 Marx 1974, p. 55.
60 Marx 1974, p. 56.
61 Marx 1974, p. 56.
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The conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality, 
distinctions within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself, 
in the antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as 
well. The process always returns to production to begin anew. That 
exchange and consumption cannot be predominant is self-evident. 
Likewise, distribution as distribution of products; while as distribution of 
the agents of production it is itself a moment of production. A definite 
production thus determines a definite consumption, distribution and 
exchange as well as definite relations between these different moments. 
Admittedly, however, in its one-sided form, production is itself 
determined by the other moments. For example if the market, i.e. the 
sphere of exchange, expands, then production grows in quantity and the 
divisions between its different branches become deeper. A change in 
distribution changes production, e.g. concentration of capital, different 
distribution of the population between town and country, etc. Finally, the 
needs of consumption determine production. Mutual interaction takes 
place between the different moments. This the case with every organic 
whole.63
We can apply the following quote from the Grundrisse to capitalist global
society to see how much sense Marx would have made of the idea that Nazi
Germany was not a capitalist state, despite the capitalist mode of production
having created a world market.
In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which 
predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence 
to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours 
and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether which determines 
the specific gravity of every being which has materialised within it.64
What Marx is saying is that the character of a given society’s constituent 
parts is determined by the mode of production which dominates, in this case, at the 
global level.
It is striking how much this approach shares with W ood’s own answer to a 
rather different question, of whether pre-capitalist social relations might exist 
alongside capitalist social relations. The parallels between the two positions reveal 
the tension in Wood’s thought. In the following passage, which is an elaboration 
on the quote by Marx above, it becomes clear that despite W ood’s reluctance to
62 Barker 1997, p. 23.
63 Marx 1973 [1999], pp. 98-99. Italics mine.
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take it to its logical conclusion at the level of global capitalist society, she firmly 
agrees with the analytical approach as applied within a territorial state:
a) ‘form of society’ refers to something like... capitalism (or bourgeois 
society), not simply an individual and unique concrete formation like 
‘England during the Industrial Revolution’... but a class of concrete 
phenomena which have some kind of common socio-historic logic; and
b) the point of the passage is, if  anything, to stress the unity, not the 
‘heterogeneity’, of a ‘social formation” .65
W ood’s description of the social unit appropriate to analysing capitalism as
‘a class of concrete phenomena’ with ‘a common socio-historic logic’ fits perfectly
with Marx’s comments on ‘the world-historical cooperation of individuals’ above.
In reference again to the origins of capitalism, she goes on to explain that societies
(by which she means countries) with ‘mixed’ social formations, (much as she or
Rosenberg might describe global society) should not be seen in terms of ‘several
modes of production dominated by one’, but, rather as ‘different branches of
production assimilated to the specific character of the branch that predominates’.66
Those other ‘branches’ of production must be seen as capitalist because the form in
which they are assimilated cannot be explained otherwise. This is what Marx
meant when he said, ‘capital at a certain point becomes the dominant force capable
of determining the form of society as a whole.’67
Elsewhere Wood argues against the idea that ‘the very existence of other
modes of domination... [within a single country] is taken to demonstrate that
/■ o
capitalism... is not a totalising system.’ In a striking passage she argues,
To deny the totalizing logic o f capitalism, it would have to be 
convincingly demonstrated that these other spheres and identities do not 
come -  or not in any significant way -  within the determinative force of 
capitalism, its system of social property relations, its expansionary
64 Marx 1973, pp. 106-107.
65 Wood 1995, pp. 57-58. Italics mine. In Barker 1997, he suggests that Wood’s tendency to treat 
countries as capitalist societies seems to be less the case in her later writings.
66 Wood 1995, p. 58.
67 Marx 1973, p. 1028.
68 Wood 1995, p. 246.
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imperatives, its drive for accumulation, its commodification of all social 
life, its creation of the market as a necessity, a compulsive mechanism of 
competition and self-sustaining growth, and so on.69
There could hardly be a stronger argument for accepting the capitalist 
nature of the global system and its constituent parts. Volume one theorists do seem 
to accept the logic of abandoning the country model of capitalist development but 
find it difficult, or unnecessary, to do so given some of their other assumptions. 
We will look at these other assumptions in the next two sections.
4.4 The Historical Trajectory of Capital
By historical trajectory we mean fundamental tendencies or directions for social 
change. The tendency under focus here is that of the centralisation of capital. It 
will be argued that ‘volume one’ marxism tends to focus on competition as an 
almost timeless force, with little attention to the way in which centralisation 
continually transforms the conditions of competition, propelling capitalism down a 
path of increasingly large competitive capitals. To the extent they acknowledge the 
centralising tendency of capitalism, volume one theorists tend to view it as 
theoretically unimportant. They reject the idea that the changing forms through 
which centralisation takes place might, at some stage, implicate the state in a more 
direct role in capitalist production. This view is reinforced by a particular reading 
of Capital volume one which leaves the concept of ‘centralisation’ undeveloped. 
How this view might be altered in light of the insights provided by volumes 2 and 
3 is the subject of this section.
69 Wood 1995, p. 246.
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4.4.1 Arrested Development
Volume one marxists have critiqued the Weberian tendency to read back into 
history that which is unique to capitalism. In this task, they have tended to focus on 
the novelty of capitalism and how it can be differentiated from pre-capitalism. In a 
sense they have been looking at what’s gone on behind them, rather than what’s 
going on around them, with the effect that they underplay developments within 
capitalism’s own history.
For Wood, the ‘starting point’ of capitalist production is nothing other than
‘the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’, ‘a
process of class struggle and coercive intervention by the state on behalf of the
expropriating class.’70 This is what starts capitalism, but it is the lack of ‘coercive
intervention by the state’ that makes capitalism. After capitalism gets started,
‘direct political coercion is excluded from the process of surplus extraction and
1 1removed to the state’. This is a kind of ‘wind up and go’ model of capitalist 
development. Once the producers are separated from the means of production, 
capitalism can simply unfold according to the laws of motion of capital. These 
laws of motion are ‘purely economic’ value relations. They do drive capitalism in 
particular directions, for example in the direction of geographical expansion and 
technological advancement,72 but they don’t challenge the theoretical model of the 
‘purely political’ state. To the extent that the state does intervene from time to 
time, this is the result of class struggle, a sign of immature capitalism or simply a
70 Wood 1995, p. 21.
71 Wood 1995, p. 44.
72 Wood, 1995, pp. 108-145. Technological development is the focus of a whole chapter of 
Democracy and Capitalism.
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matter of ‘historical contingency’, it is not a product of value relations directly.73 
State intervention in the form of imperialism, for instance, which some have 
characterised as capitalism overripe and on it way out,74 is for the volume one 
theorists, capitalism undercooked and on its way in. Imperialism is capitalism 
‘winding up’, not yet going.75
Rosenberg’s inattention to developments within capitalism’s history is 
evident in both his ‘theory of anarchy’ and his total disinterest in ‘globalisation 
theory’. In terms of anarchy, as discussed in the previous chapter, Rosenberg goes 
wrong where he attempts to explain what the realist IR theorists have only 
described,76 He is right to point out that their ‘explanation’ was at best a 
description, but he is wrong to have accepted their description. In his theory of 
anarchy he takes the realist image of an anarchical system of states and attempts to 
historicise it. The image of ‘a war of all against all’, a timeless, transhistorical, 
state of nature, endless competition with no overarching authority becomes for 
Rosenberg, not an invalid description of international relations, but instead a 
description which is historically specific to capitalism. We are left to the 
conclusion that capitalism takes place as a timeless, transhistorical (within the 
history of capitalism), ‘war of all against all’, endless competition with no 
overarching authority. Anarchy, for Rosenberg, is ‘the geopolitical form of 
capitalist modernity’. Rosenberg’s theory of capitalism is as effectively static as
73 Only in so far as class struggle and crisis result from value relations and draw in the state, but 
then, for Rosenberg and Wood, this is about the breakdown of capitalism, not capitalism per se.
74 This position is often attributed to Lenin, who did argue, along with Luxembourg and others that 
imperialist war may bring about the end of capitalism through a descent into barbarism.
75 This is certainly the perspective taken by Rosenberg who sees colonial conquest and subsequent 
retreat as marking ‘the dawn of the modem international [capitalist] system’. Rosenberg 1994, p. 
169.
76 Rosenberg is attempting to follow in the footsteps of Marx explaining what the political 
economists only described.
77 Rosenberg 2004, pp. 155. His characterisation of ‘the repetitive mechanisms of balance of power’ 
as capitalist, p. 9 is equally stunting of the developments internal to capitalism.
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the realist’s theory of anarchy.78 There is no explanation for moments in the history 
of capitalism when state-market or international relations do not appear anarchic at 
all, for instance, when the state controls production or when states enter into 
coordinated bloc behaviour.
It is also therefore no surprise that theories of globalisation should be met 
by Rosenberg with such derision. He refers to globalisation theory as ‘an 
undescribed, undescribable incomprehensible nothing’. Of its theorists he 
demands, ‘substance, soon, or silence.’79 Globalisation theory leaves a lot to be 
desired, as we discussed in detail in the first chapter of this thesis. However, its 
inability to adequately grasp the changes taking place in the global capitalist 
economy does not mean that there are no changes worthy of our attention. This is 
effectively what Rosenberg claims. Having so carefully argued in Empire o f  Civil 
Society against the realist idea that ‘the state is the state, is the state’ 
transhistorically, Rosenberg argues against globalisation theorists that ‘capitalism 
is capitalism, is capitalism’.
In fact, it is not so much that Rosenberg, or Wood (whose liberal use of the 
word ‘globaloney’ sets the tone for her intervention in the globalization debate),80 
ignore empirical changes taking place as a result of global capitalism, it is that they 
doubt their theoretical significance. Why? Because the basic theoretical model of 
capitalism has been set up since the peasants were expropriated. Everything else is 
merely historical detail, the unfolding of a single dynamic within the uneven 
historical conditions of the world. There is nothing new under the sun of global 
capitalism and the forecast is no change until the revolution.
78 Martin Wight famously claimed that there was no such thing as international theory because the 
international dimension was unchanging in its character. Wight 1966.
79 Rosenberg 2000, p. 165.
80 Wood 1997.
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4.4.2 Reading Capital
The analysis of the tendency toward centralisation is underdeveloped in volume 
one. This again relates to Rosdolsky’s assessment of volume one dealing with 
‘capital in general’ and volume three dealing with ‘many capitals’. As Marx 
described his plans for Capital to Kugelmann in 1862, “‘capital in general” 
excludes a study of competition of capitals and the credit system’.81 Centralisation, 
which is expressed in credit relations and is the result of competition, is not dealt 
with properly until we get to volume three. Centralisation of both productive and 
financial capital are however briefly mentioned in the earlier volumes.
In volume one, Marx discusses the centralisation of productive capitals, 
‘destruction of their individual independence, expropriation of capitalist by 
capitalist, transformation into few large capitals’.82 Larger capitals with larger 
scales of production are able to produce cheaper goods, pushing smaller capitals 
out of business, ‘swallowing them up’. This metaphor of big fish swallowing 
smaller fish is one of the most enduring images of M arx’s analysis. We learn from 
this that centralisation is by no means a barrier to competitive accumulation, nor is 
it simply a side effect, it is the way that competition and, in turn, capitalism 
develops.
The centralisation of capitals, or the process of their attraction, becomes 
more intense in proportion as the specifically capitalist mode of 
production develops along with accumulation. In its turn, centralisation 
becomes one of the greatest levers of this development.83
We don’t get much more detail on the centralisation of productive capital in 
volume one. Marx cuts the discussion short with the statement that, ‘[t]he laws of
81 Letter to Krugelman quoted in Rosdolsky 1977.
82 Marx 1976, p. 777.
83 Marx 1976, p. 778 fn*.
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this centralisation of capitals, or of the attraction of capital by capital, cannot be
developed here.’ 84 He continues only for a brief comment on the process of
financial centralisation.
Apart from this, an altogether new force comes into existence with the 
development of capitalist production: the credit system. In its first stages, 
this system furtively creeps in as the humble assistant o f accumulation, 
drawing into the hands of individual or associated capitalists by invisible 
threads the money resources, which lie scattered in larger or smaller 
amounts over the surface of society; but it soon becomes a new and 
terrible weapon in the battle of competition and is finally transformed 
into an enormous social mechanism for the centralisation of capitals,’85
The tendency toward centralisation, and the huge expansion of credit
relations, the development of joint stock companies, trusts, stock markets, and the
role of the state remain undeveloped in volume one. It is not until volume two that
we really begin to understand how credit relations come directly out of capitalist
relations of production and how they contribute to centralisation and competition.
In volume two, Marx looks at the circuit of capital in detail. Given the
nature of large-scale production, there are times when money capital gained as a
result of selling commodities is not adequate for redeployment in production. In
this case, a capitalist will lend the money to another capitalist, either directly or
through the medium of bank, rather than have it sit idle. Equally, another capitalist,
not wishing his means of production to sit idle while waiting for enough profit to
start a new cycle of production, will borrow money. In these ways there is a
competitive pressure to obtain and supply credit built right into the capitalist
system and this competition brings about considerable centralization, of which
Marx was well aware.
Talk about centralisation! The credit system, which has its focal point in 
the allegedly national banks and the big money lenders and usurers that
84 Marx 1976, p. 777.
85 Marx 1976, pp. 777-778. The text from ‘In its first stages’ onwards was added by Engels to the 
fourth German edition. See Marx 1976 fn*, pp. 777-778.
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surround them, is one enormous centralisation and gives this class of 
parasites a fabulous power not only to decimate the industrial capitalists 
periodically but also to interfere in actual production in the most 
dangerous manner -  and this crew knew nothing of production and have 
nothing at all to do with it.86
Banks, for Marx play an important role in the process of financial 
centralisation. But there is another organisational form which he found particularly 
fascinating: the joint stock company, which seemed to combine the centralisation 
of financial and productive capital.87 Marx credited joint stock companies with 
making possible a ‘tremendous expansion in the scale of production, and 
enterprise, which would be impossible for individual capitalists.’88 Joint stock 
companies raise funds for production through selling shares to money capitalists. 
These stocks, shares and bonds can at any time be sold on to other investors, on a 
stock market.89 An important feature of a joint-stock company is the fact that those 
who invest in it expect only a rate of return equal to the rate of interest, rather than 
equal to the rate of profit which would be expected by the capitalist himself on his 
own monetary outlay. This allows the capitalist to obtain a large sum of starting 
capital without the risks associated with the need for it to be immediately 
recovered. This organisation provides such a competitive edge that it is generalised 
very quickly throughout the system.
Part way through the discussion of joint stock companies, Engels, the editor 
of volume three, interrupts to provide an update on the development of ‘second and 
third degree’ joint stock companies, since Marx’s death. He discusses the fact that 
cartels have also been developed to help mitigate the effects of competition. ‘The 
next stage, therefore, in certain branches... was to concentrate the entire
86 Marx 1981, pp. 678-679.
87 This distinction, between centralisation of financial and productive capital, is unformulated in
Capital and underdeveloped by Marxists, as will be discussed below.
88 Marx 1981, p. 566.
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production of the branch of industry in question into one big joint-stock company
with unified management.’90
He added the following footnote to the fourth German edition of volume one,
English and American “trusts” are already striving to attain this goal by 
attempting to unite at least all the large-scale concerns in one branch of 
industry into a single great joint-stock company with a practical 
monopoly.91
So fascinated was he by these centralising tendencies, Engels wrote a
supplement to volume three, on the stock exchange. These pages, which form the
very last pages, ‘the last word’, of the Penguin edition of the book, discuss how the
stock exchange may have been a secondary element to the capitalist system in
1865, but ‘[n]ow it is different.’92
[S]ince 1865, when this book was written, a change has occurred that 
gives the stock exchange of today a significantly increased role, and a 
constantly growing one at that, which, as it develops further, has the 
tendency to concentrate all of production, industrial as well as agricultural, 
together with the whole of commerce -  means of communication as well 
as the exchange function -  in the hands of stock exchange speculators, so 
that the Stock Exchange becomes the most pre-eminent representative of 
capitalist production as such.93
In volumes 1-3, we see small capitals, larger capitals, joint stock companies, 
and trusts as the centralising forms of productive capital. We also see banks and 
stock markets centralising financial capital. All are working in the same direction, 
to constantly try and overcome the pressures of competition individually and 
collectively.94 Other forms this dynamic may take and how the state is involved, 
remain to be seen. Marx, in Capital, did not get far enough on this front. The 
closest we get may be his discussion of commercial and bank credit, in volume
89 For a useful discussion of joint stock companies and fictitious capital see Harvey 1999, pp. 276- 
277.
90 Engels in Marx 1981, p. 569.
91 Marx 1976, p. 779, fn 10.
92 Engels in Marx 1981, pp. 1045-1046.
93 Engels in Marx 1981, p. 1047.
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three, where he states provocatively that ‘the connection between the development 
of this and the development of state credit remains outside our discussion.’95
The History o f Capital
So we have found in Volumes 2 and 3 of Capital a historical trajectory with 
potentially significant consequences for our theory of capitalism. Competition 
produces centralisation which reproduces competition on an expanded scale. We 
are beginning to see that capitalism does not involve uninterrupted anarchical 
relations, it involves constant efforts to overcome the very conditions of anarchy it 
thrives on. Contre Rosenberg, anarchy has a tendency which goes unrecognized 
through his analogy to Realist IR’s static model. Efforts to overcome anarchy tend 
toward the centralisation and socialisation of productive and financial capital at 
various levels and through various organisational forms. Whether one of those is 
the state is something that Engels discussed in more detail in writings published 
after Marx’s death.96
In Socialism Utopian and Scientific Engels discusses how at a certain stage
even the joint stock company ‘form of socialisation’ is not enough. Trusts are then
developed in order to regulate production. Finally,
[i]n any case, with trusts or without, the official representative of 
capitalist society - the state - will ultimately have to undertake the 
direction of production.’ *...
*1 say “have to”. For only when the means of production 
and distribution have actually outgrown the management by joint
94 Harvey discusses how the centralisation of capital may help to improve the capacity for profits to 
equalise because, for instance, previously it was possible for smaller firms to operate as 
monopolists simply because of poor communication or transportation. Harvey 1982, pp. 143-145.
95 Marx 1981, p. 525.
96 Some may argue that Marx would have disagreed with Engels on this direction, but it seems 
more likely that the tendency, for joint-stock companies, for instance, was simply insufficiently 
developed in Marx’s lifetime. Some of Engels strongest statements on the role of the state are found 
in Anti-Duhring. This text was discussed in depth with Marx before his death. Draper 1990, p. 84.
169
stock companies, and when, therefore the state taking them over 
has become economically inevitable, only then... is there an 
economic advance, the attainment of another step preliminary to 
the taking over of all productive forces by society itself.97
Engels has an almost linear model in mind, from management by individual 
companies to joint-stock companies to states. He wrote to Bebel in 1882: ‘the joint 
stock companies have already provided the proof how very superfluous the 
bourgeoisie as such is, and to this, statification adds no new grounds of
Q O
evidence.’ State ownership or control over capital was just a further extension of 
centralisation of capital in Engels’ mind. Exactly how this would take place is 
unclear in Marx and Engels writings, but it is an analysis that will be attempted by 
theorists of actually-existing capitalism over the next two chapters.
It is important at this stage to somewhat qualify this linear model. Both 
Marx and Engels recognise that centralisation is not a smooth process. A counter­
tendency toward fragmentation, which Marx specifies is ‘the division of property 
within capitalist families’" .  But he also mentions that ‘offshoots split off from the 
original capitals and start to function as new and independent capitals’ due to other 
causes.100 However, as Harvey notes, Marx ‘does not explicitly state what are the 
“forces of repulsion” that make for decentralisation.’101
Harvey also points out, quite crucially I think, that ‘Marx is not explicit 
about the kind of centralisation he is talking about (financial, productive, etc.),’ or, 
I would add, whether he is referring to centralisation of ownership or control or 
b o th .102 The question of how centralisation of ownership and control may differ 
and may work in the same or opposite directions is a potentially fascinating area of
97 Engels 1935, p. 66.
98 Marx and Engels 1992, p. 261.
99 Marx 1976, p. 776. An occurrence less frequent given the involvement of shareholders and 
boards of directors who decide when companies split, regardless of the desire of heirs.
100 Marx 1976, p. 776.
101 Harvey 1982, p. 140.
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analysis -  one that needs much further investigation. Harvey touches on this when 
he discusses the way in which companies of a certain size (large scale ownership) 
recreate conditions of competition (fragmented control) within their company 
parameters. They set up ‘sub-companies’ that compete and bid against each other 
for contracts.103 The implications of this forjudging ‘centralisation’ of production 
may be significant.
Despite the limitations of Marx and Engels in developing these strands of 
thought, we have established that the historical trajectory of global capitalism 
contains within it a centralising tendency in the realm of productive and financial 
capital. The limits to this and the ways in which countervailing tendencies may 
hamper its progress do not lessen the fact that it takes place as a direct result of 
competition and that as long as there is competition there will be pressures toward 
centralisation. Key to our understanding of the way this centralising tendency 
works is that it does not eliminate competition, it merely reproduces it in different 
organisational forms. We have also established that this may have implications for 
the role of the state and its direct involvement in production. What all of this 
represents together, if accepted, is that there are historical developments within 
capitalism, which have theoretical implications for the ‘volume one’ definition of 
capitalism. The transhistorical model of anarchy will not suffice.
Of final note, the reluctance to entertain the notion that the state could 
centralise capital in its own hands is reinforced by the country model of society 
discussed in the previous section. Marx makes very clear in volume one that ‘[i]n a
102 Harvey 1982, p. 140.
103 This is an interesting development in parallel with the way that state owned enterprises often 
force their departments to operate according to ‘best value’ a principle which insists that they match 
results produced by private contractors in purchasing goods. Competition is enforced despite 
overall control. Also similar is the practice in the USSR, whereby several separate organisations 
were maintained and ‘competed’ against each other despite overall government control.
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given society this limit [to centralisation] would be reached... when the entire 
social capital was united in the hands of either a single capitalist or a single 
capitalist company.’104 The limits would be reached meaning, beyond this we 
would not have capitalism. ‘A universal capital, one without alien capitals 
confronting it, with which it exchanges is therefore a non-thing.’105
If the ‘given society’ is taken to be a country, the centralisation of capital in 
the single hands of the state, is taken to be not-capitalism, a non-thing. On the 
other hand if the given society is global, then the centralisation of capital in the 
hands of a state, would not mean the centralisation of the entire social capital, and 
is therefore not necessarily ‘not-capitalism’. The only limits Marx sets to the 
centralisation of capital, given a global societal framework, is the limit of a single 
global capital -  a single state capital, on the other hand, is never explicitly opposed 
and is taken by Engels to be a matter of course.106
What we have at this stage is a hint that nationalization of production and 
finance may be understood as no less ‘capitalist’ than the privatization of both. 
This may mean that the current period of privatisation needs to be recast in a light 
other than simply capitalism ‘business as usual’.
4.5 The Core Dynamic of Capital
What is meant by ‘core dynamic’ here is the process to which the capitalist mode 
of production can be reduced, its essential quality. For both the volume one
104 Marx 1976, p. 779. This is quoted in Rosdolsky 1977, p. 42. He follows this quote with the 
statement, ‘[h]ence state-capitalism would only be possible with several capitals organised by the 
state, confronting each other.’ In other words, the state would have to create its own internal 
competition, create separate ‘owners’ within.
105 Marx 1973, p. 421.
106 See Engels 1935, p. 66.
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theorists and our classical Marxist alternative, the capitalist mode of production 
has as its object the self-expansion of value, which is made possible through the 
competitive accumulation of capital. This competitive accumulation is itself made 
possible by a particular set of social relations involving the commodification of 
labour power. Labourers, and indeed capitalists, in a society where these social 
relations prevail are animated by ‘the law of value’ a law which operates ‘behind 
their backs’, but nonetheless determines their behaviour. This law of value can be 
seen as the core dynamic of the capitalist mode of production. As Marx indicated, 
‘value is the expression of the specifically characteristic nature of the capitalist 
process of production’.107 That the law of value is the core dynamic of capitalist 
society is not in dispute between ‘volume one’ theorists and our alternative. What 
is at issue is how we understand the law of value to operate, and the implications 
this may have for our understanding of the direct role of the state as an agent of 
capital accumulation.
4.5.1 The Pristine Law o f Value
It is in the analysis of the law of value as the core dynamic of capitalism that the 
distinction between the ‘volume one’ theorists’ position and our ‘actually existing’ 
alternative presents itself most starkly. This is because the way in which ‘volume 
one’ theorists understand the law of value to operate provides, in a very direct 
sense, the basis for their analysis of the role of the state under capitalism. Theirs is 
a law of value at odds with a state authority owning and controlling the means of 
production within its borders, i.e. a state acting directly as the agent of capital
107 Marx 1933, pp. 6-7.
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accumulation. In order to understand why the separation of the state from the
sphere of value relations is so important to volume one theorists we need to look at
the first volume of Capital.
Marx, begins volume one of Capital with an analysis of the commodity, the
material store of value in the form of abstract labour. He explains that abstract
labour, or value, is what all commodities have in common, it is the basis upon
which they can be exchanged. Marx understood the exchange-value of
commodities to be the way in which social relations between independent
producers were expressed in a system of generalized commodity production.
Magnitude of value expresses a relation of social production, it expresses 
the connection that necessarily exists between a certain article and the 
portion of total labour-time of society to produce it.108
Moreover, it is through the exchange of value via commodities that the
social relations of capitalist society are constantly created and recreated. This is
what Marx meant when he characterized capitalist society in terms of ‘personal
independence based on dependence mediated by things’.109
Since the producers do not come into social contact with each other until 
they exchange their products, the specific social character of each 
producer’s labour does not show itself except in the act of exchange. In 
other words, the labour of the individual asserts itself as a part of the 
labour of society, only by means of the relations which the act of 
exchange establishes directly between the products, and indirectly, 
through them, between the producers.’110
This is what is meant by the idea that the law of value operates ‘behind the backs’ 
of the independent producers of commodities in a capitalist society.111 It is not 
until goods are exchanged in the market and a price is realized that the value of the 
labour that went into them can be calculated. It is for this reason that some have 
referred to the ‘labour theory of value’ as the ‘value theory of labour’. The value of
108 Marx 1976, p. 196.
109 This quote comes from a translation of Grundrisse cited in Sayer 1991, pp. 13-14.
110 Marx 1976, pp. 165-166.
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particular labours only becomes apparent ex ante through exchange. It is through 
exchange that we discover whether the labour time contained in any particular 
commodity was ‘socially necessary’. If more labour time than was socially 
necessary went into a commodity, the cost of that extra time eats into the profit that 
particular commodity attracts. Less profit for a certain company’s commodities 
means less capital they will be able to reinvest and the greater chance that they will 
lose out in competition. In this way the production of commodities is disciplined 
by ‘socially necessary labour time’ and social relations are shaped by the desire of 
individual (or group, corporate, etc.) producers of commodities to reduce the 
necessary labour time for their particular good below the social average.
While this is a very schematic account, what is important to understand is 
that the law of value, which operates between units of capital, while not a system 
of direct control such as exists within units of capital, exercises control over the 
behaviour of individual units nonetheless and socially connects their activities. As 
Marx explains,
Division of labour within the workshop implies the undisputed authority 
of the capitalist over men, that are but parts of a mechanism that belongs 
to him. The division of labour within society brings into contact 
independent commodity producers, who acknowledge no other authority 
other than that of competition, of the coercion exerted by the pressure of 
their reciprocal interests.112
It is the fact that the process of surplus extraction under capitalism requires 
no authority other than the pressure o f  competition among independent producers, 
that leads the volume one theorists to the view that capitalism is characterized by 
the absence of the state from the immediate process of production. As Wood 
makes clear,
111 Marx 1976, p. 135.
112 Marx 1976, pp. 476-477.
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The capitalist is, of course, subject to the imperatives of accumulation and 
competition which oblige him to expand surplus value; and the labourer is 
bound to the capitalist not simply by the latter’s personal authority but by 
the laws of the market which dictate the sale of labour power. In these 
senses, it is the ‘autonomous’ laws of the economy and capital ‘in the 
abstract’ that exercise power, not the capitalist willfully imposing his 
personal authority upon labour.113
It is, for volume one theorists, precisely on the basis of the state remaining 
outside of the sphere of production and exchange that the law of value can operate. 
All prices and wages are determined through the market, through exchange, in the 
realm of civil society, not the state. When Rosenberg describes ‘the ‘purely 
political’ state, the sovereign state, the state which stands outside production and is 
therefore abstracted from the particularities o f  civil society -  in short, the capitalist 
state,’114 the ‘particularities of civil society’ he is referring to are value relations. 
For the volume one theorist state control and value relations exist in two separate 
spheres.
It is important to distinguish this volume one position from the idea that the 
state is outside the capitalist mode of production, the approach taken by the 
Weberians we discussed in chapter two, who see the state, as political, on the one 
hand and capitalism, as economic, on the other. Volume one theorists, by contrast, 
see the political and the economic as a distinction within capitalism.115 Without the 
abstraction of the state, the ‘anarchical’ operation of the law of value would not be 
possible. Therefore, this differentiation of the state is seen to be an essential aspect 
of the mode of production, in no way external to it. What this means is that while
113 Wood 1995, p. 41.
114 Rosenberg 1994, p. 141.
115 ‘The differentiation of the economic and the political in capitalism is, more precisely, a 
differentiation of political functions themselves and their separate allocation to the private 
economic sphere and the public sphere of the state’ Wood 1995, p. 31. ‘[Cjapitalism is the only 
case in which this condition of the emergence of a discrete sphere of ‘the political’ is actually 
internal to the mode of production.’ Rosenberg 1995, p. 85.
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the volume one theorists place the state within the capitalist mode of production, 
they precisely, and necessarily, place it outside the sphere of value relations.116
Volume one theorists believe that were the state to become involved 
directly, through owning and controlling the means of production, then value 
determination of the exchange relation between different commodities, the 
quantities of different commodities produced, and the proportion of society’s total 
labour time allocated to different enterprises would break down. It would be the 
state rather than the competitive comparison of commodities that would determine 
prices, wages and the relative quantity and quality of goods.
For volume one theorists, the regulation of ‘economic’ activity by the state, 
in terms of centrally planned production and distribution is evidence of non­
capitalist social relations. Given that the law of value is the signature feature of 
capitalism, and that by its very nature it operates in an ‘anarchical’ fashion, the 
volume one theorists see state ownership and control of production (i.e. ‘planning’ 
as opposed to ‘anarchy’) as a reflection of non-capitalist social relations. To be 
fair, as we have discussed it so far, this does seem to correspond to M arx’s own 
view, strongly-put, that ‘[t]he point of bourgeois society consists precisely in this,
117that a priori there is no conscious social regulation of production.’
4.5.2 Reading Capital
What we are looking for in this reading of Capital volumes one to three is a sense 
that Marx was developing an understanding of the law of value such that it
116 Wood makes the statement that ‘in capitalism, there is a complete separation of private 
appropriation and public duties’. Wood 1995, p. 31. Rosenberg agrees, as this is the basis for his 
theory of sovereignty. Rosenberg 1994, pp. 126-129.
117 Marx ‘Letter to Kugelmann’ quoted in Rosenberg 1994, p. 143.
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functions even in the case of state ownership and control of the means of
production. What we shall find is that Marx explained that the law of value, in its
very essence, involves interruption and disruption in the form of conscious
regulation of particular scales of production. Without this pattern to the law of
value, it could not continue to exist and capitalist relations of production would
never have developed. Furthermore, we find in Marx and Engel’s writings the
suggestion that state control of production and consumption intensifies, rather than
destroys, the core dynamic of capitalism.
The first step in making sense of how Marx viewed the operation of the law
of value in relation to the state is to consider how he viewed the operation of
competition in relation to monopoly, because it is here that the pure dynamic of
market exchange meets what the volume one theorists appear to consider its
opposite, conscious planning and regulation of prices according to non-market
mechanisms. Marx offers the following insights, emphasising the nature of
capitalism as a dialectical process or movement.
In practical life we find not only competition, monopoly and the 
antagonism between them but also the synthesis of the two, which is not a 
formula, but a movement. Monopoly produces competition, competition 
produces monopoly. Monopolists are made from competition; competitors 
become monopolists. If the monopolists restrict their mutual competition 
by means of partial associations, competition increases among the 
workers; and the more the mass of the proletarians grows as against the 
monopolists of one nation, the more desperate competition becomes 
between the monopolists of different nations. The synthesis is of such a 
character that monopoly can only maintain itself by continually entering 
into the struggle of competition.118
Competition, the competitive establishment of wages and prices, is never a smooth 
process, and cannot be sharply conceptually opposed to their determination 
directly by a structure of authority. Perfect competition, which it is thought would 
bring about wages and prices determined by exchange alone, exists only in the
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imagination of the bourgeois economist. Imperfect competition, the result of the
interference of various monopoly organisations is not only compatible with the
competitive drive for capital accumulation, it is the means by which this process
takes place. This is what Marx acknowledges and what our previous discussion of
the historical trajectory of capitalism suggests. This does not, however, explain
what happens to the law of value.
For the reader prepared to go to p. 1001 of the third volume of Capital,
there is a reward.119 For it is here that Marx explains the way in which monopoly
control and the law of value interact in precise ways and lays out his argument that
any ‘negation’ of the law of value through monopoly takes place on the basis of
the law of value and cannot be otherwise understood.
[I]f the equalization of surplus-value to average profit in the various 
spheres of production comes upon obstacles in the form of artificial or 
natural monopolies... so that a monopoly price becomes possible, above 
both the price of production and value of the commodities this monopoly 
affects, this does not mean that the limits fixed by commodity value are 
abolished. A monopoly price for certain commodities simply transfers a 
portion of the profit made by the other commodity producers to the 
commodities with the monopoly price. Indirectly there is a local 
disturbance in the distribution of surplus value among the various spheres 
of production, but this leaves unaffected the limit of the surplus value 
itself... The limits within which monopoly price affects the normal 
regulation o f  commodity prices are firm ly determined and can be 
precisely calculated.120
What Marx is saying here is that monopolies of any kind, which involve the setting 
of wages or prices, do not actually allow the society as a whole to escape the 
pressures of the law of value. The ‘normal’ regulation of commodity prices is 
affected in ways that can only be made sense o f  in terms of the operation of the law 
of value. Monopoly, regulation, or ‘planning’ of the prices of commodities does 
not take place outside value relations, it is one way in which value relations
1,8 Marx 1955, p. 132.
119 Marx 1981.
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function, just as monopoly and competition are two moments of the same process. 
What we might call a ‘negation of the law of value on the basis of the law of value’ 
is key to our understanding of the core dynamic of capitalism and what 
distinguishes our alternative reading of Marx from the ‘volume one’ theorists 
variety.
So we have explained how competition relates to monopoly and how
monopoly remains within the law of value. We now need to consider whether the
state can be seen as a kind of monopoly for the purpose of this discussion and this
is not something which Marx explicitly reveals.
It may be argued that joint stock companies, trusts or monopolies, all of
which have the power to influence prices in ‘non-market’ ways, are analytically
distinct from the state as an organizational form. The state is seen by many to
represent ‘public’ and not ‘private’ control of the means of production and
therefore its activities are seen to be distinct from the activities of private
corporations or monopolies and to fall outside the realm of value relations.121 To
help break down this distinction between public and private we need therefore to
look in some details at what Marx had to say about types of ownership and how
they might influence the operation of the law of value.
Marx notes in volume three that the joint stock company form involves the
‘transformation of the actual functioning capitalist into a mere manager, in charge
of other people’s capital, and of the ‘capital owner’ into a mere owner, a mere 
1money capitalist.’ In other words, the shareholders own the company, but do not 
run it, and the functioning capitalist runs the company, but does not own it. What
120 Marx 1981, p. 1001.
121 Barker makes the interesting point that in the context of the world economy, each separate state 
may be seen as no more ‘public’ than any corporation in that states legally exclude and include 
particular individuals on a global scale. Barker, correspondence 2004.
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Marx is identifying here is that at a certain level of capitalist development,
ownership and control typically become separated. In the case of a joint stock
company, owners of the capital invested may have no idea what the productive
capitalists who exercise control, are doing with their funds.
Capital, which is inherently based on a social mode o f production 
and presupposes a social concentration of means of production and 
labour power, now receives the form of social capital (capital of 
directly associated individuals) in contrast to private capital, and its 
enterprises appear as social enterprises as opposed to private ones.
This is the abolition o f capital as private property within the 
confines o f  the capitalist mode o f  production itself 123
This wording is very important, for here we have Marx identifying the abolition of 
capital as private property within the confines o f the capitalist mode o f  production 
itself This is not capitalism becoming less capitalist or changing into another mode 
of production as a result of changing organisational form from individual to joint- 
stock. This is capitalism abolishing private property while remaining capitalism. 
This is what Marx has referred to elsewhere as ‘private production unchecked by 
private ownership’.124
Marx is referring to the transformation of ownership from individual 
property to corporate property which is not the abolition of private property in the 
sense in which Rosenberg and Wood employ the term. For volume one theorists, 
corporate property is a kind of ‘private property’ in distinction to ‘state 
property’.125 But for Marx, clear from his quote above, corporate property is a kind 
of ‘social property’ in distinction to ‘private property’. It is no less capitalist, but it 
takes a social property form. As suggested above, whether Marx would have 
extended this ‘social property’ description to state property cannot be directly read
122 Marx 1981, pp. 567-568.
123 Marx 1981, p. 569. Italics mine.
124 Marx 1981, p. 569.
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off from his writings in Capital. We encounter the same problems we did in the 
previous section on centralisation: limitations rather than contradictions in his 
thought.
Engels, however, clearly did view state ownership as a kind of social
property indistinct, as such, from corporate property. For Engels state ownership
was by no means representative of fundamentally altered relations of production.
But the transformation, either into joint stock companies and trusts, or 
into state ownership does not do away with the capitalistic nature of the 
productive forces. In the joint-stock companies and trusts this is obvious.
And the modem state, again, is only the organisation that bourgeois 
society takes on in order to support the external conditions of the capitalist 
mode of production against the encroachments as well of the workers as 
of individual capitalists. The modem state, no matter what its form, is 
essentially a capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal 
collective capitalist.126 ... The capitalist relation is not done away with. It 
is rather brought to a head.127
And elsewhere,
[t]he more productive forces it [the state] takes over, the more it becomes 
the real collective body of all the capitalists, the more citizens it exploits.
The workers remain wage-eamers, proletarians. The capitalist relationship 
is not abolished, rather it is pushed to an extreme.128
For Engels, state ownership and control of production is not a negation of 
capitalism, it is an extreme form of capitalist social relations. The state and its 
ownership and control of production appear, for Engels, to be wholly compatible 
with the operation of the law of value.
While Marx said relatively little about this kind of ‘state capitalism’ he did 
offer the following very interesting comment on nationalized production, a 
statement which puts him at odds with the ‘volume one’ theorists. Many
125 This is complicated by the fact that states companies are often shareholders in corporations, but 
this is not a practice that receives much attention, muddying as it does the ‘separation of spheres’ 
definition of capitalism.
126 Engels 1954, p. 67. Italics mine. The original phrase ‘ideal collective capitalist’ was translated 
into English as the ‘ideal personification of total national capital’. Draper 1990, p. 88 fn*. This is a 
significant distinction given our discussion above about the appropriate social unit for 
understanding capitalism -  i.e. we should not assume it is national capital of which we speak.
127 Engels 1954, pp. 67-68.
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contemporary Marxists, volume one theorists included, would assert that the land
and labour over which the state has direct control is not ‘commodified’ and its
products are not ‘commodities’ for, they would argue, it is the state rather than
value relations which have set quantities and qualities and prices. Yet in his
criticisms of a textbook by Adolph Wagner, Marx made reference to the products
of state owned enterprises, distinguishing them in no way from the products of
private enterprises.
Where the state itself is a capitalist producer as in the exploitation of 
mines, forests, etc, its product is a ‘commodity’ and hence possesses the 
specific character of any other commodity.129
This must surely come as a revelation to volume one theorists of capital. 
Marx seems to be suggesting that the kind of wage and price relations involved 
where the state is employer are not to be distinguished from any other situation of 
commodified labour power and the product is not to be distinguished from any 
other commodity.
In the next section we will consider why they may have had such difficulty 
in accepting the possibility that national monopolies under the control of the state 
could be viewed as capitalist social forms.
4.5.1 The Dynamic o f Capital
There are perhaps two main reasons why the volume one theorists failed to arrive 
at the conclusion that state ownership and control of production could be 
compatible with the operation of the law of value. The first has to do with an 
insufficient degree of process reductionism, in other words their fetishisation of
128 Engels 1954 quoted in Cliff 1948 [1988] p. 177.
129 Marx and Engels 1982, p. 546.
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particular social structures, in this case nation-states, and lack of awareness of the 
way in which they can be reduced to processes. The second results from the way in 
which the core dynamic relates to the other dimensions by which we have been 
characterizing capitalism: geographic scope and historical trajectory. As such, this 
latter explanation serves as a useful conclusion to the chapter as a whole. We shall 
consider each, in turn.
Process reductionism, as a central aspect of Marx’s dialectical thinking, is 
essential if we are to understand that multiple social structures can be animated by 
a common process producing different appearances during the development of that 
process. To avoid fetishising structure over process we must remember that it is the 
process of capital accumulation that makes the capitalist, not the capitalist who 
makes the process of capital accumulation. Marx insisted upon this, that ‘the 
characters who appear on the economic stage are but the personifications of the 
economic relations that exist between them.’130
Capitalism creates its agents in the sense that the process of capital 
accumulation constantly revolutionizes social relations giving rise to new roles for 
the participants in its process. The social relations of capitalism animate 
constellations of human beings in ever-original ways in the effort to continue the 
process of accumulation. At a particular stage of development the process brings 
forth the existence of joint-stock companies, at a later stage, we may find it 
animates the state to act as the agent of accumulation.
All of this means that the operation of the law of value behind the back of 
independent producers is not a pure event with characters permanently cast: i.e. 
individual private producers and private property. We accept corporate producers
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and corporate property as a form of capitalism that has emerged directly out of the 
process of competitive accumulation of capital. It may also be possible to accept 
state producers and state property as a form of capitalism. We should not be 
concerned with private property in its particular juridical form. We need only be 
concerned that the producers do not have direct access to the means of production 
and need to exchange their labour power as a commodity in order to gain the 
means of reproducing themselves as labourers. This is the case in terms of workers 
employed by the state, just as it is in when employed by a joint-stock company or 
individual capitalist.
What we have shown in this section on the core dynamic of capitalism is 
that the volume one theorists understanding of the law of value operates at a level 
of abstraction which is highly misleading. In fact, it leads them to the view that any 
direct control over prices or wages in a sphere of capitalist production, negates the 
law of value and in this way abolishes peculiarly capitalist social relations. 
Planning and anarchy, in their understanding, stand in stark opposition. Hence 
Rosenberg’s simplistic analogy to states as islands of order in a sea of anarchical 
relations.131 What we find in our alternative reading of Marx is that the constant 
negation of the law of value on the basis of the law of value is the way the law of 
value operates and the way the process of competitive capital accumulation takes 
place. Planning is not the opposite of anarchy it is the means through which an 
anarchical form of production persists.
However, and this is where the other two dimensions of capitalism come in, 
planning can only be understood as an aspect of competition where that planning is
130 Marx says also, ‘[e]xcept as personified capital, the capitalist has no historical value...’ Marx 
1976, p. 739.
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not taking place at the level of total social capital, i.e. on a global scale. As long as 
central control exists only within units of capital (which may be states) operating 
within a complex division of labour on a global scale, capitalism can be said to 
exist, as the relations between states can still be seen to be ‘independent relations 
mediated by relations between things’.
We know from our discussion of the historical trajectory of capitalism that 
the law of value is constantly modified in precise ways, through the concentration 
and centralization of capital on the basis of competition. We know from our 
discussion of geographic scope that as long as we continue to have competition 
between the various units of production of whatever scale, and whatever degree of 
centralization, the dynamic of capital accumulation can, at least in theory, persist. 
How we understand that core dynamic involves a more nuanced appreciation of the 
law of value, in which ‘the negation of law of value on the basis of the law of 
value’ is the process through which the law of value develops.
4.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to show that in Marx’s own writings, 
specifically, volumes two and three of Capital, we have the basis for an 
understanding of capitalism, yet to be fully developed. ‘Volume one’ marxism, has 
been critically assessed and its insights have been placed in the context of the latter 
two volumes. A theory of capitalism dramatically different from the ‘separation of 
spheres’ variety is beginning to come into view.
131 The point here is that for Realists the contrast of order and anarchy is one of simple opposition, 
but for Rosenberg, reading Marx, the contrast is more complex in which the order should be 
understood as the means through which the anarchy continues.
186
What has been argued so far is that: 1) the geographical scope in which 
capitalism can be meaningfully understood is global -  that is its socio-historical 
unit. In distinction to volume one theorists we are concerned with ‘totality not 
analogy’. 2) The historical trajectory of capitalism reveals a centralising tendency, 
the logical limits of which are a single global capital. Unlike the volume one 
theorists, we would argue that ‘anarchy has a tendency’. Finally, 3) the core 
dynamic of the capitalist mode of production is an anarchical law of value which 
creates moments of planning which, in turn fuels greater anarchy. We understand 
the ‘negation of the law of value on the basis of the law of value’ as part of the 
ongoing dynamic of capitalist accumulation.
Taken together, these revised dimensions of capitalism, allow us to 
entertain the possibility that state ownership and control of industry is quite 
compatible with the capitalist mode of production. But in all three aspects, there 
remains a great deal to be developed over the next two chapters. An understanding 
of ‘actually existing capitalism’ has been released from presumed barriers in 
Marx’s theory of capitalism, but it has not yet taken its own shape. In the next 
chapter we move away from the mere theoretical possibility of ‘state capitalism’ 
toward the actual development of state capitalist structures in a period of 
imperialism and war.
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Chapter Five 
Imperialism and War: State Monopoly Trusts
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will be examining Marxist theories of imperialism developed in 
the early twentieth century with a focus on the works of Rudolph Hilferding, 
Nikolai Bukharin and Vladimir Hich Lenin.1 Some attention will also be given, 
throughout, to the writings of Leon Trotsky. These theorists provide a bridge 
between the works of Marx and Engels, discussed in the previous chapter, and 
contemporary theories of ‘actually existing capitalism’, the subject of the next 
chapter. By analyzing their work we can begin to piece together a continuity of 
ideas over the last full century, a theoretical model of capitalism which, unlike the 
‘volume one’ version, can accommodate, and make sense of, dramatic changes in 
state-market relations.
For many, the direct involvement of the state in the period of imperialism 
changed capitalism beyond recognition and raised doubts as to the enduring 
significance of Marx’s analysis.2 Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin, by contrast, 
understood imperialism precisely through extending the theoretical assumptions of 
Capital to make sense of the new historical period. This was a period in which 
capitalism was becoming truly global in its geographical scope and its historical 
trajectory was one of increasing centralisation in the form of cartels, trusts and
1 The focus on Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin as the three founding figures of a Marxist theory of 
imperialism is not unique to this thesis. See Brewer 1990, p. 79.
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monopolies linked to big banks and states all of which remained locked in the 
competitive core dynamic of capitalist value relations. Hilferding, Bukharin and 
Lenin described these changes in theories of ‘finance capitalism’, ‘state capitalism’ 
and ‘imperialism’.
The relationship of Marx’s writings to the theories of imperialism under 
analysis in this chapter has been complicated by the question of what is meant by a 
‘new phase’ of capitalist development. Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin saw 
imperialism as a new phase in the history of capitalism, perhaps, they thought, 
even the last phase, characterized by the increasing concentration of capital 
(monopoly) and its conflict-ridden geopolitical expansion (war). For these 
theorists, imperialism expressed the way in which the dynamic of capital 
accumulation, described by Marx, was manifesting itself in new ways at a 
particular stage in history. On this reading, monopoly and war may be seen as 
expressions of the dialectical relationship between concentration and competition, 
central to capitalism in all its historical phases, remarkable here for extent and 
implication.
Using different criteria for periodisation, theorists of ‘monopoly capitalism’ 
have argued that imperialism represented not new expressions of an old dynamic, 
but a new dynamic. Paul Sweezy, for instance, contrasts imperialism with ‘an 
earlier phase’ of ‘competitive capitalism’ ‘as described by Marx’.3 Sweezy 
wrongly attributes this position to Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin, whom he 
credits with having initiated this break from Marx.
2 The trajectory of the Second International away from revolutionary socialism toward social 
democracy provides some indication of the level of practical and theoretical disorientation caused 
by imperialism and world war.
3 The contrast between monopoly as analysed by Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin and competitive 
capitalism as analysed by Marx is the basis of the approach taken by Sweezy, Baran, Dobb and 
Steinl. See Zoninsein 1990, pp. 11-12.
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...Lenin, who was much influenced by Hilferding’s work produced his 
Imperialism , the highest stage o f capitalism (written in 1916); and since 
then it has become a widely, if  not universally accepted tenet of Marxist 
theory that by the end of the nineteenth century the concentration and 
centralization of capital had proceeded to the point of transforming 
capitalism from its competitive stage, on which Marx had focused 
attention, to a new stage variously referred to as finance capitalism, 
imperialism or monopoly capitalism.4
In fact, when we look at the analysis provided by these three theorists, we 
will see that Sweezy has mischaracterized imperialism as these theorists 
understood it, and misrepresented Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Put simply, 
imperialism is not understood to be ‘uncompetitive’ and M arx’s Capital did not 
restrict itself to describing a ‘competitive stage’.5 Unfortunately, the 
misrepresentation of Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin, by Sweezy and others, has 
been extremely influential and a major factor in their marginalization from what is 
understood to be ‘classical’ Marxist theory.6 These three theorists have been 
ignored by the academy, when not being misunderstood entirely. Lenin, the most 
‘popular’ of the three has survived mainly in the form of a ‘one-sided and banal’7 
interpretation of his theory of imperialism, stripped of its sharper theoretical 
insights.8 Hilferding and Bukharin scarcely receive mention at all. There are a 
number of reasons for this, in terms of the complexity of the material and delays in 
translation and publications,9 but ultimately the explanation is political and extends 
beyond a general distaste for Marxism in academia.
Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin are Marxists who have been rejected by the 
dominant stream of Marxist thought in post-war academia. For many
4 Sweezy 1981, p. 60, quoted in Zoninsein 1990, p. 3.
5 This point is usefully made in Wheelock 1983.
6 Burnham, for instance, makes the comment that we should not pass from Marx to Lenin for the 
internationalization of Marx’s theory. The assumption being that Lenin is not to be trusted. 
Burnham 1994, p. 22.
7 Halliday 1994, p. 49.
8 Slavoj Zizek’s unorthodox embrace of Lenin in his book Revolution at the Gates is a recent 
exception to this rule suggesting the potential for a revival of interest. Zizek 2004.
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contemporary Marxists, these three are irredeemably implicated in the most tragic 
trajectories of the twentieth century left. The first, from Marx to Hitler through 
Hilferding, in terms of the failure of social democracy to prevent the rise of 
Nazism, the second from Marx to Stalin through Lenin and Bukharin, in terms of 
the lack of democracy in the dictatorship of the proletariat. In rescuing them here, 
we are suggesting it is time to revisit the contribution of both the second 
international and the Bolshevik leadership, to separate the theoretical baby from 
the bathwater of historical defeat.
This chapter will show that Hilferding’s theory of finance capital, based on 
a detailed observation of the centralizing and concentrating tendencies of 
capitalism, makes a pioneering contribution to our understanding of capitalism’s 
historical trajectory picking up directly from Marx. We then look at Bukharin, 
who takes much from Hilferding, but rejects the latter’s attachment to a national 
model of capitalist development, identifying instead capitalism’s global 
geographical scope.10 Finally, we consider the contribution of Lenin, with a focus 
not on his theory of imperialism, which makes little advance on that of Hilferding 
and Bukharin, but on his analysis of the core dynamic of capital accumulation, 
how in Russia it might be modified by the Bolshevik revolution despite the context 
of a global capitalist society. The insights of Trotsky, particularly his theory of 
uneven and combined development, are mentioned in several places throughout, as 
they inform each of these dimensions of capital in its imperialist phase.
This chapter will deal with each of the three main theorists in turn. By the 
end of the chapter we should have a sense of how, in Trotsky’s words,
9 Hilferding’s Finance Capital, for instance, was not published in English until 1981.
10 Much of this analysis is compatible with and usefully informed by the writings of Leon Trotsky, 
whose theory of ‘uneven and combined development’ we will mention in this chapter but look at 
more thoroughly in the next.
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‘nationalised property and economic planning are not only possible under 
capitalism, they are themselves the historical products of capitalism in its 
development.’11 Far from the ‘volume one’ theorists’ image of the quintessential^ 
capitalist state remaining outside the productive sphere, we shall see that state 
ownership and control of production is a necessary form of capitalism at a 
particular stage in its history.
5.2 Hilferding
In 1910, when Hilferding published his most influential work, Finance Capital, it
was hailed by Karl Kautsky and Otto Bauer as ‘the fourth volume of capital’.12 It
was adopted by both German social democracy and Russian Bolshevism as a
welcome extension of the insights of Capital to empirical developments since
Marx’s death. Hilferding became ‘the point of departure for all future radical
1 ^analyses of imperialism and capitalist development. He was celebrated as a 
leading intellectual of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and read 
favourably by Bukharin and Lenin. It has been argued by Anthony Brewer that 
Finance Capital contains ‘almost every major point’ made by Bukharin and Lenin 
in their later works.14
11 Trotsky.
12Bottomore 1991, p. 1.
13 Smaldone 1998, p. 40.
14 Brewer 1980, p. 79.
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5.2.1 Historical trajectory
What makes Hilferding such an important link in the chain between Marx and 
modem theories of ‘actually existing capitalism’, despite his flaws, is that he has a 
highly sophisticated understanding of the historical trajectory of capitalism. This, 
more than a theory of imperialism, is the major accomplishment of Finance 
Capital. Hilferding saw the direction of organizational change under capitalism 
with banks playing an increasingly significant role. He picks up directly where 
Marx left off his discussion of the increasing centralization of capital and the role 
of credit therein. At the same time, he retains a sense of the dialectical relationship 
between the competition and concentration of capital upon which Marx insisted.15
Throughout Finance Capital Hilferding describes the different institutional 
forms capital takes as it organizes itself on an increasingly large scale in order to 
compete. This is very similar to Marx’s understanding, as described in the last 
chapter. Where Hilferding makes his original contribution is in the analysis of the 
role of the banks. Marx had recognised the role of banks in concentrating many 
small units of capital into larger units, which could be lent at a rate of interest to 
other capitalists, but he tended to focus on what Hilferding called ‘circulation 
credit’, loans to purchase productive input to keep the circuit of capital moving. 
What Hilferding is interested in is what he called ‘capital credit’, loans for the 
purchase of fixed capital.
Capital credit differs from circulation credit in that it involves higher sums 
and a longer period of repayment. ‘What had once been a momentary interest 
becomes an enduring one’ both in the sense that the bank is now interested in the
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long-term health of the company required to repay its loans and in that the 
company can no longer change banks with ease, when it has committed itself to a 
long-term debt.16 Hilferding argues that with this reliance on banks to finance their 
expansion, ‘an ever-increasing part of the capital of industry does not belong to the 
industrialists who use it.’17 At the same time banks increasingly become ‘collective 
industrialists’, owners of capital employed by multiple industries. This 
socialization of industrial capital through the banks is what is referred to as 
‘finance capital’.
An increasingly large section of industrial capital does not belong to the 
industrialists who apply it. The right to manipulate the capital is obtained 
by them only through the bank, which in relation to them, appears as the 
owner of that capital. On the other hand, the bank is compelled to place an 
ever growing part of its capital in industry. In this way the bank becomes 
to an ever increasing degree an industrial capitalist. Bank capital, i.e. 
capital in money form, which has thus been in reality transformed into 
industrial capital, I  call finance capital}*
Hilferding sees banks as the embodiment, in organizational form, of the 
combined capital of the capitalist class seeking productive investment. Banks 
develop a relationship of strategic control to industry in that they make decisions 
about the distribution of socialised capital according to where it will be most 
profitably employed. Banks have a stake in the profitability of multiple industries. 
They begin to take a direct interest in production, sitting on boards of directors and 
attempting to influence company strategy. With insider knowledge of a variety of 
industries in the economy, they attempt to coordinate activities between units of 
capital in the interests of stability. They promote the use of cartels and joint-stock
15 Which distinguishes Hilferding, despite his later failings, from the kind of undialectical analysis 
seen in the work of Sweezy and other theorists of ‘monopoly capitalism’.
16 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 95.
17 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 225.
18 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 225.
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companies in order to minimize competition between the companies upon which
their profits depend.19 As Hilferding explains,
Finance capital does not want freedom but domination; it has no regard 
for the independence of the individual capitalist, but demands his 
allegiance. It detests the anarchy of competition and wants 
organization....20
At this point in Finance Capital, we have an image of a few large banks 
controlling their respective national economies through their influence over very 
large corporations and monopolies. Hilferding explains how banks in this position, 
dealing with such vast sums of capital, aim to restrict competition between 
themselves resulting in an effective banking monopoly at a nation-state level. The 
image of finance capital is one of capital socialised on a national level through the 
banks, controlled ultimately by key figures in the banking industry. This is an 
extremely centralized image and the highest stage that Hilferding acknowledges 
explicitly.
There is however a higher level of centralization, another change in 
organizational strategy that Hilferding examines at length, but of which he does 
not recognize the full significance. This is the use of tariffs by the state. Hilferding 
discusses the change from ‘educational’ to ‘protective’ tarrifs and the spread of 
protective tariffs throughout the system.21 A protective tariff raises the cost of 
imports in the domestic market so that domestic producers can charge more for 
their goods in the home market while still being competitively priced in relation to 
imported goods.22
19 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 179.
20 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 334.
21 The distinction between educational and protective tariffs is also discussed in Bukharin 1972 
[1916], pp. 74-75.
22 The desire for a protective tariff is based on recognition that there exists ‘world prices’ for
commodities, that the equalization of the rate of profit takes place on a global scale. At no point
does Hilferding explicitly recognize this.
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The advantage of a protective tariff is that a domestic producer can obtain 
more than the average rate of profit for their good. They can price their goods 
according to cost, plus average rate of profit, plus a tariff charge that they 
themselves do not need to pay. Domestic producers pocket the equivalent of the 
tariff as additional profit on every sale of goods. This not only helps them to grow 
faster in their domestic market, it also allows them to ‘dump’ goods on the 
international market. Dumping refers to the practice of selling underpriced goods 
abroad in order to force down the prices of others. If others do not have the benefit 
of tariffs, they may not be able to compete. Like all the other strategies for 
combining the forces of capital, protective tariffs quickly generalize throughout the 
system. Advocates of free trade suddenly become advocates of protectionism as 
they are forced to respond to the tariffs of others. As Hilferding notes, ‘the 
ideology of imperialism arises on the old liberal ideals, whose naivety it derides.’23 
The use of tariffs can be seen as an organizational strategy for socializing 
capital at a higher level than monopolies. Tariffs come into existence precisely 
when monopolies are not, in fact, monopolies on a global scale. In a global 
capitalist economy, the effectiveness of national monopolies is undermined by free 
trade. As Hilferding notes, ‘free trade hampers cartelization and deprives 
industries, which are capable of being cartelized, of their monopoly of the 
domestic market.’24 Tariffs, on the other hand, have the effect of promoting the
23 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 335. As an aside, students of International Relations may be reminded
of E H Carr’s description of the triumph of realism over utopia in the lead up to the second world 
war. These were the forces at work. Carr describes tariffs as ‘the nemesis of utopia.’ Carr is the 
most sophisticated of the realists whom Rosenberg attempts to discredit in Empire o f Civil Society. 
Rosenberg is correct to accuse him of describing without sufficiently explaining, but he has more 
difficulty forcing Carr into the mould of a realist account of ‘anarchy without history’. Carr was, 
above all, a historian and he paid great attention to the shifts in capitalism from periods of ‘free 
trade’ to ‘protectionism’, an aspect of his work Rosenberg is forced to ignore in order to sustain his 
own argument. Hilferding, on the other hand, has a theory of capitalism that can accommodate 
Carr’s observations.
24 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 312.
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establishment of domestic cartels and strengthening monopoly on a nation-state
level. They also have the effect of weakening international cartel agreements in
that agreements about world prices are effectively broken each time a new tariff
level is set. In this way they reduce competition within state territories only to
increase competition between state territories.
Tariffs are an instrument of state policy and depend on the exercise of state
power, on the development of ‘customs’ administration, anti-smuggling laws, the
levying of state duties, etc. Tariffs enlarge the revenue base of the state, as well as
benefiting certain sections of national capital. The state itself becomes an
‘organizer’ of capital, in line with its own conception of national economic
strategy. Tariffs are absolutely central to Hilferding’s understanding of imperialism
as the ‘policy of finance capital’.
The policy of finance capital pursues a threefold aim: first, the creation of 
the largest possible economic territory, which, secondly, must be 
protected against foreign competition by tariff walls, and thus, thirdly, 
must become an area of exploitation for the national monopoly 
companies.25
This definition of imperialism was considered by Bukharin and Lenin to be 
an extremely important basis for their own analyses. The competitive acquisition 
of the largest possible economic territory is a logical corollary of the desire to 
achieve the greatest scale of exploitation by national monopoly companies 
strengthened behind tariff barriers. This is where the state comes in. ‘Finance 
capital needs a state which is strong enough to pursue an expansionist policy and 
the annexation of new colonies.’27 ‘The political power of the state has become a
25 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 326.
26 Bukharin cites this passage in Imperialism and the World Economy, p. 107, saying ‘it is 
impossible to describe the fundamental aims of present day politics better’. Lenin is said to have 
‘copied it out in his notebooks with heavy underlinings and favourable comment’. Brewer 1980, p.
99.
27 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 334.
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means of competition for finance capital on the world market’.28 This relationship 
of finance capital to the state is what, for all three theorists of imperialism 
examined in this chapter, links the very essence of capitalism to monopoly and 
war.
Once tariff barriers have become a strategy generalized throughout the 
global system, it becomes more difficult to export goods profitably. At the same 
time, domestic cartels have generated large amounts of profit, centralized through 
banks, seeking profitable investment. Capital export allows for production of 
surplus value abroad, which can then be repatriated through banks and made 
available again to domestic capitals.29
Banks and joint-stock companies facilitate capital export in that they 
‘enable capital to migrate out of a country detached from the entrepreneur’.30 
Hilferding states that ‘the precondition for the export of capital is the variation in 
rates of profit’.31 Less developed countries have lower organic compositions of 
capital and therefore produce more surplus value. They also have higher interest 
rates because they lack developed credit and banking facilities.32 The export of 
capital in the form of loans has the additional effect of encouraging the export of 
goods, because foreign populations begin to develop the purchasing power 
required to import more commodities. The export of capital makes the relationship 
between banks and states more relevant than ever in that it is necessary for banks 
to feel confident that their long-term interests will be protected overseas.
We have here reached the end point of our discussion of the centralizing 
and concentrating tendencies of capitalism as understood by Hilferding. We have
28 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 332.
29 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 314.
30 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 314.
31 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 314.
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gone as far as he is prepared to go, to a point at which finance capital, represented 
by big banks, employs the state, with its war-making and tariff barrier-creating 
powers, as a tool for its own ends. What Hilferding fails to consider is that the state 
may itself be an expression of finance capital, the form finance capital takes at a 
particular stage. The mechanisms by which this comes about have not yet been 
specified, but what is of key consideration is the question of scale. There is a scale 
at which capital must organize itself in order to be competitive with other capitals 
of equal size, of whatever organizational form, and it is as a result of this 
imperative that the institutional form of capital develops.33 As discussed in the last 
chapter, the capitalist can appear in a variety of historical forms, and the capitalist 
at this stage in history appears to be the state.
That Hilferding avoided this conclusion, and accepted an instrumentalist 
view of the state is unsurprising when we consider that it was a basic principle of 
the German Social Democratic Party in Hilferding’s time that the state could be 
won over to the cause of a classless society. The state was seen as a relatively 
neutral body that could be used as an instrument of either socialism or capitalism. 
James refers to Hilferding’s belief in the ‘sufficiency of a simply political change 
in the creation of a new economic order’.34 He believe that the bourgeois state 
could be used to effect the transition to socialism. As we will see, for Bukharin and 
Lenin, by contrast, it was precisely the development of finance capital, so well 
described by Hilferding, which made the social democratic strategy unworkable.
32 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 315.
33 This will be explained in more detail below when we discuss the way that German banking 
practices developed in order to ‘mock up’ capitals capable of competing with their British 
counterparts.
34 James 1981, p. 850. James also discusses Hilferding’s role as finance minister and the reformist 
nature of SPD politics more broadly.
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Having examined the changing organizational forms of capital from joint- 
stock companies to national cartels, syndicates, trusts and monopolies via banks 
and states, we can now assess, very briefly, whether Hilferding retains a sense of 
the dialectical relationship between competition and concentration. This is 
essential if we are to see his work as a continuation of Marx’s thought, rather than 
a break from it. Let us consider the extent to which Hilferding acknowledges the 
ongoing competitive nature of capitalism despite the increasing monopolisation he 
has identified.
Large scale production, joint-stock companies, cartels and monopolies all 
develop in order to form effectively larger units of capital with all of the 
advantages of efficiency, scale of production, and greater market power which go 
with their position. These sorts of dominant units of capital are what modem 
economists call ‘price-makers’ as opposed to ‘price-takers’. In other words, these 
companies or groups of companies can dictate some of their market conditions and 
in such a way gain a larger than proportional share of the total social capital. 
Hilferding expressed this in terms of the fact that ‘cartel profit is a deduction from 
the profits of non-cartelised industry’.35 What this means, for Hilferding, is that far 
from reducing competition in the system as a whole, the tendency to monopoly 
increases competition among non-cartelised industries and between cartelized and 
non-cartelised industries. The competitive response is for non-cartelised industries 
to seek conditions of cartelization themselves.36
Hilferding understands every organizational change discussed above, from 
large scale individually-owned companies to giant banking tmsts, as the 
consequence and cause of competition, of the anarchy of the market. In his
35 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 343.
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discussion of finance capital, he notes that ‘it detests the anarchy of competition
and wants organization, though o f course only to resume competition on a still
higher level?1 Finance capital resumes competition, according to Hilferding, by
using the state as its instrument. Tariffs, diplomacy and military expansion are all
methods for ‘national banking groups’ to compete on a global scale via the state.
This applies equally to the export of goods or capital.
The struggle for markets for goods becomes a conflict among national 
banking groups over spheres of investment for loan capital, and since 
rates of interest tend to be equalized on the international market, 
economic competition is confined here within relatively narrow limits, so 
that the economic struggle quickly becomes a power struggle in which 
political weapons are employed.38
Competition is, for Hilferding, resumed at the highest level through the
state on behalf of ‘national banking groups’. The fact that competition has taken a
‘political’ form does not deter Hilferding from this assessment. He notes that,
‘finance capital demands unlimited power politics’.39 A tariff is no less ‘political’
than a cartel, which is no less ‘political’ than a war. In power political competition
between states, the dialectical relationship between centralisation and competition
is expressed at a very high level, but it is the same relationship in essence.
While this is clearly Hilferding’s view in Finance Capital, later in his life,
when faced with what appears to be the complete merger of the interests of
‘national banking groups’ under the state during the first world war, his dialectical
sense of competition and concentration disappears. We see this clearly in his
notion of ‘the organized economy’, an image totally abstracted from the very
d/sorganized global economy of the inter-war period.
We find ourselves at present in the period of capitalism in which the era 
of free competition during which capitalism was wholly under the sway of
36 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 343.
37 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 334.
38 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 324.
39 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 335.
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blind market laws, has been essentially superseded, and we are moving 
towards a capitalist organization of the economy; in short, from an 
economy regulated by the free play o f  forces to an organized economy.40
This quote from Hilferding represents an undialectical contrast between
competition and organization, whereby one is contrasted with the other and then
turns into the other. Having not fully thought through the implications of his own
writings on tariffs and state policy, Hilferding lapsed into this undialectical stance
toward the end of his life. In a dialectical approach, by contrast, the contradictory
nature of social phenomona is recognised, the seeds of contradiction in one form
are seen to give rise to another which contains its own contradictions and so on.
There exists in competition always the pressure to centralization and in
centralization always the pressure to competition. The Hilferding of Finance
Capital understood that capitalism had never been ‘blind market forces’ to be
contrasted with ‘organisation’. Rather the anarchy of capitalism continually gave
rise to new forms of organization, on an increasing scale, which in turn
exacerbated the anarchical nature of the system.
5.2.2 Hilferding Revisited
The argument above, in favour of Hilferding’s method in Finance Capital, but not 
his ultimate conclusion in terms of an instrumentalist view of the state, is at odds 
with the analysis of Jonas Zoninsein who has argued in relation to Finance Capital 
that:
Hilferding’s analysis of the processes of capital concentration and 
centralization, as well as his conclusions, are based on a poor and 
confused understanding of Marx’s theory. Both capital concentration and
40 Hilferding 1975 [1927], p. 247. Italics in original.
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centralization are erroneously associated with the elimination of 
competition and with banking domination over industry.41
If Zoninsein is correct in his reading of Finance Capital, it is worth noting
that Bukharin and Lenin were quite mistaken in finding so little wrong with
Hilferding’s analysis.42 It will be suggested in this discussion that Zoninsein and
others have misunderstood Hilferding in a way that Lenin and Bukharin did not.
It has already been argued above that there is little evidence that Hilferding
associated capital concentration and centralization with the elimination of
competition. His approach was considerably more dialectically informed. He saw
each new organisational form as cause and consequence of increased competition,
not reduced. His national model of capitalist development, which we will discuss
below, did however lead him to believe that once the state became the agent of
national capital directly, competition, and therefore capitalism, could be said to
have ceased to exist. This is a case of incorrect conclusions having been drawn
from a correct method of analysis.
As to whether Hilferding saw banking dominate over industry, this is the
most common criticism against him and is not entirely without merit. We will look
at it here because it has implications for why Hilferding may not have considered
the state as an agent of capital socialised on a national scale.
Hilferding understood finance capital to be a socialisation of industrial
capital in the hands of the banks. The control which banks have over industry he
believed to be a result of their representation of the capital of multiple industries,
coordinated. The power of banks over industry is not a power of ‘banking capital’
41 Zoninsein 1990, pp. 104-105.
42 Brewer 1980, p. 79, claims that Finance Capital contains ‘almost every major point’ made by 
Bukharin and Lenin in their later works. Harvey notes that Lenin ‘appears to accept with but one 
reservation the basic conception of finance capital that Hilferding advances.’ Harvey 1990, pp. 289-
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over ‘industrial capital’ so much as it is the power of the socialization of industrial 
capital on a large scale, through banks, over industrial capital on a smaller scale 
within individual small units. Banks, as representatives of multiple units of capital 
have strategic control over any one of those units of capital. That this is how 
Hilferding understood it, is supported by his reference to the fact that companies of 
a sufficient size actually have strategic control over small banks, are able to dictate 
terms and conditions -  ‘cases in which a bank is so deeply committed to one 
particular enterprise that its own success or failure is synonymous with that of the 
enterprise, and it must then meet all the latter’s requirements.’43
Hilferding describes at some length the way that banks facilitate growth in 
the size of corporations which, in turn, require larger banks to fulfill the needs of 
big business and so on.44 It is quite possible for corporations of a sufficient size to 
gain the upper hand and even purchase their own banks should they wish to. (It is 
interesting to note, although Hilferding did not, that the same logic applies to states 
and capitals. English capitals in the era of the East India Company were of a 
sufficient size vis a vis their competitors that they did not need the state, they could 
supply their own armed forces and they did. With the rise of huge multi-national 
companies today, we see the return of this private purchase of deadly force from 
mercenary companies like Sandline International.) The point Hilferding makes is 
that it is important not to fetishize finance capital as anything more than industrial 
capital socialised on a certain scale. It seems fair to say that Hilferding is not guilty 
of such fetishization, given his definition of finance capital as industrial capital 
socialised through the banks.
290. Bukharin summarises the analysis given in Finance Capital almost point for point in The ABC 
o f Communism, Bukharin 1969.
43 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 95.
44 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 95-98.
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Another criticism of Hilferding in terms of his supposed insistence that 
banking is dominant over industry, is that he has incorrectly generalised from the 
experience of Germany and the US. The criticism runs that banks played an 
important role and tariffs were an important aspect of imperial strategy in these 
two countries but not elsewhere.45 England for instance, did not have the same 
banking practices, nor did it use tariffs in the same way at that time.
The problem with this criticism is that it is, itself, based on a national 
model of capitalist development. The assumption is that Hilferding is describing 
‘the way capitalism develops’, if it did not develop that way in each of its national 
units, it cannot be an accurate explanation of the way capitalism develops. The 
fault here lies in the frame of reference and, in this case, Hilferding was much 
more conscious of the effects of the competitive interaction of nation states than 
his subsequent critics. Hilferding is aware that the situation in England differs from 
Germany and the US and he offers an explanation of why this was the case 46 The 
strategy of close involvement of the banks, increased cartelization and tariffs in 
Germany and the US was developed precisely in response to the larger units of 
capital coming from England.
We cannot actually make sense of the need to ‘mock up’ larger units of 
capital through the use of bank loans, joint-stock companies, cartels, monopolies 
and tariffs, if we do not understand the competitive pressures to do so. Germany 
and the US, ‘due to backward and belated capitalist development’47 did not possess 
the large units of individually-owned capital common in England. In order to 
compete against these large units, they had to develop strategies of their own.
45 See, for instance, Brewer, p. 83.
46 Hilferding 1981 [1910], pp. 301-310.
47 Hilferding 1981 [1910], p. 307.
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We digress for a moment here, to note that this line of analysis is entirely in 
keeping with Trotsky’s theory of ‘uneven and combined development’ which sees 
the uneven development of capitalism on a global scale giving rise to a situation 
where backward countries, ‘under the whip of external necessity’ are ‘compelled to 
make leaps’, to combine or ‘draw together different stages of the journey’ of 
capitalist development.48 What Trotsky’s analysis added is an emphasis on the 
opportunity as well as the imperative of belated development. He referred to the 
‘privilege of historic backwardness’, the fact that advanced techniques of 
production and social organization could be adopted immediately without the need 
to pass through all the various stages of development. Where, in an advanced 
country like Britain, the application of new strategies of accumulation, social or 
technical, might be hampered by pre-existing relations or methods, less developed 
countries could instantly take them up on a significant scale. For Trotsky, ‘[t]he 
fact that Germany and the United States have now economically outstripped 
England was made possible by the very backwardness of their capitalist 
development.’49
What we might take from Trotsky’s analysis is that the banking system in 
Britain did not, or was not able, perhaps due to vested interests, to play such a 
revolutionary role in relation to large units of domestic capital, as it did in 
Germany and the US. What we must not lose sight of, and Hilferding is wrong not 
to stress it more strongly, is that banks in Germany and the US had a particularly 
important role in the time under analysis, not because they were banks, smaller 
banks could not have achieved the same ends, but because they represented
48 Trotsky 1933 [1965] Chapter 1. Trotsky used this analysis to explain the development of Russia 
and its ripeness for revolution. As we shall see below, this was not an analysis of Russia which 
Hilferding shared.
49 Trotsky 1933 [1965] Chapter 1.
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industrial capital socialised on a very large scale. It is not banks, per se, that are 
important, but rather it is the effective size of the capital which counts. The relative 
backwardness of Germany and the US made it both possible and necessary to 
socialize production through the banks, thus ‘mocking up’ units of capital which 
were viable on an international level.
A variation on the criticism of Hilferding just discussed is the claim that he 
was wrong to stress the power of banks, because at a later stage in the development 
of capitalism they ceased to be important. Smaldone points out that in Germany, 
for example, in the 1930s, the power of banks over industry broke down. After 
1929, the state was forced to intervene to prevent the collapse of the banking 
system. Banks were nationalized, signalling, for Smaldone, a shift from ‘bank 
power’ to ‘state power’. Smaldone writes, ‘[although finance capital would revive 
after 1945, its temporary eclipse demonstrated its historical specificity.’50
Seen in terms of increasing socialization of capital, capable of being 
organized through banks, states or large companies, the historical changes 
Smaldone notes confirm Hilferding’s projection, we see a progression through 
increasingly large scales of capital, from large nationally-based banks to the state, 
itself. If, however, the particular organizational form of socialised capital is 
fetishised, as it is by Smaldone, we see a constant movement back and forth in 
dominance between one or the other, ‘banks’ or ‘states’. That the former is 
Hilferding’s approach makes sense of the fact that Bukharin and Lenin found it so 
useful in making the transition to theorizing ‘state capitalism’.
However, it is true that Hilferding did not actually follow through on his 
own logic and this is evident in his subsequent criticisms of the theory of ‘state
50 Smaldone, pp. 46-47.
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capitalism’. So, while it may be unfair to accuse Hilferding of fetishising the
organisational form of the bank, he does fetishize the socialization of capital
through the state. Suddenly, when capital is socialised through the state it is no
longer capital. It has its ‘own interests’ and ‘total’ power over the economy.51
The following is from an article Hilferding wrote toward the end of his life
entitled ‘State Capitalism or Totalitarian State Economy’. The question concerns
the characterization of both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia.
The concept of ‘state capitalism’ can scarcely pass the test of serious 
economic analysis. Once the state becomes the exclusive owner of all 
means of production, the functioning of a capitalist economy is rendered 
impossible by destruction of the mechanism which keeps the life-blood of 
such a system circulating. A capitalist economy is a market economy.52
Hilferding rejected the notion of ‘state capitalism’ not because he had 
always lacked a dialectical conception of capitalism, he had not, but because his 
unit of analysis was the nation-state. This is the enduring criticism of Hilferding’s 
work, that he employed a national model of capitalist development, not that he was 
unable to comprehend the dialectic between competition and concentration. For 
Hilferding, the dialectic of capitalism did not end with Nazi Germany. Capitalism 
did. Sadly, Hilferding’s national model of capitalist development ultimately led 
him to his theory of totalitarianism, a model which is representative of the kind of 
‘uncritical eclecticism’ he had once described as ‘the suicide of political 
economy’.53
51 Hilferding 1976 [1940].
52 Hilferding 1976 [1940], p. 511
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5.3 Bukharin
Nikolai Bukharin was elected to the central committee of the Bolshevik party three 
months before the October revolution, at the age of 29. In 1915 he had published 
his own major study of contemporary capitalism, entitled Imperialism and the 
World Economy, introduced by Lenin, and heavily influenced by Hilferding’s 
Finance Capital The key difference between Hilferding’s text and Bukharin’s is 
the latter’s emphasis on the global economy as the appropriate social unit of 
analysis. Bukharin agreed with Hilferding’s assessment of the centralizing 
tendencies of capitalism, which in his own work he described as having reached a 
stage of competing ‘state capitalist trusts’. He did not, as is commonly suggested, 
adopt Hilferding’s later position that capitalism was becoming more ‘organised’.54 
For Bukharin, within the context of capitalist development on a world scale, the 
anarchy at the interstate level prevented this. Bukharin was one of the first to use 
the term state-capitalism to describe this situation of state-controlled blocks of 
capital competing in a global economy.
5.3.1 Geographic scope
Whereas for Hilferding, imperialism is the result of developments within capitalist 
states overflowing their boundaries into the world market, for Bukharin, the 
starting point of imperialism is developments in the world economy. It is the world 
economy that creates the imperialist state. This position is absolutely clear in his 
first published writing on the subject, Imperialism and World Economy, the title of
53 Hilferding 1949 [1906], p. 196.
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which, before translation, was actually, World Economy and Imperialism.55 For
Bukharin, the world economy is absolutely analytically prior to the behaviour of
nation states. Chapter one of Imperialism and World Economy, is ‘World Economy
Defined’. It is not until he has dealt with ‘World Economy and the Process of
Internationalisation of Capital’ and ‘World Economy and the Process of
Nationalization of Capital’ that he moves onto the discussion of ‘Imperialism as
the Reproduction of Capitalist Competition on a Larger Scale’ in the third part of
the book. Imperialism is viewed as the playing out of a global capitalist dynamic
through nation-states. The society of capitalism is global. This is something he
insists upon in all of his writings.
Contemporary capitalism is world capitalism. This means that the 
capitalist relations of production dominate the entire world and connect all 
the parts of our planet with a firm economic bond. Nowadays the concrete 
manifestation of the social economy is a world economy. The world 
economy is a real living unity.56
Throughout Imperialism and World Economy Bukharin refers to the 
‘national economy’ only in quotation marks. On the first page, he states that 
“‘national economic organisms” ... have long ceased being a secluded whole, an 
“isolated economy’” .57 That states may only be seen as parts of a meaningful 
whole, rather than wholes themselves, is best explained in another of Bukharin’s 
writings, The Politics and Economics o f  the Transition Period, in the first chapter 
entitled ‘The Structure of World Capitalism’. There he considers untrue the 
following observation made by theorist, Karl Tyska, that the world market is the 
sum of its parts:
Just as a national economy is made up of the sum of the economic 
activities of the individuals of one nation, whether these activities be 
individual or co-operative, in the same way the world economy is the sum
54 For an excellent discussion of this issue see Haynes 1985.
55 Haynes 1985, p. 24.
56 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 58.
57 Bukharin 1972 [1929], p. 17.
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of the national economies. [And] The sum of the national economies, 
which are considerably influenced by the situation on the world market, 
makes up the world economy.58
It is striking how similar Dr. Tyska’s formulation of the global economy is
to Rosenberg’s as discussed in the last two chapters. For both, nation-states are to
the global economy as individual units of capital are to the nation state. We have
two sets of simple aggregates with little sense of the organic relationship which
unites them within, and distinguishes them from each other. Bukharin writes:
The existence of a special relationship is what turns a simple aggregate 
into a real one. But this sort of aggregate excludes the concept of an 
arithmetical sum, because it is much greater and more complex than a
59sum.
Bukharin explains in Imperialism and World Economy that an
‘international division of labour’ is the special relationship existing at the level of
the world economy making it much more than the sum of its parts. In this way a
real aggregate is formed. He argues that a national economy is not a meaningful
whole because in an international division of labour, individual countries can only
be seen as parts. ‘International exchange’, or trade, generally understood to
comprise ‘the world market’, is actually an expression of this international division
of labour, or system of world production.60 The relationship between production
and exchange is at the heart of Bukharin’s understanding of the social unit of
analysis appropriate for theorising capitalism.
Any connection between producers, who meet in the process of exchange 
presupposes the individual labours of producers having already become 
elements of the combined labour of a social whole. Thus production is 
hidden behind exchange relations, the interrelation of producers is hidden 
behind the interrelation of commodities. Where connections established 
through the process of exchange are not of an accidental nature, we have a 
stable system of production relations which forms the economic structure
58 Von Tsyka Das weltwirtschaftliche Problem der modemen Industriestaaten cited in Bukharin 
1979 [1919], p. 58.
59 Bukharin 1972 [1916], pp. 58-59.
60 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 22.
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of society. Thus we may define world economy as a system o f production 
relations and correspondingly o f exchange relations on a world scale.61
The national model, employed by Hilferding and others, does not fit
because what may appear as relations between sovereign units looked at from the
point of view of exchange are actually interrelationships within a single whole,
viewed from the perspective of the relations of production.
Bukharin goes on to say that ‘[o]ne must not assume however, that
production relations are established solely in the process of commodity exchange.’
He quotes Marx, ‘[wjhenever human beings work for one another in any way, their
labour acquires a social form’, and adds,
[I]n other words, whatever the form of connections established between
producers, whether directly or indirectly, once a connection has been
established and has acquired a stable character, we may speak of a system
of production relations, i.e., of the growth (or formation) of a social 
»63economy,
In this way Bukharin is introducing the idea that flows of capital, 
movements of labour, and even political relationships of war or alliance, must all 
be seen as constitutive of the world economy.64 All these processes can be seen to 
alter the dynamics of production and exchange within a global capitalist society. 
They alter the structure of an international division of production, in the first two 
cases, by stimulating new production in particular areas. In the case of war or 
peace, the international division of labour is altered by, for instance, the extent of 
trade, land, or labour force, lost or gained, and/or the proportion of production that 
must be allocated to the manufacture of arms. Here we see that Bukharin’s 
understanding of modem war as a form which capitalist competition takes at a
61 Bukharin 1972 [1916], pp. 25-26.
62 Marx cited in Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 26. Italics Bukharin’s.
63 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 26.
64 This is quite unlike the position taken by Wallerstein, for instance, for whom the world economy 
is essentially reduced to relations of exchange.
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certain stage, to be discussed below, is underpinned by his analysis of global 
relations of production and exchange.
Returning to the language employed in the previous chapter during our 
analysis of Capital volumes 1 and 3, Bukharin has an understanding of the global 
rather than national economy as the framework for making sense of ‘total social 
capital’. It is at the global level that a general rate of profit is formed which is what 
makes the determination of world prices possible. He also notes an international 
equalization of interest rates on the same basis. He quotes approvingly the idea that 
‘the element of finance also shows a tendency to aid in substituting for market 
conditions of an individual country, the world market conditions.’65
The way in which a recognition of the global geographical scope of 
capitalism influences the theory of the organizational form of the state, will be 
explored below. It is clear from our discussion of Hilferding, that this is precisely 
the framework we have been looking for, in order to move forward with our 
development of a theory of capitalism which can account for periods of state 
ownership and control of production. But just before doing so, it is worth 
considering one of the immediate political consequences of subscribing to a global 
rather than national model of capitalism’s development.
One of the most powerful criticisms of the German social democrats, 
Kautsky and Hilferding, by revolutionaries like Luxemburg, Bukharin, Trotsky and 
Lenin had at its base this distinction between a national or global frame of 
reference. Hilferding, nicknamed ‘the brakeman of the revolution’,66 and the 
‘renegade Kautsky’ were opposed to a revolution in Russia because, in their view, 
capitalism in the country was not sufficiently developed. The alternate ‘Bolshevik’
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view is well explained by Lenin, in his April Theses of 1917, an argument which 
is foreshadowed in Trotsky’s Results and Prospects and discussed at some length 
in the latter’s The History o f the Russian Revolution. Far from Russia having to 
wait for the further development of capitalism before it had a revolution, it was 
precisely the uneven development of capitalism globally that forced revolution in 
Russia.69
It was only by grasping the world totality of capitalism that it was possible 
and justified for a small exploited minority -  the Russian proletariat -  to 
lead an anti-capitalist revolution in a backward, absolutist, semi-feudal 
country.70
We discussed above the shared assumptions of Hilferding and Trotsky as to 
the effects of uneven development, in relation to banking practices in Germany the 
US and Britain. What Hilferding showed there, was an ability to make sense of the 
domestic effects of international competition between capitalist states. Lacking a 
global frame of analysis for the development of capitalism, however, he was 
unable to extend a similar logic of combined and uneven development to make 
sense of Russia’s revolutionary potential. Unfortunately, without the support, 
above all, of their German comrades, the Russian revolution, would, by the same 
logic of the global geographic scope of capitalist society, be doomed to failure.
5.3.2 Historical Trajectory Extended
We left off Hilferding’s discussion of the historical trajectory of capitalism at the 
point at which finance capital, represented by big banks, is employing the state as a
65 Bukharin quotes Weill Die Solidaritat der Geldmarkte, Frankfurt 1903 in Bukharin 1972 [1916], 
p. 25.
*6 Smaldone 1985, p. 95.
67 See Lenin 1961.
68 Trotsky 1933 [1965].
69 Lenin 1961.
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tool to serve national monopoly interests. Tariffs, diplomacy and military force are 
its weapons. Bukharin, we will find, is in absolute agreement with Hilferding up to 
this point. In Imperialism and World Economy he cites approvingly Hilferding’s 
definition of finance capital, quoted above.71 The difference with Bukharin’s 
approach is that he comes to this image, having looked first at the process of 
centralization on an international scale. He starts with ‘world finance capitalism 
and the internationally organized domination of banks’ as ‘one of the undeniable 
facts of economic reality’.72 He draws attention to the huge number of powerful 
international trusts and cartels.73 He then seeks to understand the ‘nationalisation’ 
of capital as an increasingly dominant countertendency within that.
Bukharin explains the organization of capital on a national scale as a 
response to increased competition resulting from the internationalization of 
capitalist relations of production. Expanding capitals need to develop new 
strategies to compete and rallying behind the military power of the state is an 
attractive option, quickly generalized throughout the system. We arrive where 
Hilferding left off, but, for Bukharin, the state’s role on behalf of its national 
monopolies is seen as a reactive strategy within a global context, rather than an 
evolutionary strategy within a national context.
The significance of this distinction is that it avoids naturalizing the state as 
an organizational form. For Bukharin, capitalist states are formed by capitalist 
social relations, they do not exist ready-made, waiting to be needed by capitalists. 
He rejects any notion of the ‘creative role of the “state principle’” or any
70 Tarbuck 1987, p. 12.
71 Hilferding in Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 71.
72 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 60.
73 Bukharin 1972 [1916], pp. 54-60.
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‘predestined harmony between state and society’.74 Rather he believes that ‘the
very foundation of modem states as definite political entities was caused by
economic needs and requirements’, the state is ‘only an expression of economic
connections’.75 More radically still, Bukharin concludes that the state is ‘just as
definitely an economic organization as is a trust or a syndicate’.76 How he reaches
this conclusion remains to be analysed below.
First we should note that despite their different starting points, Bukharin
reaches the same view as Hilferding regarding the centralization of capital within
the state. This is most clearly expressed in The ABC o f  Communism where
Bukharin, having traced Hilferding’s steps in Finance Capital, arrives at the
following image.77
The industry of the whole country is united into syndicates, trusts, and 
combined enterprises. All these are united by banks. At the head of the 
whole economic life there is a small group of great bankers who 
administer industry in its entirety. The governmental authority simply 
fulfils the will of these bankers and trusts and magnates.78
But now, as Brewer notes, ‘instead of the link-up between finance capital
and the state being a conclusion of the argument (as it is in Hilferding), it becomes
a step in the argument.’79 The next step for Bukharin is as follows.
We can therefore say that a capitalist country under the dominion of 
financial capital is as a whole transformed into an immense combined 
trust. At the head of this trust are the banks. The bourgeois government 
forms its executive committee. The United States, Great Britain and 
France, etc., are nothing but state capitalist trusts.. .80
The ‘state capitalist trust’ is a concept Bukharin employs to indicate a
degree of centralization beyond the looser association of national banking capitals
74 Bukharin 1972 [1916], pp. 63.
75 Bukharin 1972 [1916], pp. 63.
76 Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969 [1920], p. 163.
77 Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969 [1920], pp. 138-146.
78 Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969 [1920], p. 145.
79 Brewer 1980, p. 105.
80 Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969 [1920], p. 145.
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vying for state attention. Here the state itself becomes an agent of capital
accumulation. The state ‘swallows up’ other organizations and ‘becomes the sole
universal organization of the ruling class’.81 Representing as it does the combined
interests of national capital, the capitalist state in its imperialist phase is, for
Bukharin, a ‘New Leviathan, beside which the fantasy of Thomas Hobbes looks
like a child’s toy’.82
Being a very large shareholder in the state capitalist trust, the modem state 
is the highest and all-embracing organizational culmination of the latter.
Hence its colossal, almost monstrous power.83
How this very centralized image of the state is in keeping with a dialectical 
understanding of capitalism is well-articulated in The Economics o f the Transition 
Period.
The centralization of capital devours competition, but, on the other hand, 
it continuously reproduces this competition on an expanded basis. It 
abolishes the anarchy of small productive units but it subsequently 
aggravates the anarchic relations between large-scale productive bodies. 
Conflicts in the system disappear in one place, only to reappear on an 
even greater scale in another. They turn into conflicts between 
fundamental parts of a huge world mechanism.84
Bukharin’s global analytical framework allows him to extend the dialectic
of competition and concentration to a higher level than we saw in the work of
Hilferding. In Imperialism and World Economy, Bukharin writes:
... even if free competition were entirely eliminated within the boundaries 
of ‘national economies,’ crises would still continue as there would remain 
the anarchically established connections between the ‘national’ bodies, i.e. 
there would still remain the anarchic structure of the world economy.85
The anarchic structure of the world economy in a period in which 
competition seemed to be largely eliminated within states was epitomized for 
Bukharin in the first world war. The pressures towards war, for Bukharin, are those
81 Bukharin 1982 [1915], p. 31.
82 Bukharin 1982 [1915], p. 31.
83 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 129.
84 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 64.
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that Hilferding described, a desire to control territories within which to create 
conditions favourable to national monopolies, both in terms of trade and protection 
of exported capital. What Bukharin adds is a sense that war is not simply conflict 
that results from capitalism, but war is capitalism, competition at the international
o /r
level operating through the organisational form of the state.
War serves to produce definite relations of production. War of conquest 
serves to produce those relations on a wider scale. Simply to define war, 
however, as conquest is entirely insufficient, for the simple reason that in 
doing so we fail to indicate the main thing, namely, what production 
relations are strengthened or extended by war, what basis is widened by a 
given ‘policy of conquest’.
This is followed by a footnote which reads:
Clauswitz’s declaration that war is a continuation of politics by other 
means is well-known. Politics itself however, is an active ‘continuation’ 
in space of a given mode of production.87
What we see with Bukharin is a theory of capitalism that goes a long way 
toward breaking down the barrier between the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’. The 
idea that war is a form of capitalist competition is a long way from the ‘separation 
of spheres’ approach of the volume 1 marxists and is equally distant from the 
‘multiple causal factors’ approach of the Weberian sociologists. What Bukharin is 
explaining is that war can be understood as a part of a broader set of capitalist 
social relations, which themselves cannot be viewed as narrowly ‘economic’. War, 
for Bukharin, is just one of many strategies employed by state capitalist trusts 
competing at the international level. Tariffs, secret treaties, diplomacy, and arms 
races are all ‘peaceful’ means of pursuing the same objectives.
85 Bukharin 1972 [1929], pp. 53-54.
86 Hilferding seems to understand the same thing as far as tariffs are concerned, but does not quite 
make the logical extension to war.
87 Bukharin 1917 [1987], p. 113.
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War, as the most dramatic form of competition between state capitalist 
trusts, intensifies the process of the centralization of capital in the hands of the 
state.
The conduct of the imperialist war was differentiated from that of all 
previous wars, not only by the dimensions of the conflict and by its 
devastating effects, but in addition by the fact that in every country 
engaged in imperialist war the whole economic life had to be subordinated 
to war purposes... To that end it was necessary that the bourgeoisie 
should place private production, privately owned trusts and syndicates at 
the disposal of the capitalist robber State. This is what they did for the 
duration of the war.88
In response to the idea that this nationalization of production would have 
been seen by capitalists as a threat to their income, Bukharin states that it 
represented simply a transfer of possessions ‘from one pocket to another; the 
possessions remained as large as ever.’89 He asks, ‘is it not precisely the same 
thing to a manufacturer... whether he receives his profits from the counting house 
of a syndicate or from the state bank?’90 In fact, due to state centralization of 
industry, capitalists actually stand to gain from this transfer of control, as the 
efficiency of the war machine improves the chances of a successful outcome to the 
war, one that would serve the interests of national capitals. ‘W ar’, according to 
Bukharin, ‘is one of the business operations of the modem bourgeoisie’.91
To understand the full extent to which this is the case, it is necessary to 
look at the role of state loans and national debt. This is an area in which 
Bukharin’s analysis of imperialism represents a significant advance over that of 
Hilferding. Having described the way in which production is ‘mobilised’ for war, 
Bukharin introduces the concept of ‘financial mobilisation’.92 With particular 
reference to Germany, he describes the way in which ‘loan banks’, state
88 Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969 [1917], p. 162
89 Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969 [1917], p. 163
90 Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969 [1917], p. 163 and 1987 [1915], pp. 155-156.
91 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 148.
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institutions dependent upon the Reichsbank (central bank), became very important
in terms of supplying credit to the state. Large internal military loans are placed
among the public by the central bank in the form of war bonds. This vastly
increases the importance of the central bank as it attracts large portions of available
capital and uses it to finance the growing state institutional structure. As Bukharin
notes, ‘[t]he central banking institute of the government thus becomes the “golden
head” of the entire state capitalist trust.’93
Bukharin also describes how with the enormous increase in state debt, it
becomes impossible to cover expenses out of state income from taxes and state
owned enterprises. It becomes necessary to extend state monopolies. He notes the
extension of monopolies in Germany into vast areas of the economy. This meets
with little resistance from German capitalists because of ‘the ever growing
closeness between state power and the leading spheres of finance capital’.94
Exactly how this closeness emerges is described in fascinating detail by McGill,
who studied the use of cartels in the German war economy. His account here
vividly indicates how state capitalism and war was a direct continuation of the
dialectic of concentration and competition in a global economy.
The Nazis succeeded in mobilizing German industry not by gross 
interference and redirection, which would probably have failed in any 
case, but by facilitating inherent tendencies which had long been at work.
Even rearmament was not a Nazi idea which Hitler thrust upon surprised 
and delighted industrialists in his Dusseldorf speech of 1932. Germany’s 
wars, particularly the war of 1914-1918, had greatly strengthened the 
groupings of heavy industry. Between 1926 and 1930 Allied loans helped 
to build an industrial plant too large for available markets, with capital 
goods capacity overshadowing the consumer goods industries. This was 
ready-made for the Nazis. So also was the long-standing concentration 
and coordination of German industry and the strength of cartels which had 
their first home in Germany.95
92 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 151.
93 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 152.
94 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 154.
95 McGill 1945, p. 36.
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Where German capitalists may once have received their income from the
office of a trust or syndicate, they would, under conditions of war and preparation
for war, receive it from the office of the state banks.96 In a situation of intense
international conflict, they are better off receiving their income from the state, as it
is capital socialised on a sufficient scale to bring about significant competitive
advantages, thus securing the longer-term future of their interests.
There is another area where Bukharin’s analysis, though only suggestive, is
quite pioneering. Where Hilferding tended to focus on the export of capital from
banks to foreign producers, or domestic producers abroad, Bukharin looks at the
export of capital between one state and another.
In many cases the introduction of capital takes the form of a loan to the 
government of the country into which the capital is introduced, a loan at a 
fixed rate interest. This means that the borrowing government increases its 
national debt, becomes indebted to the lending government. In such cases 
the debtor government usually undertakes to float all loans (especially war 
loans) among the industrials of the creditor state. Thus vast quantities of 
capital pass from one state to another.. .97
This means the capitalists of a creditor state make a profit from the taxation 
of the population of the debtor state or from the profits of its state-owned 
industries. This arises in a situation where a government needs to float its war 
debts among a population with greater wealth than its own. Typically a creditor 
state will supply its military allies with these sorts of loans. In times of war, and 
post-war reconstruction, the expenditure of a debtor state may rise dramatically. 
Again, in order to cover the interest payments, the debtor state is compelled to 
extend its monopolies. This is in the interests of the creditor state which wishes a
96 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 155.
97 Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969 [1917], p. 151.
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steady return on its investment and in the interests of capitalists in the debtor state 
for whom ‘in the final analysis the strength of the state is their own strength.’98
This characterization of events by Bukharin, would later be exemplified in 
financial strategies like the Marshall Plan and the subsequent development of 
national monopolies in various European countries designed precisely for a 
transnational purpose -  the repaying of war loans to the US. This period of 
transnationalism disguised as nationalism (the growth of national monopolies) will 
be a feature of the post-war world identified in the next chapter.
5.3.3 Bukharin Revisited
There are two common criticisms of Bukharin that need to be addressed if we are 
to move forward with his analysis. Both are well-articulated by Brewer in his 
critical survey of theories of imperialism.
Brewer’s first complaint with regard to Bukharin’s analysis is that ‘it is not 
true that competition was, then or later, completely suppressed within national 
boundaries’.99 Brewer cites as evidence the spread of multinational companies and 
the fact, for instance, that major competition in the world motor industry takes 
place between GM and Ford. This criticism is misplaced in two distinct ways. It 
represents a parody of Bukharin’s thinking and an inability to see the broader 
theoretical insight he provided. It overlooks the fact that Bukharin did not suggest 
that competition was eliminated entirely within the state, even during wartime. 
What he argued was that there was a tendency to monopoly in the hands of the 
state in proportion to the external competition faced. For the purpose of
98 Bukharin 1972 [1916], p. 154.
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understanding the movement back and forth between nationalisation and 
privatisation, the identification of a causal tendency is sufficient. We need not see 
either extreme in order to recognise a tendency at work. On the specific example of 
two large companies like GM and Ford, they are capable of sufficient coordination 
of their activities should it become essential to the national security of the US.
More seriously, this criticism shows a failure to understand the deeper logic 
of the analysis Bukharin provided. The idea that the growth of multinational 
companies refutes his analysis is wrong for similar reasons that Smaldone was 
wrong to dismiss Hilferding on the grounds that ‘the state’ took over from ‘the 
banks’. If we understand Bukharin to be referring to capital organised on an ever- 
increasing scale, which he observed to have reached the level of state-capitalist 
trusts, there is no reason to dismiss his theory because it appears to be moving 
beyond the state level. If anything the growth of multinationals can be seen as 
confirmation of Bukharin’s analysis that capital seeks organisation on an ever- 
greater scale and that we should not naturalise or fetishise the state. With these two 
principles in mind, there is no reason why the historical trajectory of centralisation 
and competition could not extend beyond the state to a multi-state level whereby 
monopolies grow up within blocs of states, while competition reigns between 
blocs. This is something Bukharin mentions in passing in Imperialism and World 
Economy. He states that were all Europe, for instance, to unite, ‘[t]he struggle 
among small (small!) state capitalist trusts would be replaced by the struggle 
between still more colossal trusts.’100 Bukharin imagines incorrectly that this 
struggle would be between Europe, on one hand, and America and Asia, on the 
other, but he is correct about the basic tendency. Both world wars and the cold war
99 Brewer 1980, pp. 106-107.
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saw the division of the world into two competing blocs within which capital was to
some degree socialised. The growth of multinational companies within those blocs
can be seen to represent sectors of capitalism socialised on a multi-state level.
The second criticism Brewer makes of Bukharin is that his ‘treatment of the
state is over-simple’.101 This objection demonstrates the tenacity of the
instrumentalist view of the state in modem Marxist thought. Brewer incorrectly
assumes Bukharin shares his own view of the state as ‘relatively autonomous’, the
product of the separation of state from the capitalist class as a result of the plurality
of capitalist interests. According to Bukharin, with the growth of finance capital,
these plural capitalist interests are seen to be cemented into fewer, more powerful
units that can exert far greater control over the state. For Brewer, this is an image
of capitalists as powerful lobbyists in relation to the state. Brewer acknowledges
that this ‘contains a grain of truth: big firms can have much more direct links with
the apparatuses of the state than can have a multitude of small firms’.102 However,
he points out, the class is not totally unified, the support of professionals and
public servants is required and ‘there is a need to absorb and contain working-class
pressure rather than simply repressing it’.103 He concludes that:
For all these reasons, the state has much more autonomy than Bukharin, 
or the other classical Marxists, admitted. It may represent the interests of 
finance capital; that is not the same thing as acting as their direct agent.104
This objection to Bukharin’s theory of the state as an agent of capital 
accumulation misses the point entirely. It is based on the misperception that 
Bukharin, like Hilferding, has an instrumentalist view of the state. The distinction 
for Brewer is simply that in Bukharin’s analysis finance capital has an even tighter
100 Bukharin 1972 [1916], pp. 139-140.
101 Brewer 1980, pp. 106-107.
102 Brewer 1980, p. 107.
103 Brewer 1980, p. 107.
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grip on the instrument than Hilferding imagined. Brewer then questions that grip 
because of other interests involved. What this ignores is the discussion of the role 
of state debt and taxation that Bukharin introduces. While, the lobbying powers of 
large trusts vis a vis the state are significant, they are not decisive. Lobbying serves 
to highlight the interests of one or other part of national capital, but the emergence 
of state debt, in the form of government bonds seals the interests of the state in 
favour of the national capitalist class as a whole. The interests of state and finance 
capital are one, because it is finance capital which is coursing through the veins of 
the state, making it what it is, capable of fighting for the interests of its national 
monopoly capitals.
In Bukharin’s analysis the state is an expression of capital interests on a 
national level. As we quoted him previously, the state is ‘just as definitely an 
economic organization as is a trust or a syndicate.105 It makes no more sense to say 
that the state is ‘autonomous’, relative or otherwise, from finance capital than it 
does to say that large trusts or syndicates are autonomous. The state is the 
mechanism through which finance capital is securing its interests.106 The state is an 
organisational strategy, it is a set of social relations, not an object or instrument fo r  
use by a set of social relations. Brewer refers to the fact that ‘Bukharin’s vision of 
the world represents an abolition of the state as a body distinct from “civil 
society’” .107 This is something which the ‘volume one’ theorists would be unable 
to comprehend as a capitalist social form, convinced as they are of the ‘empire of
104 Brewer 1980, p. 107. Italics his.
105 Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969 [1920], p. 163.
106 As a theory of ‘the capitalist state’ Bukharin’s writings lack specification. It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to fill in this gap. To describe in detail the precise mechanisms by which the state as a 
particular form of organisation expresses the interests of capital would involve a detailed historical
and theoretical analysis of tax, tariffs and war, elements of ‘the state as capitalist’ to which 
Bukharin refers. What we are concerned with here, vis a vis ‘volume one’ theorists, is the fact that 
historically states, as agents of capital, have employed these techniques in order to compete on an 
international scale. This is an argument which Bukharin convincingly makes.
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civil society’ model of capitalism, but it is exactly what Bukharin understood to be 
the case. The state is not distinct from civil society, it is an expression of it.
5.4 Lenin
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Lenin’s understanding of 
imperialism is based largely upon the writings of Hilferding and Bukharin. He 
shares with Bukharin the analysis of the historical trajectory and geographic scope 
of capitalism that we have arrived at thus far, an understanding significantly 
influenced by Hilferding’s work. In the study of these dimensions of capitalism, 
therefore, he has nothing much original to add to our alternative approach.108 It is 
in what we have been studying as the third dimension of capitalism, its core 
dynamic, that Lenin makes his most impressive contribution. What we are 
concerned with here is Lenin’s analysis of the challenges faced by the Bolshevik 
leadership as they attempted to break the core dynamic of capitalism within the 
context of a global capitalist economy. In attempting to overcome the law of value 
through the transition to a socialist society, a great deal was revealed as to the way 
in which the law of value functions.109
10/ Brewer 1980, p. 107.
108 This is not to suggest that Lenin’s writings on imperialism have nothing to add to our 
understanding of the subject but just that in terms of the categories we are employing here, 
Hilferding and Bukharin led the way. For the significance of Lenin’s own writings on imperialism 
see Harding 1977, 1981.
109 In placing this importance on the efforts of the revolutionary leadership we concur with Mike 
Haynes that ‘the issue of the transition takes us directly to the heart of contemporary debates about 
capitalism...’ Haynes 1985, p. 1.
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5.4.1 Core Dynamic
In the following discussion we refer back to the insight of the previous chapter in 
which a nuanced understanding of the law of value allows for considerable 
‘negation of the law of value on the basis of the law of value’. What is argued here, 
on the basis of Lenin’s analysis and its practical application, is that despite the 
most valiant effort, the degree of control and planning exercised by the Bolshevik 
leadership must be understood as ‘a negation of the law of value’ on a national 
scale, which remained trapped ‘on the basis of the law of value’ on a global scale. 
As such, the Russian revolution ultimately must be seen to have failed to escape 
the core dynamic of capitalism, the law of value in a global capitalist economy.
In this analysis we shall focus on the period immediately following the 
revolution, a period marked by war and civil war from 1917-1921 and also the 
period that followed that, up until Lenin’s death in 1924. Only very briefly, can we 
recount the major events of this period in which Czarist Russia, ‘a weak link in the 
chain’ of global capitalism, erupted in revolution and a Bolshevik vanguard party 
attempted to lead the transition to socialism. As discussed above, Lenin and 
Trotsky had argued that it was because o f  its historical backwardness that Russia 
could and should lead what must be a worldwide revolutionary struggle. Russia’s 
late development meant that it lacked a strong indigenous bourgeoisie and yet, 
given the global nature of capitalism, the country represented an important sphere 
of production in the world economy, equipped with pockets of advanced 
production and a small but strategically significant working-class. Suffering under 
the yoke of foreign imperialism, and lacking an effective ruling class, Russia 
proved ripe for revolution.
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However, and this is key, it was never the expectation of those who 
attempted to lead and guide the Bolshevik revolution, that it would be able to 
succeed in making the transition to socialism without revolution also taking place 
in more developed countries, particularly Germany. Without international support, 
the Bolsheviks understood they would become the victims of ‘the capitalists and 
landowners, lying in wait abroad and supported by the world bourgeoisie.110 The 
total political disorientation of the Second International, the capitulation of the 
German left to social democracy and its subsequent obliteration by the Nazi 
regime, ensured the isolation of Russia. Without revolution elsewhere, Russia was 
faced with the enormous obstacle of battling imperialist forces externally while 
trying to develop the means of production internally. Russia became, in Lenin’s 
words, ‘a besieged fortress’ ‘a blockaded country’.111 W hat’s more, the Bolsheviks 
had accomplished a worker’s revolution in a country in which the majority of the 
population was not workers but peasants, independent small-scale producers whose 
immediate interests did not coincide with those of the workers. And this peasant 
majority was made even more dominant following the cull of the proletariat by 
imperialist forces during the civil war.112
It is in this context that the policies and strategies of the Bolshevik 
leadership were played out. Their aim was to break the core dynamic of capital 
accumulation on a global scale, knowing that to attempt to do so on a national 
scale would fail. The tasks that presented them following the revolution, isolated in 
a world economy driven by capitalist imperatives, made the goal of post-capitalist 
society unreachable. Events conspired against them almost immediately as they
110 Lenin 1965a, p. 360.
111 Lenin 1965a, p. 352.
112 ‘The civil war of 1918-1920 aggravated the havoc in the country, retarded the restoration of its 
productive forces, and bled the proletariat more than any other class.’ Lenin 1965a, p. 341.
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plunged into civil war, against enemies backed by imperialist powers abroad.113 It
was in this context that the Russian state developed the policy of War Communism
involving a dramatic centralization of power and direction of production. Lenin
explains how the situation of war distorted the priorities of the revolutionary
leadership. ‘It was the war and the ruin that forced us into War Communism. It
was not, and could not be, a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the
proletariat. It was makeshift.’114
After the civil war, more makeshift solutions followed as Lenin led the
Bolshevik Party down the road of ‘state capitalism’ coexisting with the
dictatorship of the proletariat in an attempt to raise productivity to the point where
some recovery, internal stability and development could take place. The New
Economic Policy, the tax in kind, and the concessions to international business
represented, for Lenin, a retreat back to state capitalism to consolidate some of the
gains of the revolution in a global situation in which socialism was not yet
possible. It was Lenin’s strategy that in order to ensure survival vis a vis other
‘bourgeois ‘state capitalisms’, and in order to maintain the cooperation of the
peasants, only state capitalism would do.
While the revolution in Germany is still slow in ‘coming forth’, our task is 
to study the state capitalism of the Germans, to spare no effort in copying 
it and not shrink from adopting dictatorial methods to hasten the copying 
of Western culture by barbarian Russia, without hesitating to use 
barbarous methods in fighting barbarism.’115
‘What compels us to do this? We are not alone in the world. We exist in a 
system of capitalist states.’116 ‘Until the final issue is decided [i.e. rule of
113 See Trotsky 1933 [1969] and Deutscher 1967.
114 Lenin 1965a, p. 335.
115 Lenin 1965a, p. 335.
116 Lenin 1965b, p. 491.
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capitalists or rule of proletariat] this awful state of war will continue.’117 Lenin
responded to his detractors and others who would argue that ‘it is unbecoming for
us revolutionaries to “take lessons” from German imperialism, in no uncertain
terms. ‘There is only one thing we can say in reply: the revolution that took these
people seriously would perish irrevocably (and deservedly).’118
It is in this context of striving for survival at the international level that the
New Economic Policy was launched. Its intention was to assist the proletariat in
retaining power through encouraging the production and market distribution of
food by the peasants (internal security) and the development of large scale industry
for defense and other purposes (external security).
The real nature of the New Economic Policy is this -  firstly, the 
proletarian state has given small producers freedom to trade; and 
secondly, in respect of the means of production in large-scale industry, the 
proletarian state is applying a number of principles of what in capitalist 
economics is called ‘state capitalism’.119
The situation in which we are carrying on our work has not been created 
by ourselves alone; it is bound up with the economic struggle and our 
relations with other countries. Things so turned out that last spring we had 
to discuss the question of leasing, and today we have to discuss the 
question of trade and the money system.120
Lenin believed that it was possible to make the transition to socialism
through state capitalism ruled by the proletariat.121 But there was no mistaking for
Lenin, that this was capitalism, the kind of capitalism necessary for the new
regime’s survival.
We must organize things in such a way as to make possible the customary 
operation of capitalist economy and capitalist exchange, because this is 
essential for the people. Without it, existence is impossible.
117 Lenin 1965b, p. 495.
118 Lenin 1965a, p. 335.
119 Lenin 1966a, p. 407.
120 Lenin 1966b, p. 105.
121 ‘One possible way to proceed to communism is through state capitalism, provided the 
state is controlled by the working class.’ Lenin 1966a, p. 407.
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The extent to which Russia came to operate like other state monopoly trusts
in relation to the world market, is suggested in the following comment by Lenin in
an interview with the Manchester Guardian.
The foreign trade monopoly... will help us to keep the Nepmen in hand, 
for, without consulting them, prices will be determined by the price of 
production abroad plus the extra charge imposed by the state for the 
purpose of subsidizing production.122
In this way the Bolshevik regime was operating like any other state
capitalist trust, creating a monopoly from which it could obtain a certain
proportion of surplus value created on a global scale.
Lenin referred to this kind of proletariat ‘state capitalism’ as ‘capitalism
that we must confine within certain bounds’ but he also admitted, ‘we have not yet
learned to confine it within those bounds.’123 The pressure to accumulate currency
in order to develop large-scale industry, for instance, shaped the whole
development of Russian society.
We must economise now although it is at the expense of the population...
We are economizing in all things, even in schools. We must do this 
because we know that unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, 
we shall not be able to build up an industry at all; and without an industry 
we shall go under as an independent country. We realize this very well.124
Allowing peasant trading and foreign investment, had effects on Russian
society that were quite unpredictable. One year into the NEP, Lenin makes the
following observation.
Well, we have lived through a year, the state is in our hands; but has it 
operated the New Economic Policy in the way we wanted in this past 
year? No.... How did it operate? The machine refused to obey the hand 
that guided it. It was like a car not going in the direction the driver 
desired, but in the direction someone else desired; as if it were being 
driven by some mysterious hand, God knows whose, perhaps of a 
profiteer, or of a private capitalist, or of both. Be that as it may, the car is 
not going quite in the direction that the man at the wheel imagines, and
Lenin 1966a, p. 409.
123 Lenin 1966c, p. 279.
124 Lenin 1966d, p. 426.
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often it goes in an altogether different direction. This is the main thing 
that must be remembered in regard to state capitalism.125
In this statement Lenin explicitly acknowledges that the organisation of the
Russian economy was being shaped and determined by forces other than the
conscious will of his leadership. ‘Behind the backs’ of the Bolshevik leadership,
the organization of the Russian economy was developing in relation to competition
elsewhere. In this way we might say that it continued to be vulnerable to the law of
value, albeit mediated through other capitalist trusts, on a global scale.
But is it really accurate to describe Bolshevik Party policies as being
determined by the law of value? Referring back to the last chapter, we recall that
the volume one Marxists believe that were the state to become involved directly,
through owning and controlling the means of production, then value determination
of the exchange relation between different commodities, the quantities of different
commodities produced, and the proportion of society’s total labour time allocated
to different enterprises would break down. It would be the state rather than the
competitive comparison of commodities that would determine prices, wages and
the relative quantity and quality of goods. Let us consider briefly what this might
mean in the context of the Bolshevik regime’s efforts to control and plan
production and trade.
It is certainly possible to argue that it was the Bolshevik Party rather than
the law of value that determined which commodities were produced in Russia
between 1917-1924 in what quantities they were produced, and at what price they
were exchanged. But what exactly would this mean? As we have argued above, in
a period of war and civil war the Russian economy behaved like any capitalist war
economy, production was planned and carried out according to what was
125 Lenin 1966c, pp. 279-280.
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considered necessary in order to compete with imperialist forces on a global scale. 
The international imperative of war shaped all aspects of domestic production.
As we know from the last chapter, the law of value transforms concrete 
individual labour into abstract social labour. How can we see this taking place in 
the context of Russia 1917-1924? The key is to examine its development as social 
labour on a level beyond that of a single territorial state. Let us consider the 
organization of labour in Russia and Britain together, for example, in this period. Is 
labour power allocated between different productive tasks according to conscious 
decision, for example Russia will make bullets and Britain will make guns? Or 
does it develop through the blind interaction of different acts of labour organized 
independently of each other, for example, both Russia and Britain making bullets 
and guns in a quantity and quality that will help to ensure their survival as 
independent countries? It is the latter. In war, the allocation of labour within each 
state takes place in relation to, in competition with, the allocation of labour in the 
other state. It is in this way, during war, that concrete individual labour is 
transformed into abstract social labour, not only through the market, but also 
through military conflict.
The idea that the goods which compete in war are somehow of an 
ontologically different kind from the goods which compete in peace is absurd. 
Why should we not see, as our theorists of imperialism have argued, competition 
in war as an extension of competition in peace? As Engels usefully pointed out ‘the 
triumph of force is based on the production of arms, and this in turn on production 
in general -  therefore on ‘economic power’ on the ‘economic order’ on the 
material means which force has at its disposal.’ As Bukharin made clear, war is
126 Engels 1954, p. 231.
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never war in general, it is war for the establishment of a particular set of social 
relations and in the period under examination here, we are talking about capitalist 
war. This was a capitalist war in which the Bolshevik regime was forced to engage. 
We introduce here the idea that the law of value worked through military 
competition to shape social relations within Russia. The argument that military 
competition alone can transmit the law of value, will require greater specification 
in the next chapter which covers a period in which the USSR, under Stalin, had 
little or no market exchange with the West.
For now, however, if we accept that any state at war within a global 
capitalist economy is engaged in planning which represents ‘a negation of the law 
of value on the basis of the law of value’; and, if we accept that the ‘negation of 
the law of value on the basis of the law of value’ is the way in which the law of 
value proceeds, then, the argument that the Soviet regime was exercising its own 
priorities in distinction to those dictated by the pressures of competitive capital 
accumulation on a global scale begins to break down. We will now turn to a 
particular criticism of Lenin which allows us to look at this question in more detail.
5.4.2 Lenin Revisited
There have been many criticisms of Lenin’s writings on imperialism, adequately 
outlined and debated elsewhere, stemming from a variety of political 
perspectives.127 There have also been many unfavourable assessments of Lenin’s 
theorization of the role of the vanguard party and the development of a dictatorship 
of the proletariat. These latter criticisms have come particularly from social
127 For a useful account of these criticisms see Brewer 1990, pp. 108-137.
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democratic and anarchist thinkers, who have argued that Lenin had an elitist theory 
of revolutionary struggle and crushed the democratic spirit of the revolution
1 98through centralization of control. These are variants of the bourgeois historian’s 
‘Lenin-led-directly-to-Stalin’ argument and are at odds with the argument 
presented here. But we shall not dwell on these well-rehearsed debates now.129 
What we are concerned with here is a criticism of Lenin from quite a different 
angle altogether. This is the criticism made by Preobrazhensky, one of the 
foremost theorists of the Left Opposition,130 and others, notably European and 
North American representatives of the Communist International,131 that Lenin had 
retreated too far towards capitalism and had opened the door too widely to the law 
of value. We shall concentrate here on Preobrazhensky’s position.
Preobrazhensky’s concern emerged in the context of the New Economic 
Policy and the granting of concessions to international capitalist concerns and 
continued after Lenin’s death as Preobrazhensky debated with Bukharin and 
eventually capitulated to Stalin.132 At the root of Preobrazhensky’s criticism of 
Lenin was the idea that the law of value (which he associated with market
128 This social democratic argument was made by Kautsky after 1917. See Kautsky 1919. A good 
general survey of all a variety of views can be found in Bell 1958. The most widely discussed 
anarchist attempt to argue this is probably Brinton 1975.
129 For a discussion of these debates see especially Cohen 1977 and Haynes 1998. See also 
Volkogonov 1991; 1994; 1996 for a recent revival of the critique.
130 Day 1981, p. 229.
131 There is a fascinating exchange of letters between Lenin and members of the Communist 
International as they react with horror to the NEP. In a speech to the Eleventh Congress of the 
Russian Communist Party Lenin refers to a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist 
International where ‘[m]oved by the best communist sentiments and communist aspirations, several 
of the comrades burst into tears because -  oh horror!- the good Russian Communists were 
retreating.’ To which Lenin replied ‘we have no time for sentiment.’ His argument, which we have 
touched on above, was that the retreat to state capitalism was necessary in order to secure the 
advances made, chiefly the survival of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin 1966c, p. 281.
132 The following discussion of the crucial difference between the position taken by Preobrazhensky 
and that taken by Lenin and Bukharin owes much to Mike Haynes engaging analysis in Haynes 
1985, pp. 85-88. This interpretation of Bukharin is at odds with Day, who argues that Bukharin, 
like Hilferding lacked the dialectical understanding of the relationship between planning and 
anarchy, and as a result came under attack from Lenin. Day 1981, p. 34 .1 find Haynes’ evaluation 
of the evidence more convincing.
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relations) and the law of primitive accumulation (which he associated with state
planning) were in constant battle in the society in transition and if the former were
to gain ground over the latter this would signal a step backward to capitalism rather
than a step forward to socialism.133 It is in this context, as Haynes points out, that
he would eventually side with Stalin, keen to see that ‘the plan’ was finally in
ascendancy over ‘the market’.
Preobrazhensky believed that there was a fundamental conflict between the
‘law of value’ and the ‘law of planning’134 and that the former could be overcome
by the latter if economic development was more closely under the control of the
state. As Haynes remarks, ‘[w]hat Preobrazhensky did was to counterpose the
market and planning as two exclusive categories, defined basically on the
distinction between state and private property.’135 This may sound familiar. It is a
variant on the Weberian association of capitalism with commodity production,
associated with the market, and contrasted with something other than capitalism,
represented by planning and control by the state. This fetishization of categories,
with the state placed in stark contrast to market relations which are seen to
represent the essence of capitalism, is what Peter Binns has called ‘the fetishism of
“commodity fetishism’” 136 Haynes explains.
This involved an obsession with the commodity form which led to the 
erection of a basically static conception of capitalism as a market form 
and a misunderstanding of the very dynamic of capitalism and the way in 
which it tends to modify both the market and the commodity as it 
develops.137
133 See Filtzer 1978, pp. 68-70.
134 Bettelheim credits Preobrazhensky with being the first to identify this conflict. Filtzer 1978, p. 
70.
135 Haynes 1981, p. 86. Haynes goes on to note that in practice Preobrazhensky’s argument was 
‘much less crude than this. Like Bukharin [and Lenin] he laid stress on the form of the state and 
working class control.’
136 Binns 1980, pp. 105-109. This is cited in Haynes 1985, p. 88.
137 Haynes 1985, p. 88.
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Preobrazhensky was not an unsophisticated thinker. He demonstrated an
awareness in The New Economics of the principle that ‘[w]hen there is
trustification or syndication... prices systematically deviate from value...’138 In
this, he shows an awareness that planning within a monopoly formation may
deviate from the law of value but does so in ways that never escape the logic of
that law of value, that cannot be understood other than in relation to the law of
value. Yet elsewhere in the same text, while discussing German state capitalism,
Preobrazhensky made the following observation,
The regulation of the whole of capitalist production by the bourgeois state 
reached a degree unprecedented in the history of capitalism... Free 
competition was abolished, and the working of the law of value in many 
respects was almost completely replaced by the planning principle of state 
capitalism’.139
It is this undialectical understanding of the relationship between planning 
and value relations, at the level of the territorial state, that led him in The Decline 
o f Capitalism to the view that capitalism had become so disconnected from the law 
of value, that it could no longer function. As Day explains, for Preobrazhensky, 
‘fascism was the typical political superstructure of state-monopoly capitalism, the 
necessary consequence of interference with the law of value, the most direct 
evidence of the historic decline of the capitalist mode of production’.140
Preobrazhensky arrived at this view because he did not share with Bukharin 
and Lenin, the view that planning within a state monopoly formation is a means by 
which the anarchy of value relations continues. Lenin and Bukharin understood 
that planning and the market were not opposites and that both could express the 
same essence.141 It is this principle that Lenin acted on in allowing an internal
138 Preobrazhensky 1965, p. 152. Italics mine.
139 Preobrazhensky 1965, p. 85.
140 Day 1981, p. 242.
141 Haynes makes this point in reference to Bukharin 1985, p. 85.
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market to develop within Russia and it is this that made him resolutely realistic 
about the fact that however much planning took place within Russia, it was state 
capitalism and not socialism that they were creating.
Lenin objected to Preobrahzensky’s stance in both theoretical and practical 
terms. Theoretically he was opposed to ‘the very concept of purity’ in terms of 
planning or anarchy, which he believed indicated ‘a certain narrowness, a one­
sided cognition, which cannot embrace an object in all its totality and 
complexity.’142 Practically, he believed that planning, in and of itself, was ‘no 
more socialist than a locomotive is socialist’143 and that ‘planning does not make 
the worker less of a slave, but it allows the capitalist to make his profits according 
to a plan’.144 He notes that
...however much they do plan, however much the capitalist magnates 
calculate in advance the volume of production on a national scale, and 
however much they systematically regulate it, we still remain under 
capitalism...145
Adapting a well-worn mantra of critical IR theory, we can concur with 
Lenin that ‘planning is always for some one or some thing.’146 For Lenin, it is who 
is doing the planning that matters and in whose interests. What counts is not the 
state’s control over production, i.e. planning, but the workers’ control over the 
state, i.e. democracy of the means of production. It is for this reason that the 
argument that ‘Lenin-led-directly-to-Stalin’ is so weak. Lenin was a champion of 
radical democracy, his every effort was channeled to improve the conditions within 
which the democratic control of production in Russia could take place. Planning by 
the proletariat, in their own interests, was what Lenin sought as the objective of the
142 Lenin quoted in Day 1981, p. 34.
143 Lenin 1964a, p. 304.
144 Lenin 1964a, p. 306.
145 Lenin 1964b, p. 443.
146 This is a reference to the mantra of the father of critical theory in IR, Robert Cox, who reminds 
us that ‘theory is always for some one and some purpose’. Cox 1996, p. 87.
238
struggle of socialism. Planning, in and of itself, meant nothing and in the context 
of anarchical capitalist relations on a global scale, in war or ‘peace’, did not allow 
‘planners’ to escape the law of value.
5.5 Conclusion
What we have done over the course of this chapter is examine Hilferding, 
Bukharin and Lenin’s writings on imperialism in order to make sense of the 
‘advance of the state’ in their time. We looked first at Hilferding’s national model 
of capitalist development within which the historical trajectory of centralization 
and competition on an ever-increasing scale was facilitated enormously by joint- 
stock companies and the involvement of banks. This brought us to an 
understanding of the state as an expression of the interests of finance capital acting 
on behalf of national monopoly capitalists. From here, Bukharin took the analysis 
one step further, the state became more than an instrument, it was seen as an agent 
of capital accumulation in its own right within the geographic scope of capitalism 
on a global scale. With this came an understanding of war as a kind of capitalist 
competition. Finally, with Lenin, we saw that given the presence of anarchical 
capitalist relations on a global scale, in war or peace, individual states cannot 
escape the law of value, the core dynamic of capitalism on a global scale. National 
planning cannot be contrasted with anarchy, it must be understood as a means 
through which that anarchy continues.
We were set the challenge by Trotsky, at the end of chapter three not ‘to 
throw out of reality, for the sake of logical completeness’ aspects of actually 
existing capitalism which appeared to be at odds with our understanding of
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capitalism. For the volume one theorists this includes any ownership and control of 
production by the state. Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin, by contrast, represent an 
alternative tradition of classical Marxism, interested in making sense of capitalism 
as it has ‘actually existed’ through periods of nationalized production and war. As 
Haynes notes this involves a conception of capitalism which is precisely not an 
abstract model, ‘not an ideal type which is held up to the world.’ He adds that 
capitalism cannot be reduced to ‘a simple formula whether that be commodity 
exchange, wage labour, the market or whatever’. Capitalism is ‘a dynamic mode of 
production which is constantly in the process of transforming itself.’ Haynes 
advises that ‘what Marxists must do is to understand the nature of this constant 
transformation and not erect timeless categories into which an intransient reality 
has to be hammered.’147 It is this that the theorists of imperialism examined here 
have done. This is a method of engagement we will follow through into the next 
chapter in order to better understand the development of post-war capitalist 
relations as they have ‘actually existed’.
147 Haynes 1985, p. 126.
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Chapter Six 
Cold War: State Capitalism and Beyond
6.1 Introduction
Over the last two chapters we have been developing a theory of capitalism, based on 
an alternative tradition of classical Marxism capable of making sense of significant 
variations in state-market behaviour, of which the apparent ‘retreat of the state’ over 
the last two decades is one example. Specifically, we have been attempting to 
understand extensive state ownership and control of the means of production, as an 
aspect of actually existing capitalism on a global scale. It is hoped that we will be able 
to make better sense of a historic process like the ‘privatisation revolution’, if we can 
first understand the state ownership which logically and historically preceded it. The 
‘volume one’ Marxism of Rosenberg and others denies that state ownership and 
control can be understood as capitalist in its nature, and as a result fails to engage 
analytically with the structural changes in the nature of capitalism which 
‘globalisation’ represents. This is the third of three chapters which present an 
alternative classical Marxist approach to capitalism as it ‘actually exists’.
In chapter five we argued that the theoretical possibility of capitalism taking 
the form of state ownership and control of the means of production, was evident in the 
writings of Marx and Engels. In chapter six we traced the actual historical 
development of ‘state capitalism’ in the form of imperialism and world war, as 
analysed by Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin. In this chapter, we shall focus on the 
immediate post-war period and through the 1950s and 60s during the height of the 
Cold War. We will be attempting to make sense of the enormous growth in the role of
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the state throughout the world in the post-war period. This historical moment is of 
particular significance for our understanding of ‘the retreat of the state’ because it is 
the apparent stability of individual states and the state system over several decades 
following World War Two that has formed the backdrop for later assumptions about 
change, in terms of the last decade of privatisation and globalisation.1 In other words, 
had it not been for the scale and scope of state ownership and control of production 
following the Second World War, the privatization of the last two decades would not 
appear to represent such a revolutionary volte-face.
In the first half of this chapter there will be a particular focus on the nature of 
the Soviet Union. The USSR represented a clear case of state ownership and control 
of the means of production, tightly managed within the borders of a territorial state, 
yet existing within a global economy driven by the imperatives of capital 
accumulation. As such, it represents an important case, allowing us to study the 
strengths and limitations of the perspective we have been developing so far. In the last 
chapter, we looked at Russia in the period following the Bolshevik revolution and 
found considerable evidence of adaption to market mechanisms internally, and 
externally, through the NEP. In the period under consideration here, however, the 
USSR under Stalin and throughout the Cold War, complete state control was the 
guiding principle and very little international exchange took place.2 How we
1 In chapter two we discussed the way in which many theorists of globalisation had naturalised aspects 
of state market behaviour which were in fact quite historically peculiar to the post-war period.
2 International exchange did begin to develop on a greater scale in the 1970s in a period of detente, a 
cooling of Cold War tensions. Poland, for instance, attempted to break out of the crisis of a stagnating 
economy by seeking Western investment and borrowing extensively ‘in the hopes that they would find 
a favourable place in the international division of labour’. Barker recalls a joke in the 1970s that if 
Poland was socialist, the the tractor workers in Warsaw who worked both for the Polish state and 
Massey-Ferguson (in a joint enterprise) changed their relations of production every lunch time. In the 
morning they just made tractors in the afternoon they also produced surplus value for capital. Barker 
2004 correspondence. This joke highlights the inadequacy of a ‘volume one’ approach which cannot 
make sense of such a formation.
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understand the dynamic of social relations in the Soviet Union will reveal a great deal 
about the relative strength of our alternative theory of capitalism.
The idea that the post-war world was divided into countries that were 
capitalist, ‘non-capitalist’ or somehow ‘mixed’ of the two, has been the prevailing 
view in International Relations and throughout most of the social sciences.3 The Cold 
War was seen as, in some sense, a war between capitalism and ‘something other’ than 
capitalism, whether that ‘other’ was understood to be communism, ‘actually existing 
socialism’, or some other label for describing the centrally planned authoritarian states 
of the ‘second world’. Notoriously shy of the word ‘capitalism’, IR theorists showed 
more interest in the external manifestation of the Cold War conflict in terms of 
balances of power, patterns of alliance and domino theories, than the more 
fundamental question of the nature of social relations within these societies. From a 
classical Marxist perspective, we might argue that what was required was a movement 
beyond labels, toward an ongoing analysis of the historical development of global 
capitalism which could make sense of both the ‘centrally planned’ Soviet Union and 
the increased role of the state in the West and South. Without this we cannot make 
sense of the central conflict of the post-war world. The Cold War cannot be explained 
within the terms conventionally set and cannot really be explained outside them, 
unless the dynamic of the Soviet Union is understood.
Similarly, since ‘actually existing capitalism’, in all its post-war forms 
contains major elements that we associate with the Soviet Union, those aspects too 
become inexplicable.4 The paradox is that we have no theory (we have only 
description) of late capitalism because late capitalism is at odds with the volume one
3 Typical in this regard is the text by Davis and Scase, Western Capitalism and State Socialism 
although they note that their view of ‘state socialist societies’ as ‘distinctive social types’ existed only 
since the 1960s. Davis and Scase 1985, p. 1.
4 State ownership and control of production in the Keynesian welfare state, for instance.
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analysis that traditional accounts gravitate toward. Reality is not matching up with 
theory and we are experiencing intellectual crisis. It is no exaggeration to say that 
contemporary ‘theories’ of the Cold War provide ample evidence that such a crisis 
exists.5 We might suggest that what is required here is nothing short of a ‘paradigm 
shift’. Kuhn argued that scientific advancement was not evolutionary but rather 
involved a ‘series of peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent 
revolutions’, and in those revolutions ‘one conceptual world view is replaced by 
another’.6 Scientific revolutions occur when anomalies arise which cannot be 
explained by the current paradigm. The inability of mainstream academia and much 
classical Marxism to provide an explanation of late capitalism as it ‘actually exists’ is 
one such (rather major!) anomaly.7
The advantage of the approach that we have been developing over the last few 
chapters is that, by itself, state ownership and control of production in the Soviet 
Union appears not to preclude it from being considered capitalist. It may be 
understood as a form of state capitalist trust competing in a global capitalist system of 
states. This would be an approach quintessentially at home in the discipline of IR and 
IPE, as it places considerable analytical weight on the dimension of the international. 
What is more, in explaining both the development of the USSR and the rest of the 
world through an analysis of a single world historical dynamic, it would represent a 
considerable advance over mainstream IR. It would avoid the breaking down of the 
social world into separate parts to be mechanically interrelated in ahistorical models 
like ‘the balance of power’ or into mystifications of ideological impasse.
5 Cox 1999 makes this explicit.
6 Kuhn 1962 [1996], p. 122.
7 It is this anomaly that makes the quest for an explanation of ‘actually existing’ capitalism legitimate. 
We have reached a stage where the current paradigm is so limiting that we need a revolution in our 
thinking in order to understand the world as it ‘actually exists’.
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The first section of this chapter looks at the main answers to ‘the Russia 
question’ among Marxists in the post-war period. Orthodox Trotskyist and New Class 
theories of the nature of Russian society are considered as well as two versions of 
what is known as a ‘state capitalist’ analysis. These four positions are distinguished 
along the lines of whether or not class relations are seen to exist in Russia, the 
significance of state ownership and control of production in characterizing the 
Russian state, and the frame of reference for analysis, whether it is national or global. 
What we find is that one of the ‘state capitalist’ approaches we examine fits well 
within our understanding of the nature of capitalism, as developed through our 
alternative classical Marxist approach.
In the second section of the chapter we look in more detail at this particular 
answer to ‘the Russia question’ which was formulated by Tony Cliff and described as 
a ‘bureaucratic state capitalist’ perspective. This is an approach well-formulated in 
terms of the geographical scope and historical trajectory of capitalism as it ‘actually 
exists’, and consistent with our understanding of its core dynamic. It appears to 
provide an analysis of the post-war period which continues the alternative tradition of 
classical Marxism that we have been developing. The impetus for this approach was 
Cliffis attempt to orient himself politically within the Cold War. Unfortunately, he 
develops his perspective in a quite unselfconscious way, avoiding explicitly 
elaborating his understanding of Russia into a more developed theory of capitalism.
In the third section of the chapter we move ‘beyond Russia’ to consider the 
implications of Cliff’s analysis for our ongoing development of a theory of capitalism 
as it actually exists. While there are many strands of C liffs  analysis that we could 
develop, here we will focus on the question of whether free wage labour is essential to 
the functioning of capitalism, a debate which has arisen directly out of C liffs
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characterisation of Stalin’s USSR as ‘state capitalist’. For the present thesis, this is an 
important debate as it exposes in stark form the difference between the volume one 
marxists, for whom free wage labour is the essential ingredient of capitalism, and the 
alternative tradition who, following Cliff, acknowledge that no such ingredient existed 
in the USSR. At this stage in the argument we also move ‘beyond Russia’ in the 
geographical sense, with comment on the nature of free wage labour in the West and 
consideration of whether state-capitalism usefully describes the post-war 
‘nationalisation revolution’ in the West and South.
Finally, in the last section of the chapter, in the final ‘movement beyond’, we 
try and transcend the limitations of the theory of ‘state capitalism’ itself. It is argued 
that, despite the many virtues of Cliff’s approach, (not least that he kept alive an anti- 
Stalinist tradition of classical Marxism throughout the Cold War), if what we are 
trying to understand is the high levels of state ownership and control of production 
during this period we need to develop our analysis of nation-state capitalism into a 
theory of ‘bloc capitalism’. This argument is counter-intuitive given that vast sectors 
of industry during this period were nationalized, but we will be arguing that 
nationalization within individual western countries (and within many developing 
countries) was evidence of international coordination aimed at surviving bloc 
capitalist competition with the USSR. In this way we come to understand the high 
levels of nationalization of industry characteristic of the Cold War as an expression of 
the rivalry of competing bloc capitals. We arrive at this position through extending the 
alternative tradition of classical Marxism we have been developing, beyond the point 
where Cliff’s state capitalism has left it.
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6.2 The Russia question
Over the last half century or more, Marxists who have understood state ownership and 
control of the means of production as a logical and historical step in the development 
of global capitalism, have employed the central insights of this approach to 
understanding Russia and other centrally planned economies as in some sense 
capitalist. This is in line with the kind of analysis we have developed over the last two 
chapters. But this was, and remains, a minority position. A brief overview of other, 
more popular, answers to the ‘Russia question’ is necessary first in order to 
contextualise the state capitalist approach we are interested in. In very broad outline 
we can distinguish at least four main positions on Russia that became dominant 
among Marxists during the Cold War: orthodox Trotskyist, new class theories and 
two versions of what might be called a theory of ‘state capitalism’.8
6.2.1 The Orthodox Trotskyist Position
The ‘orthodox Trotskyist’ position on the nature of the USSR, is most closely 
associated with Ernest Mandel, but was also adopted by many bourgeois writers 
without attribution.9 Influenced by Trotsky, Mandel saw central planning and state 
ownership of the means of production in Russia, and then the USSR, as in some sense 
‘progressive’ and characteristic of a definitive break with capitalism.10 Although well 
aware of the lack of genuine worker’s democracy within Russia, neither Mandel nor
8 Barker 1981, is an invaluable guide to these debates.
9 See Callinicos 1990, for a useful discussion of Mandel. As for other writers, the key is that if they do 
not accept that Russia was socialist (which most do not), they tend to fall into the ‘degenerate worker’s 
state’ position which relates to what they think it could have been, not what they think it was.
10 Trotsky made apparently conflicting statements as to whether state planning and ownership are 
compatible with capitalism. It seems that he was capable of recognizing this compatibility in relation to 
other countries, for instance Mexico, but did not find it a convincing description of Stalinist Russia.
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Trotsky believed that the bureaucracy comprised an exploiting class with its own 
distinct interests. Russia was not seen as a class society of any kind. Rather, the 
outcome of the 1917 revolution was a kind of worker’s state, but one which had 
degenerated into an undemocratic form. This is a theory of Russia as in some sense 
‘transitional’ between capitalism and socialism, having left one behind through the 
development of state planning and ownership and not fully realized the other in terms 
of worker’s democracy.
There is mixed evidence as to whether Trotsky held this view right up until his 
death. He certainly did not believe it was a state of affairs that could survive for long, 
without either the workers crushing the bureaucracy or the whole society reverting to 
capitalism. As he said, ‘[i]n reality a backslide to capitalism is wholly possible.’11 In 
fact, the only thing that could prevent the latter, in Trotsky’s view, was the spreading 
of the revolution to the rest of the world. It is therefore somewhat puzzling that this 
‘transitional society’ image would be held by those, like Mandel, who have lived to 
witness decades of stability in the internal social relations of the Soviet Union. This is 
the major limitation of their position, and by extension all those who subscribe to it 
explicitly or otherwise, that it leaves the USSR stranded historically and 
geographically -  in ‘transition’ for fifty years and stripped of its international context. 
As late as 1990, Mandel claimed that ‘the fate of the USSR as a transitional society 
between capitalism and socialism ‘frozen’ at its present stage by the bureaucratic 
dictatorship, has not yet been settled by history.’12
11 Trotsky 1972, p. 241.
12 Mandel 1990, p. 47.
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6.2.2 New Class Theories
The second major position is held by those who view the social relations of 
production in Russia as indicative of a ‘new class society’ of some kind. On this 
reading, the USSR and other centrally planned countries are neither socialist nor 
capitalist but represent some ‘other’ kind of class-based mode of production. These 
ideas developed in the 1930s among dissident members of the Fourth International 
like Max Shachtman and James Burnham.13 A number of East European intellectuals, 
including Svetozar Stojanovic and Rudolf Bahro, also developed this analysis of the 
Soviet Union around the journal Praxis, in the 1970s.14 In the West, these views were 
taken up by, among others, Hillel Ticktin around the journal Critique}5 This 
perspective on Russia is also known as an ‘exceptionalist’ position as it sees centrally 
planned economies as having taken a separate, or ‘exceptional’ path from either 
socialism or capitalism.16
Despite important distinctions, these writers have a very similar understanding 
of what state ownership and control of the means of production in Russia signifies. 
They hold the view that state property is a new kind of class property and, unlike the 
orthodox Trotskyist position, that this is not progressive, or transitional, but rather 
evidence of a bureaucratic class exploiting workers collectively through the 
mechanism of the state. The label given for these countries is ‘bureaucratic 
collectivist’ or ‘state collectivist’. The means of production in this case are not held
13 Burnham 1942.
14 Bahro 1978; Stojanovic 1973.
15 Important to note that in some ways Ticktin does not fit neatly in this category as he does not 
actually believe Russia was a class society because he does not see class as an appropriate concept with 
which to analyse it. He does however see it as sui generic which is why he never extends his analysis to 
the Eastern bloc. Thanks to Haynes for this clarification. See Molyneux 1987. Ticktin 1973, 1976. See 
also Carlo 1974; Fantham and Machover 1979; Fiiredi 1986.
16 There is nothing to stop them applying this description to other periods of history.
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privately, by individual capitalists, but nor are they under the control of the working 
class. The state is more than an instrument of class repression, it directly organizes the 
mode of production. Stojanovic employs the term ‘statism’ much in the way that 
Hilferding did, to describe this phenomenon of direct state control over the economy.
17Bahro, uses this same concept to explain post-war third world developmental states.
‘Volume one’ Marxists, and other Marxists who have paid little direct 
attention to the nature of the Soviet Union, subscribe to some version of this account 
in which centrally planned countries are seen to have failed at producing socialism 
and to have developed essentially in parallel to capitalism.18 Wood has been unwilling 
to specify the nature of the USSR and other centrally planned economies, referring to 
them simply as ‘Soviet-type’ states,19 and, as we have noted, Rosenberg’s 
understanding of the Soviet Union is that it is not capitalist, but has been produced by 
capitalism, in parallel to capitalist (i.e. liberal democratic) societies. We do not have 
the space here to discuss the limitations of this answer to the Russia question, 
something which has been done quite successfully by others.21 What can be said here 
is simply that this approach is very largely descriptive and assumes a country-model 
of development.
What these first two positions, ‘degenerate worker’s state’ and ‘new class 
society’ have in common, despite holding contrasting views about something as 
fundamental as whether or not class relations exist within centrally planned 
economies, is that they both consider state ownership and control of the means of 
production to be inimical to capitalism. This means that neither the theorists 
subscribing to a ‘degenerate worker’s state’ position nor any one of the ‘new class
17 Bahro 1978.
18 See Fantham and Machover 1979, p. 4.
19 Wood 1995, p. 33 cited in Barker 1997, p. 57.
20 See the argument in Chapter Three of this thesis.
21 See for example, Barker 1981 and Haynes 1998.
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society’ adherents would accept that centrally planned economies could be described 
as capitalist states.
The next two positions, two versions of a ‘state capitalist’ analysis, take the 
view that these societies can be described as capitalist. Understood here as the third 
and fourth significant Marxist answer to the Russian question, the label of ‘state 
capitalism’ has confusingly been used to describe two very different positions. The 
first group of Marxists who perceived Russia and other CPEs as ‘state capitalist’, 
argued that capitalist market relations, had been restored within these societies, while 
the second group did not. Michael Howard and John King recently described these 
approaches as ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ theories of state capitalism, respectively.22 
We shall turn to those now.
6.2.3 Internal Theories o f State Capitalism
The central and most sophisticated proponent of the ‘internal’ state capitalism 
position is Charles Bettelheim, but a similar analysis can be found in the work of 
Bordiga and in the writings of the Chinese Communist Party.23 Bettelheim lays out his 
theory of state capitalism most clearly in Economic Calculations and Forms o f  
Property}4 He traces the history of the reversion to capitalism of Russia and Eastern 
Europe in a three-volume work entitled Class Struggles in the USSR covering the 
period 1917 to 1941.25 The gist of Bettelheim’s argument is that in the transition to 
socialism, the ‘economistic’ Marxism of the Bolshevik Party was decisive in allowing 
the conditions of market capitalism to re-establish themselves. He argues that the
22 Howard and King 2003.
23 Barker 1981, p. 29.
24 Bettelheim 1976a.
25 Bettelheim 1976b, 1978 and 1982.
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focus on industrialization, on building the means of production, meant that the 
development of the appropriate social relations of production, particularly an alliance 
of workers and peasants, required to ensure a successful transition to socialism, did 
not take place. Without this, a state bourgeoisie emerged and conditions for market 
capitalism were re-established. On this reading, the Soviet Union and its legacy 
represent the failure of class struggle in the moment of transition from capitalism to 
socialism.
The most significant thing about Bettelheim’s position, for our purposes, is 
that he rejects a formalistic equation of state ownership and control of property and 
production with the absence of capitalist relations of production. Rather, Bettelheim 
sees Russian capitalism as a version of capitalism in which the state is owner and 
controller of the means of production. However, in order to argue that capitalist 
commodity relations exist within Russia, as a result of market conditions having been 
re-established, Bettelheim makes a number of unsubstantiated claims about the nature 
of Russian society. Light on empirical evidence, Bettelheim nevertheless claims that 
Russian industry operated in terms of a number of effectively independent (although 
state-owned) enterprises that competed with one another under market conditions not 
dissimilar to those prevailing in the West. The role of money in Russia, Bettelheim 
believed, was that which you would expect to find under conditions of generalized 
commodity production. Wage relations existed between workers and enterprises and 
money served as a means of extracting surplus value, which was then realized through 
the market.
It is very difficult to find empirical studies that provide any evidence of the
kind of ‘independence’ Bettelheim attributes to Russian enterprise in the period under
26 Following this logic, Bettelheim was very interested in the Chinese Revolution, the emphasis on a 
worker-peasant alliance and what he perceived to be the more favourable relative weight given to 
cultural as opposed to industrial development. See Barker 1981, p. 33 and Bettelehim 1978, p. 315.
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examination.27 Nor does Bettelheim, despite his lengthy examination of Russia, 
actually provide that evidence himself. Russian enterprises were not free to set wages 
or prices. They did not choose the goods that they made or who supplied or bought 
them. They did not make independent decisions about reinvestment and long-term 
planning. Bettelheim’s characterization of Russian society as dominated by 
spontaneously created internal capitalist market relations does not, in fact, hold up. 
The more conventional description of Russian society, held by most Marxists and 
non-Marxists alike, that it is a centrally planned economy, is more heavily supported 
by the evidence.
While there is a great deal more that could be said about Bettelheim’s position, 
his inability to establish the existence of ‘independent’ competing enterprises, upon 
which his theory depends, allows us to dismiss him at this stage for the purposes of 
this thesis. Without independent competing units of production within the country, 
this theory does not support the description of Russia as a capitalist country. Without 
competition there is no operation of the law of value, without which the dynamic of 
capital accumulation does not take place.
Where does this leave us in terms of developing a theory of actually existing 
capitalism which could make sense of the social relations of production obtaining in 
centrally planned economies? It leads us back to the insights of the previous two 
chapters which suggest an answer to the Russian question quite distinct from those 
provided thus far. What all three of the positions above have in common, despite their 
lack of agreement on something as significant as whether Russia was socialist, 
capitalist, something other, or something in between, is that they are looking at the
27 The possible exception to this is Filtzer 2002, 1994,1992.
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social relations obtaining within centrally-planned states in order to arrive at their 
characterization of these countries.
One of the central tenets of the theory of actually existing capitalism we have 
been tracking over the last two chapters is that capitalism is a global system. The 
social relations of production within an individual country cannot, therefore, be 
theorized in isolation. Russian revolutionaries who were opposed to the idea of 
socialism in one country held this view both because they felt that Russia lacked the 
internal resources to go forward and because of the contradiction they felt between 
capitalism as a global system and an individual revolutionary state.28 We need to find 
a theory of Russia which recognizes that reality.
6.2.4 International Theories o f  State Capitalism
We turn now to the final major Marxist position on the Russian question known both 
as ‘state capitalist’ or ‘bureaucratic state capitalist’. This position distinguishes itself 
from all others in that it seeks to make sense of the social relations within ‘centrally 
planned economies’ as part of global capitalist relations. This is what Howard and 
King refer to as an ‘externalist’ state capitalist position, and we shall refer to as an 
‘international’ theory of state capitalism.29 On this reading, Russia should be 
understood as a state-capitalist formation because of international not internal social 
relations of production.
One of the first proponents of the theory of ‘international’ state capitalism 
applied to the post-war period was Tony Cliff.30 In 1948 Cliff wrote The Nature o f
28 This was discussed in the last chapter in terms of Lenin and Trotsky’s analysis of the revolution.
29 Howard and King 2003.
30 Other theorists with what is arguably a similar position include C L R James and Raya 
Dunayevskaya writing under the label of the Johnson Forest Tendency (JFT). However, while the JFT
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Stalinist Russia which was subsequently published in several different versions.37 In
this work Cliff attempted to ‘locate the underlying dynamic of the Russian system and
see it in world historical terms’.32 He rejected both the orthodox Trotskyist position
that Russia was a degenerate worker’s state, and the ‘exceptionalist’ position that it
was neither capitalist nor socialist. Yet, unlike Bettelheim, he did not look at Russia’s
internal relations alone to determine its capitalist nature.
Cliff’s position was that Russia had been a struggling worker’s state until
1928, when its internal social relations finally took the form of a capitalist war
economy. It was with the first five year plan, that the bureaucracy under Stalin finally
constituted itself as a ruling class and began to systematically exploit the workers in
competition, largely military competition, with capitalist states elsewhere. Social
relations within Russia were like relations within a capitalist enterprise.33 There was
‘despotism’ within Russia and ‘anarchy’ between Russia and other states. It is the
external relations of military competition which give Russia, its capitalist character.
The Stalinist state like a factory owner, decides the division of labour within 
the factory -  it is planned. But it is planned in relation to world competition -  
the division of labour is not arbitrary. The rate of exploitation is not the 
arbitrary will of the Stalinist state, but is dictated by world capitalism. When 
Russia is viewed within the international economy the basic features of 
capitalism can be discerned: anarchy in the social division of labour and 
despotism in that of the workshop are mutual conditions the one of the 
other.34
Before explaining C liffs  analysis more fully, it is worth drawing attention to 
something we prefigured in chapter three. Cliff’s analysis, which epitomizes our
share Cliffs image of the USSR as ‘like a factory’ among other ‘factories’ (states monopoly 
formations) within a global capitalist society, they focus on the vertical relationship (of state as 
employer) and fail to combine it with the horizontal relationship (of competition between states) in 
order to derive their sense of the capitalist dynamic of the USSR. See Dunayevskaya 1941 [1992] and 
James 1969. See also Callinicos 1990b, pp. 73-85 for a useful discussion of the distinction between 
these two positions and that of Cliff.
31 Cliff 1988.
32 Harman in Cliff 1988, p. 18.
33 The word ‘enterprise’ here is preferable to the word ‘factory’ which has been misunderstood to be a
fetishisation of the industrialisation of the USSR.
34 Cliff 1988, pp. 221-222.
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alternative to ‘volume one’ Marxism, is strangely similar to Rosenberg’s presentation 
of global capitalism in Empire o f  Civil Society. As just explained, Cliff sees Russia as 
capitalist because anarchical capitalist relations persist at the international level 
(shaping domestic social relations in Russia in such away that they cannot be 
understood as anything but capitalist). Both Cliff and Rosenberg have an 
understanding of capitalism in which nation-states may be seen as islands of order 
within a sea of anarchy, both see the anarchy of competition between states as a 
defining feature of capitalist social relations on a global scale. This, remember, was 
Rosenberg’s ‘unexpected discovery’ -  that Marx had a theory of interstate anarchy.
The difference, and what makes Cliff’s analysis coherent where Rosenberg’s 
is not, is precisely that Cliff has an historical understanding of state capitalism, i.e. he 
accepts that capitalist states can be owners and controllers of nationalized production, 
and that this is a moment in the development of capitalism on a global scale. 
Rosenberg believes quite the opposite, arguing at length that this role for the state is 
inimical to capitalism, a belief which leads him, among other things, to dismiss the 
idea that the USSR is capitalist and, more obviously erroneously, to a position where 
he must ignore the fact that for Realists the Cold War is an example of the balance of 
power.35
Cliff has a theory of capitalism as it actually exists and has developed 
historically, based on a particular tradition of classical Marxism. This allows him to 
make sense of the USSR and the Cold War. Rosenberg has two sets of descriptions, 
one taken from the crudest Realist IR, the other from volume of one of Capital, both 
highly abstract. He maps the latter onto the former, a superficial exercise that leaves
35 Rosenberg as discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. Rosenberg 1994. Unfortunately, this lead him 
to argue, along with the ‘new class theorists’ that Russia and other centrally planned economies 
develop in parallel to capitalism. Rosenberg 1998. An awkward conclusion for someone who is 
otherwise so attuned to the notion of the totality of social relations, as evidenced in his critic of the 
Weberian eclecticists.
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him open to the kind of objections lodged at length in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
The question which follows is how is it that C liffs  analysis can have been so 
dismissed by the academy, while Rosenberg’s analysis has been lauded as one of the 
most significant breakthroughs in Marxist theory of the International?
There are several explanations I would like to note. The first is that an analysis 
of the Soviet Union as capitalist has been totally unpalatable to a generation of 
Marxist academics who spent their youths, if not their lives, believing in the Russian 
model as a progressive alternative to Western capitalism.37 The second, is that the 
theory of ‘state-capitalism’, as introduced by Cliff, has been somewhat self- 
ghettoizing. It was an analysis developed for a practical purpose and has therefore had 
little academic ambition. It served to orient an organization of revolutionary socialists 
away from the dead end of Stalinist apologia, and its theorists, few in number, were 
amply occupied by this task.38 The third, and most theoretically significant, 
explanation for the neglect of this perspective is that, at first glance, this analysis of 
Russia is totally at odds with a classical Marxist understanding of capitalism. A 
‘paradigm shift’, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter, is required. The task 
in the next section, is to explain precisely how C liffs  approach assists in this shift, 
how it develops the classical Marxist tradition we have been examining.
36 See Hobden and Wyn Jones 1997 p. 143. Rosenberg won the prestigious Isaac Deutsher Prize in 
1994.
37 See Callinicos 1990a, pp. 78-79. Callinicos describes how Perry Anderson, and others were 
concerned that a class analysis of the USSR involved an accommodation with Western capitalism. See 
Anderson 1984. The disorientation that this belief has caused should not be underestimated. It is only 
in the last decade, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, that a new generation of academics is 
emerging who do not associate socialism with the centrally planned economies of the twentieth 
century. See Smith and Rupert 2002 for some examples of this recent scholarship in IR.
38 Exceptions can be found in work of Barker, Callinicos and Haynes, but they are few in number.
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6.3 The State Capitalist Answer
It is argued here that there is a clear continuity of thought as we move from the 
insights of Marx and Engels, through the analysis of imperialism outlined by 
Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin, into the understanding of the Soviet Union provided 
by C liffs  theory of state capitalism. C liffs  is an understanding of state ownership and 
control of production as an important phase in the development of a global capitalist 
system. His geographical scope of analysis is global. He views the centralization of 
production in Russia as a response to competition, on an increasing scale, thus 
echoing our thoughts so far on the historical trajectory of capitalism. Finally like 
Bukharin and Lenin, Cliff sees military competition as a form of capitalist 
competition within the context of a global capitalist system. Thus the core dynamic 
persists, the negation of the law of value within the state is on the basis of the law of 
value operating between states through military competition.
We will look briefly at the first two dimensions of C liffs  argument and then 
focus more closely on the third. The argument that military competition can replace 
market competition in transmitting the law of value between states will need further 
specification. Bukharin and Lenin’s important contributions to this discussion, 
introduced in the last chapter, covered only the period up until Lenin’s death. Cliff is 
interested in explaining the core dynamic of Soviet Russia during the Cold War. This 
is a more challenging task given the complete control that Stalin exercised over the 
Soviet economy and the insignificant levels of international trade. Cliff needs to make 
the more difficult case that the internal dynamics of the Soviet Union express the law 
of value despite its planned economy and its restricted access to the global market.
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6.3.1 Geographic scope
Cliff analyses the dynamic of the Russian economy within a global capitalist system. 
Like Bukharin, it is through the prism of the global that he makes sense of the 
national.39 Cliff understands the USSR to be like a factory, a single unit of production, 
a single enterprise, owned and controlled by the state bureaucracy within a world 
system made up of competing units of capital.40 This concept only makes sense within 
the framework of the global, a society containing other such enterprises and states, i.e. 
other units of capital and state capital, with which the Soviet Union competes and 
from which it derives its peculiar internal dynamics. In this sense, Cliff’s theory is 
quintessentially a theory of international relations. Viewed in isolation from world 
capitalism, the USSR cannot be viewed as a capitalist society of any kind. On a global 
scale, however, it can only be understood as capitalist in its nature. As quoted above, 
for Cliff
[w]hen Russia is viewed within the international economy, the basic features 
of capitalism can be discerned: ‘anarchy in the social division of labour and 
despotism in that of the workshop are mutual conditions the one of the 
other.41
Attempts to understand Russia as capitalist, along the lines of a country-model of 
development will fail. Russian state ownership and control of production viewed in 
isolation would represent the exploitation of one class by another, but we would have 
no way of making sense of the dynamic which compels this class to do so -  the 
dynamic of competitive accumulation of capital on a global scale 42 How this dynamic
39 While for a long time Cliff was one of the few theorists to make reference to Bukharin at all, his 
references are relatively few in terms of explicitly drawing out the latter’s analysis. Haynes, however, 
has done much to make the connection between Bukharin’s means of analysis and Cliffs end result. 
See Haynes 1985.
40 See Cliff 1988 and Binns 1987 for more detail.
41 Cliff 1988, pp. 221-222.
42 This is the major limitation of the approach taken by the Johnson Forest Tendency. For a discussion 
of which, see above.
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is transmitted on the basis of the law of value, without an internal wage labour market
and without external price competition, remains to be discussed below. But what is
not in doubt is that, for Cliff, the nature of Russian society can only be understood as
a moment in the uneven development of capitalism on a global scale.
Can a worker's revolution in a backward country isolated by triumphant 
capitalism be anything but a point in the process of development of capitalism 
even if the capitalist class is abolished?43
6.3.2 Historical trajectory
How and why state capitalisms like Russia have emerged, i.e. the historical trajectory
of capitalism, is understood by Cliff in much the same terms as it has been explained
by Bukharin and Lenin, influenced by Hilferding. Russia, for Cliff, is a state
monopoly capitalist formation, along the lines of a capitalist war economy, evolved
through a dialectic of competition and centralization. Centralised control of
production develops in relation to competition with other capitals.
Failing the international spread of socialist revolution, Russia was faced with
the prospect of reassuming its subordinate position within an international division of
labour or attempting to compete with advanced capitalist states. Given its enormous
natural resources, the latter presented itself as a viable option, but it required
considerable centralization and socialization of production in order to begin to match
the capability of large foreign capitals. Stalin’s five year plans allowed Russia to catch
up and compete. As Stalin noted, it did so on pain of extinction.
To slacken the pace (of industrialisation) would mean to lag behind; and 
those who lag behind are beaten. We do not want to be beaten... We are fifty 
or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this 
lag in ten years. Either we do it or they crush us.44
43 Cliff 1988 [1948], p. 164.
44 Deutscher 1966, p. 232.
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Unlike, for instance, Bettleheim, Cliff can acknowledge the full extent of 
coercive control over all aspects of the economy within the Stalinist state because his 
global frame of analysis allows him to continue to recognize competition at the level 
of competing state capitals. The dialectic sense of concentration and competition of 
capital is preserved in the international state capitalist approach.
6.3.3 Core dynamic
We turn now to the most controversial aspect of C liffs  analysis. We are looking for
evidence that the core dynamic of capitalism can be found in relation to the USSR
despite its centrally planned nature and its almost nonexistent international trade. In
other words we are expecting to find the law of value expressed through the social
relations of production of an isolated centrally planned economy.
As argued in Marx’s own writings, and in the writings of Hilferding, Bukharin
and Lenin, as discussed in the chapters above, the dynamic of actually existing
capitalism is such that the negation of the law of value on the basis of the law of value
is a consistent feature. This is the very dynamic of capitalism, this is the process of
self-expansion of capital, rather than a deviation from its course. It is with this
observation that Cliff also begins to build his case. In State Capitalism in Russia he
starts to approach the question of value relations in Russia by considering how the law
of value relates to monopoly formations. He explains that the law of value is altered
by everything from the slightest monopoly advantage to complete state ownership and
control of the means of production.
The law of value assumes the regulation of economic functions in an 
anarchical way. It determines the exchange relations between different 
branches of the economy, and explains how relations between people appear, 
not as direct, crystal clear relations, but indirectly, lost in mysticism. Now the
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law of value holds absolute sway only under conditions of free competition, 
i.e. when there is free movement of capital, commodities and labour power. 
Therefore, even the most elementary forms of monopolistic organisation 
already negate the law of value to a certain extent.45
The distinction between the negation of the law of value by monopoly companies and
its negation by the state, is, for Cliff, a question of degree, not kind and at no point is
the law of value negated entirely. What happens rather, is that the law of value is
partially negated, on the basis o f  the law o f value itself46 This should, by now, sound
familiar as this is exactly the point that Marx was making in his discussion of the
inter-relationship between monopoly and competition, which we looked at in chapter
four of this thesis.47
Like the theorists of the last two chapters, Cliff does not believe that the
partial negation of the law of value frees the economy from the law of value
altogether. Rather the economy as a whole is subordinated to it even more, as
heightened state competition is produced on a global scale. When monopoly power,
state subsidies, or even state ownership allow an enterprise to sell its goods below its
costs of production, it means that total surplus value is distributed in favour of that
enterprise, intensifying conditions of competition elsewhere. Cliff explains the way in
which this logic is inescapable:
The total labour time of society and the total labour time directed to the 
production of the necessities of life of the workers as a whole determine the 
rate of exploitation, the rate of surplus value. The total labour time allotted to 
the production of new means of production determines the rate of 
accumulation. While the price of every commodity does not exactly express 
its value (this did not happen, except accidentally, even under individual 
capitalism) the division of the total product of society among the different 
classes, as also its allotment to accumulation and consumption, is dependent 
on the law of value. Where the state owns all the means of production and the 
workers are exploited while the world economy is as yet disunited and 
atomised, this dependence receives its purest, most direct and absolute 
form.’48
45 Cliff 1988, p. 173.
46 Cliff 1988, p. 212.
47 Marx 1955, p. 132, as referred to in s.4.5.2 above.
48 Cliff 1988, p. 173.
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For Cliff, therefore, the law of value is by no means negated by state 
ownership and control of production. The distinguishing feature of capitalism is 
‘accumulation for accumulation sake’ with the object of standing up to competition.49 
Competition between capitals, the relations between capitalists, is what gives 
capitalism its peculiar dynamism. As long as competition exists, and it does between 
states, as between large monopolies, the law of value will operate, although in a 
modified way. The fact of the size of individual enterprises and their relative sway 
affects which enterprises obtain larger portions of surplus value, but does not affect 
that accumulation is motivated by competition. As Cliff notes, ‘their relations to each 
other in production [still] assume a material character independent of their control and 
conscious individual actions.’50
Cliff applies this analysis of the law of value to Nazi Germany where the state 
controlled much of the production and distribution of goods. In this situation, he 
argues, production is not governed by conscious will, but rather is subject to blind 
economic forces. Decisions about which companies would be awarded contracts, how 
those companies would organise themselves to win contracts, etc. was determined by 
the pressure of competition. It was military competition that increasingly determined 
the division of the total national product between different classes and the distribution 
of labour time between production and consumption. The law of value is understood 
by Cliff to have worked through military competition in this case. It is military 
competition that determines the total quantity of commodities of one kind that will be 
produced compared with commodities of another kind, and therefore, the division of 
total labour time of society among different enterprises.
49 Cliff 1988, p. 180.
50 Cliff quoting Marx, Cliff 1988, p. 211.
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Cliff then extends the logic of this analysis to the Russian case. Russian
society is planned centrally, but like any capitalist enterprise, the division of total
labour time within, is not arbitrary, it is dictated by competition with outside forces.
The rate of exploitation, that is, the ratio between surplus value and wages 
(s/v) does not depend on the arbitrary will of the Stalinist government, but is 
dictated by world capitalism. The same applies to improvements in 
technique... [i.e. the relation between constant capital (machinery, etc) and 
variable capital (wages)]. The same therefore applies to the division of the 
total labour time of Russian society between production of the means of 
production and of means of consumption.51
In the case of the Soviet Union these outside forces are felt, not through 
market mechanisms, but through the pressure of military competition.52 For Cliff 
‘price is not the medium through which Russian production and the division of labour 
in Russian society as a whole are regulated.’53 In this way he makes explicit his 
argument that price competition is not the only means by which the law of value can 
be transmitted.
Cliff is interested in the fundamental meaning of ‘value’ under capitalism. He 
notes that it represents ‘the only expression of the social character of labour in a 
society of independent producers’.54 His argument runs that where the development of 
capitalism has reached a stage where the state plays a role in organizing production, 
including military production, the value of the labour undertaken within each state is 
determined after the fac t of military competition. Social relations are mediated by 
relations between things, in this case military hardware. Independently direct labours 
are ‘systematically compared’ through military competition and the consequences of 
this competition shape the structures and relations of production within the two 
societies. It is in this way that Cliff can argue that ‘the law of value... is the arbiter of
51 Cliff 1988, pp. 221-222.
52 Cliff 1988, p. 222.
53 Cliff 1988, p. 216.
54 Cliff 1988, p. 222.
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the Russian economic structure’ as soon as it is seen in its ‘concrete historical 
situation’.55
It is worth noting, as Cliff does, that he has on his side in this argument, 
official theorists of the centrally planned Soviet economy, themselves, who 
acknowledged in a 1943 journal article that the law of value shaped the economy of 
Russia.56 This article, entitled ‘Some Questions of Teaching Political Economy’ 
represented a complete break with the official analysis in the USSR up to that date. 
The authors claimed that law of value did in fact operate in Russia and, in order to 
explain this, they further asserted that it was not therefore a basic law of capitalism. 
Their logic was that it could obviously be found under socialism, as it existed in the 
USSR! Three volumes of Capital were thus swept aside in respect of the theory of 
socialism, but this major ideological shift allowed those directing the Soviet economy
cn
the space to address value issues in theory and practice.
While greater elaboration of C liffs  theory and its implications are required, 
they are not possible within the bounds of this thesis. Moreover, it is an area of 
Marxist theory that remains significantly underdeveloped. In the next section of this 
chapter we will consider what implications the theory has for our understanding of the 
significance of wage labour under capitalism. But this moves well beyond C liffs  own 
interest in the topic. Here, we will simply briefly consider one of the possible 
consequences of not accepting Cliff’s characterization of ‘centrally planned’ 
economies as ‘state capitalist’, as indeed a majority of Marxist academics would not.
Cliff’s view of value relations as capable of transmission through non-market 
means is one sharply at odds with that taken by most Marxists today. Typical of those
55 Cliff 1988, p. 224.
56 Cliff 1988, pp. 202-203.
571 thank Mike Haynes for this point.
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rejecting the scenario in which military competition transmits the law of value is
Mandel who asserts, as if it were a revealed truth that,
[a]ny rule of the law of value ‘through the intermediary of the world 
market’ has to operate via trade, like anything to do with capitalism.
Enterprises that fail to compete with imported goods are doomed to go 
under. At least two thirds if not more of Soviet enterprises do not 
compete with imperialist enterprises. If they were subject to the law of 
value operating ‘through the intermediary of the world market’ they 
would be doomed to fail.58
Mandel is correct that if Soviet goods were subject to the law of value operating 
‘through the intermediary of the world market’ they would be doomed to fail -  just as 
the goods of a great many countries would be doomed to fail without tariffs. That 
doesn’t mean that they do not form part of the capitalist mode of production on a 
global scale, it simply means that the law of value is nowhere pristine.
If Mandel were correct in his assertion that any capitalist competition has to 
operate via trade, he would have to argue that Britain and Germany were not 
competing capitalist countries during the Second World War or at least that the nature 
of their competition was not capitalist. In this way capitalist competition and state 
competition, i.e. war, are analytically separated and states and markets take up their 
autonomous positions. Weberian eclecticism with all its inherent weaknesses is 
permitted free reign. All of our efforts, thus far in this thesis, have been directed 
precisely toward escaping Weberian eclecticism while still remaining faithful to an 
image of capitalism as it actually exists. Cliff’s analysis, building on the tradition of 
classical Marxism we have been developing, appears to provide a way forward.
58 Mandel 1990, p 47.
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6.4 Beyond Russia
It has been argued above that C liffs  analysis of Russia, more than any other
developed in the post-war period, appears to represent, and even advance, the
alternative tradition of classical Marxism mapped out over the last two chapters.59
However, and what is crucial in terms of the rest of this chapter, is that Cliff himself
did little to elaborate his analysis of Russia into a theory of capitalism or to extend it
to make sense of the pattern of capitalist development in the West.60 In this sense,
C liffs  work represents the most useful link in the chain developing analysis of
capitalism as it actually exists, but it is nevertheless a fairly weak link.61 It may be fair
to suggest that C liffs work, and that of those influenced by his writings, has been
insufficiently self-conscious of the role it may have to play in developing an
alternative tradition of classical Marxism. Mike Haynes makes this point.
In particular, we ourselves have failed to insist on the central issue-namely 
that state capitalism is not an analysis of Eastern Europe but an analysis of 
capitalism in general of which these societies are a part. To the extent that 
state capitalism has been presented as a theory of Eastern Europe it has 
contributed to the more general growth of theories based on ‘exceptionalism’ 
which hive off parts of the world and try and explain them ‘in their own 
terms’.62
Derek Howl, too, notes that many critics have missed the point that ‘[a]t issue 
is not only how the USSR and Eastern Europe should be characterised, but also how 
the concepts of Marx’s Capital should be applied.’63
59 Cliffs analysis may be seen to advance the theory of capitalism we have been developing in that he 
tests it at an extreme by applying it to post-war Russia, a ‘centrally planned economy’ with few market 
relations with capitalist countries elsewhere.
60 He did, however, extend his analysis to attempt to explain third world revolutions in China, Algeria 
and Cuba. See Cliff 1962.
61 Cliffs position, outside academia, has meant that some of his insights and those of his supporters 
have been rather haphazardly related to academic debates over the nature of capitalism.
62 Binns and Haynes 1980, p. 34.
63 Howl 1990, p. 89.
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Taking these concerns seriously, there are two tasks which this section of the 
chapter will undertake. The first is to consider how the theory of state capitalism 
might alter our analysis of capitalism in general, in theoretical terms, beyond its 
application to Russia, and the second is to extend its insights to an analysis of 
capitalism as it exists throughout the world, geographically ‘beyond Russia’. Given 
that we have been shaping our alternative tradition of classical Marxism in contrast to 
the ‘volume one’ variety, we shall focus first on how the hallmark of volume one 
Marxism: free wage labour, accords with the theory of state capitalism. Then, we shall 
consider how a state capitalist analysis might help us to understand the high levels of 
state ownership and control of production in the West, during the Cold War.
6.4.1 State Capitalism and Free Wage Labour
One of the most significant sources of misunderstanding for those trying to make 
sense of Cliff’s theory of state-capitalism is the role of wage labour in the functioning 
of the law of value. We look at it here, given the theoretical significance of ‘free wage 
labour’ for the volume one theorists. For these theorists, it is the abstraction of the 
state from the process of surplus production which defines capitalism because it is 
this that allows labour to be commodified, i.e. to become ‘free wage labour’. It is the 
expropriation and commodification of the labourer which, for them, defines the 
capitalist system.
It is argued by Cliff, contre Bettelehim, that there was no internal market for 
labour in the USSR and only one employer, the state. In this way, the Soviet economy 
falls outside Marx’s understanding of commodified labour power in terms of the 
worker’s ‘periodic sale of himself, by his change of masters, and by the oscillations in
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the market price of labour’.64 As Cliff notes, in the USSR ‘a “change of masters” is 
impossible and the “periodic sale of him self’ becomes a formality’ .65 How then can 
the USSR be said to be capitalist when it is commodified labour which creates surplus 
value and the competitive accumulation of value which defines the capitalist system? 
Marx’s comments on the subject are far from ambiguous: ‘[cjapital presupposes wage 
labour; wage-labour presupposes capital. They reciprocally condition each other; they 
reciprocally bring forth each other.’66
In an article published in 1980, Binns and Haynes first tackled the question of 
how Cliff’s analysis might relate to Marx’s category of wage labour. They argued that 
wage labour in the formal sense in which Marx described it, could not be found in the 
USSR. By this they meant, following Cliff, that labour power was not a commodity in
f»7Russia because there was not a market for it. They then cited approvingly Carlo’s 
idea that ‘wage labour is not necessary for capital.’ The truth of this claim was 
demonstrated for Binns and Haynes by the fact that in the American slave south, for 
instance, free wage labour did not exist and yet that system of production was clearly 
subordinate to a broader capitalist mode of production into which it fed. Moreover, 
they note, it was Marx who said: ‘not only do we call the plantation owners in 
America capitalists, but they are capitalists’.69
The dynamic of slave production in the US, its pace and its intensity, was set 
by the needs of a global capitalist mode of production. Binns and Haynes point out 
that the difference between the systematic subordination of labour in the US cotton 
fields and the character of exploitation in pre-capitalist slave societies, is significant
64 Marx 1976, p. 663.
65 Cliff 1988, pp. 219-220. Cliff notes that there do exist in the USSR ‘oscillations in the market price 
of labour’ but that ‘total real wages are directly fixed by the state’.
66 Marx 1847.
67 See Binns and Haynes 1980, p. 29.
68 Binns and Haynes 1980, p. 29 citing Carlo 1974.
69 Binns and Haynes 1980, p. 23, citing Marx 1977, p. 513.
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enough to suggest that looking at a simple, local, labour relation is not an adequate 
basis for determining the overriding social relations of production. Banaji, who 
Haynes invokes in a reply to his critics, accounts for the complexity of the situation in 
the following way: ‘[i]n short, the slave plantations were capitalist enterprises of a 
patriarchal and feudal character producing absolute surplus value on the basis of slave 
labour and a monopoly of land.’70 In this way he acknowledges that the labour 
relation does not have to be freely-waged, in order for the systematic exploitation of 
capitalism to work through it.71
In an appendix to their paper, Binns and Haynes do more to flesh out the 
theoretical justification for the claim that surplus value can be produced even if the 
labour that creates it is not freely-waged. To make this argument they separate out 
two conceptually distinct moments in the creation of surplus value: ‘the production of 
surpluses and the valorisation of these surpluses in the form of surplus value.’ The 
two processes, they note, can be separated in time and space. In fact, one often 
happens without the other. A good produced, which does not get sold, does not 
produce profit -  the surplus contained within it is not realised as surplus value. In 
other words, there is a ‘capital-positing moment’ and a ‘capital-realising moment’. 
Binns and Haynes argue that non-wage labour can be capital positing, but it is only 
through freely-waged labour that capital, or surplus value, can be realised or 
valorised. The process of valorisation is the process through which a good produced is 
systematically compared with other goods, usually through the price mechanisms of
70 Banaji, 1977, p. 17. See also Banaji 2003.
71 A far less satisfactory formulation, in my view, is provided by Robert Mies, who refers, for instance, 
to ‘a slave mode of production’ in South Africa existing along side a capitalist mode of production in 
other countries. This image ignores that fact that the capitalist mode o f production was global and 
whatever the nature of local labour relations in South Africa, that society formed part of a global 
capitalist division of labour in which the dynamic of capital accumulation was dominant. Mies 1987, 
pp. 215-217.
Binns and Haynes 1980, p. 46.
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the market, in order to determine whether it contains more or less socially necessary 
labour time. Socially necessary labour time is expressed in the price which the good 
exchanges for in the market if it is more than the cost of the labour power that went 
into it, surplus value is produced. This is the law of value which is the basis of the 
self-expansion of capital.73
What Binns and Haynes argue is that surplus can be produced from non-wage 
forms of labour and then, through exchange with commodities (based on wage labour) 
become valorised with respect to all other commodities. Speaking this time about 
Russian serfdom and the way in which peasant-produced wheat and cotton comprised 
part of the capitalist mode of production on a global scale, they say, ‘the surplus 
products become surplus values and their owners become capitalists. But the workers 
who produced them did not thereby become wage-labourers.’74
We can see from this that it was misleading of Binns and Haynes to have 
suggested that ‘wage labour is not necessary for capital’. This was a misstatement 
which they correct in a later piece by saying that ‘capitalism cannot exist without 
forms of wage labour’.75 They add that ‘the concept of wage labour is not a self- 
evident one’ and ‘the forms of wage labour that do exist can only be analysed if we 
have a prior appreciation of the nature of value and capital and the way their 
domination works through a particular society’. It seems they would acknowledge 
that it is only with generalised commodification of labour power that capitalism can 
be understood to exist. This does not mean however that non-commodified labour 
cannot posit surplus which produces surplus value in the course, for instance, of
73 In the case of the USSR, SNLT is expressed in the equivalent arms it exchanges for. We see here 
very clearly how capitalism works ex post facto, the characterization of the USSR’s goods as 
commodities comes from systematic comparison with the west through arms competition.
74 Binns and Haynes 1980, p. 46.
75 Haynes 1982, p. 3.
76 Haynes 1982, p. 3.
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exchange on the market. More to the point, the nature of non-commodified labour in a
system of generalized commodity production cannot be understood in isolation.
What is required for this analysis to apply to the USSR, is that within the
context of generalised commodification of labour power on a global scale, the
surplus-produced under the authority of a single employer, the state, on a non-wage
basis, is somehow valorised through exchange with commodities produced elsewhere
in the world. In other words, ‘the surplus products become surplus values and state
bureaucrats become capitalists, without the workers themselves being wage
labourers’. But how is this surplus valorised? What Binns and Haynes argue, in line
with Cliff, is that military competition can substitute for market competition in the
case of competition between state capitals. What is important is that goods should be
‘systematically compared’. This is the argument for the transmission of the law of
value through military competition that we have already introduced.
In a useful critique of Binns and Haynes, from within the same tradition, Alex
Callinicos responded to their argument by accepting the transmission scenario, but
only on the basis of wage labour within Russia itself. In his response Callinicos was
attempting to reassert the ‘essential connection between wage labour and the capitalist
mode of production’.77 In so doing, he relied upon an aspect of the definition of
capitalism favoured by the volume one theorists discussed in chapter three.
The distinction between wage-labour and the two other (class) modes of 
production which I shall discuss here, slavery and feudalism, is that the 
extraction of surplus-labour through the wage form depends primarily on 
economic compulsion rather than physical coercion. The wage labourer 
possesses no property other than his or her labour power.78
Yet unlike volume one theorists, Callinicos would not claim that the state 
ownership of the means of production in the USSR, qualified its exclusive nature vis a
77 Callinicos 1980, p. 97.
78 Callinicos 1980, p. 99.
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vis the producers. In the USSR labourers possessed no property other than their labour 
power. He has no illusions in the ‘public’ nature of state ownership, therefore the 
separation exists, and he is half way to finding wage labour in Russia. Unfortunately 
the other half involves finding dependence on economic compulsion rather than 
physical coercion. He cannot find such a freely-waged labour in the USSR, but then 
he notes this ‘ideal type’ does not, in fact, exist elsewhere.
Callinicos contribution highlights the problematic nature of assumptions about 
free wage labour throughout the capitalist world and throughout the history of 
capitalism. The idea that in order for labour to be considered capitalist, labourers must 
be individually bought and sold freely on a market, motivated by economic 
compulsion alone, leaves out a great deal of the labour which has contributed to the 
development of the capitalist mode of production on a global scale, and continues to 
do so. How, for instance, do we understand the planned allocation of labour in a 
western war economy? Do we really want to be left with a situation where Britain 
between 1910 and 1950 was capitalist, non-capitalist, capitalist, non-capitalist, and 
then capitalist again? During the second World War, was the US Navy, recruiting on a 
voluntary basis, more capitalist than the army, using the compulsory draft system?79 
Are we really going to say that the use of Nazi slave labour was not part of the 
development of German capitalism?
In fact, when looked at closely, throughout most of the history of capitalism, 
peacetime or war, the wage labour market is a complex phenomenon in which 
physical coercion has replaced economic compulsion wherever necessary. This was a 
process that has historically lasted a lot longer than primitive accumulation, i.e. the 
expropriation of the peasantry from the land. Vagabondage in Victorian England was
79 Joseph 1943, p. 4.
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punished by physical violence, beatings and draggings through the streets.80 Work 
houses were established for no other reason than to force labour. More recently, 
workfare, reductions in welfare, and the criminalisation of poverty, punishable by 
prison, all serve to promote the extraction of surplus in a coercive way. The ILO 
recently reported that, ‘[fjorced labour, slavery and criminal trafficking in human 
beings - especially women and children - are on the rise worldwide and taking new 
and insidious forms.’81 How much of actually existing capitalism do we lose if we 
stick to our formal definition of free wage labour?
To what extent can we take seriously the volume one theorists objection that 
capitalist labour must be the product of economic compulsion not physical coercion? 
We quoted Rosenberg explaining in Chapter Three of this thesis that capitalism 
‘sometimes takes bayonets and tear gas to drive workers into factories’.82 For him, 
these labour relations were nevertheless capitalist because the factories, Hyundai and 
Samsung corporations, were not state-owned. Focused on making the point about 
state versus private ownership, he seems relatively unconcerned in this case about the 
direct physical coercion involved in the abstraction of surplus value.
To conclude on this issue, the assumption that there needs to be freely-waged 
labour within the USSR in order for its internal dynamics to be viewed as capitalist, 
stems from the kind of country model of the development of capitalism against which 
we have argued from the start. It is this method of theorising capitalism which so 
distorted our understanding of the nature of the Eastern bloc during the Cold War and 
did nothing to aid our understanding of the West. Haynes warned in the early 1980s, 
that we did not want to end up with:
80 See, for instance, Hufton 1972 and McMullan 1984.
81 ILO 2001a.
82 Rosenberg 1994, footnote 2, p. 198.
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the erection of a multiplicity of differing modes of production which 
coexist with one another. When the discussion of Russia will be the 
discussion of a special case and it will rest on trite questions about 
whether there is a 49% capitalist labour market there -  in which case it is 
non-capitalist or if there is a 51% capitalist labour market there in which 
case it is capitalist.. ..’83
Yet, if the study of International Relations is anything to go by, that is 
precisely the kind of analysis of the Cold War we had, adopted in some form or 
another by an alarming number of Marxists. The logic of the categorization of 
‘capitalist’, ‘other-than-capitalism’, and ‘mixed’ economies is precisely one of ideal 
types related to country models of development. It is fundamentally at odds with our 
alternative tradition of classical Marxism.
6.4.2 The Nationalisation Revolution on a Global Scale
We now turn to the question of the significance of nationalization of production in the 
rest of the world following the Second World War. Haynes makes the point that the 
distinction between ‘centrally planned’ economies and others was by no means 
straightforward.
Although the nominally ‘socialist’ nations (Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland,
USSR and Yugoslavia) show a greater average degree of public ownership 
than the nominally “capitalist” nations, the range among nations with the 
same nominal system is sometimes greater than the difference between the 
average for the two systems. Indeed several ‘capitalist’ nations have a higher 
labour share in the public sector than Yugoslavia.. .84
One of the features of the world economy after 1945 was large public sectors 
and high levels of state ownership and control of production. In Britain, for instance, 
important sectors of the economy were nationalized in the 1940s, including steel, 
electricity, coal, and the railways.85 The National Health Service and the modem
83 Haynes 1980, p. 29.
84 Haynes 1980, p. 30.
85 Shepherd 1976, p. 5.
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system of comprehensive schooling were also initiated. A similar process took place 
in France, Germany, Italy and Japan, in as much as post-war reconstruction in all 
these countries involved a strong state, planning economic recovery and development. 
In the so-called developing world, newly independent states, no longer dominated by 
what was now dramatically weakened European capital, and lacking strong 
indigenous bourgeoisies of their own, also adapted to the idea of state-led 
development. The United States, for its part, while not planning its domestic economy
Q /r
as a whole, owned and controlled a vast sector of production in the military sphere. 
Defense contracts played an enormous role in the shaping of the US economy after 
1945.
The historian, Eric Hobsbawm, notes that this kind of state ownership and
control of production was a feature throughout the post-war world.
Western constitutional capitalism, communist systems, and the third world... 
were virtually all states which deliberately and actively, rejected the 
supremacy of the market and believed in the active management and planning 
of the state... Capitalist governments were convinced that only economic 
interventionism could prevent a return to the economic catastrophes between 
the wars... Third World countries believed that only public action could lift 
their economies out of backwardness and dependency. 7 
It is from the starting point of the state’s significant post-war role that the entire
characterization of the ‘retreat of the state’ in the globalisation literature is
understood. It is important therefore, that we understand it, and it is suggested here
that it may have been misunderstood by the theorists of state capitalism, following
Cliff.
The first systematic attempt to apply the theory of state capitalism to the West
QQ
was Mike Kidron’s Western Capitalism Since the War. Kidron had been a close
86 Harris 1983, p. 38. Between 1949 and 1953, in the space of only four years, US military production 
increased from an annual figure of $13 billion to $50 billion. The US federal and state government was, 
and continues to be, the largest employer in the country, with Wal-Mart a close second.
87 Hobsbawm 1994, pp. 177-177.
88 Kidron 1968.
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collaborator of Cliff’s and had done much to shape the original theory of state 
capitalism as applied to the Soviet Union.89 His application of the theory to the West 
began with the promising statement that ‘western capitalism, the outgrowth of the 
original private enterprise model, cannot be understood except in terms of the world 
system, and particularly in terms of its competitive relations with state capitalism’.90
From this statement, we might assume, following on from Hilferding’s 
analysis of the dialectic between competition and centralization of capital, that we 
would find in Kidron a recognition of the extent to which capitalist production in the 
West was coordinated on a ‘bloc scale’ in order to compete with the East under the 
direction of the USSR. This was something which Bukharin had predicted: a stage 
beyond nation-state capitalism. We could imagine that the great merit of Cliff’s 
approach, was that it could acknowledge a high degree of planning in the West in 
terms of international economic organizations like the OECD, IMF, World Bank and 
GATT and even military organizations like NATO, without it appearing that 
capitalism, per se was becoming any less competitive, or anarchical, because 
competition continued at the bloc level, militarily.
What we find instead with Kidron is a model of the West in which Western 
capitalist countries are seen to have a relationship with one another like the 
relationship between the two blocs, i.e. orderly within, and anarchical between. On 
the evidence of high levels of state planning and nationalization of production in the 
post-war West, he claims,
[w]hile the planlessness, or competitiveness, or ‘anarchy of production’
within each national sphere has been tempered by government intervention,
89 Kidron and Cliff also developed a theory of the ‘permanent arms economy’ to explain the stability of 
the Soviet system and, later, the post-war boom in the West. The basic gist of that argument was that 
the production of arms slowed the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, as these means of destruction 
did not re-enter the cycle of production. This is a complicated argument that will not be addressed in 
this thesis. See Kidron 1968. See Callinicos 1990, pp. 81-86 for a brief account of the theory.
90 Kidron 1968, p. 9.
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so that spontaneous decisions of individual capitals are to some extent pre­
ordained by decisions covering a wider sphere, anarchy remains very nearly 
absolute internationally.91
Kidron’s is a model of planning within and ‘very nearly absolute’ anarchy 
between western capitalist states in the post-war world, countries like Germany, 
France and Japan. Yet, inter-state relations of the 1950s are nothing like those of the 
1930s when economic anarchy between these competing imperial powers, culminated 
in two world wars.92 The novelty of the post-war period stems precisely from the fact 
that after these wars, the economies of France, Germany and Japan, for example, were 
to a large extent, organised on a bloc scale. This began with lend lease during the war 
and continued with the Marshall Plan and the economic architecture of Bretton 
Woods. Economically and militarily we see an unprecedented period of coordination 
of national economies within the West. There was a degree of planning within the 
Western bloc, as we might expect from our analysis thus far, in relation to anarchy 
between the two blocs: East and West.93
So why would Kidron be tempted to describe the post-war West in terms of 
‘unrestrained economic competition between independent economies’?94 Why when 
presented with the more plausible image of East and West as two enormous empires, 
within which nation-states jostled for position, would he claim ‘[t]here are no empires 
left. There are only independent states more or less powerful militarily and 
economically, with more or less integrated and secure ruling classes?’95
91 Kidron 1968, p. 56.
92 Or as Harris, better explains it, nineteenth century capitalism which culminated in two world wars, 
was ‘economically a much more national one than that which exists today, or rather, an imperial one, 
for the dominant powers each controlled geographic areas beyond their frontiers. Harris 1983, p. 33-34.
93 Our analysis so far has indicated that anarchy and planning mutually condition each other. The 
dialectic of competition and centralization continues. This is not to suggest that planning within the 
blocs is total and no competing interests on a nation state level exist, but simply that we should expect 
a degree of coordination in relation to the competition faced outside, and in fact we do find that 
historically.
94 Kidron 1968, p. 64.
95 Kidron 1977, p. 4.
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It is suggested here that the reason for Kidron seeing anarchy between nation­
states in the West, was that he saw planning within nation-states in the form of state 
ownership and control of production. The problem is that Kidron has looked at the 
form  of nationalization without sufficiently considering its content. Certainly we do 
see widespread nation-state level ownership and control of production in the post-war 
period, this is what the ‘nationalisation revolution’ represents, but the content of that 
planning and production is such that it cannot be understood to be independent of that 
going on in other states of the Western bloc. There was an international division of 
labour on a bloc scale and bloc level finance capital to accompany it. Capital 
accumulation in the post-war world appears to have been organized, through various 
international organizations and projects, on the scale of the bloc, not the nation.
That this post-nation-state model of capitalism might be adopted by those who 
subscribe to a state-capitalist theory of the USSR seemed possible when, in 1977, 
Chris Harman suggested that Kidron had overstated one feature of post-war 
capitalism at the expense of another.96 Harman argued:
The trend is towards state capitalism, towards the complete merger of 
individual capitals in each country with the national state. But the trend is 
also to the internationalization of production: the most modem techniques are 
developed on an international scale; the resources for participation in key 
industries like chemicals, aerospace, computers, and increasingly, motors can 
be obtained by pooling the resources of more than one country.97
Not only does he acknowledge the internationalization of production in the 
Western bloc, but Harman points to financial integration, a new form of finance 
capital brought about by the power of Western, ‘and particularly American’ banks. He 
notes that, ‘the banks are able to exploit the existence of a world market to deploy 
resources on an international scale, to move funds across national frontiers and back
96 Harman 1977.
97 Harman 1977, p. 10.
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no
again, leaving national governments helpless and bemused.’ In this he seems to be 
acknowledging the way in which transnational organization of production was taking 
place through the discipline of multinational, mainly US, banks. Yet later in the same 
article he asserts uncritically that ‘each national capital competes both economically 
and militarily’.99 He credits Lenin and Bukharin with this insight. He does not 
consider the fact that this may have been a feature of capitalism in their time, which 
has now, to some degree, been superseded.
Several years after Harman’s response to Kidron, Nigel Harris, another 
theorist influenced by Cliff, wrote a book entitled O f Bread and Guns: The World 
Economy in Crisis in which he declared ‘the end of capitalism in one country’.100 His 
argument was understood to represent the antithesis of the argument made by Kidron 
in the 1960s.101 Harris was arguing that despite the appearance of increasing state 
control over national economies in the form of Keynesianism interventionism, 
nationalized production and the ‘managed economy’, ‘the state as an economy agency
i  mwas becoming increasingly obsolete’. Harris’ argument was that the international 
economy within the Western bloc was so integrated that it was impossible for states to 
solve their own domestic crises in terms of overproduction and unemployment, 
without damaging the world system and thereby their own ‘domestic economy’.
Harris argument, which was flawed in certain important respects,103 had the 
merit of once again drawing the attention of post-war theorists of nation-state 
capitalism to the fact that capitalism was organising beyond the level of the nation­
98 Harman 1977, p. 10.
99 Harman 1977, p. 11.
100 Harris 1983, p. 237.
101 Green 1983, p. 94 ‘he has adopted the diametrically opposite position to Kidron -  the world market 
is all, the states are obsolete.’
102 Harris 1983, pp. 67-68.
103 Significantly, in attempting to show that the nation-state could not control internationally organised 
capital, Harris falls into the globalisation literature’s trap of separating the dynamic of capital 
accumulation from a supposedly separate state, or interstate, dynamic. See Green 1983 for this critique 
of Harris.
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state. In this way it seemed to confirm and extend Harman’s critique of Kidron. 
However, Harris’s critics argued that he had gone too far. Pete Green argued that 
Harris had overstated the internationalization of capital. Green preferred Harman’s 
writings at the time with their ‘repeated emphasis on a world of “competing state 
capitals’” .104 Green argued ‘what is missing from [Haris’] account is the role of the 
state as an agent of capital accumulation not just “the state and capital”, but the “state 
as capital”.’105
The ‘state as capital’ argument is associated chiefly with the writings of Colin 
Barker, another theorist influenced by Cliff’s work.106 It was this phrase which 
represented Barker’s major contribution to the state debate of the 1970s. He argued 
that the state could not be analysed in the singular. Following the kind of alternative 
tradition of classical Marxism we have been mapping, they argued that capitalism 
from its beginning presupposed a world market. From this Barker claimed that ‘the 
state form within the capitalist mode of production is... a system of national states 
whose relations with each other are antagonistic.’107 ‘When we talk of the capitalist 
state, we always mean the nation-state, or rather the nation-state system.’108
Evident in Barker’s work, is the idea that the nationalization of capital is an 
ever present tendency which exists in a dialectical relationship with the tendency to 
the internationalization of capital.109 This is similar to Bukharin’s understanding of 
the nation-state as a unit for the organization of capital accumulation except that 
Bukharin saw this as a historical moment which would pass as capitalism developed
104 Green 1983, p. 84.
105 Green 1983, p. 99. While Green was right to insist that Harris not separate the motives of capital 
from those of the state, he is wrong in so far as he identifies ‘state-capitalism’ in the post-war world 
with the boundaries of individual countries.
106 Barker 1978, reprinted in Clarke 1991.
107 Barker 1978, pp. 18-19.
108 Barker 1978, p. 19.
109 See especially Harman 1991. In this article, Harman brings up to date the IS position, critiquing 
both Kidron and Harris. His views on the internationalisation of capital post-1970 will be discussed in 
the next chapter.
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to a higher stage. There was nothing essential about the nation-state for Bukharin, 
there was just global capitalism which produced within it increasing scales of 
organization for competition. That nation-state was one of those.
Capitalism, in the post-war period, described by the theorists of state 
capitalism, in terms similar to those used by Bukharin, had actually progressed to a 
stage beyond that which was in existence when Bukharin was alive. The theorists of 
state capitalism in the post-war world, lived to see the bloc capitalist formations he 
predicted, but failed to recognize them. Or rather, they recognized the significance of 
bloc capitalism in terms of military competition between East and West, but did not, 
following the logic of their own analysis, sufficiently modify their image of market 
competition within the Western bloc.
The reason why the discussion of national ownership and production at the 
start of this section is of interest is because it is this activity which lent support to the 
state capitalist theorists’ image of Western states as nationally-organised units of 
capital accumulation involved in inter-state capitalist competition in market terms.110 
We have on the one hand the USSR as a ‘state capitalist’ competing militarily with 
the West as a bloc and, on the other hand, market competition between nation-‘states 
as capital’ within the Western bloc. That this is not an accurate image, and that it is 
flawed on the basis o f the very logic to which these theorists subscribe, remains to be 
explained in more detail below.
110 See for instance Barker’s emphasis on this in Clarke 1991, pp. 33-36.
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6.5 Beyond State Capitalism
The implication of the theory of bloc capitalism introduced above, is that the 
‘nationalization revolution’ of the 1940s and 50s was not about the independent 
strength of the nation-state. In fact the ‘nationalization revolution’ of the post-war 
period was merely a step in the process of strengthening capital on a bloc scale, 
already beyond the level of the nation-state. In making this argument below, we will 
be drawing on those theorists who have taken the formation of bloc capitalism 
seriously. In particular, Kees van der Pijl and Peter Gowan have usefully drawn 
attention to this feature of the post-war world.111 Van der Pijl has looked at 
transnational class formation in the post-war West and Gowan has looked at US dollar 
hegemony in the Western bloc. Neither of these theorists are subscribers to C liffs 
analysis of the USSR, but, and rather, both give due consideration to the actual 
appearance of capitalism in the West post-war.
What will be argued below is that the post war world is not, in fact, best 
characterized in terms of competing state capitalisms, where those states are 
understood to be on the scale of the nation-state. The logical extension and application 
of our alternative tradition of classical Marxism leads us beyond ‘state capitalism’ in 
the sense of ‘nation-state capitalism’ to ‘bloc capitalism’ in the sense of ‘transnational 
capitalism’. To make this argument, we revert once again to our three dimensions of 
capitalism in terms of its geographic scope, historical trajectory and core dynamic. 
We shall argue here that in all three dimensions, a ‘bloc capitalist’ approach is 
superior to what appears to be the ‘nation state-capitalist’ analysis of theorists 
following on from C liffs  analysis of Russia.
111 Pijl 1984; Gowan 1999.
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6.5.1 Geographic Scope
For Bukharin, it was not the development of capitalism within individual countries 
that produced state-capitalist blocs, it was the dynamics of capital accumulation on a 
global scale that gave rise to the imperialist state. The aggressive militaristic 
economically protectionist imperialist state was a reaction to global capitalism. The 
global dimension of capitalism is considered to be analytically prior and no sub unit 
of capitalism, whether the individual, the corporation, the joint stock company, the 
cartel, or, we should now add, the nation-state should be fetishised or naturalized. 
Capitalism in its global reach produces the variety of forms of organization which 
historically have competed. Capitalism is revolutionary and its forms are constantly 
changing.
The Second World War epitomized capitalist competition on a global scale in 
its arch-imperialist phase. The intensity of competition at this time was so incredible, 
and the scale of what was at stake so great, that all engaged forces gathered behind 
one of two possible contenders: the Allied and the Axis powers. At this point, during 
the war, the world was already divided in what were essentially two capitalist blocs. 
They coordinated their actions and resources as blocs locked in competition to the 
death (or rather the millions of deaths of their respective populations). The 
Allied/Axis competitive blocs then became Cold War competitive blocs according to 
the division of spoils between those left standing, the US and the USSR. The Iron 
Curtain marked the boundary of their respective ‘spheres of influence’.
Van der Pijl vividly describes how already after World War One the potential 
for organizing an empire beyond the size of those currently in existence was very real.
When the defeat of the central powers cut down German imperialism to size,
and the Russian Revolution struck two decades of capital investment from the
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books of the French and Belgian capitalists, the Atlantic circuit, with Britain 
now a debtor of America, could serve as a viable launching ground for an 
experiment in ultra-imperialism.112
The universalism of Wilson was an attempt at such a project, a revised version 
of which would not emerge until after the Second World War. An ultra-imperialist 
power, a ‘superpower’, did emerge after 1945, and it emerged on the basis of, in 
reaction to, developments at the global level, crisis and war.
What is important to remember in terms of the geographical scope of ‘actually 
existing capital’ is that the society of capital is global. Total social capital operates on 
a world scale. We warned in chapter four of this thesis against drawing the borders of 
the society of capital in an a priori fashion. The dynamics of capital accumulation on 
a global scale bring forth different scales of organization. To assume, as the theorists 
of the ‘nation-state as capital’, and as we have already noted the ‘volume one’ 
theorists, do that the borders of nation-states are somehow of transhistorical 
significance (within the history of capitalism) is at odds with our understanding of the 
development of actually existing capitalism on a global scale.113
This is not to suggest that the differentiation of states within blocs is 
insignificant. It is not. Nor should we forget that during the Cold War certain states 
appear to fall outside either bloc, or to enter and exit blocs at different points in time. 
The process of organization within blocs is never complete, nor should we expect it to 
be. Capitalism develops unevenly and necessarily so. We will look at this again in the 
next chapter, when we make the case that ‘beyond bloc capitalism’ by no means 
suggests beyond unevenness and conflict. Having extricated the best from Hilferding 
through Bukharin, we are under no illusion about ‘organised capitalism’. In absolute 
terms, it is a contradiction. What we are getting at here is that in the post-war period
112 Pijl 1984, p. 56.
113 This criticism has also been made by Robinson with reference to Ellen Wood’s work. Robinson 
however traces this flawed technique to Marx, where I have not. Robinson 2000.
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we can recognize a degree of planning and coordination on a supranational scale, 
roughly corresponding to Cold W ar blocs, which is not insignificant, and which if our 
alternative tradition of classical Marxism has been on the right track, we should 
expect.
The context for developing a theory of bloc capitalism at present is that we 
have, on the one hand, theorists of state capitalism who are theoretically stuck on the 
nation-state and, on the other hand, theorists like van der Pijl and Gowan, who have 
moved beyond the nation-state, but have not done so on the basis of the alternative 
tradition of classical Marxism we have been attempting to recover. One of the 
limitations of the method of the latter group is that the coordinated transnational 
response they describe is not understood to have developed in response to capitalist 
competition between East and West. For them the ‘centrally-planned’ economies were 
not capitalist, therefore capitalism elsewhere, is capitalism full stop. What this means 
is that Western bloc capitalism has been analysed as a whole, not a part. It is perhaps 
for this reason that van der Pijl, for instance, places such significance on ideology or 
the acts of individuals in accounting for the trend towards unification of capitalist 
class interests. He does not see Cold War competition as capitalist competition and 
does not therefore interpret the unification of interests in the West in terms of the 
historical trajectory of concentration and competition of capital on an increasing 
scale.114
114 Although this is not true in so far as he does recognise the role of ‘contender states’ in shaping 
social relations within states in the West. The problem with this however is that it is still not capitalist 
competition at work, which leaves him vulnerable to a Weberian separation of state and market.
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6.5.2 Historical Trajectory
The question of the historical trajectory of capitalism is key to our discussion of 
whether the post-war period is best described in terms of state or bloc capitalism. In 
making the argument for the reinterpretation of post-war nation-state capitalism as 
bloc capitalism, what we are talking about is a reevaluation of the scale of 
organization of production. In our previous discussions of historical trajectory we 
have been looking at how competition leads to concentration of capital on ever- 
increasing scales. Capitalism reaches the level of ‘socialized’ bloc capitals only after 
competition in the form of inter-imperialist war. It is at this point that capital 
accumulation is organized, or socialized, on an ultra-imperialist or bloc level.
Hilferding’s definition of imperialism involved the creation of the largest 
possible economic territory, protected against foreign competition by tariff walls, in 
order to be an area of exploitation for national monopoly companies. The United 
States, as an imperial power in its own right, came into the Second World War, under 
the assumption that such a prize would be won. The USSR which lost between 10 and 
20 per cent of its total population in the war, felt equally deserving of reward.115 Their 
strengths at this time were reasonably balanced, and perhaps more to the point, neither 
had the resources to exercise influence over the world as a whole. They each gained 
enormous ‘economic territories’ protected not merely by tariff walls, but by actual 
walls of brick, and stockpiles of weaponry. These were areas of exploitation for the 
national monopoly companies of the US and the USSR.
Focussing on developments in the West, the US feared another depression on 
the scale it had experienced in the interwar period. It therefore needed external
115 Hobsbawm makes this point quite clearly. Hobsbawm 1994, p. 43. See Haynes 2003 on the Soviet 
death toll.
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markets for its manufactured goods and it needed to get US dollars into European 
hands.116 The Marshall Plan, following on from lend-lease arrangements during the 
war,117 began this process.118 What is often overlooked is the fact that the Marshall 
Plan granted aid on the condition that European countries coordinated their needs and 
submitted a joint proposal. This was done so as to rationalize the industrial 
organisation of production within Europe and to make it compatible with the US.119 
Van der Pijl refers to international integration as a mode of socialization of capital. 
What he means by socialization, or Vergesellschaftung, is the ‘planned 
interdependence... of functionally divided social activity’.
A structure of socialization is needed because:
[a]s production becomes more complex, the supply of these elements [land, 
labour, and money], which the discipline of the market presumes are 
forthcoming by the same mechanisms as other commodities, has to be 
safeguarded by certain interventions meant to curb the destructive effects on 
the social and natural substratum of the market economy (as well as on its 
monetary system).120
Why does production become more complex? Van der Pijl does not provide 
this answer, but we know that technological innovation under capitalism results from 
the pressure to compete. The pressure to compete at this level at this point in history,
116 See Kolko 1969, pp. 252-253. He quotes the US State Department saying ‘trade cooperation will 
help us a great deal... We’ve got to plan on enormously increased production in this country after the 
war and the American domestic market can’t absorb all that production indefinitely. There won’t be 
any question about us needing greatly increased foreign markets.’
117 Although the crucial difference between the two being that one was a gift and the other was a loan 
to be repaid. See Kolko 1969, pp. 490-492.
118 See Pijl 1984, p. 28 on the significance of the Marshall Plan to establishing transatlantic class 
relations.
119 First hand reports from the Marshall Plan archives include the following: ‘most people I knew felt 
that the generosity of Americans was a self-serving one, in the sense that they thought of Europe as an 
outlet for their goods, as a market to export stuff and we thought that we could see that in the types of 
thing that they wanted us to buy with the money that they lent us. And we were very skeptical about the 
disinterested motives of the Marshall Plans and we even thought that in some areas they were trying to 
prevent French industry from building up again in order to export some of their goods and some of 
their stuff to Europe.’
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-3/debouzyl.html
120 Pijl 1998, p. 15.
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comes from capitalist inter-bloc competition, a level of capitalist competition, which
van der Pijl, not following C liffs  analysis, would not recognize as such.121
Despite these differences in analysis, van der Pijl does accurately capture the
way in which, through the Marshall Plan and other strategies, capital accumulation
was reorganized on a transatlantic scale.
Through recurrent offensives of the US and concomitant accelerations of the 
internationalization of finance capital, a restructuration of Atlantic class 
relations was brought about which ultimately eliminated the lag hitherto 
separating the pattern of capital accumulation and internationalization in 
Europe from that of the United States.122
From this kind of account we can begin to rethink the ‘nationalisation 
revolution’ of the post-war period in transnational terms. Nationalisation of industry, 
in Europe and throughout the world, was made possible by the extension of US 
loans.123 European and developing country state capitalisms were an investment for 
US and European capital at a time when post-war instability made private debtors 
more risky.124 US dollars were loaned on a scale and in directions that suited the 
needs of transnational finance capital. The Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and 
the IBRD, later the World Bank, were international organisations of the post-war 
period which shaped these developments. In the same way as the major banks within 
Germany rationalised domestic industry to make it more efficient, to make it ‘fighting 
fit’, through extending and denying credit to various sectors of the economy, leading
121 Again, this may help to explain why he, and others, attempt to understand such changes in ‘regime’ 
in terms of the acts of individuals or the ideology of classes. In mainstream IR, see Ruggie 1982 for 
this analysis elevated to the level of a theoretical approach.
122 Pijl 1984, p. xvi.
123 There are fascinating discussions at this time about how to justify the fact that the US was 
encouraging, and many conservative European governments were implementing, nationalisation of 
industry when it was precisely state ownership and control in the USSR which represented the enemy. 
See a very interesting series of interviews available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-3. Also in the confidential discussions 
leading up to the Marshall Plan, it was absolutely clear that it was the state-planning of the USSR, a 
level and kind of planning the West recognised in itself only in war time, that became the object of 
competition. That the US was shaping Western bloc capitalism in relation to developments in the 
USSR is beyond a doubt.
124 In the sense that unlike the state, private recipients of US loans could become bankrupt if new post­
war enterprises did not find an adequate market.
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Western capitalists states, through the IMF and World Bank, took up this role within 
the Western bloc.
This ability to coordinate production through the manipulation of financial
arrangements is something which Gowan has looked at in his study of the post-war
international monetary system. Following on from Hilferding and Bukharin he
describes the relationship between productive capital and money capital as one in
which the former is ‘determinant’, but the latter is ‘dominant’.
The productive sector is determinant because it produces the stream of value 
out of which the money-capitalists in the financial sector ultimately gain their 
royalties, directly or indirectly. On the other hand the financial sector is 
dominant because it decides where it will channel the savings from the past 
and the new fictitious credit-money -  who will get the streams of finance and 
who will not.125
For Gowan, as for Hilferding, the differentiation of money and productive 
capital is important because it ‘enables money capital as the controller of funds to 
play a planning role in capitalist development.’126 This is a role he grants to the US in 
the post-war world as, he argues, the openness of the system allows for the 
overwhelming strength and size of US finance capital to be felt throughout the rest of 
the bloc.
John Gerard Ruggie, a fairly mainstream IPE theorist, has referred to the 
several decades after the Second World War as a period of ‘embedded liberalism’.127 
He described it as follows: ‘unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would 
be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, 
its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism.’128 Ruggie is 
drawing attention to the fact that this period cannot be described in the same terms as 
the 1930s, the height of nation-state capitalism. For Ruggie, something else was going
125 Gowan 1999, p. 13.
126 Gowan 1999, p. 13. See similar statements from Hilferding in the last chapter.
127 Ruggie 1982, p. 392.
128 Ruggie 1982, p. 393.
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on after 1945, a multilateralism that would allow a certain degree of domestic 
stability. That stability, should be understood to be the result of the permissive context 
of multilateralism, it should not be seen to be the consequences of domestic policies 
as though they existed in a vacuum. Ruggie refers to the development of the West as a 
‘single entity’, and sees this as the first time that ‘international public responsibility’ 
was taken for ‘supplementing the market mechanism’ at this bloc level.129
What is suggested in this account, with the Marshall Plan as a particularly 
vivid moment in a general process, is that planning took place on a bloc scale within 
the West, just as it did in the East. The many meetings and negotiations to establish 
these international organizations are evidence of planning on a bloc scale.130 The 
anarchy of capitalist competition was considerably subdued at the intra-bloc level to 
maximize the chance of successful competition at the inter-bloc level. This certainly 
does not mean that every aspect of intra-bloc relations was planned and coordinated. 
It need not be. With certain international financial organisations playing an 
overarching role, there was considerable scope for independent activity within nation­
states, under the label of Keynesianism. That this independent activity was, in fact, 
severely and inherently restricted, was something which would only become more 
obvious once the boom ended in the 1970s.
But perhaps some would argue, despite the provisos, that with the image 
above, we are at risk of underplaying the economic competition between capitalist 
states in the West which continued in the post-war period. What about, for instance, 
the trade wars between the US and Japan throughout the 1980s? There were books 
written and even careers made in the 1980s and early 1990s on the basis of the
129 Ruggie 1982, p. 398.
130 See Pijl 1984 for a good discussion of these planning sessions.
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argument that Japan had battled the US and won.131 Burbach and Robinson provide a 
useful counter-argument to this nation-baiting. They note that ‘at the height of 
“Japanese bashing’” in the US the ratio of US exports of cars to Europe was 1:9, 
whereas for Japan it was about 1:6. ‘In other words the US maintained a more 
unfavourable trade relation in cars with Europe than with Japan.’ What was there 
really to worry about in terms of a Japanese threat? Burbach and Robinson point out 
that, ‘by the 1990s US, European, and Japanese auto firms had become so 
interpenetrated that national distinctions had lost meaning’.132
Gowan is equally skeptical, arguing that the US ‘need not constantly fear that 
other parts of the world are growing faster than the US domestic economy, as 
mercantilists would claim: after all this growth should be growth for the US 
companies playing a decisive role in these areas.’133 As evidence of bloc planning, 
Gowan describes ‘managed trade’ between the US and Japan whereby Japan must 
accept ‘certain quantitative targets for their imports and exports of particular sets of 
goods, as in Comecon-style trade planning.’134 If nothing else, Gowan’s 
understanding of US-Japanese relations is preferable to that of those who exaggerate 
competition between western nation-states, in that it prevents us having to deal with 
another case of ‘engendering of conquerors’. After all, if we discuss these matters in 
terms of competition between these two countries, it was the US who created the 
Japanese post-war economy... only to find itself victim to it a few decades later?
131 Including such dated titles as Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead, Prestowitz 
1988; A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany and the Struggle for Supremacy Garten 1992; and The 
Endangered American Dream: How to Stop the US from Becoming a Third World Country Luttwak 
1993.
132 Burbach and Robinson 1999, pp. 25-27.
133 Gowan 1999, p. 68.
134 Gowan 1999, p. 86.
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Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this thesis to account in detail for the 
structure and dynamics of these blocs.135 The point to be made is that there is no 
reason to reject models of post-war capitalist development, like van der Pijl’s and 
Gowan’s, which involve a considerable degree of planning at the bloc level. We may 
wish to debate the extent of this planning, but we must acknowledge the considerable 
evidence that it took place in practice and, moreover, that there is no need to resist the 
image in principle. If we recall Marx’s observation on centralization quoted in chapter 
three, he said ‘[i]n a given society this limit [to centralization] would be reached... 
when the entire social capital was united in the hands of either a single capitalist or a 
single capitalist company.’ The state-capitalist analysis provides a way of 
understanding centralization in the hands of a nation-state in terms of capitalism, 
given competition at the international level. The understanding of the post-war period 
in terms of ‘bloc capitalism’ provides for an acknowledgement of centralization at the 
bloc level, with the same proviso that we see capitalist competition at the inter-bloc 
level. This, surely, is what the theory of the Cold War provided by the ‘international 
state capitalist’ approach allows us to do. We can retain a clear sense of global 
capitalist relations while nevertheless acknowledging high levels of economic 
planning on an international scale.
6.5.3 Core Dynamic
Perhaps the most bewildering aspect of the state capitalist approach to the post-war 
West is their separation of economic and military competition. After all, was it not the 
theorists of state capitalism who argued, when claiming the law of value could be
135 A great deal of empirical work would have to be done to establish the boundaries of these blocs and 
the ongoing significance of nation-state borders within.
136 Marx 1976, p. 779.
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transmitted by either market or military means, that military and economic 
competition were two aspects of the same phenomenon? Yet, convinced of an image 
of nation-states competing within the Western bloc, and still employing the 
historically specific tools which Bukharin and Lenin supplied, (rather than adapting 
the tools to changed circumstances, as Bukharin and Lenin had), Harman claimed that 
‘each national capital competes both economically and militarily’.137
Where is the evidence for this image in the post-war world? Has Japan, for 
instance, really been trying to compete militarily with the US for the last 50 years? Of 
course not, and that it has not, is not a minor feature of its existence. Were the 
Japanese to attempt to compete militarily with the US, their economy would bear 
absolutely no resemblance to that which we have known. The entire structure and 
content of the Japanese economy is predicated on the fact that it does not need to 
compete militarily as an independent nation state. Cox in his analysis of the postwar 
global economy refers to this when he describes how Germany and Japan continued 
to support the US payments deficit in return for US military presence.138
By extension, and in support of the arguments made by Gowan in the section 
above, to the extent that Japan could be said to compete with the US economically, 
they do so at the grace of the US. What is meant by this is that were they to have to 
structure their economy around defending themselves militarily, as an independent 
nation state, their economy would be so distorted as to represent no economic 
competition whatsoever. The US economy, of course, would also look nothing like the 
US economy does now if it were engaged in military and economic competition with 
all other nation-states. The whole point is that where once competing empires 
allowed for significant inter-state rivalry, or rather inter-imperial rivalry, in the post­
137 Harman as cited above.
138 Cox 2002, p. 34.
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war period the US-led Western bloc represented an empire which dominated more
than half the world. Production was now organized on a bloc level, with an
international division of labour. This has meant that the US could get up every
morning and make weapons because another country was making the coffee.
The way it has been described by some theorists of state capitalism, Japan and
Germany were catching up with the US and were about to overtake because they were
‘economically competitive’ whereas the US was no longer, having tried for too long
to be ‘militarily competitive’. Barker argues:
At the same time, forces of ‘economic’ competition undermined arms 
spending in the US in a different way, as the ‘non-military state capitalisms’ 
of Japan and Germany were able, through higher levels of investment in 
‘peaceful’ trade goods, to undermine the competitive position of major US 
industries, and thus to compel a fall in the proportion of US spending devoted 
to arms. ‘The dynamic of market competition was relentlessly undercutting 
the dynamic of military competition.’139
Yet it was the theorists of ‘international state capital’, following Cliff, who had 
argued that capitalist competition had reached a stage of warring blocs. This was the 
form which capitalist competition had taken. There may be a jostling for position 
within the bloc and the bloc certainly constitutes a differentiated mass, but that does 
not mean that capitalist competition, military or economic, can be assumed to 
correspond to the borders of particular countries within the bloc. The kind of 
pressures which Barker describes above relate to the crisis of profitability within 
major US industries and the Western bloc as a whole. These are problems inherent to 
capitalism, not the result of intra-bloc manoeuvering. The US would no more want to 
‘outcompete’ Japan and Germany than those countries would wish to see the US 
bankrupt.140 Capital seeks out higher than average rates of profit throughout the
139 Barker 1998, p. 98. This is based on analysis by Harman 1984, pp. 93-99.
140 Which is one of the reasons why it is allowed to maintain such a high debt level.
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system and it is more than capable of crossing the borders of states in the Western 
bloc, the fates of which were, and are, intimately bound up together.
Why did the theorists of state-capitalism take this view? Perhaps it is because 
they did not sufficiently extend their own analysis. Perhaps they could not quite shake 
the image which the vast majority of Marxists and non-Marxists held, that 
‘capitalism’ referred simply to the economies of the West.141 Viewed in isolation, 
these Western states were behaving, in the post-war period, in what were remarkably 
harmonious ways: lending each other money, sharing weapons, establishing, as van 
der Pijl describes, a huge number of joint planning organisations, etc.142 Perhaps it 
was felt that this kind of capitalism seemed to support Kautsky’s projections of a 
peaceful ultimate stage of capitalist development.143
Well, the answer to that is that, it would, i f  it were taking place on a global 
scale. But surely, the whole point of the state capitalist analysis introduced by Cliff 
was that on a global scale what we had was capitalist competition at its highest stage, 
i.e. mutually assured destruction -  a sufficent contrast to Kautsky’s image of peaceful 
capitalism! We do not need to try and maintain the view that the competitive and 
violent nature of contemporary capitalism was such that at any point trade war among 
Western countries could have turned into real war. If we did, we would be doing so at 
the expense of reality. War between... Japan and the US? France and Germany? 
Canada and Mexico? With an international division of production and shared capital,
141 Not centrally planned, but we should note, significantly planned on a bloc level.
142 Pijl 1984.
143 Harman, for instance, says that the logic of Harris’ argument is that which ‘led Bernstein and 
Kautsky to drop their differences.’ Harman 1991, p. 5. Harman’s critique of Harris assumes the latter to 
be saying that if not the nation-state, then no state. We are saying here, if not the nation-state, the bloc 
formation with all its combined military ferocity directed at the East and parts of the South tempted to 
go the way of the East.
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how would they decide who got the weapons they jointly built and how would they 
divide the proceeds of war?144
It is generally understood that a function of the state is to take care of general 
conditions of production and reproduction that are beyond the reach of individual 
producers. If we accept that capitalism in the post-war world had reached a stage of 
competing capitalist blocs, then at least part of what is necessary for the production 
and reproduction of individual producers in that Western bloc is protection from the 
other bloc. This kind of protection was only possible on a bloc level which means that 
however nationally-bound these units appeared, they were intimately tied into a 
socialized bloc of capital which was capable of developing defence on that scale.
6.6 Conclusion
This has been an ambitious chapter. Its objective has been to provide a theoretical
analysis of Cold War nationalisation of production on a global scale, such as it exists
as the historical backdrop to the privatization revolution of the last few decades. To
do this, it takes the most dominant example of large scale state ownership and control
of production in the twentieth century and attempts to explain it in terms of actually
existing ‘state capitalism’ according to an alternative tradition of classical Marxism. It
then uses the Russian case as a basis from which to reconsider a central assumption
about the nature of capitalism, i.e. its dependence on free wage labour, thus
demonstrating how an understanding of Russia so alien to mainstream Marxism can
be understood as rooted in a classical Marxist analysis. Finally, it suggests that the
theory of ‘state capitalism’, while it has contributed to our ongoing development of a
144 War among advanced capitalist countries is of course conceivable where it comes about as a result 
of the breakdown of one of the societies, but given the advanced stage which weapons manufacturing 
has reached, the rebel society could not last long in isolation without the support of an opposing bloc.
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theory of capitalism, may not, in fact, provide the best means of characterizing the 
period of the Cold War. It is suggested that ‘bloc capitalism’ more accurately captures 
actually existing capitalism at this time.
So, the chapter attempts to grapple with Russia question by providing a state- 
capitalist answer, and then moves both ‘beyond Russia’ and ‘beyond state capitalism’. 
A great deal more could have been said in every section of this chapter. The task here, 
however, has been to continue to develop our alternative tradition of classical 
Marxism, to try and shed some light on various apparent anomalies of the post-war 
period. This is in order to better understand capitalism on a global scale prior to the 
period understood in terms of ‘globalisation’.
The argument in the last section above represents only tentative steps in the 
direction of reorienting the alternative tradition of classical Marxism away from its 
arrest at the level of nation state-capitalism, toward bloc-capitalism. It would take 
another thesis to adequately draw out the image of bloc-capitalism sketched here. Of 
particular importance would be a theorization of the ongoing significance of the 
differentiation of blocs into states, rather than simply the general statement we have 
above, building on our defense of Bukharin, that the extent of coordination can be 
understood in relation to the extent of competition.145 Rather than attempt to do that, 
however, we will move forward on the basis of this sketch, to look at how bloc 
capitalism has evolved and what globalization, with bloc capitalism as a backdrop, 
might mean.
145 In chapter five we responded to Brewer’s criticism of Bukharin, on the assumption that the latter 
had argued that all competition was suppressed within the state. In fact, it is more accurate to say that 
Bukharin argued that competition would be suppressed within in relation to competition existing 
without.
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PART THREE
RETHINKING GLOBALISATION AND THE RETREAT OF THE STATE
We have now reached the end of our three chapters in which an alternative tradition 
of classical Marxism for International Relations has been mapped out and applied to 
make sense of ‘actually existing capitalism’. Let us revisit the reasons for initiating 
this project.
We were frustrated in our attempt to make sense of the apparent ‘retreat of the 
state’ as a result of ‘globalisation’. We had evidence of structural changes in state- 
market relations in the form of the ‘privatisation revolution’, but we lacked a 
theoretical model of capitalism within which to understand it. Weberian-based IPE 
and Historical Sociology could describe the interactions of ontologically distinct state 
and market forces, but were unable to explain them within a broader social and 
historical framework. The ‘volume one’ Marxists had a clear understanding of a 
broader set of capitalist social relations within which states and markets appeared 
separate, but were unable to make sense of those moments when they did not appear 
separate at all.
What was required was a theory of capitalism which could explain the direct 
ownership and control of production by the nation-state, as well as the relinquishment 
of that control in the current period. In other words, both the ‘advance’ and ‘retreat’ of 
the state. The last three chapters have suggested an alternative classical Marxist 
approach and have applied it to making sense of the ‘advance of the state’. In the next 
chapter we will be considering how the same classical Marxist analysis might be able 
to make sense of the state’s ‘retreat’.
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In this final chapter we will extend our analysis to the period of the 1970s and 
beyond to consider what globalization looks like through the lens of our alternative 
approach. We will consider how this account is an improvement over other attempts 
to theorise this period. Does it allow us to acknowledge the significance of 
globalisation where ‘volume one’ theorists cannot? In what ways does it assist us to 
move beyond the descriptions of Weberian-influenced IPE and Historical Sociology? 
What might our contribution to the globalisation debate over ‘the retreat of the state’ 
now look like?
This final part of the thesis represents an application of the theory developed 
in chapters four, five and six, to explain the subject matter of chapter one, in a way 
that the approaches to state-market relations outlined and critiqued in chapters two 
and three could not. As such, it represents a rethinking of globalisation and the retreat 
of the state on the basis of an alternative classical Marxist analysis of actually existing 
capitalism.
This chapter is necessarily speculative as we do not have the space to engage 
with the detailed empirical work which might complement this theoretical framework. 
In that sense, this thesis has brought us only part way through M arx’s dialectical 
method as discussed in Chapter Four. We started with a concrete phenomenon, the 
privatisation revolution, we challenged the way in which that process had been 
theorised by globalisation theorists as the ‘retreat of the state’. We then suggested a 
more nuanced theory of capitalism, a more robust abstraction of reality, than that 
offered by Weberian and classical Marxist scholars in IPE and IR, in the hopes of 
accommodating a greater degree of the concrete -  capitalism as it ‘actually exists’. 
But that task of more fully appropriating the concrete, using a new theoretical model 
of capitalism, will be one taken up at a later date, or by others, should they find the
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model of capitalism provided here to be of use. Marx’s ‘rich totality of many 
determinations and relations’ comprehensible within an abstract model is the never- 
ending task of a new research agenda. Only the first tentative steps are taken here.
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Chapter Seven 
Actually Existing Globalisation
7.1 Introduction
In this final chapter we revisit the subject matter of chapter one and apply to it the 
insights we have gathered throughout the thesis as a whole. We will be looking at the 
events which have been characterised as ‘globalisation’ and the way in which they 
have been theorised. We will apply our own analytical framework to make better 
sense of this moment in the history of global capitalism and we will determine the 
‘value added’ by the approach we have taken. Does an alternative tradition of 
classical Marxism really deliver when it comes to making sense of globalisation and 
the retreat of the state?
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, we will look at globalisation 
in practice, i.e. the material changes in the political economy on a global scale which 
have given rise to theories under the label of ‘globalisation’. We approach these 
events in two stages and our account of them is informed by our analysis so far. The 
first stage begins in the 1970s, a period of economic ‘interdependence’ when the 
limitations of post-war national planning first began to be noticed. The second stage 
begins in the 1990s, following the collapse of the ‘centrally planned’ economies of 
Eastern Europe and the USSR. This period marks the beginning of the emphasis on 
globalisation, as such, with capital capable of organising on a truly global scale and 
the very existence of the nation-state as a viable unit of social organisation in 
question.
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In the second section of the chapter we will look at globalisation in theory, 
according to the alternative classical Marxist theory of ‘actually existing capitalism’ 
we have been developing. Here we return for the final time to our three dimensions of 
capitalism: its space, time and motion. We shall look at the geographic scope, 
historical trajectory and core dynamic of ‘globalisation’ to show the continuity of 
capital accumulation despite its changing appearance.
The third section of the chapter will revisit the critiques made in chapters two 
and three of the thesis. There we looked at two models for making sense of state- 
market relations under capitalism. The first was the Weberian-influenced IPE image 
of the separation o f  states and markets and the second was ‘volume one’ Marxism, 
influential in IR, with its definition of capitalism in terms of the apparent separation 
o f states and markets. We return to these now in order to make the argument that 
neither is a necessary nor useful means of analysing capitalism as it actually exists.
Finally, at the end of this chapter, we rethink the idea of the ‘retreat of the 
state’. We return to the ‘globalisation paradox’ which characterised all three waves of 
the literature on the retreat of the state: the idea that the nation-state had created the 
very forces to which it has now fallen victim. We are able, finally, in this last section 
of the last chapter of the thesis to resolve this paradox, to move away from the 
formulation of this problem in such paradoxical terms.
7.2 Globalisation in Practice
For many theorists of globalisation, there are two key moments in the twentieth 
century corresponding to stages in the retreat of the nation-state as a result of world 
market forces. There is a significant period of interdependence after the early 1970s,
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within the West, when the nation-state is noticeably constrained in its actions. Then, 
there is globalisation proper from the 1990s onwards, when the nation-state is seen, 
by many, to have been entirely overrun. This was the understanding of events 
articulated by the globalisers, Horsman, Marshall, and Reich, in chapter one of the 
thesis.1 It is, for them, as though the state stumbles in the 1970s and then falls two 
decades later. There is interdependence and then even greater interdependence until 
the state can bear it no longer. The period as a whole from roughly 1973 to the present 
day tends to get treated as a single trajectory in which we find a strengthening global 
market and a weakening nation state. Even Hirst and Thompson’s analysis supports 
this image. They accept the idea that the period 1945-1973 marked an era of ‘classical 
national economic management’ which is now, they believe, ‘largely obsolete’.2
One of the implications of the ‘bloc capitalist’ characterisation of the post-war 
period introduced in the last chapter, is that we may question the significance placed 
on the 1970s as the point at which ‘globalisation’ really began to take off. Rather, 
from the analysis sketched out briefly at the end of chapter six, it would appear that 
1945 more accurately marks the moment at which global capitalism began to develop 
on a truly ‘multinational’ scale.3 It was at this stage that international organisations 
and structures were established which intimately intertwined the fates of the 
economies of the developed world. That the extent of this interdependence was not
1 Horsman and Marshall 1994 and Reich 1992 as discussed in chapter one.
2 Hirst and Thompson 1996, p. 199.
3 Shaw makes the point that ‘the importance of 1945 leading to a profound reorganisation of military- 
political and hence socio-economic and cultural space is only fully recognizable today.’ Shaw is a 
Weberian historical sociologist who adds together military, political, and economic phenomenon in a 
rather descriptive fashion. However, his desire to be descriptively accurate is such that he gives 
adequate attention to both military and economic developments. He refers to the Western bloc between 
1945-1990 as the ‘Western state’ such is his belief that it represents a meaningful unit. He refers to the 
period post-1990 as one in which we see the development of a ‘global state’. I would argue that this is 
an unhelpful formulation but that it stems from a recognition of post-Cold War developments in the 
military and economic organisation of capital. Shaw 1997, pp. 498-513.
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recognised until the 1970s remains to be explained, but what is suggested here is that 
the 1970s is merely a period of recognition of what was a pre-existing reality.
What this means is that the period between 1945 and the early 1990s should 
perhaps be seen as one significant phase in the structural organisation of global 
capitalism, and the period since the early 1990s should be seen as another. We will, of 
course, have to provide some explanation for the events of the 1970s, or at the very 
least, for the common perception of them as a pivotal moment. We will start here.
7.2.1 The 1970s
1973 is a significant date in the diary of every serious theorist of globalisation. It was 
in this year that the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates came to an end and 
OPEC countries quadrupled the price of oil. What resulted was a depression of the 
global economy in the mid-1970s, which was deep by post-war standards. Inflation 
was high and unemployment soared. Governments attempting to curb inflation by 
cutting the money supply, found that under a system of floating exchange rates, their 
policies were self-defeating. The consequent rise in the domestic interest rate caused 
an inflow of capital which defeated the original attempt to combat inflation. Countries 
began to feel themselves harshly disciplined by the movements of speculative capital 
on a global scale.
The crude orthodox globalisation image of this transition from fixed to 
floating exchange rates is that, one minute, prior to 1973 the state was happily 
determining its own domestic policies and the next minute they were facing the 
discipline of global capital markets. This is a mischaracterisation of events that should 
be clarified if we are to move forward. What needs to be recognised is that constraints
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on the economic policy-making of nation-states existed under both fixed and floating 
exchange rate systems. Further, that the need to shift from one to the other can only be 
explained in terms of the pressures to release capital controls. These pressures, 
themselves, must be understood in the context of a crisis of profitability due to 
overproduction. We have limited space to make this argument, but it is necessary to 
outline it in brief.
In Gilpin’s discussion of the post-war system he notes, that ‘[u]nder the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, national economies had become 
closely linked, thereby constraining domestic policy options.’4 The Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates had been designed to prevent destabilising capital 
flows like those which had plagued the system in the 1930s. All currencies were 
pegged to the dollar which itself was meant to maintain a convertibility into gold at a 
fixed rate. The United States assumed responsibility for the world monetary system 
under the guise of the IMF. As Gilpin notes, ‘[t]he Federal Reserve became the 
world’s banker, and the dollar became the basis of the international monetary 
system.’5 A country could find itself in balance of payments difficulties and would 
need to use its foreign exchange reserves to defend its currency or it could persuade 
the IMF, or the US itself, to help.
This all changed when the system of fixed exchange rates came to an end. 
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, as Gowan puts it, the basis of a 
currency’s stability became its ‘creditworthiness in private international financial 
markets'.6
4 Gilpin 1987, p. 143.
5 Gilpin 1987, pp. 133-134.
6 Gowan 1999, p. 23. Italics his.
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Under the previous system, private financial markets had been largely 
excluded -  banned by ‘financial repression’ -  from involvement in the 
international monetary system. Now they were to play a central role.7
While extremely valuable in a number of ways, something which is missing
from Gowan’s account is an understanding of the significance of the European
removal of capital controls already in the 1950s.8 With the City of London acting as
an ‘off-shore’ unregulated centre for international private capital flows, the
speculative power of capital was developing apace. The question is why was this
taking place? Perhaps we can understand the same pressures which gave rise to the
London-based Eurodollar market as ultimately necessitating the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system, rather than seeing the US decision to end the system of fixed
exchange as the permissive condition for the rise of speculative capital. The former
approach suggests that there were ongoing pressures to relieve controls on capital
building up throughout the boom of the 1950s and 1960s, but they did not reach a
critical mass until the early 1970s.
Gowan has persuasively argued that the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system was of significant benefit to the United States, rather than ‘a defeat for a
weakened American capitalism’.
The Nixon administration was determined to break out of a set of 
institutionalised arrangements which limited US dominance in international 
monetary politics in order to establish a new regime which would give it 
monocratic power over international monetary affairs.... The break up of the 
Bretton Woods system was part of a strategy for restoring the dominance of 
US capitals through turning the international monetary system into a dollar- 
standard regime.9
While the collapse of Bretton Woods may not signal a defeat for weakened 
American capitalism, it must be seen as evidence of capitalism on a global scale (of 
which US capital was dominant) straining to find a means of accommodating an
7 Gowan 1999, p. 23.
8 He does note that this took place, but does not give it any analytical significance. Gowan 1999, p. 22.
9 Gowan 1999, p. 19.
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enormous overproduction of capital. When, after the 1970s, we see a huge rise in 
speculative capital with all its disorienting effects on national policy-making, this 
must be understood in the context of the build-up of such capital flows over a number 
of decades. Gilpin notes that already by the mid-1970s ‘the volume of the 
international flow of capital assets exceeded the volume of world trade many times 
over,’ and between 1979 and 1984, the ratio of foreign exchange trading to total 
exports would double.10
In the context of the characterisation of the pre and post-Bretton Woods 
systems above, we need to rethink what it was that the developed countries agreed to 
in the post-war period which anchored them into a system in which they would later 
have such little control over their own economies. The key to this is the role of the US 
as banker in the post-war system, starting with the Marshall Plan and continuing 
through the IMF. The Marshall Plan and the activities of the IMF can be seen as a 
means by which a general pattern of capitalist relations are imposed on the West as a 
whole.
The Marshall Plan has been described by Eichengreen and De Long as 
‘history’s most successful structural adjustment programme’.11 They argue that US 
aid ‘made the relaxation of controls and the return to markets politically palatable’ in 
the post-war period.12 From this perspective, the system of fixed exchange rates 
appears almost as a set of training wheels placed on the global economy while trade 
and investment were revived on a significant scale. Once the economies were 
sufficiently strong and sufficiently integrated, and once many productive outlets for 
capital accumulation had been exhausted, the training wheels were removed and the
10 Gilpin 1987, p. 144.
11 Eichengreen and De Long 1993. This is the title of their paper.
12 Eichengreen and De Long 1993, p. 220.
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dynamics of advanced capital accumulation and crisis on a global scale reasserted 
themselves.
What the above image of the post-war international economy does, is suggest 
that we are making a mistake if we place too much importance on the changes in the 
economy in the 1970s. These changes reflect developments within a structure of the 
international economy which was established in the immediate post-war period. From 
our analysis of bloc capitalism in the last chapter, we would say that this post-war 
structure involved extensive interdependence from the outset. The institutions of 
Bretton Woods were designed to prevent the collapse of the US economy and to 
restructure capitalist relations on a bloc scale. The crises inherent in capitalism took 
their toll on this structure but should be seen as acting through it, rather than breaking 
from it.
This line of analysis moves us sharply away from those who would suggest 
that the post-war boom resulted from strategies of national economic management, or 
new Fordist regimes of accumulation. These approaches are flawed, not least because 
they grant causal independence to the release of capital controls, suggesting it was this 
that destroyed the Keynesian or Fordist project. Simon Clarke usefully challenges this 
line of thinking and, in fact, nicely supports our image of post-war bloc capitalism and 
the relative insignificance of the 1970s. We will quote him at length here, from a 
contribution he made to a discussion on ‘the phases of capitalist development’.13
Clarke rejects the ‘conventional interpretation of the post-war boom’ in terms 
of the idea that increased direction of the economy by the state could contain the 
tendency to overaccumulation and crisis. This, we might note, is the starting point of 
orthodox theories of globalisation.
13 This is the title of the collection in which Clarke 2001 can be found.
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According to this view, the limits of these modes of regulation were 
determined by the fact that they were established on a national basis, and so 
have been progressively undermined by the internationalisation of capital.14
For Clarke, rather,
[t]he internationalisation of capital was not the source of the recurrent crisis 
of the last quarter century. The growing pressure of international competition 
expressed not so much the internationalisation of capital, as the growing 
overaccumulation of capital on a world scale... Similarly, the speculative 
movements of international money expressed not the breakdown of earlier 
‘national’ modes of regulation, but the uneven development of capital which 
underlay the growing imbalances in international payments which 
international capital was called upon to finance. The internationalisation of 
money capital made it possible to sustain accumulation, despite such 
imbalances, by the massive expansion of international credit. Thus the crisis 
is not the result of internationalisation of capital, but rather expresses the fact 
that such internationalisation had reached its limits.15
The same applies, for Clarke, when considering the significance of Fordist or
post-Fordist regimes of accumulation.
The belief that the post-war boom was based on the institutionalisation of 
modes of regulation of accumulation through which the accumulation of 
capital was subject to the direction of the nation state is equally false...
The bottom line for Clarke, and implicit in our discussion of bloc capitalism in
the previous chapter, is the idea that the 1970s have reaped what the 1940s
sowed.
The tendencies towards the internationalisation of capital and the 
liberalisation of capitalist regulation are by no means new, but have been the 
dominant tendencies ever since the Second World War, central features of the 
boom as much as of the crisis.16
Capitalism expanded on a bloc scale in the post-war period, organising itself in 
competition with the USSR, under the direction of the United States. Clarke, though 
he would not characterise East-West competition as capitalist in its nature, arrives at a 
very similar account of the post-war order as guided by the US state and capital.17
14 Clarke 2001, p. 82.
15 Clarke 2001, p. 82.
16 Clarke 2001, p. 82.
17 The downside for him, or rather for us reading him, is that he is unable to explain the rivalry of the 
two superpowers in capitalist terms.
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The priority of the bourgeoisie was to avoid repeating this experience [of 
1929] by using the interventionist apparatus of the state to restructure the 
productive forces, on the one hand, and to develop appropriate financial 
institutions of the other, which could ensure a smooth restoration of the 
liberal order. Although the details of this strategy differed from one country 
to another, the task was a global one, coordinated by US capital and the US 
state.18
Finally, he gets to the heart of the issue which is that the post-war period was and
could only be understood as a phase in the history of capitalism on a global scale in
which it organised itself on a multinational level. This period was characterised by an
international division of labour on a bloc scale, an enormous volume of international
trade, and associated multinational financial infrastructure. As Clarke notes,
[t]he idea of national reconstruction was a myth... because the uneven 
development of the forces of production made reconstruction on the basis of 
national self-sufficiency inconceivable. The priority of national 
reconstruction was to expand exports, which would provide outlets for the 
surplus products of the more highly developed branches of production and 
provide the means of international payment with which to purchase urgently 
needed means of production and subsistence. Thus national reconstruction 
could take place only within the framework of international reconstruction.19
What is so useful about Clarke’s account is that it acknowledges that in the post-war
period, nationalisation was an aspect of the internationalisation of capital
accumulation. Nationalisation was not just about the nation-state, its economic health
or independence, it was about establishing the conditions for international capital
accumulation, the benefits of which the boom reflected. Clarke explains.
The post-war reconstruction boom had been based on the reintegration of the 
global capitalist economy on the basis of the dismantling of the barriers to the 
free movement of commodities that had been erected in the inter-war period 
as national governments had sought to protect their domestic economies from 
the ravages of depression.20
So what then is the significance of the 1970s? For Clarke they represent a 
period of ‘overaccumulation and uneven development of capital’ which led to an 
economic crisis as well as a political one, which appeared as the crisis of
18 Clarke 2001, p. 83.
19 Clarke 2001, p. 83. Italics mine.
20 Clarke 2001, p. 87.
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Keynesianism, i.e. national capitalism, but was in fact evidence of crisis inherent to 
capitalism. The apparent success of Keynesianism in the first place, and the strength 
of ‘independent’ nation-states, was only made possible by the relative prosperity of 
the boom.
It was the sustained accumulation of the post-war boom, based on the rapid 
internationalisation of capital and liberalisation of the international 
movements of commodity, money and productive capital, which made 
possible the national policies of Keynesian interventionism and economic 
planning, whose success enabled politicians then to claim that they had tamed 
capitalism.21
In this account, the internationalism of the 1970s is not a problem  which the 
nation-state faces, it is a solution which capital has found to assist it in overcoming its 
inherent limitations.22 That these limitations and their various solutions impact on 
countries throughout the Western bloc, is not evidence of the power of 
internationalism over nationalism, but rather is simply the result of the fact that these 
countries structured themselves on the basis of bloc organisation of capitalism since 
the early post-war period. In other words, the notion of ‘globalisation’, or 
‘internationalisation’ as it was more commonly expressed at the time, has no 
explanatory power in the 1970s, just as it does not in the current period.23
21 Clarke 2001, p. 84.
22 Brenner’s Economics o f Global Turbulence follows a similar timeline in that he sees the period after 
1973 as a continuation of a crisis of profitability that first becomes apparent around 1965 and continues 
right up to the present day. This is for Brenner, a crisis of profitability, exacerbated by competition 
between states, the underlying fundamentals of which are due to overproduction. Brenner 1999.
23 We have not discussed here the impact on developing countries of the post-war restructuring of 
capitalist relations on a bloc scale. There is a body of literature which suggests that the apparent 
economic nationalism of post-war developing countries belies an embedded internationalism. The idea 
of ‘embedded internationalism’ was introduced in a discussion of the strategy of import substitutionism 
in the post-war world. Lipietz has drawn the comparison between Fordism and import substitutionism 
in the developing world in a way which is quite compatible with Clarke’s discussion of Fordism above. 
Lipietz 2001, p. 17. Bina and Yaghmaian refer to the import substitution phase of development in the 
Third World in similar terms, that is to say that they argue that this development strategy is apparently 
a sign of the independence of national economies, but in fact represents an essential stage in the 
restructuring of a broader internationalised, what we would call ‘bloc’, capitalism. Bina and 
Yaghmaian 1991, p. 126.
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7.2.2 The 1990s and Beyond
In the early 1990s, the world lurched forward. In quick succession, we witnessed the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the rise of independence movements in the Baltics, 
Armenia and other Soviet republics and then the collapse of the USSR in 1991.24 This 
was an extraordinary series of events with dramatic implications for the international 
system. According to the analysis we have been developing above, this would 
represent the first opportunity for a major restructuring of the global economy since 
the Second World War.
Two important things need to be said about the collapse of Eastern Europe and 
the USSR in relation to the alternative tradition of classical Marxism we have been 
developing thus far. The first is that the theorists of state-capitalism, following Cliff, 
predicted this collapse in a way that sovietologists of every political persuasion did 
not.25 Haynes, for instance, in 1980 and 1987 drew attention to the crisis of Eastern 
European and Soviet economies in the context of the broader crisis of global 
capitalism.26 He was able to do this because the tradition of classical Marxism to 
which he subscribed located these countries within a single global capitalist society.
The second, is that the theorists of state capitalism took from these events an 
interpretation quite opposite to that of the mainstream. While Fukuyama’s view that 
the collapse of the USSR signalled the end of history and the triumph of capitalism, 
may have been extreme, it was an exaggeration of what was a widely held belief.27
24 See Haynes 2002, pp. 191-219 for a useful discussion of the dynamics of this period.
25 That sovietologists did not, is the dominant message in Cox 1999. Remnick 1994, is quoted in Cox 
1999, p. 2 saying ‘how could we get it so wrong?’. Moises Naim, the editor of Foreign Policy is 
expresses a similar sense of bewilderment. Naim 1998.
26 Haynes 1980, 1987. Cox is, in fact, quite wrong to suggest that Haynes argued that the end for the
USSR was nowhere in sight. What Haynes argued was that the stagnation and decay of Eastern Europe 
and the USSR could not be understood in isolation from crises in the global capitalist economy as a 
whole, although there were specific features of the Eastern experience. Cox 1999 p. 26.
27 Fukuyama 1992.
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Capitalism had won. This conclusion, however unpalatable, seemed, to many on the 
left, to be unavoidable in some form or other. This was a period of great disorientation 
for Marxists, and for many others who had been critical of capitalism in the West. For 
theorists of state capitalism, however, these events caused little confusion. The 
collapse of the USSR was not evidence of the triumph of capitalism, it was a 
manifestation of capitalism in crisis, a crisis they had been tracking for the last several 
decades. This crisis had global as well as regional causes and consequences, but it was 
without a doubt a crisis o f capitalism.
In an article published in 1987, Haynes looked at the general crisis of state 
capitalism and then the particular crisis of USSR-type state capitalisms and came to 
the conclusion that every state capitalist economy, East and West, suffers from a 
reluctance to allow bankruptcies to solve the problems of overproduction.28 In this 
way the ground clearing that is necessary to counteract the tendency for the rate of 
profit to fall, does not take place. Industries which are strategically and politically 
important for states are not allowed to go to the wall no matter how uncompetitive 
they might be. Through taxation and subsidy, the inefficiencies of one sector are 
generalised throughout the economy as a whole. This is the crisis which befalls all 
state capitalisms.
In addition there is a particular problem associated with what Haynes calls the 
autarchic state capitals of the East. These economies are at a disadvantage because 
they do not benefit from the enormous international division of labour which 
structures capital accumulation in the West, nor do they possess access to vast 
markets. State enterprises in the East were unable to take advantage of the economies
28 Haynes 1987, p. 43.
314
of scale and long production runs that were available to enterprises in the West.29 As 
Barker notes, ‘The original “advantage” which Russia held under Stalin, namely its 
more advanced centralisation of capital, has been lost through the continuing and
o n
enormous degree of centralisation of capital in the West.’
In other words, bloc capitalism, a coordination of the conditions for capital 
accumulation, as part of a Cold War competitive strategy, was more effective in West 
than East, and the latter lost. It was in many ways incredible that the USSR survived 
as long as it did, given the enormous pressure of competition from the West. The 
competitive advantage of the combined productive capacity of the West was such that 
no other force in the world could hope to rival it, and this included China, who began 
to make its accommodations in the 1970s. Harris describes the trap which the USSR 
found itself in, which prevented it from being internationally competitive. It needed 
its enormous arms sector in order to compete in the world economy, but it was this 
same arms sector which ensured it would remain uncompetitive in world market 
terms.
Being self-reliant requires a nationally independent economy, capable of 
producing the full diversified range of output, services and foodstuffs which 
guarantee survival and which match the pattern of output produced in rival 
states. An independent economy will include sectors or activities which, by 
criterion of the market are unprofitable, but are necessary both for self- 
reliance and to retain other activities that are profitable; the profitable and 
unprofitable are interdependent wholes, and the unprofitable is necessary to 
keep companies in operation which are profitable.31
As Kidron noted already in the 1970s, ‘the minimum cost of entry into the 
world market is growing every day. The resources by which to fund it in backward
29 Binns and Haynes 1980, pp. 43-44.
30 Barker 1981, p. 65.
31 Harris 1983, p. 232
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countries are not.’ The result was to bring to a ‘close the period in which a Russian- 
style state capitalist development could be thought feasible for backward countries’.32
When we refer to the end of Eastern bloc capitalism in 1989-1991, it must be 
noted that we are talking about its formal trappings, Comecon itself, for instance. The 
actual collapse or integration of the Soviet bloc was a much longer and more uneven 
process even just within the USSR.33 Trade with the West expanded under Brezhnez, 
then contracted again as relations with the US soured. Then again under Gorbachev 
there was ‘reform’ of international trade which allowed many individuals within the 
Eastern bloc to amass private fortunes. In the 1980s there was a reduction of imports 
to help pay hard currency debts. By 1987, the USSR had requested observer status in 
GATT and in 1988 they signed a preliminary agreement with the EEC. In a sense, 
1991 follows rather than leads the way toward the integration of the Eastern bloc in 
the global economy.
In any case, where does this leave us post-1991? We are alone in the world 
with ‘Western capitalism’. The collapse of the USSR and Eastern Europe signals the 
end of capitalism organised on a bloc scale and the movement toward capitalism 
organised on a truly global scale. What is meant by this is that for the first time 
international organisations like the IMF, World Bank, and, since 1996, the WTO have 
‘the world as a whole’ as their object of intervention.34 The development of the WTO 
from GATT is particularly instructive in this regard. The WTO aims to reduce tariff 
and non-tariff barriers throughout the world. In the 1930s tariffs were a strategy of 
nation-state capital competition, during the Cold War tariffs came down within the 
bloc according to GATT rules, but there were significant barriers to trade between
32 Kidron 1974, pp. 171-172.
33 See Haynes 2002.
34 The Russian Federation applied to the WTO in June 1993. Since that time they have been negotiating 
their entry, shaping their economy in order to meet WTO guidelines. China joined the WTO in 2001.
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East and West. Now, the organisation of the trading system is truly global. The
reduction of barriers to trade is the core agenda of the WTO, and the IMF and World
Bank facilitate this process.35
What is significant about the period since 1990 is that it paves the way for a
major restructuring of the organisation of capitalism. The ‘new international division
of labour’, may not be entirely new, but to the extent that it has been an ongoing
development, it is in response to the same sort of pressures which brought about the
collapse of the USSR. The latter is a sign that the need for a restructuring of capital
was required. In a sense, the USSR and other state capitalisms represented barriers to
trade, barriers to the export of goods. The collapse of these economies represents a
new source of markets and access to cheap raw materials both of which are potentially
useful in restoring profitability in the global economy as a whole. As Clarke notes,
W ith the collapse of the Soviet bloc and economic reform in China new 
horizons opened up before global capital in the 1990s, to supplement the 
more limited opportunities presented by the Asian tigers and the opening of 
Latin America. For the first time since 1914 capital was free to roam the 
whole world in search of profitable outlets for investment.36
In this characterisation of post-1990s ‘globalisation’ we are acknowledging to 
a very significant degree the image painted by the globalisers. The nation-state scale 
of organisation of capital has been surpassed (we argue since the Second World War). 
Bloc-capitalism has truly collapsed in the 1990s (with the capitulation of the USSR) 
and we now have a single set of structures designed to serve the interests of capital in 
general on a global level. Whereas we might once have identified a coherent national 
banking system which served the interests of national capitals, within a bloc capital 
formation, we now have an effectively global banking system. As Tony Smith points 
out,
35 Obviously this process is selective. Continuing state subsidies in the US and Europe suggest an 
uneven application of the free trade agenda.
36 Clarke 2001, p. 89.
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All local forms of money must ultimately be defined by their relationship to 
world money. Even neoliberals grant that the world market requires 
‘appropriate’ monetary decisions by states (especially their central banks)37 
regarding the relationship between national currency and the form(s) of world 
money in force at a particular historical conjuncture.38
Where once legal rules were decided on a nation-state basis, within the
framework of the bloc, we have the ongoing development of a ‘global neoliberal
constitution’. This, after all, is what the General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS) and all of the rules of the WTO represent.39 As Robinson notes,
This process parallels the nation building stage of early capitalism that 
constructed an integrated national market with common laws, taxes, currency, 
and political consolidation around a common state. Globalization is repeating 
this process, but on a world scale.40
This is not an argument about nation-states weakening in the face of market 
forces, it is about capitalism seeking to organise itself in terms of global security, 
global trade, and global financial regulation. This is not about one set of social 
relations (states) being set against another (markets), it is about a particular set of 
social relations (capitalism) constantly reorganising itself on a larger scale in an effort 
to overcome its own contradictions. The work of van der Pijl and Robinson is 
instructive in this regard.41 The class relations which characterise capitalism in all its 
phases have been reorganised to a significant degree in the period following the 
second world war up through the 1990s and beyond. There is a very real coordination 
of elite interests at the transnational level and a wide range of organisations and 
planning instruments that reflect their interests. Robinson refers to the World
37 Robinson points out that it is not uncommon to have central bank presidents appointed by the IMF or 
World Bank. Robinson 2000 p. 45.
38 Smith 2003b.
39 The World Development Movement, which campaigns against GATS, has been persuasive in 
arguing that the GATS rules constitutionalise neo-liberalism. ‘GATS will ensure that once 
governments have opened up particular service sectors to WTO rules, there is no going back. The 
decision of how to organise service delivery is effectively being removed from the political arena. In 
future, citizens will no longer have the democratic right to decide whether or not services should be 
regulated.’
40 Robinson 2000, p. 55. Robinson is wrong, however, to see this as an evolutionary process within the 
nation state and then beyond to the global.
41 Pijl 1984, 1988; and Robinson 2000.
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Economic Forum as the ‘international’ of capitalism.42 When the G7 became the G8 it 
reflected the interests of a now global transnational class in policy coordination on a 
world level.
Of course, it is a nation-state that signs these agreements,43 and a nation-state 
that will have to negotiate the rescue of failing capitals where necessary and 
possible 44 and a nation-state that cracks down violently on its population when they 
protest at being pimped in the global economy.45 These are banal observations. The 
question is what is it that animates a nation-state to do any of these things? Is it capital 
accumulation organised on a national or imperial basis? Or is it the fraction of total 
global capital which the state secures for itself? It is the latter. Without that fraction, 
which requires above all the continued profitability of capitalism organised on a 
global level, the nation-state can do nothing. The borders of nation-states do not, in 
the current historical moment, indicate effective boundaries of economic, political, or 
military sovereignty if that word is to have any significant meaning.
To reiterate, we are talking about scale of organisation, not the dominance of 
one kind of organisation over another. We should not have to keep acknowledging the 
continued significance of the nation-state level of organisation. The economic crises 
we have witnessed in the late 20th century suggest that, for even those states 
considered by many to be extremely strong and ‘competitive’, such organisation is 
not to be had. Where it appears to exist, it can be disorganised by global capital 
overnight. Consider the following report on the crisis in the Asian economies.
42 Robinson 2000 p. 133.
43 Although it is often the case that trade negotiations are too complex for certain countries to be able to 
represent themselves. Canadian lawyers, for instance, were contracted by the Mexican government to 
help them negotiate the Mexican government’s own position in NAFTA!
44 A situation may of course arise whereby a government is forced to rescue a company which is 
‘foreign-owned’. Milner reports on the German state hoping to benefit from UK rail privatisation in 
2003 ‘[p]art of Britain's railway system may pass back into state ownership next year, but it will not be 
the British government taking control.’ Milner 2003.
45 Although in Genoa, for instance, it was very much the governments of the G8 together who allowed 
their respective citizens to be beaten down by the Italian police.
319
“If you structured your whole economic policy on your anchor to the dollar 
and you're a little $100 billion economy, you get flung around like a cork on 
the end of a whip,” Mr. Courtis said. Kenneth Courtis, chief economist for 
Deutsche Bank Group Asia Pacific, says the crisis has more to do with 
countries’ reliance on the U.S. dollar, Japan’s persistent recession and 
worldwide overcapacity in industries producing such things as cars, 
electronics and textiles.46
And yet, in response to this there are those who wish to maintain that
capital is organised according to national boundaries, that the national capital
class has not splintered and re-formed at a global level, and, moreover, that the
borders of individual countries accurately reflect the exercise of sovereign
power in a global political economy. Wood, for instance, writes:
If ‘globalisation’ means the decline of national capitalist classes and the 
nation-state, the transfer of sovereignty from the state to the organs of some 
kind of unified transnational capital, it certainly hasn’t happened yet and 
seems unlikely ever to happen. It is hard to see the day when capital will stop 
being organised on national principles 47
Not only does Wood see the borders of particular countries as the organising 
principle for capitalism, but she cannot imagine how it could ever be otherwise. In our 
critique of the country-model of capitalism in chapter four of this thesis, we assessed 
that kind of transhistorical (within the history of capitalism) image of the state. In the 
last chapter we also took issue with the state capitalist theorists’ attachment to the 
‘nation-state as capital’. Their scepticism about the organisation of capital beyond the 
nation-state is echoed in W ood’s dismissive reference above to ‘some kind o f  unified 
transnational capital’. Implicit in this description is the question, how is it supposed 
that capital can float free from its dependence on nation-states?
It is instructive here to consider a critical review of Hardt and Negri’s Empire, 
by Callinicos. For Callinicos, one of the problems with Empire is that the authors 
seem to suggest that capital could survive without the nation-state. It is likely that
46 Fuller 1998.
47 Wood 1999, p. 22.
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Callinicos would find the same fault in our account of ‘beyond bloc-capitalism’
above. Let us consider the work of Empire, a text which despite its many flaws,
illuminates a number of important issues.
We can start by noting that Hardt and Negri’s analysis of globalisation, or
‘empire’, takes its departure, as we do, from the post-war world rather than changes
following the 1970s.
As a result of the project of economic and social reform under US hegemony 
the imperialist politics of the dominant capitalist countries was transformed in 
the postwar period.48
Their evaluation of the historical specificity of the ‘nation-state as capital’ is
something with which, on the basis of the alternative tradition of classical Marxism
we have been tracing, we can agree.
[T]he decline of the nation-state is not simply the result of an ideological 
position that might be reversed by an act of political will: it is a structural and 
irreversible process. The nation was not only a cultural formulation, a feeling 
of belonging, and a shared heritage, but also and perhaps primarily a juridico- 
economic structure. The declining effectiveness of this structure can be traced 
clearly through the evolution of a whole series of global juridico-economic 
bodies, such as GATT, the World Trade Organisation, The World Bank and 
the IMF. The globalisation of production and circulation, supported by this 
supranational juridical scaffolding supersedes the effectiveness of national 
juridical structures.49
This characterisation of the state is quite in line with Bukharin’s remarks on the
subject, the idea that the state is ‘just as definitely an economic organization as is a
trust or a syndicate’.50 What Hardt and Negri draw attention to is the fact that the
economic organisation of capital has reached a level beyond the nation-state.
Callinicos responds to Hardt and Negri by acknowledging that,
the development of what are called “forms of global governance” such as the 
G7, NATO, the EU and the WTO suggest that sovereignty has become 
hybrid, so that state actions are often legitimised not on the basis of their
48 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 244.
49 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 244.
50 Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969 [1917], p. 163.
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national constitutional procedures, but rather under the authority of some 
international institution.51
Callinicos is acknowledging that the ideological justifications for state behaviour 
seem to have been transferred to the international level. Yet, Hardt and Negri have 
stated clearly that what they call ‘the decline of the nation-state’ ‘is not simply the 
result of an ideological position’, they are pointing to very real structural 
transformations. Yet Callinicos continues,
[t]his ideological shift does not, however, determine the actual distribution of 
geopolitical power...Not to recognise the depth of these antagonisms 
between rival centres of capitalist power is badly to misunderstand the nature 
of the contemporary world.52
Callinicos then reveals the source of his concern:
It is also to come dangerously close to offering an apologetic view of this 
world. This tendency is indeed the second major weakness of Empire. The 
conception of Empire as a ‘smooth space’, a decentred network in which 
power ‘is everywhere and nowhere’, is not that far removed from the idea 
favoured by theorists of the Third Way such as Anthony Giddens that 
‘political globalisation’ is accompanying economic globalisation and 
subordinating the world market to democratic forms of ‘global governance’.
Hardt and Negri are critical of this idea, but some of their formulations lend 
themselves to appropriation for very different political purposes.53
However much we may disagree with Hardt and Negri’s characterisation of 
capitalism as ‘a smooth space’, and we should, there is nothing in their argument to 
suggest they see democratic global governance on the horizon. Far from it. Callinicos 
realises that, but he remains uncomfortable with references to capital ‘beyond-the- 
nation-state’.
As things stand, with this kind of critique of Empire, we may have missed an 
opportunity to engage with the real issue of whether there are, in fact, organisational 
structures which facilitate the centralisation and concentration of capital at a level 
beyond the nation state. Hardt and Negri believe there are and Callinicos provides
51 Callinicos 2001 p. 52.
52 Callinicos 2001 p. 52.
53Callinicos 2001 p. 52.
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insufficient evidence that there are not. We have indicated from our discussion over 
the last few chapters that we side with Hardt and Negri on this and believe that 
Callincos, on the basis of his own logic, should too.
7.3 Globalisation in Theory
In the discussion of globalisation above, we have identified a movement beyond 
nation-state and bloc scales in terms of understanding the organisational structures of 
global capitalism. We will now attempt to show that this is an understanding of 
globalisation which is compatible with the analysis of ‘actually existing capitalism’ 
we have been mapping throughout the last three chapters. It will be argued that the 
time, space and motion of capitalism at this stage can be clearly recognised as a 
development from, rather than a break with, our understanding of capitalism thus far.
Throughout the next section, it will emerge that the image of globalisation we 
have produced does differ from that of ‘volume one’ Marxism, in the ways we might 
expect from the critique of their position in chapter four of this thesis. However, it 
need not break from the theoretical tradition of ‘state capitalism’, explored in chapter 
six, such as that body of work has been an important link in the theoretical chain of an 
alternative classical Marxist analysis of capitalism.
7.3.1 Geographic scope
We started our discussion of the ‘geographic scope’ of capitalism in this thesis by 
asking what might be the ‘society’ within which we could theorise the capitalist mode 
of production. We decided that this society, the meaningful social totality, was global.
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We agreed that there might be sub-societies worthy of analysis, but that they should 
not be assumed a priori to fall within, for example, the borders of particular countries, 
when the processes and social relations involved in capital accumulation may indicate 
otherwise.
In line with this approach, we can follow the suggestion of Tony Smith who
has argued that a Marxist approach to globalisation should take as one of its starting
points the idea that the process of capital accumulation ultimately occurs on a global
scale.54 He rejects the idea that capitalism consists of an ‘aggregate of independent
national economies externally related through trade and money flows’. He states that:
[t]he world market is a distinct level of determinations with its own emergent 
properties. National economies -  and the states attempting to regulate them -  
have always been incorporated as moments within the world market and 
interstate system. The world dynamic of capitalist development is something 
more and different than the ‘sum’ of national dynamics.55
We may recall that for Bukharin the national economy, such as it formed, was 
a reaction to the pressures of global accumulation. The nation-state as capital was not 
an evolutionary point the state had reached, but a strategy which served the purposes 
of capital accumulation on a global scale. This characterisation is in line with von 
Brauhmuhl, who contributed to the ‘state debate’ of the 1970s, and who owes some 
debt to Bukharin. Von Braumuhl stated quite clearly that ‘capitalist relations of 
production emerge in and on the basis of a world economy ‘within which statehood 
arises and consolidates itself.’56
On this understanding we have a sense that it is capital ‘as a set of social 
relations’ on a global scale which creates the state as an agent of capital, rather than 
the state as an agent which creates capitalism. Capital as a set of social relations
54 Smith 2001, p. 3. He actually says ‘world market’ a different description from ‘world economy’ 
which belies the fact that for Smith, as for most Marxists, war would not fall under the heading of 
strategies of capital accumulation.
55 Smith 2001, p. 3.
56 Von Braumuhl 1978, p. 167.
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created the corporation, the joint stock company, and the trust, and it also reached a 
stage at which it created the modem ‘nation-state as capital’ in reaction to the 
pressures of competitive accumulation on a global scale.
It is absolutely fundamental to Marx’s perspective that it is capital which 
creates the capitalist not the other way around.57 This principle extends to the level of 
the state, as Bukharin made clear. It also extends to the concept of ‘bloc capital’, as 
we saw that, following the second world war, capitalism needed to develop on a bloc 
level or not at all, and it created the bloc capitalist stmctures necessary to facilitate 
this. Now, we would wish to argue that this principle should also be seen to extend to 
the level of global capitalist structures of organisation. Capital, in its attempt to 
overcome its own limitations, has internationalised, bringing forth new forms of 
global organisation and new institutions.
Despite the protestations of many theorists of state capitalism who are 
unhappy extending the idea of capitalist social relations to a global level of 
organisation, it is on the basis of their mode of analysis that we arrive at this position. 
It was the pressures of capital accumulation on a global scale that brought down the 
USSR, as they acknowledge. With their recognition that the social unit of capitalism 
is global, theorists of state capitalism helped explain that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union should be understood not as the failure of a trajectory of development which 
differed from those taking place within countries in the West, but as a response to the 
same pressures developing unevenly throughout the world. From start to finish, the 
history of modem Russia is part of the history of global capitalism. The Bolshevik 
Revolution through to the collapse of the Berlin Wall cannot be viewed as an 
independent chain of events to be compared and tested against the West.
57 ‘Except as personified capital, the capitalist has no historical value...’ Marx 1976, p. 739.
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A problem with the state capitalist position which we have identified above is 
that there is not a sufficient distinction made between the ‘sovereignty’ of powers 
within the West and the ‘sovereignty’ of East and West? Nation-states within the 
West appeared to these theorists as sovereign while, in fact, they were heavily locked 
into a bloc division of labour, their economies totally shaped by their existence as part 
of a bloc. The East, by contrast, was genuinely sovereign vis a vis the West, in that it 
had its own international division of labour. As we saw, however, it was not able to 
maintain that position and has since taken its place within what is now a global 
division of labour.
Capitalism now exists as a set of global social relations which in the current 
conjuncture has organised for its reproduction on a global level. No longer competing 
states, empires, or blocs, we now have a territorially global division of labour. This 
does not however mean that competition has ceased to exist, nor does it mean that 
organisation on a global level is the last word in the development of capitalism, as we 
shall see below.
7.3.2 Historical Trajectory
By historical trajectory we refer to the fundamental tendencies or directions for social 
change that propel capitalist social relations forward. In chapter four we rejected a 
static model of capitalism held by the volume one theorists. In their analysis there 
appeared to be capitalism on the one hand and history on the other. Capitalism was a 
pure set of conditions involving anarchy between and order within units of capital, 
history was why these relations sometimes appeared otherwise, for instance, in times 
of state intervention. What we argued then was that there exists in capitalism, as a
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response to the pressures of competitive accumulation, a tendency toward the 
centralisation and concentration of capital into progressively larger units. These larger 
units include corporations, joint stock companies and trusts. All of these and then the 
‘nation-state as capital’ and ‘bloc capital’ are examples of centralised, socialised, 
capital as a competitive strategy.
If all this is true, and we have witnessed in 1991, a movement beyond bloc 
capitalism did we then thereby witness not ‘the end of socialism’, but ‘the end of 
capitalism’? If what we are saying is that we have seen the highest stage of capitalist 
competition concluded, then there is a potentially fatal flaw in the analysis we have 
been mapping out over the last few chapters. At a very schematic level, what we seem 
to be saying is that the historical trajectory of capitalism is such that competition led 
to concentration of capital on increasing scales up to the point where there were only 
really two ‘capitals’ left in the world and they competed until the Eastern bloc 
surrendered.
Then there was one.
How do we understand ‘one capital’? A single capital with no other capital 
with which to compete is a non-capital, for as we know from our earlier discussion of 
Capital, the essence of capitalism is competition. Have we talked ourselves up 
through nation-state capitalism to bloc capitalism, only to arrive at non-capitalisml Is 
non-capitalism the stage beyond bloc capitalism?
The answer to this is no, and there are two main strands of reasoning behind it. 
First, we must remember Bukharin’s comment that whenever capitals coordinate in 
order to compete they do not coordinate absolutely, and competition continues at 
lower levels. Whether in its nation-state or bloc-capitalist form, competition between 
capitals within these territorial units still existed. As Harman explains,
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even at the high point of [nation] state capitalism “national planning” was 
very much a myth: what in reality occurred was a continual jockeying for 
position between different interest groups, each using political influence to 
get its way. Yet there could never be a complete breakdown of the national 
entity since access to political influence meant putting forward a programme 
which seemed to relate to the interest of the whole state capital.58
Is this not a useful characterisation of the way in which bloc capitalist ‘planning’ and 
now global capitalist ‘planning’ may be viewed, as both a material reality and a myth? 
At the same time as there are institutions which help to ensure that the general 
conditions for capital accumulation are maintained and extended, there is a constant 
jockeying for position within that. This jockeying may appear in the form of 
multinationals competing directly in the global market, or through states negotiating 
better terms for capital with which they have close ties, or even heads of business 
within sector-specific planning groups determining each other’s cut of the market.
The imperative to coordinate and centralise in order to compete on a bloc level 
is gone, so in that sense the will to coordinate is gone, but the imperative exists for 
individual capitals as they grow and merge to form giant conglomerates of capital 
which can throw their weight around at a global level. The drive to maintain and 
extend general conditions of capital accumulation also exists simply in response to 
capitalism’s own crises, crises which result from the competitive accumulation of 
capital which continues.
The second reason we have not reached a point at which capitalism becomes 
noncompetitive is because capitalism continues to expand unevenly. The relationship 
between ‘uneven geographical development’ and capitalist competition and crisis is 
well explained by David Harvey.59 He refers to regional ‘revolutions in technology, in 
means of communication and transport, in the centralisation and decentralisation of
58 Harman 1991, p. 3.
59 See Harvey 1982 [1999], pp. 413-442.
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capital... in monetary and credit arrangements, [and] in social and physical 
infrastructures...’.60 Neil Smith, the geographer and student of Harvey, has argued 
that ‘as the scale of concentration and centralisation of capital has proceeded, the 
scale of uneven development has worsened.’61
The uneven geographical nature of capitalism is such that relative territorial 
and sectoral advantages appear and disappear all the time. This takes place, in part, 
as a result of the interaction between natural resources and technological 
developments. For instance, a given technological development can result in a 
previously neglected part of the world suddenly possessing strategically significant 
resources or the exhaustion of those resources can result in a slowing of capitalist 
investment to that area. As Smith has usefully put it, ‘uneven development, thy name 
is war’.63 Uneven development and competition go hand in hand.
Capital, in its modus operandi, constantly moves around the world seeking the 
highest return, developing and neglecting areas as investment floods in and out. 
Added to this is the fact that periodic crises inherent in the capitalist mode of 
production serve to destroy value in various parts of the world, and sectors of 
industry, in relation to each other, creating a kind of roller coaster of capitalist 
development which tests even the most cordial of relations. Though we might 
acknowledge, for instance, a high degree of cooperation between global elites, we can 
see splits in this emerge in periods of crisis. Robinson argues for instance that within 
the transnational capitalist class (TCC) there have been significant splits, particularly 
resulting from crises in Mexico 1995, Asia 1997 and Russia and Brazil 1998. He
60 Harvey 1982 [1999], pp. 418-419.
61 Smith 2003. He provides in evidence the following ratios of per capita income in the richest and 
poorest regions of the global economy. 1913: 9 to 1; 1950: 11 to 1; 1973: 12 to 1; 1992 16 to 1.
62 On ‘uneven development’ see also Smith 1990 and Bond 1997.
63 Smith 1984, p. 158.
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characterises these as ‘important contradictions and growing splits in the globalisation 
bloc’.64
What is suggested here therefore is that the dialectic of competition and 
centralisation continued, reaching a stage at which there was a degree of centralisation 
within two blocs. This stage has been surpassed and now competition has come to the 
fore along different lines. In the last chapter we introduced van der Pijl’s use of the 
term Vergesellschaftung, or socialisation, which referred to the ‘planned 
interdependence... of functionally divided social activity’.65 Central to van der Pijl’s 
use of this concept is the idea that one structure of socialization can be embedded in 
another.66 He gives the example of how a machine tool corporation might be
embedded within the British national state -  one social organisation of capital within
(\1another. The nation-state itself, in a period of bloc capitalism, was embedded within 
a bloc, West or East. The global economy is a mass of functionally divided social 
activity the interdependence of which is planned on different scales, in some cases 
across borders, in some cases within national boundaries, according to the uneven 
development of capital on a world scale.
Something which is very important which may not have been accurately 
conveyed by theories of state capitalism is that there while there does appear to be a 
tendency toward internationalisation which produces a counter-tendency, as Bukharin 
described, there is no reason to suppose that this counter-tendency is toward 
nationalisation of capital, i.e. a reversion to organisation of production within the 
nation-state as such. For one thing, for even the largest and most productive states,
64 Robinson 2000 p. 42.
65 Pijl 1998, p. 15.
66 Pijl 1998, pp. 15-16.
67 Pijl 1998, pp. 15-16.
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the US and China, this would involve an enormous leap backwards in their material 
development.
From the point of view of the perspective we have developed over the last few 
chapters, it is extremely difficult to imagine a day when capitalism will revert to being 
organised along specifically national lines unless it is in the wake of an enormous 
destruction of value on a global scale. Already in 1975 Hugo Radice was remarking 
upon the fact that ‘the British industrial economy no longer exists as an economic
/TO
unit: the reproduction and renewal of its material basis is no longer autonomous....’
He noted the way in which British engineering firms rely upon a concrete
international division of labour.
The means of production form a complex whole in which various often 
highly specific use-values under different ownerships and locations are 
brought together... the productive structure o f the British national industrial 
economy today has become disintegrated. Because the organisation of 
production and exchange no longer privileges links within the nation-state, 
customer-supplier links no longer function to integrate the national industrial 
economy.... this material impact of internationalisation has been largely 
overlooked in the discussion of the effects of MNCs...69
In the same way as British engineering firms were predicated on capitalism 
organised on a global scale, so now are a vast number of industries and services. It is 
now extremely difficult to imagine the circumstances in which Vivendi, for instance, 
would revert to being a water company of the French state with a national monopoly 
on water services within France. Vivendi’s internationalisation was an attempted 
solution to the inherent crisis-tendencies of capital, to the effects of overproduction. 
Only a massive destruction of use-values could serve a similar purpose.
The state capitalist model, which sees nationalisation as an ever present 
counter-tendency to internationalisation suggests that there exists a transhistorical 
(within the history of capitalism) alternation between poles of attraction, when in fact
68 Radice 1975, p. 134.
69 Radice 1975, p. 135.
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the very concrete development of increasingly large scale productive structures based 
on an international division of labour, suggests otherwise.
7.3.3 Core Dynamic
What distinguishes the ‘volume one’ Marxist approach to the law of value from the 
alternative tradition which we have been developing is that the first group of theorists 
operate at a very high level of abstraction. This allows these theorists to grant the ‘law 
of value’ a certain pristine hue, such that much of its actual operation is then viewed 
as falling outside the dynamics of capitalism, per se. An example of this is when the 
state takes direct control and ownership over the means of production. This, for the 
volume one theorists is when the state appears to be ‘planning’, rather than the market 
exerting its ‘anarchical force’. We have argued against this undialectial opposition 
throughout the thesis. Working our way through various monopoly scenarios, we have 
argued that the law of value continues to operate through the nation-state and even 
through the bloc of capitalist interests. To the extent that these organisational forms 
negate the law of value, we have argued that they do so on the basis of the law of 
value.
There are two dangers when we attempt to track the law of value through to 
the contemporary period of apparent ‘globalisation’. The first is that we might 
imagine that the world is becoming increasingly deregulated and therefore the law of 
value is re-emerging after a period of relative dormancy, or at least obscuration, 
during the Cold War, when states ‘interfered’. There are two things to be said in 
response to this. We have tried throughout to make clear that the ‘negation of the law 
of value on the basis of the law of value’ is the way that the law o f value works. We
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have not left a period of the ‘law of value’ tainted by war and state regulation, now to 
enter a period in which it actually reigns supreme. This is a version of the neo-liberal 
fantasy that the ‘market’ can work without the ‘state’ and may finally get the chance 
to do so now that the Cold War is over. The second, related, point, which has become 
the observation de rigeur of the second wave of globalisation theory is that the 
deregulation of the current period in fact involves a great deal of re regulation, i.e. 
interference by ‘non-market’ forces. Having noted this, however, and viewing the US 
as the leader of the pack of reregulators, we encounter another danger.
This second potential pitfall is that we might suggest that the law of value may 
be more constrained than ever because we now have the ultimate ‘central planner’, a 
planner without rival to subject it through competition to the anarchy of capital 
accumulation: the United States. Here we raise a rather thorny issue which we have 
avoided thus far. What happens to the role of the United States in the shift from a bloc 
to a global organisation of the capitalist mode of production?
This important question emerges in relation to Gowan’s work on the role of 
the US in the development of global capitalism in the late 20th century. We will 
consider the debates surrounding his approach. Gowan sees globalisation as a political 
strategy of the US state. He quotes Joe Quinlan, senior analyst for the investment 
bank Morgan Stanley, saying ‘no one has reaped more benefits from globalisation 
than the United States and Corporate America’.70 He argues that the ‘central nervous 
system’ of globalisation is the international monetary and financial relations which 
have been ‘redesigned and managed over the last quarter of a century’ by the US 
state.71
This new monetary and financial regime has been one of the central motors 
of the interlocking mechanisms of the whole dynamic known as
70 Quinlan quoted in Gowan 1999, p. 3.
71 Gowan 1999, p. 4.
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globalisation. And it has been not in the least a spontaneous outcome of 
organic economic or technological processes, but a deeply political result of 
political choices made by successive governments of one state: the United 
States.72
Gowan has labelled this US project, the Dollar Wall Street Regime (DWSR).
Under this heading he makes a number of observations about the role of the US as
financial hegemon. For instance, he argues that the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system gives the US ‘monocratic power’ over international monetary affairs and by
way of illustrating the extent to which it served the interests of the US above all
others, he quotes Williamson saying that:
The central political fact is that a dollar standard places the direction of the 
world monetary policy in the hands of a single currency which thereby 
acquires great influence over the economic destiny of others. It is one thing to 
sacrifice sovereignty in the interests of interdependence; it is quite another 
when the relationship is one way.74
Callinicos has pointed out, where Gowan goes wrong is perhaps that he fails to 
acknowledge the way in which what the US does is of value to the system as a 
whole.75 In this way we might see Gowan’s thesis as too nation-state based. Implicit 
in Callinicos’s critique is the idea that the ‘design’ of international monetary and 
financial relations may not be about the US state, as such, but rather about the 
ongoing viability of capitalism in general.
If this is what Callinicos is saying, it is an interesting observation on his part 
given that one of the weaknesses of the state capitalist tradition is, arguably, that their 
own understanding of the post-war period is too nation state-based. They recognise 
the limitations of this when it comes to the agency attributed to the US by Gowan, but 
not when they are arguing about the ongoing significance of ‘all nation-states as 
agents on behalf of their respective capitals’. One of the ways in which the tension of
72 Gowan 1999, p. 4.
73 Gowan 1999, p. 19.
74 Williamson quoted in Gowan 1999, p. 20.
75 Callinicos 2002.
76 This is what we have argued above.
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this position manifests itself in the work of Callincos, and others, is that when 
attempting to supply evidence of the ongoing relevance of the nation-state as an 
organiser of capitalist relations, they most often use the US as an example.77 This is a 
problem because the US does have a unique place in the global economy, (although 
not in the way that Gowan thinks it does), which they are not acknowledging when 
using the actions of the US as merely an illustration of capabilities they attribute to all 
nation-states.
The US does not have the same kind of relationship to the global economy as 
other nation-states. This is an obvious point when we consider Canada for instance, or 
even Germany or Japan. If we accept a ‘bloc capital’ or global model which we have 
argued is preferable to what in the state-capitalist tradition seems almost to be a model 
of equally ‘sovereign’ states, we cannot use the behaviour of the US as an example to 
illustrate the behaviour of ‘nation-states’. We have argued that the organic totality of 
the bloc and then globe is such that the US is not simply one ‘part’ to be added to 
other ‘parts’ to form the whole. The US plays a role in relation to the organic totality, 
of bloc capital during the Cold War, and global capital now, which is unique.
Having said that it is unique, however, we would not want to say, as Gowan 
seems to, that the US can act upon the rest of the global economy in a deterministic 
fashion. It cannot because it is caught up in it. It is not, as he almost seems to suggest 
‘relatively autonomous’ of the imperatives of capital accumulation. The largest units 
of corporate capital in the world tend to act through the infrastructure of the US and
77 Typical in this respect is Harman’s comment that ‘[sjtate intervention -  particularly in the US where 
the state poured tens of billions of dollars into the financial system -  was central in preventing the 
financial crisis spilling over into a crisis of the rest of the system in October 1987. What is more, 
individual finance capitalists responded to the crisis by rushing back to the relative security of their 
national states.’ He then cites a number of US-pension funds dumping foreign and holding domestic 
investments. Again, the ‘vital role’ the state plays was held to be evident from the Savings and Loan 
bail out in the US. Harman 1991. Yet, there was no such vital state role when it came to the Mexican 
bail-out. There, international organisations took the place of the state.
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the international organisations which the US dominates, but these are simply 
mechanisms for organising capital accumulation, all of them. The fundamental 
contradictions of capital accumulation are such that no organisational structure can 
overcome them. This has been the case all the way through our analysis, neither the 
joint-stock company, the trust, the nation-state, ‘bloc capitals’ or a ‘US-led global 
capital’ can rise above the relentless dynamic of the law of value.
The United States is subject to the same law of value that the rest of the world 
is. It is transmitted through the money form and no amount of planning can overcome 
its anarchical tendencies. It exists as something which stands over the particular 
governmental structures of the US state, in the form of international money markets. 
The US cannot influence or rein-in these money markets without compounding the 
crisis-tendencies of capitalism. The US government is not ‘owner’ of all that capital,
n o
capital is a social relation which shapes the US as much as any other state.
As Marx reminds us, money, as it appears in the market,
is not represented by single capitalists, by the owner of this or that particle of 
capital present in the market, but it appears as a concentrated, organised 
mass, which, entirely unlike real production is subject to the control of 
bankers representing social capital.79
At this stage in capitalism’s development, even the bankers are just
representatives of global social capital. To the extent that the US plays the role of
banker, the position is well-described by Tony Smith:
The currency of the hegemonic state necessarily tends to play a privileged 
role in the world market; this currency necessarily tends to become the main 
de facto  form of world money. As a result that hegemonic state necessarily 
tends to enjoy certain privileges in the world market. For one thing, it will not 
face limits on the ability to create credit money that are imposed on other 
nations. For another, it will be able to fund massive trade deficits without 
significant loss in the value of its currency, at least for an extended period of 
time. These privileges rest on the need and desire of foreign agents to obtain 
the dominant reserve currency of the world market for the sake of 
international payments and investments. As long as credit flows into the
78 Again, as Marx reminds us, it is capital that makes the capitalist, not the other way around.
79 Marx cited in Pijl 1985 pp. 5-6.
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hegemonic state continue, that is, as long as loans are rolled over by new 
loans, trade deficits can become ever more massive, with the result that more 
and more of the world’s output is consumed in the domestic market of the 
dominant region.80
What is being suggested here is that the ‘hegemony’ of the US, both under a 
system of bloc capitalism and more recently needs to be reconsidered. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to do that, but this is the kind of question our new understanding 
of capitalism raises. A possible starting point is offered by Alnasseri et al., in a study 
of the phases of capitalism. They ‘consider it useful to conceptualise international 
hegemony not in terms of a nation-state, but in terms of a mode of development.’81 
They explain,
[t]he internationalisation of capital has proceeded to a point such that the 
problem of macroeconomic coherence should no longer be seen in national 
contexts, but rather in a global framework. So, for example, the US supported 
by the absolute size of its economy and the international imposition of the 
dollar, currently assumes the role of global consumer, it absorbs the trade 
surpluses of Germany and Japan... the latter countries in turn accept the role 
of financing the structural balance of payments deficits by means of credit.82
In this way we can recognise that the fates of all capitals are deeply 
intertwined and the ‘design’, such as it exists, of international monetary and financial 
relations is a slave to the necessary anarchy of capital accumulation. Planning and 
anarchy, as always, exist in dialectical relation to one another. Though it may 
sometimes appear that the US, as an individual nation-state, has planned the anarchy 
to which the world’s population and its environment is subject to its detriment, this is 
not the case. Within the logic of capitalism, which is the logic of the contemporary 
system of nation-states, ‘There Is No Alternative’.83 The overwhelming conclusion 
which stems from our alternative theory of classical Marxism is well-expressed by
80 Smith 2003b.
81 Alnasseri et al 2001, p. 163.
82 Alnaressi et al. 2001, p. 163.
83 This is, of course, with reference to what is possible under capitalism. In this sense the statement is a 
critique of capitalism not an endorsement of states or state leaders who fail to see beyond it.
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Smith when he stresses that ‘[e]ven the hegemonic power in the system of states 
cannot escape the law of value governing the world market.’84
7.4 Rethinking States and Markets
In this section of the chapter we will briefly suggest what might be the ‘value added’ 
to our understanding of capitalism as it ‘actually exists’, by the alternative tradition of 
classical Marxism that we have attempted to develop throughout the thesis.
7.4.1 A Riposte to Volume One Marxism
The starting point for ‘volume one’ theorists is that capitalism is a system of social 
relations characterised by the indirect extraction of surplus, through the mechanism of 
market exchange. This system requires private property and free wage labour. State 
property and forced labour characterise ‘another mode of production’ which is not 
capitalist. ‘Volume one’ Marxists look around the world, within the borders of 
particular countries, and assess whether or not these conditions prevail and 
subsequently describe these nation-states as capitalist or ‘otherwise’.
The ‘volume one’ analysis of capitalism is based on: (1) a country-model of 
development, (the world economy is the sum of its parts); (2) a static understanding of 
the relationship between planning and anarchy (anarchy has no tendency); and, (3) a 
pristine law of value (the negation of which is the negation of the capitalist mode of 
production). It has been argued throughout this thesis that on these three dimensions: 
the space, time and motion of capitalism, the ‘volume one’ theorists are misguided.
84 Smith 2003b.
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We have offered in its place a theory of capitalism which sees: (1) the world 
economy as an organic totality within which capitalist social relations take various 
organisational forms; (2) the historical development of capitalism in terms of a 
dialectical process of competition and centralisation on an ever-increasing scale, 
which at a particular historical stage has involved the nation-state as an agent of 
capital accumulation; (3) a law of value which is the ‘impure’ dynamic behind 
capitalist accumulation, such that anarchy does not disappear despite moments of 
planning, ownership and ‘control’ by the nation-state.
Capital volume one provides a theoretical model for making sense of, among 
other things, the apparent separation of economic and political spheres. Marx 
explained how it was that capitalism was uniquely capable of taking an apparently 
‘purely economic’ form. He did not argue that it would always appear so. It remained 
for the model to be read through history. Capital is not a thing, it is a set of social 
relations, and as such it cannot be separated from concrete space and time. Alnasseri 
et al. in trying to make sense of capitalism’s development through time and space note 
the following:
An adequate understanding of the spatial dimension of capitalist development 
has often been obscured because the relationship between the capitalist mode 
of production and the nation-state has frequently been perceived not in terms 
of a historic coincidence, but of a logical necessity.85
The ‘historic coincidence’ of the nation-state and the capitalist mode of 
production is such that at a particular point in time, the latter creates the former as an 
agent of capital. The process of competitive capital accumulation on a global scale 
brings forth the nation-state as its agent at a particular point in history. In so doing, it 
does not negate the law of value, it reproduces it on a different scale. The nation-state 
is an historically-specific expression of capitalist accumulation. As such it is neither
85 Alnasseri et al. 2001, p. 163.
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‘separate’ from it, as the Weberian influenced social theorists would argue, nor will it 
always be ‘apparently separate’ as the volume one theorists suggest.
The ‘value-added’ by our approach to understanding capitalism, over that of 
the volume one theorists, is that we have something to say about the changing 
relationship between states and markets and the changing forms of competition. We 
can make sense of moments when state and market appear to be separate and, 
crucially, we can make sense of moments when they do not. Without an explanation 
for the latter and for the range of behaviour between the two we would be forced to 
avoid commenting on the specifically capitalist nature of changing global social 
relations over the last long century: nationalisation and privatisation, war and peace.
The fact that ‘volume one’ theorists of capitalism do not remark upon the 
novelty of the current historical moment in the development of capitalism, understood 
as globalisation, is a problem in and of itself. We may not wish to say that 
globalisation marks an ‘epochal shift’ in the development of the world capitalist 
system, the transition from a nation-state phase to a new trans-national phase of 
capitalism, this formulation is such that it was one way and is now another. Nor 
would we agree with the ‘volume one’ theorists that it as one way and never another. 
We have attempted to characterise it in terms of a historical process within which both 
and even other phases have existed and can be made sense of in relation to the 
dynamic of capital accumulation. In this way we have tried to grapple with what are 
ever-changing forms of a single historical process. As social theorists we have a 
responsibility to explain change as it is experienced, despite, and in light of,\ our 
underlying understanding of continuity. The problem with ‘volume one’ Marxism is 
that it has singularly failed to do this.
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7.4.2 A  Rejoinder to IPE
The conversation between IPE and ‘volume one’ Marxists which we encountered at 
the beginning of the thesis ran something like this. The Marxists accused the IPE 
theorists of assuming that states and markets were separate social forces when, they 
argued, it was only under capitalism that they appeared that way. The IPE theorists 
replied that they did not believe states and markets appeared that way at all, their 
whole project was to analyse the changing relationship between the two social forms 
which included a great many moments when they were virtually indistinguishable. 
This was the stalemate we began with. The IPE theorists had extremely valuable 
descriptions of state-market relations in all their variation, the ‘volume one’ theorists 
had a theoretical model in which such variation could not be understood.
Changes in the global economy, including globalisation presented no problem 
for Weberian-influenced IPE. We were witnessing political, economic and ideological 
power coming together in new and interesting ways. In fact, the IPE theorists had so 
much to say about globalisation, they were happy to ‘explain’ it twice: in the 1970s 
and again in the 1990s. But two debates over the interdependence of states brought 
them no closer to an explanation, and this is where they have stayed. Weberian 
influenced IPE like mainstream IR has no analytical purchase because it has no theory 
of the social relations from which the social forms they study emerge.
IPE theorists, and chief among them neo-Gramscian IPE theorists, were 
however correct to seek an explanation of the changing social forms they witnessed. 
Cox was correct to ask why if, as Rosenberg, Burnham, Bromley and Boyle 
suggested, relations between states and markets had a specific relationship to one 
another ‘under capitalism’, did this relationship appear so different at different points
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in time? This was a reasonable question and one which needed to be answered if 
classical Marxist theory was to be responsive to the changing social world. Cox’s 
notion of the ‘hegemonic bloc’, though flawed, was an attempt to describe what we 
explained above in terms of a stage of bloc capitalism. This was an important phase in 
global capitalism which it was necessary to attempt to come to grips with. The neo- 
gramscians recognised that. For volume one Marxists, rather, it was more of the same. 
For Rosenberg, it was a case of ‘don’t mention the war’ (any war), because he could 
not explain it. Our alternative tradition of classical Marxism, by contrast, attempts to 
get to grips with social reality in such a way that both continuity of process and 
change of form are understood. Nationalisation and privatisation, peace and war.
States and markets are not separate spheres with separate logics, one which 
can be related to another. States and markets take different forms at different points in 
history as they both express social relations of capital accumulation as they develop 
on a global scale. The variation in their appearance can be explained in terms of the 
way in which a particular dynamic animates social relations and works through 
concrete time and space. IPE theorists are right to notice these changes, but they are 
wrong not to investigate the fundamental social relations which the changes express. 
Given the ‘volume one’ Marxism that was offered as an alternative, it is perhaps 
understandable why they did not believe that the concept of ‘capitalism’ could capture 
the variation of social relations at work. Our alternative tradition of classical Marxism 
provides that possibility.
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7.5 Rethinking the Retreat of the State
In chapter one of the thesis we looked at the globalisation debate and identified a 
fundamental paradox whereby the state was seen to have fallen victim to the very 
market forces which it had, itself, created. This formulation was based on the idea that 
the nation-state has it ‘own’ power. This power, according to the three waves of 
globalisation theory may be less than or equal or even adaptive to that of the market 
in the current conjuncture.
What we have argued throughout the rest of the thesis is that the nation-state 
cannot be seen to possess any power of its ‘own’ vis a vis capitalist social relations. 
Like a corporation, or trust, the state is a means of organising capital accumulation 
and cannot be seen separately. The state is animated by capital, it cannot exist without 
it, and so it is meaningless to counterpose the two. It is equally meaningless to suggest 
that one is adaptive to the other, although as we noted in chapter one, is the most 
superficially accurate.
7.5.1 The Globalisation Paradox Resolved
The alternative tradition of classical Marxism which we have developed over the core 
chapters of this thesis allowed us to explain the ‘advance of the state’ in the post-war 
period in order to make sense of the ‘retreat of the state’ since. What we discovered 
was that the nation-state, as such, advanced in the 1930s, in a period of state- 
capitalism, as theorised by Bukharin. This was a competitive strategy undertaken by 
states, in order to overcome crises of profit, through the aggressive 
internationalisation of capital. The state was a vehicle for that internationalisation
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process which resulted in world war. The state in war was animated through the 
taxation of profits of its respective national capitals and direct ownership and control 
of production.
In the post-war period it appeared as though the nation-state was still 
‘advancing’. In a sense it was, as it was necessary for the nation-states of the West to 
coordinate production in such a way that they could compete with the military force 
of the USSR and satellite states in the East and vice versa. Individual nation-states 
retained considerable control over their respective infrastructures and in the 
production of many key resources like steel and oil, all of which were of strategic 
significance. The idea that this was a period in which capitalist competition took a 
military form was something we understood from the post-war theorists of state 
capitalism.
The crucial insight which we derived from developing our alternative tradition 
of classical marxism, in a slightly different direction from the post-war state 
capitalists, was that we needed to understand the period after 1945 in terms of ‘bloc 
capitalism’. Nationalisation, the direct ownership and control of production by the 
nation-state, was seen to be an aspect of internationalisation on a bloc scale. The 
significance of the period of bloc capitalism is that the nation-state did not possess the 
independent capabilities which it was presumed to possess, but the boom gave it the 
appearance that it did, even while tariffs were coming down and debts were going up.
In the 1970s, when the bloc capitalist system began to experience a classic 
crisis of overproduction, the interdependence of Western economies began to be felt. 
It was at this time that ideas about the ‘retreat of the state’ began to emerge. What we 
understand from our analysis of actually existing capitalism is that the apparent 
‘retreat of the state’ was an aspect of global capitalist development. Apparently
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‘domestic’ difficulties cannot be understood in abstraction from the global context. 
The limits of the state at this time were limits imposed by the organisation of capital 
accumulation on a global scale in the post-war period.
By the early 1990s, crises had hit both Western and Eastern blocs and the 
latter experienced a crisis from which it could not recover. This crises was one of 
many over a period of two decades, including one in Mexico and in the East Asian 
economies. When the USSR collapsed, so did a bloc scale international division of 
labour which had existed in parallel to that of the West. The fall of the Eastern bloc 
meant the development of a new international division of labour and the ability of 
capital to reorganise itself on a truly global scale. Over the period since the end of 
war, bloc institutions like the GATT had developed, out of them now emerged 
organisations like the WTO. The IMF and the World Bank took on an increasingly 
important role.
It is important to note that when the IMF, World Bank or WTO force 
particular adjustments on a nation-state, this is not evidence of market forces 
overriding state forces. The political state is not in retreat in the face of global 
economic forces, rather the IMF, WB and WTO are just as political as the nation-state 
ever was, it is just that they are representing the interests of capital accumulation on a 
much greater scale than the nation-state did in its time. NATO and US or UN forces
86 Bina and Yaghmaian argue that ‘[i]n economic terms, the IMF has been increasingly adopting the 
status of an international state, implementing policies that are intended to achieve global capitalist 
accumulation and stability.’ Their use of the word ‘state’ suggests they are trying to get at something 
more than mere financial institution. Bina and Yaghmaian 1991, p. 125. As Smaldone notes the IMF 
and World Bank’s ‘control over capital resources allows them not only to promote “development” 
projects, but to directly and indirectly shape the economic-and ultimately the political-policies of their 
clients.’ Smaldone 1998, p. 212.
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also represent the interests of capital accumulation on this scale although their 
‘economic’ nature is not always recognised.87
On the basis of the alternative tradition of classical Marxism that we have 
sketched in this thesis we have a greater sense of the continuity of social relations 
such that the globalisation paradox is resolved. Rather than representing a dramatic 
reversal in the fortunes of the state as an actor, we can begin to see the post-war 
period as a time in v/hich the nation-state expressed the interests of capital 
accumulation in one way and the present period when it does so in another way. The 
system of capitalist nation-states has no alternative to the capitalist world market, they 
are of a piece. As we stated above, globalisation of capital is not a problem  for the 
nation-state, it is an attempted solution to the overproduction of capitalism on a global 
scale.
7.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this present chapter within the thesis was to begin to reassess the 
current period of globalisation, to try and make sense of it in light of the alternative 
tradition of classical Marxism we have been sketching. We have revisited the 
theoretical options provided in chapters two and three of the thesis and suggested the 
ways in which the alternative provided here is superior.
What should stand out from the discussion in this chapter is the idea that it is
possible to make sense of the enormous variation in state market relations we have
witnessed over the last century, without losing the theoretical thread of classical
Marxism. Within the disciplines of International Relations and IPE, many Marxists
87 The negative public perception of the recent war on Iraq does however provide some evidence that 
awareness of ‘economic’ motives behind US, UN and Nato force intervention is actually quite strong. 
See Klein 2003.
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are attempting to grapple with the changing nature of the social world. Many of them 
do so under the heading of globalisation. Few however, possess an understanding of 
capitalism which can explain, both the advance and retreat of the state as a product of 
global capitalism. Yet it is this movement away from an image of the ‘pre-existing or 
traditional state that plays its own role in relation to capitalism’ which will help us to 
break from the dead end of globalisation theory as well as the dead end of political 
reformism. We will take up this point now, in the concluding chapter, in the context 
of developing an appropriate stance on privatisation.
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Conclusion
The Privatisation Revolution as Post-Cold War Reconstruction
We began this thesis with Susan George asking why governments around the world
seemed to be giving up so much and getting so little in return. We looked at the extent
to which the globalisation debate was able to provide an answer to that question. We
concluded that ‘the retreat of the state’ was something that globalisation theorists had
exchanged descriptions about, but had been unable to explain. We then looked to the
discipline which on paper, was mostly likely to provide an analysis: IPE. There, Susan
Strange, one of the discipline’s founders, had identified a similar question, a decade
earlier. Strange had concluded that the question which faced IPE was:
why do states fail to act to regulate and stabilize an international financial 
system which is known to be vitally necessary to the ‘real economy’ but 
which all the experts in and out of government agree is in dangerous need of 
more regulation for its own safety?1
Strange specifically identified this question as a ‘puzzle’ or ‘paradox’.
Strange and George had identified the same problem: where once the state 
seemed to assume responsibility for the shape of the national economy, it was no 
longer doing so, despite to all outward appearances being as capable as ever, should it 
choose to assume its ‘traditional’ role. George wanted an answer to her question. 
Strange wanted that and an answer to a second question of why IPE was failing to 
provide an answer to the first. The rest of the thesis, has, in a sense, been dedicated to 
that task, through a dramatic rethinking of our understanding of capitalism.
In this conclusion, we will look first at how we might understand the 
‘privatisation revolution’ using the perspective we have been developing over the 
course of the thesis. How can we answer the question posed by George? We will then
1 Strange 1988, p. 11.
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turn to look at the strengths and limitations of the thesis as a whole in providing an 
alternative to mainstream IPE that can explain capitalism as it ‘actually exists’. Have 
we answered the question about the limitations of the discipline, as posed by Strange?
The privatisation revolution of the last several decades has been a disorienting 
political process. It has appeared to many that a state which once served the interests 
of all is now no longer willing or able to do so. There is a temptation to wish the state 
back to its earlier role, without properly understanding what that role was. What has 
been argued over the course of this thesis is that both the post-war period of wide 
scale nationalisation and the contemporary period of global privatisation, must be 
seen as stages in the development of ‘actually existing capitalism’. In fact, 
privatisation can be seen to follow precisely the same logic as nationalisation, in that 
historically both have allowed for the reorganisation of capital on an increasing scale.
It was argued in chapter six that post-war nationalisation of industry and 
services throughout Europe and the rest of the world in terms of the various models of 
state ownership and control of production, must be understood as a key aspect of 
capital competing on bloc scales. Nationalisation in the West was a means by which 
capitalism was restructured in the post-war period under the supervision of the United 
States. Government ownership and control of production allowed for the rebuilding of 
key sectors of European economies in which the US directly and indirectly invested 
and it provided a responsible borrower for US dollars, in the form of the nation-state. 
The creation of international financial organisations like the IMF and WTO ensured 
the development of capitalist relations within the bloc in a manner that suited the 
interests of US capital. Military dependency on the US provided the opportunity for
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other Western economies to recover, but at the same time sealed their subordinate 
place within the bloc.
The current period of ‘privatisation revolution’ can be seen as post-Cold War 
reconstruction, in that over the last few decades, and at great pace including the 
collapse of the USSR, privatisation has allowed for a restructuring of capital on a 
truly global scale. Privatisation provides the means by which barriers to the 
organisation of capitalist enterprise on an unprecedented scale are eliminated, thus 
providing new outlets for surplus capital, and new opportunities for capital 
accumulation.
The world trade in services provides a useful illustration. In the 1980s, 
services comprised two-thirds of all economic activity and employment in OECD 
countries. Four major services constituted 25 per cent of economic activity and a large 
share of the indirect costs of manufacturing: electricity, air and ground transport, retail 
distribution and telecommunications. Schwartz notes that ‘the largest barrier to 
international trade in these areas was public ownership and/or regulation’.3 The 
GATT and WTO, responding to the needs of dominant units of capital, pushed a 
strong privatisation agenda that allowed those companies who were most competitive 
on a global scale to gain considerable advantage. According to Schwartz, the US 
service sector experienced a $65 billion trade surplus per year, throughout the 1990s 
as it entered a freer market in services and successfully out-competed its rivals.
Outside the OECD as well, US capital has tried to dismantle state-run 
industrialisation programs and open up service sector markets, particularly in finance, 
in order to ‘get a piece of the action as owners and not just lenders’.4 Financial crises 
in various parts of the world have made it possible for the IMF to impose privatisation
2 Schwartz 2000, p. 277.
3 Schwartz 2000, p. 277.
4 Schwartz 2000, p. 302.
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as a condition in return for financial assistance. The Mexican peso crisis in 1995, the 
financial crisis in the Asian economies in 1997-98, and the ongoing crises in Eastern 
Europe have rendered these economies ripe for IMF/US restructuring.5 The US is able 
to use economic instability, and the rapid devaluation of capital which follows, to 
strengthen its own position. Stiglitz has been critical of the role of the IMF in causing 
crises through the rapid deregulation of capital markets.6 As Smith notes, however, 
what the IMF does in terms of contributing to economic crisis in vulnerable countries 
is rational in the sense that it shifts the burden of devaluation to these parts of the 
world.7 Crises of overproduction are endemic to the system as a whole, an 
unavoidable aspect of the logic of capitalism. Who pays the price in those crises, 
however, is something which powerful actors can significantly influence.
The kinds of crises that can provide the opportunity for a new round of capital 
accumulation can involve purely financial devaluation or physical material 
destruction of capital. Both are, in capitalist terms, events of ‘creative destruction’. 
Accumulated value is destroyed which allows profit rates to be restored, and it also 
provides an opportunity for organisational innovation. The organisation of capital on a 
bloc scale was a ‘territorial fix’ for ailing Western capitalism after the War, made 
possible by the fact that two world wars had physically destroyed vast sectors of 
industry. The US needed markets and a place to invest surplus capital and the 
countries of Europe and Japan needed large amounts of investment and development. 
In the current period, by contrast, there is an overproduction of capital without the 
kind of massive devaluation of fixed capital brought about by both World wars. 
Instead what we have are economic crises that wipe out huge values from economies 
overnight, providing new opportunities for already dominant capitals.
5 Schwartz 2000, p. 301.
6 Stiglitz 2002.
7 Smith 2003.
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What we also have is privatisation, which David Harvey has described as 
‘accumulation by dispossession’.8 Privatisation opens up new areas for exploitation: 
health, education, pensions, transport, all of which have, in the post-war period, had a 
mediated relationship to the dynamic of capital accumulation. Privatisation brings 
new outlets for investment and the opportunity for the development of even larger 
scale production. We now have truly global firms, like Vivendi, and Bechtel. We have 
opened up the possibility of a global provider for health care, or water, or education. 
From the perspective of ‘actually existing capitalism’ privatisation can be seen as part 
of what Harvey calls a ‘spectacular phase of reconsolidation of capitalism’ on a global 
scale.9
Harvey also uses the notion of ‘reconsolidation’ to describe what he calls the 
‘new imperialism’.10 He makes specific reference to the war on Iraq as another aspect 
of the global restructuring of capitalism in the post-Cold War era. It is interesting for 
us to look at this here, because the privatisation motive behind this conflict has come 
so much to the fore. This war can be seen, in part, as a peculiarly violent privatisation 
process. Our understanding of war as a means by which economic ends are pursued 
under capitalism, an analysis we get from Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin, has a vivid 
contemporary illustration. Our understanding of the privatisation revolution is 
enriched by seeing the war in Iraq as one particular means to the end of restructuring 
capitalism through privatisation.
Very shortly after the bombing of Iraq began, Philip Materra, an independent 
journalist, wrote a short article about how post-war Iraq would be a showcase for 
privatisation.11 As soon as the war had begun, Robert McFarlane, National Security
8 Harvey 2002.
9 Harvey 2002.
10 Harvey 2002.
11 Materra 2003.
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Adviser during the Reagan administration and Michael Bleyzer, chief executive of an
equity fund management company, published an article in the Wall Street Journal
headlined ‘Taking Iraq Private’.12 It was argued in the article that the US and its allies
should bring together corporate business leaders to supervise the restructuring of the
Iraqi economy. Iraq has an extremely profitable state sector from which a US-led
coalition could profit enormously.
Materra quotes from another report by the American research institute, the
Heritage Foundation, in which it is argued:
To rehabilitate and modernise its economy, a post-Saddam government will 
need to move simultaneously on a number of economic policy fronts, 
utilising the experience of privatisation campaigns and structural reform in 
other countries.... Lesson No. 1: Privatisation works everywhere.13
In his eagerness to rapidly privatise all Iraqi state assets, Paul Bremer 
introduced order 39 which opened up Iraqi industry to 100% foreign investment. This 
was part of what the Economist referred to as Iraq becoming a ‘capitalist dream’.14 As 
Klein has noted, however, this proposal goes against the Geneva conventions of 1949, 
which specify what an occupying power can do. In Klein’s words, the US government 
‘can only act as caretaker of Iraq’s economic assets, not its auctioneer’.15 The 
possibility that a sovereign Iraqi government could subsequently overturn the US 
order, has apparently left investors nervous and the plans to privatise 200 state firms 
have been scaled down.
What is so extraordinary about this strategy to privatise Iraq through the use of 
military force rather than economic compulsion, is that it has been recognised as a test 
case for the rest of the Arab world.16 This is a part of the world where oil riches have
12 Bleyzer 2003.
13 Cohen and O’Driscoll 2002 cited in Materra 2003.
14 Cited in Klein 2004.
15 Klein 2004.
16 Ali 2003.
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made states much less vulnerable to economic crisis and less likely to find their 
economies restructured by the IMF. Where the IMF cannot reach through economic 
compulsion, the US and its allies can strike with military might. This is certainly a 
vivid illustration of what Harvey refers to as ‘accumulation by dispossession’.17 This 
is as far from the ‘volume one’ model of capitalism as we could hope to go, and yet it 
is precisely the way in which capitalism is functioning in the early twenty-first 
century. This is the post-Cold war restructuring of capitalism on a global scale, by any 
means necessary. This is capitalism as it actually exists.
Before we move to an assessment of the thesis as a whole, it is worth 
addressing the question of how we relate to privatisation on the basis of the analysis 
above. If nationalisation was one phase of capitalism and privatisation is another, 
what have we to choose between them? How should we orient ourselves to nation­
states in the process of privatisation?
The importance of a clear analysis of privatisation is very clear when we 
consider the unfortunate political positions that can emerge from a faulty analysis. 
Illustrative of this, is the position taken by Mandel in the early 1990s. Following the 
change of regime in Eastern Europe and the USSR, Mandel argued that socialists in 
these countries must fight on two fronts: ‘against privatisation and for democratic 
rights’.18 He saw the fight against privatisation as a fight against ‘capitalist 
restoration’.19
17 Harvey 2003.
18 Mandel 1992, p. 156.
19 Mandel 1992, p. 135. In rejecting the analysis that these countries had been capitalist prior to 1989, 
he said ‘how is it possible under capitalism to restore capitalism?’ This has been explained, in the 
thesis above, in terms of a restructuring of global capitalism, but for Mandel this was a nonsense 
question illustrating the poverty of theories of state capitalism.
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Callinicos responded to Mandel’s argument by pointing out that ‘the key issue 
is not preserving the legal property form of state ownership, but the development by 
workers of organisations capable of defending jobs, wages, conditions and services.’20 
This is very much along the lines of the argument presented in chapter five above, that 
what counts is not whether the state controls the market, but whether the workers 
control the state. Socialism involves the radical democratisation of the means of 
production, this is its meaning for both Callinicos and Mandel. Mandel however, 
responded by insisting on the benefits that Soviet workers derived from ‘nationalised 
property’ and declared that ‘we are unconditionally on the side of those workers who 
oppose privatisation, regardless with what ideology and regardless of whether a 
section of the bureaucracy also supports them.’21 In this way Mandel seems precisely 
to be saying, it is not about whether the workers control the state, it is about whether 
the state controls the market.
What we have developed in the thesis above, is an analysis of capitalism in 
which the state does not control the market. Full stop. In a global capitalist economy, 
the state does not represent an alternative to the market logically, and has not 
historically. The state has been a means through which the logic of the market 
persists. The state has always been a necessary adjunct to the market. Planning is a 
form of competition, not its opposite. The biggest myth of the twentieth century has 
been the idea that the state offers an alternative to the market. It is this erroneous view 
which lent credence to the idea that the nationalist dictatorships of the USSR, Cuba, 
and China, represented progressive alternatives to the West. It is also this perspective 
that fuels reformist sentiment in the West and ultimately political disorientation. It is 
this myth we must dispense with.
20 Callinicos 1992.
21 Mandel 1992.
355
Callinicos’ suggestion that ‘the key issue is not preserving the legal property 
form of state ownership, but the development by workers of organisations capable of 
defending jobs, wages, conditions and services’, applies to both East and West. It is 
part of mainstream British history that in the post-war period, the workers fought for 
the welfare state. It is theirs to defend. What is more accurate, however, is that in the 
post-war period the workers fought. What they got was the welfare state. In the last 
several decades as that welfare state has been dismantled, we have had the 
opportunity to better understand its limitations. Democracy at all levels of society in 
East and West, Mandel’s second fighting front, has been missing, and it this lack of 
accountability that has allowed state owned sectors of the economy to be so easily 
dismantled. The rhetoric of ‘public interest’ has slipped, as the reality of ‘private 
profit’ comes to the fore. This is a disorienting political process, but it is useful that 
the veil has come off. In its ‘retreat’, we have the opportunity to see the state for what 
it always has been, an agent of capital accumulation.
Assessing the thesis as a whole
This thesis took as its starting point a widespread confusion over what seemed to be 
the state’s retreat in the face of market forces, specifically the privatisation of public 
industry and services. We have not, however, looked in detail at the process of 
privatisation itself, something that is adequately documented elsewhere. Instead, the 
thesis has taken the form of a theoretical intervention. The ‘globalisation debate’ has 
been running for over a decade now with remarkably little progress. As argued in 
chapter one, the terms of the debate involve little more than an exchange of 
descriptions, a conversation that could continue well into the next decade. What we
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have tried to do here is explain why that debate has been so unsuccessful and to offer 
an alternative approach to the problem. The thesis attempts to pick up the 
globalisation debate from where it has been frustrated and put it down on more 
intellectually fertile ground.
Establishing the need to offer an alternative theoretical framework, through 
the critique of two dominant theoretical approaches: Weberian IPE and their classical 
Marxist critics, was only the start. In Part One of the thesis we attempted to do justice 
to the range of views which fall within the discipline of IPE and to draw out the 
critiques of the IPE method as articulated by theorists of classical Marxism. The point 
in this section of the thesis was to show that IPE could reasonably be supposed to 
address the question of the retreat of the state. It is a discipline that was conceived 
with that task in mind. However, as the classical Marxists persuasively argued, IPE 
theorists had done little more than describe the changes they saw taking place and, as 
such, were no better equipped than the participants in the globalisation debate.
Also in Part One we attempted to show that while the limitations of the 
Weberian approach may have been well-identified by its ‘classical Marxist’ critics, 
those critics did not offer an alternative that could grapple with the subject matter 
which concerned IPE theorists. That is, the classical Marxist critiques of IPE had no 
alternative theory of changing state-market relations. While they seemed to have 
correctly identified the fact that Weberian theorists had naturalised the separation 
between state and market, their own understanding of capitalism, based on the 
‘apparent separation of state and market’, did little to help our understanding of 
capitalism as it ‘actually exists’.
In Part Two of the thesis we began to map out an alternative approach to that 
taken by the classical Marxists. Through a rereading of Capital volumes 1-3, we made
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the argument that the ‘apparent separation of spheres approach’ is based on an 
understanding of capitalism limited to a particular reading of volume one. It was 
argued that given Marx’s dialectical approach, a richer understanding of capitalism 
can be arrived at if all three books inform our analysis. In chapter four, we 
reconsidered the geographic scope, historical trajectory and core dynamic of 
capitalism in a way that allowed us to begin to better understand the changing nature 
of state-market relations. In chapter five, we looked at these three dimensions again as 
they are developed in the writings of Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin, who sought to 
explain changing state-market relations in a period of imperialism and war. Finally in 
chapter six, capitalism reconceived in terms of its geography, history, and dynamic, 
was used to explain the post-war period, specifically the Cold W ar and the social 
forms of capitalism, East and West.
Part Three of the thesis brought us to the point where we could begin to try to 
rethink the subject matter of chapter one: globalisation and the retreat of the state, in 
light of the analysis of capitalism we had developed in Part Two, in a way that was 
not possible using the dominant approaches critiqued in Part One. We arrived at a 
position where the changing role of the state could be understood as part of a 
continuous process of capital accumulation. Rather than seeing the state in retreat, we 
could see the state adapting its organisational form to suit the changing needs of 
capital accumulation. Like the joint-stock company, the corporation and the trust, at a 
particular stage in the history of capitalism, the state becomes a particular kind of 
agent of capital accumulation, and it changes as capitalism develops. Imperialism, as 
theorised by Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin, involved states as agents of capital 
accumulation on a national scale, following the second world war they were agents of
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capital accumulation on a bloc scale, and at present they are organised in order to 
facilitate the survival of capitalism on a global scale.
Our analysis above stems from our understanding of capitalism as a system 
that is global in its scope, which has developed historically through competition and 
coordination on ever greater scales, and which has as its dynamic a ‘law of value’, 
that operates through an ongoing negation of itself. This allows us to explain how it is 
that ‘the capitalist state, is not the capitalist state, is not the capitalist state’, ever 
separate from market forces if it is to be understood as capitalist, but is rather a set of 
social relations that change over time.22 The state is no less capitalist when at war or 
when nationalising large sections of the economy. Actually existing capitalism 
includes all these moments and our alternative tradition of classical Marxism can 
capture them.
There is a certain strangeness in the fact that the volume one Marxists, who 
have made so much of the distinction between publicly and privately owned means of 
production (for them the very definition of capitalism depends on it), have shown so 
little interest in the very real and wide-scale transfer of ownership and control from 
public to private hands in an era of ‘globalisation’. One would think this would signal 
for them an important transition, worthy of note, viewed by them as the adoption of 
‘capitalist’ social relations in more and more sectors of society. We, on the other 
hand, who see capitalism in terms of both publicly and privately owned means of 
production, could be expected to be less interested in such changes in the real world. 
Instead what we find is that, for us, the privatisation revolution marks an important
22 What the ‘volume one’ theorists have been good at pointing out, and what is part of the basis of their 
critique of Weberian IPE, is that it is incorrect to think of that ‘the state is the state is the state’ 
transhistorically and not notice the fundamentally different forms the state takes in relation to different 
modes of production. Rosenberg 1994. What they have failed to notice is the way the state form 
changes over time under capitalism and the extent to which it is only ever a differentiated part of a 
totality of capitalist social relations.
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new phase in the restructuring of ‘actually existing capitalism’ on a global scale. 
Whereas, for the ‘volume one’ theorists, it is just ‘business as usual’. The inability of 
‘volume one’ marxists to theorise changing state-market relations within capitalism, 
has meant they have ignored important developments in the global economy which, 
once noted, can enrich our understanding of capitalism.
This thesis has been a theoretical intervention which has sought to provide a 
more constructive critique of IPE from a Marxist perspective than that provided by 
classical Marxist theorists of IR. This has been in order to end the dialogue of the deaf 
between the Weberian pluralists and their critics, and to put IPE on a footing where it 
might begin to answer some of the questions posed by the globalisation debate. The 
core contribution has been an original critique of classical Marxism in IR as ‘volume 
one’ Marxism. The ‘volume one’ approach is seen to involve the mapping of a highly 
abstract analysis of capitalism directly onto the changing social forms of state-market 
relations. Where abstraction did not match the social relations which exist, the latter 
were ignored, or documented separately in a descriptive fashion no more sophisticated 
than that found within mainstream IPE.23 What was missing was an analysis which 
connects the essence of volume one with the appearance of changing state-market 
relations. This was the promise of Capital in all its volumes, and it remains for us to 
attempt to realise that analytical project. Through the exploration of an alternative 
tradition of classical Marxism this thesis has attempted to sketch the outline of such a 
project.
23 Rosenberg is unusual in the extent to which he is guilty of the former approach, Wood, Burnham, 
Holloway, Picciotto and most other ‘volume one’ theorists take the latter approach in their work.
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Limitations
It is appropriate to acknowledge that this thesis has involved the ‘sketching’ of an 
alternative approach rather than a systematic and detailed application of such a mode 
of analysis. It has been useful to make the argument that there exists a need for an 
alternative approach, that debate is stagnating without it and that theorists are talking 
past each other with no end in sight. It has been important to attempt to pinpoint 
where the aspirations of classical Marxism have been thwarted by their ‘volume one’ 
limitations. It has been essential to begin to explore an alternative tradition that seems 
to provide a way out of this cul-de-sac in social theory. However, it is another project 
altogether to really draw out the potential of that alternative approach and to apply it 
to the history of the last two hundred years or more. There is a sense in which the 
latter chapters of this thesis are necessarily schematic and suggestive, rather than 
detailed and conclusive. A major change in approach is being advocated and that 
simply suggesting a reorientation is a thesis in itself -  this thesis. The limitations of 
this thesis could only be overcome with a great deal of empirical research, essentially, 
another thesis. It is the implicit argument of this project as whole that the empirical 
research would support the more general descriptions provided, but that detail is not 
present in this work.
There is one area in particular where it would be useful for this kind of 
empirical analysis to begin, in order to strengthen the argument overall. The notion of 
‘bloc capitalism’ is one of the more original parts of the thesis, but it remains 
underdeveloped. The insistence that capitalism in the post-war period must be viewed 
in terms of its organisation on a bloc scale is not something that has been stressed by 
other theorists who fall within the alternative tradition of classical Marxism we
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examined in Part Two of the thesis. It is however a feature of post-war capitalism 
noted by theorists of IPE, van der Pijl among them. It seems to me that this awareness 
of the bloc formation of capital coming out of World War Two is very important and 
in fact more closely continues the tradition of thought developed by the theorists 
discussed in Part Two. However, there are two empirical projects which need to be 
done to flesh out the concept and make it more useful. These relate to the external 
boundaries of bloc capitalism and the internal differentiation of states within the bloc.
Very roughly, the external boundaries of bloc capitalisms in the post-war 
period may be seen to reflect the division of the Cold War world. Military 
competition is an important feature of ‘actually existing capitalism’. The logic of our 
argument in Part Two is that the battle lines drawn in the Cold War should, in some 
albeit mediated sense, reflect the organisation of capitalism in that period. However, 
battlegrounds are messy places and countries do not neatly fit under the heading of 
one or other bloc throughout the period under question. It is only through empirical 
study that we could establish which countries fell within which blocs in terms of their 
place in either sides’ complex division of labour. We would need to look at military 
and other goods production and consumption structures as well as trade, aid, and 
investment networks. We might expect to find that the boundaries of bloc capitalism 
have shifted as the system has developed; perhaps also that the two major blocs are 
not equal in terms of the coherence of their boundaries.
As noted in chapter six, the boundaries of bloc capitalism in the West in the 
post-war period are relatively easy to discern. There is a great deal of coordination 
between Western Europe, North America and Japan after the war. There is planning 
by the US directly and through international organisations on a scale which includes 
these regions. Their relationship to less-developed parts of the world, however, is far
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more fluid. In the East, the boundaries of bloc capitalism appear to be more rigid and 
changes in the relationship of nation-states to the bloc appear to be more distinct 
because of the overt political relationship between countries outside the Western 
alliance. The changing status of China and Cuba as allies of the USSR was, for 
instance, a sharper process, more clearly delineated in time and space, than, for 
instance, the more gradual drawing of Newly Industrialised Countries into the 
Western fold. All of this blurring of boundaries indicates the need for empirical 
analysis, but does not necessarily weaken the utility of the concept of ‘bloc 
capitalism’.
It is worth stressing that the concept of ‘bloc capitalism’ is a necessary 
corrective to the model of nation-states as competing wholes. It stresses instead their 
existence as part of the singular but differentiated totality of global capitalist society. 
While the Marxist state debate of the 1970s may have concluded that we needed to 
move beyond an analysis of ‘the state’ in singular and pointed out that we were 
dealing with a system of competing nation-states, it did not go far enough to stress 
that the system was a differentiated whole rather than a sum of its parts. We need to 
move beyond what IR theorists refer to as the 'billiard ball model' of states and think 
more about the totality of capitalist relations and the changing differentiation of social 
forms within.
States are not like-objects, they are not like-sets of social relations.24 The 
erroneous assumption that they are, has continued up to the present day in analyses of 
globalisation that discuss the US as though it were just ‘another state’. As argued in 
chapter seven, this analysis is flawed and it is flawed on the basis of the logic of the 
alternative approach we have developed. Capitalist social relations form a totality that
24 That they are not, is recognised in IR in terms of the fact that students of the discipline are noted to 
be confused by the idea that all states are sovereign, but some states are more sovereign than others.
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is global in its scope and the appropriate ‘parts’ are determined not a priori in the 
form of territorial nation-states, but rather through an understanding of the changing 
nature of capitalism as a whole. Acknowledging this, however, we must recognise 
that the significance of the differentiation of states within the bloc is not immediately 
apparent.
There is obviously some sense in which nation-states are like-objects, but 
crucially, this sense changes over time and throughout the history of capitalism. The 
borders between states play different roles at different times: in periods of military 
alliance and rivalry, whether there exists monetary union or not, given trade 
agreements or disputes, and in periods of widespread labour mobility or rigid 
immigration control. How significant are the boundaries and functions of states for 
our understanding of the way that capitalism develops? This questions remains to be 
answered in increasing depth. Theorisation of the state in terms of that which all states 
have in common will, of course, be useful in this analysis.25 Formal law-making 
capacity and the ability to demand taxes are two key functions of any state. The 
former has been studied a great deal more than the latter.26 The changing role of 
taxation under capitalism and the difference in methods of taxation between states are 
both valuable areas for study if we are to better understand the significance of the 
differentiation of capitalist social relations into nation-state forms. It should be noted 
that it is only once we begin to move away from the ‘volume one’ definition of 
capitalism that the significance of taxation comes to the fore. Taxation can be seen as 
an aspect of actually existing capital accumulation rather than a fundamentally 
different kind of practice, to be studied separately from capitalism, as such.
25 See especially the state debate, Clarke 1991.
26 Barker has argued strongly that a Marxist analysis of taxation would greatly inform our 
understanding of the state. Barker 1997.
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In conclusion on the concept of bloc capitalism, all that has been possible in 
this thesis is to suggest that it may be illuminating to see this as a form which 
capitalism is capable of taking at a particular stage in its development. It has been 
argued that this is superior to the alternative widely-held view of capitalism as having 
always taken the form of competing nation states.
Finally
All that remains to be said is that we look forward to the development of IPE theory 
in the directions indicated by the thesis above, based on the classical Marxist tradition 
provided. So-called ‘classical’, or ‘volume one’, Marxism in IR has for too long been 
ghettoised as a result of its high level of abstraction and its unconstructive critique of 
mainstream IPE. IPE has for too long contented itself with detailed descriptions of 
state-market relations and has lacked a coherent analysis of capitalism to which these 
descriptions could be related. Most exciting, the possibility of a more fruitful 
discussion between these two fields of thought brings with it the promise of the 
beginning of the end of the torturous ‘globalisation debate’.
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